

Authoritarianism and UMNO's Factional Conflicts

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Malaysia is generally described as a prime example of a society severely divided along ethnic lines and most observers agree that ethnic conflict has been, and still is, one of the most distinctive sources of political conflict. Malaysia, nonetheless, is one of the few plural societies that has achieved a fairly high degree of regime stability since independence in 1957. Apart from a two-year period following the racial riots after the 1969 general election, the parliamentary system of Malaysia has functioned continuously and general elections have been held regularly. Though not as a result of elections, there have been three consecutive changes of head of government without violence and there have been ten uninterrupted general elections. In this sense, the political process of Malaysia has been regular and predictable since independence.

However, despite the relatively stable political process, the experience of Malaysian politics over the last few decades also illustrates that the country has moved closer to non-liberal status on a liberal-authoritarian continuum. Since the 1970s, the Malay-dominated government frequently used repressive means to control imminent and/or potential political opponents. Especially under Mahathir's leadership of the 1980s, the Malaysian political system shifted in a more authoritarian direction. During this period, the political dominance of the Malay-led ruling elite was further consolidated, especially around Mahathir's personality. Some characteristics of democratic political process were not completely abandoned. Nonetheless, all the significant political institutions, that is, the judiciary, the press, the Malay Rulers and even Islam, were systematically enervated by the centralization of executive power. It therefore eventuated that there was scarcely any element remaining to check the growing authoritarian rule of the Mahathir regime towards the mid-1990s.

Regime change in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states has often been attributed to divisions within the ruling group, especially in countries with a strong tradition of single party dominance. In Malaysia, therefore, a more responsive political system should be expected from factional splits in Malaysia's dominant political party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). There is, however, little evidence that UMNO factionalism promoted political liberalization in Mahathir's Malaysia after the

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severe factional conflict in 1987. The recent factional dispute within UMNO since Anwar's downfall in 1998 provides another opportunity for transformation of the political landscape of Malaysia. This article examines the interrelations between UMNO factionalism and political liberalization in Malaysia under Mahathir's leadership, comparing the two most distinctive UMNO factional splits of 1987 and 1998.

The 1987 UMNO Leadership Crisis and Its Relevance to Political Liberalization

On 24 April 1987, UMNO experienced an unprecedented fight over the question of leadership, the most serious such fight in its 40-year political history. The top two posts, president and deputy president, were contested and the six candidates for three vice-presidencies and 69 contenders for 25 Supreme Council seats were evenly divided between a "Team A" (Mahathir Mohamad-Ghafar Baba) and "Team B" (Razaleigh Hamzah-Musa Hitam). Up to 90% of party delegates were believed to be equally grouped into the two teams. Of the contenders for the Supreme Council seats, 34 publicly declared their support for the incumbent Team A while the remaining 35 declared for Team B. The election results subsequently revealed how intense and close the "battle royal" was. Both Mahathir and Ghafar won but with very narrow margins of 43 and 40 votes of the total 1,479 votes cast respectively.¹ What was even worse, given Mahathir's narrow margin of victory, further factional disputes were widely expected. As a clear signal, open declaration of support for the defeated challengers and resistance to the elected incumbent leadership increased noticeably in the aftermath of the party election. Neutrality was no longer possible. This finally led to Malaysia's dominant political party, UMNO, being split into two in 1988: UMNO (*Baru*) led by Mahathir's Team A and *Semangat 46* led by Razaleigh's Team B. The elite confrontation within UMNO circles then spilled over into the new arena of nationwide political battles as another general election approached in 1990.

Given the closeness and bitterness of the intra-elite schism within the ruling elites, Malaysian politics after 1987 was widely expected to be much more responsive and competitive. There might even have been a transition from "semi" to "full" democracy.² Indeed, as O'Donnell and his co-authors correctly observe, regime changes in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states have often been attributed to conflict and/or disintegration within the ruling bloc, especially in countries with a strong tradition of single party dominance.³ In this light, Gomez and Jomo believe that the breakdown of Malaysia's authoritarian regime, if it is to emerge, may come from the severe factionalism within UMNO circles.⁴

There is, however, little evidence that the severe factionalism promoted political liberalization in Malaysia under Mahathir's new political party, UMNO (*Baru*), especially during the period of 1987-90. Indeed, what Mahathir actually did was destroy the ruling party that already existed and rebuild the party around his dominant personality. Mahathir first further marginalized the political space of civil society by using "self-

created" racial tensions followed by massive Internal Security Act (ISA) arrests in *Operation Lalang* in October 1987. Then, Mahathir drove out all of his political rivals within the new political configuration. His actions closely resemble Machiavelli's advice in *The Discourses*: if the foundations of his power are weak, the best thing a leader can do in order to retain his influence is to reorganize everything in the state from scratch.⁵

With the advent of UMNO (*Baru*) in 1988, new guiding principles of behavior appeared within the ruling party: "de-politicization" and/or "no-contest" for the party's top post to create UMNO (*Baru*) as a new loyalist party. Promotion of this "new tradition" was in response to Mahathir's bitter experience of serious challenge to his leadership by well-organized factional alliances led by Razaleigh and Musa in 1987: the increasing electoral competitiveness during Mahathir's early leadership (1981-87) was gradually, but systematically, restricted when he rebuilt UMNO as UMNO (*Baru*). It was only after Mahathir successfully drove out all of his enemies within the new political configuration that he reverted to a traditional checks-and-balances approach, but without the risk of a leadership challenge against him. Since 1990, with all of his arch-rivals gone, Mahathir was easily able to consolidate his grip on power within and outside the new ruling party.⁶

The years after 1990 saw an intermittent replay of the key features of the period 1987-90, especially in the political sphere. Mahathir's main concern has been one of increasing centralization that vests power in his personal grip. Mahathir therefore appeared much less tolerant than pre-1987 in handling any potential contenders to his political dominance. In particular, he has frequently invoked the fear of intra-Malay strife to modify the UMNO (*Baru*) constitution in a more authoritarian direction. Moreover, the pace of constitutional amendments rapidly escalated and the underlying reasons for the amendments increasingly reflected the motive of aggrandizing the powers of the Prime Minister himself. As Jomo argued, during the 1990s the key democratic features of Malaysian politics were further eroded due to a growing concentration of power in the hands of Mahathir within and outside the new ruling party.⁷ The notion of strong executive authority was in fact enshrined in the Malaysian political system, especially after Mahathir took over the power in 1981, but it was after 1990 that the power of one man came to be seen in more centripetal way.

The Mahathir-Anwar Leadership Crisis and UMNO Politics After Anwar

The year 1998 appears to be another landmark in Malaysian political history. After several years of rumors of leadership conflict within UMNO, Anwar was abruptly dismissed from office, expelled from the party, imprisoned under the ISA, beaten while in custody and eventually charged in court on five counts of sodomy and five counts of corruption. These events happened with Machiavellian ruthlessness in September 1998. Anwar's sacking shocked the nation because such treatment of a Deputy Prime Minis-

ter had never happened in Malaysian politics. Even resignation was not part of Malaysian political culture until Mahathir came to power in 1981. Many political observers within and outside the country saw Anwar's sacking, expulsion and subsequent detention as the denouement of a long political battle between Mahathir and his chosen successor. Nonetheless, such drastic measures failed to bring an end to the political confrontation. No sooner had he been ejected from the ruling party than Anwar launched a *reformasi* movement, highlighting the abuse of power and corruption by the Mahathir government, and calling for Mahathir's resignation.⁸

To some extent, the circumstances and political maneuverings that surrounded the Mahathir-Anwar tussle resembled those of the previous leadership conflict, especially the situation preceding the split of the Mahathir-Musa leadership in the mid-1980s and subsequent breakup of UMNO in 1988. Musa believes that Anwar's problem was similar to his own problem with Mahathir, even though Mahathir's political maneuvering in handling Anwar was much more refined, since Mahathir had learnt from his experience in the 1980s.⁹ The changing conflict configuration after September 1998 offers another opportunity to reexamine some of the same questions which were raised in the aftermath of the UMNO leadership split in 1987, in particular, the relationship between UMNO factionalism and the transition of authoritarian regimes. Specifically, to what extent does severe factional strife within the ruling party's inner circle transform the political system into a more open and responsive one in an ethnically fragmented society?

