

**THE
COMMUNIST
STRUGGLE
IN MALAYA**

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with an introduction by
VICTOR PURCELL

and a postscript by
SIR ROBERT THOMPSON

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The present study does not claim to be a comprehensive discussion of the 'Emergency' which has so seriously disturbed the military and political security of Malaya for several years, but only with one important phase of it. For a much more extensive account of Malayan political and economic problems in recent years, readers should consult a newly published I.P.R. study, *Malaya: Communist or Free?* by Dr. Victor Purcell who has been kind enough to write the introduction to Mr. Hanrahan's report.

Though, in many ways, Malaya can be regarded as an encouraging example of how a Communist rebellion can be suppressed by a combination of vigorous military and police action coupled with wide-ranging measures of resettlement and political reform, it is also a striking instance of the difficulties and high costs of such measures in an Asian colonial area. Even so vigorous a military commander as General Sir Gerald Templer has recently acknowledged that the Malayan Communist guerrilla forces, though severely weakened and discredited, were by no means eliminated but have been able to recruit new adherents and partially make