For a while after Anwar's dismissal, very serious elite divisions within UMNO circles, between Anwar's supporters and detractors, were widely expected, as had occurred in the wake of the UMNO split of 1987 when Razaleigh secured defections of a significant section of the ruling political elites. It was, however, obvious that similar fractures did not happen. On the contrary, Mahathir actually consolidated his grip on power within UMNO circles by keeping the ruling political elite, including seasoned political figures and even many of Anwar's allies, collectively on his side. Mahathir began this process by ruthlessly eliminating Anwar from the ruling party through a well-designed special UMNO Supreme Council meeting.¹⁰ By removing any possibility of Anwar's political comeback into UMNO politics, Mahathir could secure almost unanimous support of UMNO leaders. Within a few days of the expulsion of Anwar, all UMNO MPs, Menteri Besar, cabinet ministers and deputy ministers, parliamentary secretaries and UMNO division leaders came out in full support of Mahathir's decision.¹¹ Indeed, UMNO leaders, remembering the problem of supporting Musa and Razaleigh a decade ago and the consequences of siding with the wrong leaders, did not want to put themselves in a difficult situation.

Unlike the aftermath of the UMNO leadership crisis of 1987, there were no serious political purges against Anwar's allies, especially at senior levels of UMNO leadership. Nonetheless, this did not necessarily mean that Mahathir's adversaries within UMNO circles were free of political oppression. If the political purge after the "battle royal" of 1987 was top-down, the one after Anwar's dismissal was more from the bottom-up.¹²

To some extent, this change of tactics was because what happened after Anwar's dismissal was quite different from what Mahathir had forecast. In the wake of Anwar's dismissal, anti-Mahathir feelings continued to run high in the country, though Mahathir and his close allies had thought that the Anwar episode would die down within a few weeks. Given the sensitivity of the issue and popularity of Anwar, to remove any more of his supporters from UMNO may have further undermined Mahathir's image and weakened the ruling party. The experience of the leadership crisis in 1987, during which a significant number of UMNO leaders challenged Mahathir's leadership after a series of political purges, made Mahathir reluctant to remove senior associates of Anwar within the ruling party. As another general election was approaching, those who were to be ousted might turn against Mahathir's leadership, as such a situation would give them a chance to stand against UMNO candidates.¹³

Meanwhile, as a way of keeping Anwar's allies on side, Mahathir played the impending general election card very effectively. A well-known aide of Anwar, who sided with Mahathir after Anwar's expulsion, privately admitted that the imminent general election was one of the substantial reasons why Anwar's allies, especially MPs and division leaders, seemed to distance themselves from Anwar and his *reformasi* movement prior to and after Anwar's detention. Specifically, those who allegedly associated with Anwar feared that even their irresolute attitudes would be subject to censure by Mahathir and, thus, they would not be nominated for the impending general election.¹⁴ Indeed, it is worthwhile noting that Mahathir's government had hinted of the possibility of an early general election immediately after Anwar's dismissal. For those of the "rice bowl" mindset amongst UMNO, siding with Anwar was political suicide at this time.

Outside UMNO, there were no widespread arrests after Anwar's dismissal, as had happened in the aftermath of the UMNO leadership crisis of 1987. However, this did not mean that after the Anwar episode Malaysian civil society enjoyed a more open political arena without fear. The authorities reiterated the possibility of arrests practically every day following the launch of *reformasi* by Anwar.¹⁵ Well before the detention of Anwar on September 20, a series of arrests of Anwar's allies was made.¹⁶ Within a week of Anwar's arrest, 16 of Anwar's political associates were also detained under the ISA. The detainees included leaders of Muslim youth organizations, including *Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia* (ABIM, Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement), who were perceived as having wide political influence in the Islamic student movement.¹⁷ In addition, on several occasions Mahathir implied that Anwar's wife Wan Azizah would be arrested. The selective ISA arrests continued in October and November, but expanded from the original core of Anwar supporters to those who organized and participated in the *reformasi* movement. Though there were no widespread ISA arrests, a culture of fear had already spread. An opposition leader commented, "we, in fact, expect another *Operation Lalang* will strike the nation if Mahathir cannot control the current political situation."¹⁸ As the wet season began towards mid-November and the

Muslim fasting month approached in December, street protests eventually subsided.

At the end of 1998, having gradually regained control outside UMNO, Mahathir maneuvered to consolidate his power again within UMNO. About one month after Anwar's sacking, 17 amendments to the UMNO constitution were proposed by the Constitutional Amendment Committee chaired by the UMNO secretary-general.¹⁹ Most of the proposed amendments were passed at the UMNO extraordinary general assembly, held on 13 December 1998. The amendments included: the removal of the 10 bonus votes system; the requirement of a minimum of 30 and 20% of divisional nominations respectively for candidates for the party president and deputy president; and the empowerment of the Supreme Council to postpone the triennial Supreme Council elections. A provision for the permanent sacking of any party member who contests the elections as an independent or opposition candidate was also included.²⁰ These changes showed Mahathir's determination not to allow any possible kind of political comeback for Anwar or his supporters in UMNO. On 8 January 1999, Mahathir announced the postponement of the triennial Supreme Council elections, scheduled in June 1999, for up to 18 months.²¹ This prevented Anwar's remaining supporters or Mahathir's potential adversaries from mounting a leadership challenge at least until the end of 2000.

On the same day, Mahathir named Badawi as Deputy Prime Minister as well as Home Minister. Mahathir loyalist Daim was appointed as Finance Minister. Among the senior UMNO leaders, Badawi and Daim were the most anti-Anwar political figures. Although Mahathir relinquished two key posts, there was no doubt that he would continue to dominate the cabinet. As *FEER* reported, "[Abdullah Badawi's] government will be predictable, there will be no change in policy, no change in the vision. So when Abdullah takes over, the Mahathir legacy will be preserved."²²

In the aftermath of Anwar's dismissal these changes to the political and constitutional configuration of UMNO reasserted Mahathir's power and patronage within the ruling party. In this context, Case saw that politics beyond Anwar in Malaysia would be almost the same as before, as Mahathir appeared to have effectively managed the crisis. In his recent study of UMNO factionalism and its effects on the system, Case concludes that:

...while on first blush the struggle between Mahathir and Anwar evokes serious divisions in elite-level relations, this break has neither been complete nor without precedent. Specifically, by isolating Anwar, Mahathir has regained the loyalties - or at least ensured the passivity - of the rest of the elite collectivity.... Thus, if one believes that elite-level relations forge the most critical arena in which any meaningful political change must take place, Mahathir's regime would appear less threatened today than it was during the late 1980s, with the UMNO then splitting evenly into rival elite "teams."²³

Changing Conflict Configurations and the Rise of Multi-Ethnic Awareness

As expected by Mahathir and his associates, Anwar's legacies appeared to have petered out within UMNO circles only a few weeks after his expulsion. Learning from the experience of 1987, Mahathir made sure that Anwar was completely isolated from the

rest of UMNO leadership. However, what distinguishes the Mahathir-Anwar tussle from the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis was that the former was not simply an intra-elite schism. In the wake of the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis, the conflicts were perceived as fairly typical, but rather intense, internal UMNO power play. The Anwar episode, however, has drawn the attention of people from very different levels in Malaysian society, especially from the new generation of Malays. Together with growing generalized grievances against cronyism and nepotism during the economic crisis, the extravagant handling of the Anwar case acted as a catalyst for an unprecedented political awakening in the Malay community at large. In short, what happened after Anwar's downfall can be seen as a transition from "de-politicization" to "re-politicization" not only in the Malay community but also in Malaysian society as a whole.

Many political observers believe that if Anwar had been sacked only for his disloyalty, the Anwar episode would have been perceived only as a nominal power struggle within UMNO, regardless of how unfair and unjust Mahathir was in removing Anwar. However, Mahathir's humiliating treatment of Anwar in public was perceived as cruel, vindictive, and even un-Islamic among Malays, whose political culture explicitly admonishes the ruler (as a "protector") against ever shaming his subjects in return for their loyalty. As Chandra Muzaffar observes, Malays believe, by virtue of "false consciousness" induced by the ruling elites, that, since the colonial period, UMNO, or the UMNO-led government, has succeeded in its role of ruler as their substantive "protector." For the last half century, "mistaken beliefs" in this "protector-protected relationship" were the backbone of continuous Malay support to UMNO.²⁴ However, the manner in which Anwar was humiliated and the way in which state apparatuses, the supposed supreme protector of the Malays, were used against unarmed demonstrators, mostly Malays, awakened the new generation of Malays from "political hibernation" or "false consciousness."

What may be more significant is the extent to which the political awakening has penetrated the rural Malay heartland, UMNO's political power base. Musa believes that the issue of Anwar's humiliation was so emotional among the Malays as to cut across social, class and regional boundaries in the Malay community. The question of Anwar's innocence or guilt was virtually irrelevant and the two Malay words, "*kezaliman* (cruelty)" and "*kasihan* (pity)," were at the very heart of anti-Mahathir sentiment. At that point, it was still arguable whether the widespread anti-Mahathir mood would translate into the erosion of Malay support for UMNO. Musa, however, made it clear that there were enough signs that for the first time ever Malays were starting to distance themselves from UMNO after Anwar's humiliating treatment. He saw that this was a clear indication that "dislike for Mahathir was transforming into dislike for UMNO."²⁵ A survey showed that about 70% of Malays were unhappy with the way the "old man" had treated his chosen successor in a desperate situation.²⁶ Even within UMNO and government circles, quite a few party members and civil servants bluntly revealed their dissatisfaction with Mahathir's persecution of Anwar. Such anti-Mahathir-outrage seemed

to result in the defection of significant numbers of UMNO members to opposition parties.²⁷ In this regard, an opposition leader stressed that "never before in the political history of the nation has the legitimacy of UMNO as the undisputed representative of the Malays been so seriously questioned and challenged."²⁸

In sum, the anti-Mahathir mood in the aftermath of Anwar's dismissal was not limited to UMNO leadership circles, as was the case with the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis. This time anti-Mahathir sentiment was widespread among the Malay grassroots and UMNO, therefore, can no longer take Malay support for granted. A series of political upheavals that developed since Anwar's dismissal reminds us of Przeworski's conditions that lead to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. In particular, he emphasizes that "one would expect to observe mass unrest or at least mass uncompliance *before* any liberalization occurs."²⁹ As Francis Loh argues:

The hegemony or ideological control of the government over the public has been broken and fragmented. Fissures have occurred. Sycophants aside, *the previous unquestioning loyalty among the public to the executive or party leaders has all but disappeared....* As never before a wide spectrum of Malaysian society has lost faith in many of the institutions of our parliamentary system [including the police, the judiciary and the mass media].³⁰

Indeed, the loss, or at least erosion, of the legitimacy of UMNO from its traditional power base is really something new to Malaysian politics and it goes beyond the similar crisis situation of 1987. In this regard, Shamsul saw Malaysian politics beyond Anwar as the beginning of "new politics" of "resistance." He concludes that:

Whatever the future holds, sooner or later Malaysia has to move on without Mahathir, even if Anwar is not at the helm. But nobody could deny that the "Anwar factor" has been critical in the making and consolidation of the "new" Malaysian politics, especially in building a democracy of which Malaysians can be proud of.³¹

In the same way, political commentator Rustam Sani argues that:

What happened to him [Anwar] is a *blessing in disguise*. If there had been a smooth transition of power from Mahathir to Anwar, only the personalities would have changed and the old system would have continued.³²

Political Institutionalization of a Multi-Ethnic Anti-BN Consciousness

When Anwar launched the *reformasi* movement, the objectives of his reform movement were somewhat unclear and even self-contradictory. Many of Anwar's critics claimed that if Anwar succeeded Mahathir he would lead the country with the same system of corruption, cronyism and nepotism that Mahathir has relied on to expand his patronage. The argument commonly used was that Anwar started to promote *reformasi* only after his sudden political marginalization and the *reformasi* movement itself was in fact manipulated for his own political ends. Only a few people took seriously the so-called *reformasi* demonstrations, despite increased mass-gatherings around Anwar. They believed that this was mainly a matter of curiosity and that activities were largely localized around Kuala Lumpur.

Indeed, as Farish Noor acknowledges, it cannot be denied that the so-called reformers, including Anwar supporters, opposition politicians and NGO activists, were

articulating a vague and ambiguous concept of *reformasi* without setting forth concrete programs for reform.³³ Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the discourse of *reformasi* became deeply entrenched in part of the “everyday social and political reality” of Malaysia and appeared as a very effective tool for “political and ideological confrontation” in Malaysian politics after Anwar.³⁴ What was perhaps more noticeable about the Anwar issue and the momentum of the *reformasi* movement was its catalytic role in “political institutionalization” of a multi-ethnic anti-BN consciousness.

To begin with, two major multi-racial coalitions were launched while Anwar was in police custody on 27 September 1998. First, NGOs, headed by *Suara Rakyat Malaysian* (Malaysian People’s Voice, SUARAM), initiated the formation of a multi-racial coalition calling for political, economic and social reform in the wake of Anwar’s downfall.³⁵ This was called *Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat* (Coalition for People’s Democracy, GAGASAN), and comprised four opposition parties and 14 NGOs. As a NGO-led coalition, GAGASAN was designed to provide a forum for disparate opposition parties and NGOs to seek alternative ideas and programs to those of the ruling BN coalition. According to Tian Chua, GAGASAN *pro tem* chairman, the idea of forming GAGASAN as a social movement was mooted even a year before Anwar’s dismissal when the country encountered the economic crisis of mid-1997, though the Anwar issue acted as a catalyst for materialization of the idea.³⁶

Secondly, PAS reacted quickly to take advantage of the Anwar episode. The same day GAGASAN was formed, PAS launched another coalition, called *Majlis Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat Malaysia* (Council of Malaysian People’s Justice Movement, GERAK), whose membership was similar to that of GAGASAN, drawing on PAS, DAP, PRM and various NGOs including ABIM. The PAS-led GERAK, however, had a rather distinct Malay-Muslim flavor in its activities in the rural Malay areas. While GAGASAN focused on much longer-term objectives, GERAK’s agenda was centered on the abolition of the ISA. Despite similar membership components, the main activities of two coalitions were distinctive and mutually supportive. According to Tian Chua, GAGASAN attracted the urban-based, multi-racial middle classes through closed-door meetings, its programs and seminars. Meanwhile, GERAK, with its strong grassroots networks, aimed at mobilizing lower-income peoples, especially in rural Malay communities.³⁷ Neither coalition acknowledged formal links with Anwar, though in general terms their formation stemmed from the Anwar case.³⁸

Apart from these two instrumental coalitions, there was also much broader mass-based support for Anwar. As Farish Noor observes, this mass support was generally identified as the “*reformasi*” movement and was actively involved in most public rallies in the aftermath of Anwar’s expulsion from UMNO.³⁹ Unlike GAGASAN and GERAK, these supporters tended to identify with the issue of Anwar’s expulsion and sought his restoration and Mahathir’s resignation. After Anwar’s arrest, this group was led by his family and his strong supporters, but it mobilized grassroots support for Anwar and promoted anti-Mahathir sentiment, especially among the urban-based Malay

middle class.

It was only after the public rallies subsided in early December 1998 that the Anwar-led *reformasi* movement established a formal instrumental body, a more sophisticated form of multi-racial social coalition. This was called ADIL (*Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial* or Movement for Social Justice) and was led by Wan Azizah, Anwar's wife. The formation of ADIL was the first official step by Anwar and his supporters to transform the *reformasi* agenda from a narrowly pro-Anwar one to a much broader one of political, economic and social reform. As Wan Azizah stressed, the issue was no longer Anwar's political fate but had snowballed into something bigger: the reformation of the whole authoritarian system under Mahathir's leadership.⁴⁰ For a while, ADIL remained a multi-racial social coalition in order to bridge different racial and religious backgrounds. It was, however, also because ADIL wanted to attract the support of former Anwar followers within UMNO circles.⁴¹

Changes in Malay Middle Classes' Attitudes

Along with the political institutionalization of social mobilization, the most distinctive characteristic of Malaysian politics after Anwar has been the changing attitude of the Malay middle class. Bell and his co-authors generalize that the middle classes in Asian countries are actually beneficiaries, not adversaries, of authoritarianism and therefore less willing to promote liberal democratic values.⁴² Gomez and Jomo also identified the growing Malaysian middle classes in the 1990s as highly "materialistic" and unlikely to take "the avoidable risks of seeking reforms" of authoritarian forms of governance.⁴³ Similarly, in his earlier study of the middle class in the 1980s, Crouch assumes that the relatively prosperous Malaysian middle class provided a solid base of support and principal justification for an authoritarian style of politics.⁴⁴ More interestingly, Saravanamuttu's survey of the Malaysian middle classes' attitudes shows a remarkably high proportion of the Malays satisfied with Malaysian political system as "just" and "fair," compared to a relatively low percentage of non-Malay communities.⁴⁵

The Malay middle class's attitudes, however, have changed drastically since the removal of Anwar. It seemed that the middle class was not the main forces of popular upsurge in the aftermath of Anwar's dismissal. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that unprecedented numbers of the Malay middle class were deeply involved in the *reformasi* movement. As Francis Loh points out, it was because of the shift in loyalties of this previously pro-government Malay middle class that "expectations ran high for a change of government" in the run-up to the general election, though the change did not occur.⁴⁶ Shabery Chik, special associate to Razaleigh, even stresses that the change in attitude among the Malay middle class cannot be perceived as just a limited occurrence. These Malays have also shifted the attitudes of lower-income peoples in the rural Malay communities considerably through their personal contacts and through Muslim Youth organizations during the *reformasi* period and up to general election. Shabery believes that,

without serious consideration of the Malay middle class change in attitude and role, UMNO's loss of legitimacy among them would spill over into the whole of Malay society.⁴⁷

Furthermore, a significant number of middle class non-Malays were involved in the *reformasi* movement. Although their participation in street demonstrations was lacking, their voices were heard in more issue-based activities, promoting the questions of justice, human rights and democratic values. In short, a significant section of the Malay and non-Malay middle class, many of whom had been quite apathetic and indifferent to politics, followed political developments more closely and critically than before Anwar's expulsion, even if they have yet to translate their views into action. An obvious example of the increase in political participation among young or previously apathetic groups was the 680,000 new voter registrants during the 1999 registration, held about six months after the detention of Anwar. This was almost half a million more than the usual 200,000 new voters registered per annum. Many believe that the increased numbers resulted from the Anwar issue and the new registrants probably would have voted for the opposition coalition, if given the chance.⁴⁸

The Easing of Racial Divides and Increasing Role of Alternative Media

What further distinguishes the post-1987 UMNO leadership crisis from the post-Anwar situation is that in the latter, there was no serious racial tension. Obviously, a fear of racial riots was widespread in the country as Malaysians had just witnessed bloody racial killings in Indonesia. The possibility of racial rioting in Malaysia was also suggested by the mainstream media, especially during *reformasi* demonstrations. However, unlike the strong racial disputes which occurred after the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis, the post-Anwar situation showed little sign of culminating in racial tension. On the contrary, the *reformasi* demonstrations seemed to lower racial barriers between the Malay and non-Malay communities to a certain extent. Musa also observes that there was a considerable decrease in racial politics during the *reformasi* phase. He stresses that:

...[in the past] any demonstration of any nature in Kuala Lumpur or Penang would always turn racial. Even if they were against the government, they would burn the Chinese shops. If the *reformasi* movement and demonstrations could be given any significance in terms of Malaysian politics - if there is anything that I could unhesitatingly come to [consider] a positive conclusion - it never turns racial. It's amazing. In the old days, people would be afraid of it turning racial. To me the *reformasi* movement is significant. It is more issue-based than racial. I'm fascinated.⁴⁹

What then made Malaysian politics after Anwar less racial in character? First, it should be noted that the general Malay perception of the Chinese community in the 1990s was not as antagonistic as it had been in the 1970s and 1980s. This was largely because of the impact of the New Economic Policy (NEP) over the past two decades and the country's high economic growth during the 1990s. This resulted in the creation of a large multi-racial middle class in Malaysian society and considerably diluted eco-

conomic barriers between Malays and Chinese, especially among a large, well-educated, young urban Malay middle class. It is significant that these young urban middle class Malays were at the forefront of most of the *reformasi* demonstrations after Anwar's dismissal.

Furthermore, the recent political crisis was widely viewed as an internal Malay affair, at least at the initial stages of the *reformasi* movement. This was one of the main reasons that non-Malays did not really become involved in *reformasi* demonstrations. Besides, the non-Malay communities did not perceive the UMNO leadership crisis as an opportunity to pursue their own political and social rights, as they did in the aftermath of the UMNO leadership crisis of 1987. On the contrary, around this time the non-Malay communities were concerned with possible reversion of Malaysian politics to the politics of racialism from what is called the politics of "developmentalism" and "cultural liberalization."⁵⁰ This was also one of the reasons why the Chinese noticeably separated themselves from the *reformasi* movement. The possibility of collision between Malays and Chinese in 1998, therefore, was much less than in 1987. In this context, the recent crisis provided less occasion for Mahathir and his followers to revert the traditional racial politics, even though they were inclined to. Besides, the main issues following the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis were largely racially sensitive matters, whereas after the more recent crisis, the key issues were non-racial ones such as the abuse of power, corruption and transparency.

Several other individual factors also contributed to the decrease in racial politics at the time of the 1998 crisis. First, the case of Lim Guan Eng attracted wide sympathy not only among the Chinese but also among many Malays, especially after his imprisonment following his defense of a Malay girl who was an alleged victim of statutory-rape by then Melaka Chief Minister Rahim Tamby Chik.⁵¹ As a way of promoting his multi-racial stance, Anwar often showed solidarity with Lim Guan Eng by recalling his concern and sympathy for the Lim Guan Eng case even well before his dismissal from the government.⁵² As a symbolic gesture, Anwar signed a DAP petition seeking a royal pardon for Lim Guan Eng on a visit to a DAP branch in Kajang during the *reformasi* movement. The much reduced racial divides were witnessed in a massive multi-racial gathering when Lim Guan Eng was released from the prison on 25 August 1999. Also, GAGASAN *pro tem* chairman Tian Chua drew enormous Malay support for his active involvement in the Malay-dominated *reformasi* movement. During *reformasi* demonstrations, he was arrested at least four times and emerged as a hero among many Malays.⁵³ Despite the individual nature of these cases, they contributed to the easing of racial divides before and during the *reformasi* movement.

After the removal of Anwar, one of the main factors contributing to the decrease in racial politics was the changed attitude of Malaysian people toward mainstream media. Until recently, a majority of the Malaysian public depended heavily on mainstream media for general information. The bias of the mainstream media had become a crucial factor in distorting the information given the public and, thus, reinforcing the incumbent power structure in Malaysia. Moreover, the effects of media partisanship were

even more serious given the relative weakness of the restricted alternative mass media in the country. These organs of opposition parties and NGOs, both weeklies and monthlies were both financially weak and very limited in their circulation.⁵⁴ The 1990 general election offered a good example of how far the government-controlled media would go to foster racial fear in the interests of the ruling political elites within the three or four days before polling.⁵⁵

This time around, however, public antagonism towards the mainstream media increased noticeably over the unfair coverage of the Anwar issue. The mainstream media's lack of credibility resulted in a dramatic increase in alternative media's popularity. In particular, *Harakah*, the biweekly organ of PAS, increased its circulation extraordinarily, from approximately 60,000 to 300,000 per issue, in the wake of Anwar's dismissal. The total sales of *Harakah* reached around RM700,000 per week. Considering the estimated 200,000 circulation of the two main English and Malay newspapers, *NST* and *The Star*, *Harakah* ostensibly became a *de facto* mainstream newspaper after Anwar's downfall.⁵⁶ *Aliran Monthly*, a more middle class oriented critical publication by the NGO Aliran, also more than doubled subscriptions and street sales during late 1998 and early 1999.⁵⁷ Besides these, several new political magazines, such as *Detik* and *Eksklusif*, were launched and circulated widely around this time. Other political material, like videos, cassette tapes and even VCDs, received extraordinary public demand. Moreover, a significant number of internet websites became very popular among Malaysians and played a crucial role in promoting pro-Anwar and pro-*reformasi* material. These alternative sources provided serious competition to the pro-government mainstream media since the Malaysian public was anxious to receive credible news and critical analyses of the political upheaval of the country.

In short, the Mahathir-Anwar leadership crisis is certainly not the first in Malaysian political history; there has been a series of serious leadership struggles within UMNO circles.⁵⁸ However, unlike previous tussles within the UMNO top leadership, the Mahathir-Anwar conflict can be viewed as something "unprecedented" in Malaysian politics as its political, social and even cultural consequences may not simply be bounded by the "Malay issues" or "UMNO affairs." The Anwar episode has acted as a catalyst in the making of a new political configuration in Malaysian politics as a whole, as well as Malay politics in particular.

Revisiting the Nexus of UMNO Factionalism and Political Liberalization

The 1999 General Election and Its Implications

On 4 April 1999, with Anwar's endorsement and in anticipation of an early general election, ADIL turned into a political party, KeADILan (*Parti Keadilan Nasional* or National Justice Party), led by Wan Azizah. KeADILan, as a multi-racial political party, attracted the key participants of the two reform groups, GAGASAN and GERAK, and

other prominent NGO leaders. Along with former UMNO members, these multi-racial reformers, like Chandra Muzaffar (JUST), Tian Chua (GAGASAN), Irene Fernandez (*Tenaganita*) and many ABIM leaders, were evenly distributed within the KeADILan leadership. It was widely expected that the multi-racial KeADILan would be situated as a middle group in the coming general election between the Malay-based PAS and the Chinese-dominated DAP, just as former UMNO-splinter party *Semangat 46* was in 1990.⁵⁹

Until recently, elections in Malaysia, as Crouch observes, were perceived as just a routine ritual casting of a vote every four or five years to provide “a cloak of legitimacy for what is really authoritarian rule.”⁶⁰ Certainly, the rules of electoral competition in Malaysia do not seem to be designed to allow the electorate to change the government, even though they allow an element of choice. Due partly to the delineation of electoral constituencies to favor rural Malays, opposition parties have never been able to prevent the ruling coalition from securing its two-thirds majority in parliament, except in 1969. Even in 1969, the ruling coalition obtained 64.1% of parliamentary seats with only 48.4% of the total votes cast.⁶¹ In 1990, the ruling coalition gained over 70% of parliamentary seats with only 52% of the total vote.⁶² As long as elections in Malaysia are largely contests for ethnic support and opposition parties are divided along ethnic lines, the multi-ethnic ruling coalition’s two-thirds majority in parliament seems to be impregnable.

The 1999 general election, however, was not viewed as another ritualistic and orchestrated exercise legitimating the UMNO-led government’s authoritarian rule. Malaysia’s four main opposition parties, PAS, DAP, PRM and KeADILan, formed an unprecedented and better-than-expected multi-ethnic opposition coalition under the common banner of the *Barisan Alternatif* (Alternative Front or BA). While Razaleigh had to form two separate opposition coalitions in 1990, one with PAS (APU) and the other with DAP (*Gagasan*) since the two parties could not comfortably ally, the reform movement unleashed in September 1998 provided a fulcrum for the crystallization of a single, united opposition front.⁶³ After much deliberation, the allied opposition parties nominated Anwar as their candidate for prime minister, seeking to provide a “capable” and “collective” leadership as an alternative to the ruling BN government.⁶⁴ Finally in October 1999, as the general election approached, the BA announced a common election manifesto and even an alternative budget.⁶⁵

The 1999 election results, however, did not meet the earlier expectations of the BA. The overall election results generally showed that voters favored the BN, which retained its traditional two-thirds parliamentary majority. Although the BN’s popular vote declined significantly, from 65.1% in 1995 to 56.5% in 1999, the BN secured 76.7% of parliamentary seats (148 out of 193) and 71.3% of state legislature seats (281 out of 394). On the surface at least, the convincing victory of the BN appeared to confirm yet again the hypothesis that electoral competition in Malaysia is little more than a ritual by which the UMNO-led government authenticates the legitimacy of its authori-

tarian rule.

Nonetheless, the opposition did not entirely fail to transform the Malaysian political order of single-party dominance. A close scrutiny of the results demonstrates that considerable change has occurred in Malaysian politics. The most distinct change is the major shift in voting patterns among the Malays. After intense pre-election speculation about how much anti-Mahathir sentiment would be translated into real votes, the UMNO-led ruling coalition suffered serious losses in most of the Malay-dominated northern states. As a result, the BN lost another state, Terengganu, to the opposition, along with Kelantan. The BN was all but wiped out in both states. Moreover, the Malay ground went noticeably against the ruling coalition in Kedah, Perlis and Pahang. As a result, UMNO, which had been the main contributor to the ruling coalition's election victories for the last four decades, found its position deeply eroded.

UMNO lost 21 of its 93 parliamentary seats and 66 of its 242 state assembly seats. For the first time, UMNO took less than half (72) of the total parliamentary seats (148) won by the ruling coalition. What is more disconcerting for UMNO, all but one of the 59 parliamentary seats retained by UMNO in peninsular Malaysia was won with a greatly reduced winning majority.⁶⁶ UMNO's top leaders, including Mahathir, Badawi, Razaleigh, Rafidah and Najib, showed declines in their winning majorities. UMNO also lost four ministers, six deputy ministers, one Menteri Besar, and several state executive councilors and parliamentary secretaries.⁶⁷ According to Francis Loh, UMNO's popular vote in constituencies where two-thirds of voters were Malays dropped significantly, from 62% in 1995 to 49% in 1999. Compared to the 1995 elections, UMNO's loss in its total vote in most states was: Kelantan (-6%), Terengganu (-14%), Perlis (-12%), Kedah (-9%), Selangor (-31%), Negeri Sembilan (-32%), Penang (-25%), and Melaka (-21%). The losses in those last four states were even more serious than those in the states in the so-called Malay heartland in the north, though they did not result in seat losses for UMNO.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, non-Malay voters largely supported BN candidates, in contrast to the erosion of support among the Malays for UMNO and the BN. The BN's performance was outstanding in most multi-ethnic constituencies where no single ethnic group composed a majority. The BN won all but one of the 61 multi-ethnic constituencies where Malays comprised less than two-thirds and the Chinese less than half of the voters.⁶⁹ Indeed, the rally of non-Malay voters behind the ruling coalition did much to prolong Mahathir's eighteen-year rule.

The newly-formed KeADILan obtained only a handful of seats in Parliament and State Assemblies. Yet, KeADILan candidates lost very narrowly in most multi-ethnic constituencies and its share of the popular vote (12.3%) was similar to the DAP's (13.5%).⁷⁰ It was clear that KeADILan's multi-ethnic approach was well received in Malaysian politics, especially given past circumstances in which little political space was given multi-ethnic parties. The DAP's performance in 1999 was no worse than in 1995, despite the losses of several of its prominent leaders. Indeed, what happened was

that the party maintained its traditional strongholds but was unable to attract new support from the growing multi-racial Malaysian middle class.

Overall, the BA's share of the popular parliamentary vote was 42.5% in 1999.⁷¹ Of this, only 23.3% of the popular vote, however, was reflected in parliament due to the first-past-the-post electoral system in Malaysia. It is worth noting that almost 35% of parliamentary seats (50 out of 144) in the peninsula were won with a margin of victory of less than 10%. The BN won 29 of these seats. What is more important, the 680,000 new registrants in 1999 whose voting rights were denied constituted about 7.1% of the 9,564,071 total registrants for the 1999 general election and represented 9.7% of the 7,009,507 total voters who turned out in the parliamentary elections.⁷² Interestingly, as Francis Loh notes, the ratio of BN to BA parliamentary seats in peninsular Malaysia would be 73 to 71 if the BA had taken all the marginal seats through about a 5 to 6% swing in votes in favor of the opposition.⁷³

In sum, UMNO can no longer take almost undivided Malay allegiance and loyalty for granted. Unlike in the 1990 elections, where the issue of Malay supremacy turned out to be crucial, this time the question of leadership became more important in deciding voting behavior: who could run the country with more accountable, workable and less corrupt processes.⁷⁴ The 1999 election results also showed that the BA has a reasonable chance of winning in a substantial number of multi-ethnic seats with only small swings in popular votes. It would be premature to conclude that Malay voters have abandoned UMNO, and cracks have begun to appear in the UMNO-led authoritarian regime. However, as Francis Loh argues, the ferment and fragmentation of Malaysian politics after Anwar makes a change of government a real possibility with only a small swing in voting behavior - a far cry from the situation of the last few decades, when BN victory was ensured by the ritual casting of votes.⁷⁵

Toward Regime Change or Regime Consolidation?

The question then arises: will the UMNO-led BN government be more responsive to a more politicized public and expand the limits of liberalization? In other words, will Mahathir's UMNO be more adaptive to the changing expectations of the Malay community and prioritize issues such as the abuse of centralized power, the reinvention of the ruling party and leadership change?

It is argued that ruling elites sometimes concede "functional needs" to transform, or at least modify, certain forms of authoritarian rule into more responsive modes, not because of a change in their primary concerns toward openness and/or good governance but for their own political survival.⁷⁶ In this regard, many political analysts, and even some UMNO leaders, suggest that the UMNO-led government and UMNO itself need to be more responsive, if not reinvented, in response to the result of the 1999 general election. Post-election developments, however, suggest that Mahathir is not prepared to respond positively to the changing expectations of Malaysian civil society.

Mahathir continues to rely on the same harsh methods of authoritarian control in handling his political opponents and critics within and outside the ruling party.

A series of crackdowns on the opposition came within a few weeks of the 1999 elections. Following the Home Ministry's letters threatening to ban five alternative publications, *Harakah*, *Detik*, *Eksklusif*, *Wasilah* and *Tamadun*, several leaders from the three main opposition parties were arrested for sedition or under the Official Secrets Act. Those arrested included Karpal Singh, Deputy Chairman of the DAP and Anwar's lawyer; Marina Yusoff, Vice President of KeADILan; Mohamed Ezam Mohd Noor, KeADILan Youth Chief; Zulkifli Sulong, Group Editor of *Harakah*; and Chea Lim Thye, the owner of the firm that prints *Harakah*.⁷⁷ A few weeks later, *Harakah*, the political organ of PAS, was allowed to be printed only twice monthly instead of twice weekly, a move virtually banning its publication. In addition, publication of *Detik* and *Eksklusif* was suspended as their annual permits were not renewed by the Home Ministry. Far from introducing political and democratic adaptations, Mahathir appears to be banking on the same iron-fist control he has used in the past.

This continuing authoritarian trend affects not only opposition circles but also UMNO. Mahathir seems to refuse to recognize the need to rejuvenate the ruling party and heed his critics. On the contrary, he has consolidated his power even further by effectively sidelining Razaleigh, his only remaining serious challenger, keeping him not only out of the top two posts but also out of a vice-presidency in UMNO party elections in May 2000. As for the top two posts, any room for challenge was quashed as contests were prevented through Mahathir's no-contest "advice" and a subsequent no-contest "resolution" by the Supreme Council, despite the party constitution's allowance for contests. Razaleigh was out of the vice-presidential race as his eligibility to stand as a candidate was rejected by the Supreme Council.⁷⁸ It is believed that the disqualification of Razaleigh's candidacy was the reflection of Mahathir's wish not to allow any room for individual or factional threats to the incumbent party leadership.⁷⁹

Many UMNO officials worry in private that if UMNO does not respond positively to the changing circumstances of the Malay community, the party will lose the strength and values which have enabled it to remain the dominant political force in the country. A senior UMNO official stressed that UMNO's problems have become much more serious than outsiders have observed, especially after the party's Supreme Council election in May 2000. He believes that there is no "will" within the current Mahathir-led UMNO leadership to reform the party. But, what is even worse, the newly elected UMNO leadership shows neither "credibility" nor "will" to reform the party after its leadership succession. Badawi's "unopposed ascendancy" to the deputy presidency was not legitimately endorsed by the party delegates, while the three vice-presidents were selected not on the basis of delegates' confidence in them but rather as a "protest vote" against Mahathir's leadership.⁸⁰ Indeed, Najib's victory with the highest number of votes in UMNO elections, compared with his narrow margin of victory in the 1999 general election, suggested that the UMNO Supreme Council elections did not reflect Malay

grassroots sentiments.

Will the prospect of new multi-racial politics and the resurrection of Malaysian civil society be sustained and eventually lead to a transition from UMNO-led authoritarian rule to democracy? Many political observers were doubtful about the sustainability of the BA before and during the 1999 elections. They speculated on whether the DAP and PAS could co-operate with one another on a long-term basis, and whether KeADILan would remain as a viable multi-ethnic party or be another *Semangat 46*, modifying its policies in a Malay nationalist direction and returning to the UMNO fold. On the surface, however, the BA appears to be holding together and even further institutionalizing co-operative mechanisms among component parties. KeADILan's political future seems to be different from *Semangat 46*; the party is seeking to merge with PRM, another multi-ethnic BA component party.⁸¹ It is therefore claimed that relations within the BA have become more constant than before the 1999 general elections.

For instance, the institution within which the BA component parties discussed a common election manifesto and seat allocation before the 1999 elections continues. This is called the "BA Secretariat." It is chaired by Chandra Muzaffar, and there have been almost weekly, or at least fortnightly, meetings to consolidate the relationships among the BA opposition parties. The BA's top leaders also continue to hold irregular meetings, as the Presidents' Council. There is always a pre-council meeting, or at least communication, among the BA MPs before parliament sits, too. Moreover, about 20 policy bureaus, called Barisan Alternatif Bureau, have been formed to assist the BA MPs. The BA Bureaus are perceived as *de facto* shadow cabinets drawn from BA component members.⁸² A series of "inter-civilizational dialogues" have also been organized by PAS and the DAP to foster mutual understanding at the grassroots level. Obviously, these post-election developments are quite different from the relationships maintained among the opposition parties in *Gagasan* and APU in the aftermath of the 1990 general election. Indeed, as Crouch argues:

[the regime] sometimes became more democratic not because of a fundamental realignment of social forces but because opposition leaders were able to put aside their longstanding rivalries in order to mount an electoral challenge to the government.⁸³

There is no doubt that the post-election development within the opposition is a remarkable achievement in itself. However, to what extent the BA component parties, individually and collectively, have overcome their perceived credibility problem of the pre-election period remains to be seen. Furthermore, it is too early to use the 1999 election result as an indicator of the direction in which Malay voters are swinging. PAS's recent defeat in the Sanggang by-election by almost double its prior margin of loss warns against assuming that Malays' swing away from UMNO in 1999 will be continued in the next general election.⁸⁴ Of course, the by-election in the multi-ethnic Teluk Kemang parliamentary seat which followed Sanggang's proved that the BA component parties could still mobilize considerable votes for each other. For KeADILan particularly, the by-election result was regarded as "a victory in defeat," since the party reduced its margin of loss from 9,942 in the 1999 general election to 5,972.⁸⁵ The

serious rift between DAP and KeADILan over the right to contest the Teluk Kemang seat, however, illustrated that pre-election credibility problems and mutual distrust among the opposition parties still exist.⁸⁶

In fact, it is well known that there was mutual suspicion within the opposition coalition. In particular, neither the DAP nor PAS had much confidence about the sustainability of KeADILan beyond the 1999 elections. More importantly, the two main opposition parties were reluctant to see the emergence of the multi-ethnic KeADILan as a viable alternative force in Malaysia's opposition political arena. Previously, the Malays had only two choices, UMNO and PAS, whereas the Chinese had only the DAP if they supported the opposition. In 1990, Razaleigh's *Semangat 46* was regarded as an alternative for the Malays, not the Chinese. However, the formation of KeADILan, with its seeming multi-ethnic character, seemed to provide both Malays and Chinese with an alternative. Especially for young urban-based Chinese, KeADILan was viewed as a viable alternative force. Given that the DAP is facing problems attracting new support from the younger generation, the emergence of KeADILan as a third opposition party poses a long-term threat to the DAP. The situation was more or less the same with the PAS.⁸⁷ This was why both DAP and PAS were so reluctant to give any promising seats to KeADILan when the BA negotiated seat allocations in the run-up to the 1999 general election. In this regard, a senior KeADILan leader stressed that the two existing parties perceived KeADILan as a "bigger enemy than the ruling coalition in the longer term if KeADILan survives with its multi-ethnic character." Judging from his own experience with both DAP and PAS, the senior KeADILan official believes that the two parties, or at least their top leaders, were more interested in consolidating their power bases within the current system of racial politics than changing the structure of the Malaysian political system itself toward a new politics of multi-racialism.⁸⁸

The Anwar episode and its social, cultural and political consequences disclosed a possible erosion of the politics of racialism and, thus, helped to create a more promising climate for the emergence of a third force in Malay politics and the opposition political arena more broadly. However, especially in opposition politics, whether PAS and DAP would allow KeADILan to extend its influence as a third political force remains to be seen. There is no doubt that KeADILan has to overcome its internal weaknesses of membership and leadership. The new party has to prove its own strength. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting that both PAS and DAP have tended to sideline or ignore KeADILan in various ways.⁸⁹ Interestingly, it is well known that DAP and PAS enjoy a better relationship with each other compared to their relationships with KeADILan and PRM since the 1999 general election.

Conclusion

It became clear that the social and political conditions induced by the Anwar episode have put the sustainability of authoritarian forms of governance in Malaysia in doubt. Case notes that "resurrection of civil society, a promise of popular upsurge, and the

enhanced prospects for democracy will constitute the most important changes in Malaysia's political life after the removal of Anwar."⁹⁰ The Mahathir government is now facing increasing challenges to expand the boundaries of liberalization and limited democracy. There is no denying that the sharp erosion of Malay support for UMNO creates high expectations of a shift away from Mahathir's style of authoritarian rule. Many political observers inside and outside UMNO caution that UMNO should take the resurrection of civil society and its pressures for *reformasi* seriously. Failing that, the possibility of breakdown of the ruling bloc could become a reality.

However, as O'Donnell and Schmitter emphasize, enhanced favorable circumstances for a new political order are "by no means a constant." The euphoria of a transition can easily subside when a majority of the people become much keener on a "new social order."⁹¹ And it should be noted that the discourse of a new social or political order has often become a principal justification for imposition of a new authoritarian form of governance in many previously authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries.⁹² The Anwar episode and subsequent political upheaval, indeed, gave rise to a momentum and some of the favorable conditions for a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule in Malaysia. However, successful democratic transition in any society cannot be explained merely by a context favorable to democratization. Furthermore, the breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily lead to the establishment of certain democratic forms of governance. Rather, the regime can often be transformed into an "uncertain something else." Transitions can possibly develop into "the instauration of a political democracy," but can also give way to "the restoration of a new, and possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule."⁹³ In Malaysia, the ruling political elite has shown considerable capacity to make effective political adaptations, through both coercive and co-optive means, in order to safeguard their own political survival despite desperate crisis situations - as shown in the wake of the leadership crisis of 1987. It is also worth noting that UMNO has successfully adapted to a series of internal and external crisis circumstances and continues to re-emerge as strong as ever at the national and state levels. The crucial questions faced by the BA parties, individually and collectively, are how to overcome their "defensive mentalities" and develop convincing alternative political programs to promote voters' confidence in the opposition in the foreseeable future.

Notes:

1. For detailed accounts of the 1987 UMNO leadership crisis, see Shamsul A. B., "The Battle Royal: The UMNO Elections of 1987," *Southeast Asian Affairs 1988* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 170-188; and Ranjit Gill, *The UMNO Crisis* (Singapore: Sterling Corporate Services, 1988).
2. William Case, "Semi-democracy in Malaysia: Pressures and Prospects for Change," *Regime Change and Regime Maintenance in Asia and the Pacific*, Discussion Paper Series Number 8 (Canberra: Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU, 1992).
3. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press,

- 1986).
4. Edmund Terence Gomez & Jomo K. S., "Authoritarianism, Elections and Political Change in Malaysia," *Public Policy*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July-September 1998), pp. 113-144.
 5. Leslie J. Walker (trans.), *The Discourses of Niccolo Machiavelli*, Volume I (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 273-274.
 6. Within a few weeks of the April 1987 UMNO elections, five Ministers, including Razaleigh, and four Deputy Ministers were dropped from the Cabinet and were subsequently driven out from the mainstream of UMNO politics. See *FEER*, 14 May 1987 (Suhaini Aznam, "Dr. Mahathir's Surgery").
 7. Jomo K. S., "Deepening Democracy with More Checks and Balances" in Muhammad Ikmal Said and Zahid Emby (eds.), *Malaysia: Critical Perspectives* (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Social Science Association, 1996), p. 74.
 8. A comprehensive account and interpretation on the political development of the Anwar episode can be found at Fan Yew Teng, *Anwar Saga: Malaysia on Trial* (Selangor: Genting Raya Sdn Bhd, 1999).
 9. Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999.
 10. On the day after Anwar's expulsion, Mahathir reasserted his grip by taking over the position of Acting Finance Minister, besides being the Prime Minister and Home Minister. Meanwhile, he indicated that the new deputy presidency of UMNO and deputy premiership would remain vacant until the next year's party election. See *The Straits Times*, 5 September 1998 (Brendan Pereira, "Senior minister-type post likely").
 11. For examples, see Najib, Badawi and Razaleigh's open support for Mahathir's action in *The Straits Times*, 5 September 1998 ("Anwar 'improper to attack system'"). See also *The Straits Times*, 6 September 1998 ("UMNO MPs back Mahathir's actions").
 12. It was alleged that the UMNO Supreme Council used various other types of action against Anwar's supporters, especially at the divisional level. These included expulsion, show-cause letters, warnings and suspension of membership. Shamsul, a UKM social scientist, claims that his survey findings shows that in the one year after Anwar's dismissal, on average of 4 out of 11 UMNO divisional delegates were sacked or otherwise punished for supporting Anwar and his *reformasi* movement. Interview with Shamsul A. B., Director of Institute of Malay World and Civilization at Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, 12 August 1999. For examples of other types of actions, see *The Star*, 10 October 1998 ("Sabbaruddin: 20 members issued letters") and *The Star*, 5 November 1998 ("25 to face disciplinary action").
 13. Under Malaysia's law, the next general election had to be held before mid-2000.
 14. Confidential interview, Kuala Lumpur, August 1999. In an interview held a few months before the general election, the same interviewee predicted a cleanup of Anwar's allies in the run-up to and soon after the general election. He believed that only a few of Anwar's former aides would be included in the candidacy list for the next election. Even those who were selected as UMNO candidates would be posted in relatively vulnerable seats where they would face very strong challenges from Anwar supporters. For those whose names were not included on the list, their political future was vulnerable anyway. This is either because they would not be given any chance to stand as opposition candidates as the selection of UMNO candidates would be made at the very last moment of nomination, or because they would not be accepted by voters if they stand as independent candidates, due to their opportunistic attitudes.
 15. Well before Anwar was charged in the High Court on October 5, 1998, there was an unprecedented trial by media, where maximum coverage was given to statements made by Mahathir, cabinet ministers and UMNO leaders saying that Anwar was immoral and corrupt. For more details of the trial by media over Anwar, see *Aliran Monthly*, 1998:18(9), pp. 11-15 ("The Rule of Law Under Threat").
 16. First, Sukma Darmawan, Anwar's adopted brother, was arrested on September 6 for his alleged involvement in acts of sodomy with Anwar. Next, Munawar Anees, Anwar's speechwriter, was detained under the ISA with similar charges on September 14. Then, on the same day, Anwar's former private secretary in the Finance Ministry, Mohamad Ahmad, was arrested under section 117 of the Penal Code. After that, on September 15, another of Anwar's former private secretaries, Mohamed Azmin Ali, was detained under section 117 of the Penal Code. Mohamad Ahmad and Mohamed Azmin Ali were released on September 23 and September 22 respectively, whereas Sukma Darmawan and Munawar Anees were sentenced to six months in prison. See "Chronology of the Case against Anwar Ibrahim," <http://www.hrw.org/hrw/campaigns/malaysia98/anwar-chronology.html> [Posted November 1998].

17. The ISA detainees included Zahid Hamidi, the UMNO Youth chief; Ruslan Kassim, Negeri Sembilan state UMNO Youth chief; Kamarudin Jaffar, the head of the Institute for Policy Research (IKD), a think-tank closely linked to Anwar; Ahmad Azam Abdul Rahman, the president of ABIM; Mukhtar Redhuan, the deputy president of ABIM; Siddiq Baba, Student Affairs Rector at the International Islamic University; and Zulkifli Nordin, a member of Anwar's legal defense team.
18. E-mail correspondence from Teresa Kok, then a Central Committee member and currently a Member of Parliament from the DAP, 5 October 1998.
19. See *Business Times*, 8 October 1998 ("Supreme Council agrees to amend UMNO constitution").
20. The "10-bonus-votes" system allows a candidate for the president or deputy president's post to gain 10 extra votes automatically upon securing a divisional nomination. Anwar used the 10-bonus-votes system to oust then UMNO deputy president Ghafar in the run-up to the 1993 party elections. For more details of the amendments to the UMNO constitution, see *NST*, 14 December 1998 ("15 constitutional amendments passed").
21. See *The Star*, 9 January 1999 ("UMNO polls put off to next year").
22. See *FEER*, 21 January 1999 (Jayasankaran, "Tactical Retreat"). For further explanation of Mahathir's consolidation of power through the cabinet reshuffle, see *Asiaweek*, 22 January 1999, pp. 16-22.
23. William Case, "Politics Beyond Anwar: What's New?," *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (June 1999), p. 15.
24. Chandra Muzaffar, *Protector? An Analysis of the Concept and Practice of Loyalty in Leader-led Relationships Within Malay Society* (Penang: Aliran, 1979), especially see pp. 50-71 and 114-154.
25. Interview with Musa Hitam, Kuala Lumpur, 23 August 1999. Musa's distinctive viewpoint on the erosion of the Malay support for UMNO can also be found in his speech at the Annual General Meeting of UMNO branches in the Johor Baru division on 19 February 2000. For the details of Musa's speech, see *Aliran Monthly*, 2000:20(2), pp. 7-10 (Musa Hitam, "What Has Happened To UMNO?").
26. See *FEER*, 29 October 1998 (Murray Hiebert, "A Single Spark").
27. A senior PAS official said that PAS membership increased by at least 8,000 per month. This made the PAS membership jump by 20% within ten months after Anwar's dismissal. He argued that these new members mostly transferred from UMNO and, more importantly, represented various sections of the Malays, old, young, rich, poor, learned and non-educated, whereas the party usually attracted young Malays before the Anwar issue. Interview with Subky Latiff, PAS Central Committee Member, Kuala Lumpur, 9 August 1999. It was also reported that KeADILan registered 150,000 members within three months of its inauguration. See *FEER*, 1 July 1999 (Murray Hiebert, "Signs of the Times").
28. Lim Kit Siang, "The Impact of the Anwar Ibrahim Case on Politics in Malaysia," Speech at Griffith University, Brisbane, 4 May 2000.
29. Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy" in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (eds.), 1986, p. 50, italics in original.
30. Francis Loh Kok Wah, "A Nation On Trial," *Aliran Monthly*, 1998: 18(9), p. 7, italics added.
31. Shamsul A. B., *The Redefinition of Politics and the Transformation of Malaysian Pluralism*, working paper, conference on "Southeast Asian Pluralism," ISEC-Ford Project, Kuala Lumpur, 5-6 August 1999, p. 17.
32. Interview with Rustam Sani, cited in *Australian*, 28 December 1998, p. 6, italics added.
33. For a distinctive analysis of how the concept of *reformasi* has been introduced, developed and utilized within the Malaysian political arena, see Farish A. Noor, "Looking for Reformasi: The Discursive Dynamics of the Reformasi Movement and Its Prospects as a Political Project," *Indonesia and the Malay World*, Vol. 27, No. 77 (1999), pp. 5-18.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.
35. SUARAM is a non-governmental organization committed to upholding human rights. It began as a campaign body for the abolition of the Internal Security Act (ISA) in 1989 in the aftermath of *Operation Lalang* of 1987.
36. Interview with Tian Chua, currently Vice-President of KeADILan, Kuala Selangor, 24 August 1999.
37. Interview with Tian Chua, Kuala Lumpur, 10 August 1999.
38. A senior PAS official Subky Latiff pointed out that GERAK had no formal link with Anwar-led *reformasi* movement, though it had sympathy with Anwar and his family. Interview with Subky Latiff, Kuala

Lumpur, 9 August 1999. Tian Chua also mentioned that the idea of GAGASAN was not restricted to campaigning for Anwar, even though members actively participated in the public protests held in the wake of Anwar's dismissal. Interview with Tian Chua, Kuala Lumpur, 10 August 1999.

39. Noor, *op.cit.*, p. 11.
40. Interview with Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, Petaling Jaya, 26 August 1999.
41. *Ibid.*
42. Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya and David Martin Jones (eds.), *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia* (Oxford: St. Martin's Press, 1995).
43. Gomez and Jomo, *op.cit.*, pp. 113-144.
44. Harold Crouch, *Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Cooperation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), especially pp. 5, 25-26. Crouch's observation on the close relation between the middle class and regime stability has been evidenced in a series of by-elections and general elections in the 1990s, as the growing middle classes became the prime sources of popular support for the Mahathir government, despite its growing tendency towards authoritarian forms of governance.
45. In particular, 91% of the Malay middle class "agree" or "very much agree" that the Malaysian electoral system is fair, whereas 59% of the Chinese and 62% of the Indian[replied positively about the same question. For more details, see Johan Saravanamuttu, "The State, Ethnicity and the Middle Class Factor: Addressing Nonviolent, Democratic Change in Malaysia," in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), *Internal Conflict and Governance* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 56.
46. Francis Loh Kok Wah, "Post-NEP Politics in Malaysia: Ferment and Fragmentation," paper presented at the Second Australia-Malaysia Conference, ANU, Canberra, 24-26 May 2000, p. 4.
47. Interview with Ahmad Shabery Chik, Special Assistant to former *Semangat 46* President Razaleigh Hamzah, Canberra, 24 May 2000.
48. The 680,000 new registrants were not allowed to vote in the 1999 general election as the Election Commission (EC) claimed that their registrations as eligible voters could not be processed until February 2000, due to the enormous increase in number of the new registrants.
49. Musa Hitam, <http://www.malaysiakini.com/archives_news/2000/may/may6-7/news2.htm>. Weekend edition May 6-7, 2000.
50. Loh Kok Wah, *op.cit.*
51. Lim Guan Eng, MP for Kota Melaka and deputy secretary-general of the DAP, went on trial in January 1996 and was sentenced in April 1998 to two concurrent 18-month jail terms for printing a political pamphlet, *Mangsa Dipenjarkan, Penjenayah Bebas* (Victim Imprisoned, Criminal Free), criticizing the government for not pressing statutory-rape charges against Rahim Tamby Chik. Lim Guan Eng's appeal against the court's decision was finally dismissed on 25 August 1998. For the details of the Lim Guan Eng case, see *Aliran Monthly*, 1998:18(8), pp. 32-37 and p. 40 ("A Shameful Episode"); *FEER*, 18 June 1998 (Murray Hiebert, "Missed Opportunity"); and *The Rocket*, June 1999, pp. 43-47 ("Sedition is a serious offence...").
52. For the details of Anwar's remarks on the Lim Guan Eng case and his multiracial approach after September 2, see Fan Yew Teng, *op.cit.*, pp. 46-57.
53. See *Aliran Monthly*, 1998:18(11/12), pp. 24-25 ("Chua Detained... Again").
54. For a discussion of the alternative media in Malaysia, see Francis Loh Kok Wah and Mustafa K. Anuar, "The Press in Malaysia in the Early 1990s: Corporatisation, Technological Innovation and the Middle Class," in Muhammad Ikmal Said and Zahid Emby (eds.), *Malaysia Critical Perspectives* (Petaling Jaya: Persatuan Sains Sosial Malaysia, 1996), especially pp. 107-111.
55. For details of the role of the media and the 1990 general election, see Mustafa K. Anuar, "The Malaysian 1990 General Election: The Role of the BN Mass Media" in *Kajian Malaysia*, 1990, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 82-102.
56. Interview with Zulkifli Sulong, Group Editor of *Harakah*, Kuala Lumpur, 27 August 1999. *Harakah's* sale price per issue was then RM1.30.
57. E-mail correspondence with Francis Loh Kok Wah, Aliran Exco member, 17 June 2000.
58. In fact, the internal life of UMNO showed a series of struggles for the UMNO-top leadership and the strengthening of factional alliances since its establishment as a political party in 1946. For instance, there

- was the Onn Jaafar-Abdul Rahman conflict in the late 1940s over the party leadership. During the 1960s and 1970s, there were a number of constant leadership conflicts, which later split into the open in the 1980s and 1990s, as evidenced in Mahathir-Musa-Razaleigh tussles and Anwar-Ghafar Baba conflict respectively. An excellent overview of the UMNO leadership crisis in the 1970s is provided by Harold Crouch, "The UMNO Crisis: 1975-77" in Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong (eds.) *Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Election* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 11-36.
59. See interview with the KeADILan president Wan Azizah Wan Ismail and her deputy Chandra Muzaffar in *Asiaweek*, 16 April 1999 ("We Want to be a Bridge").
 60. Harold Crouch, "Malaysia: Do elections make a difference?" in R. H. Taylor (ed.), *The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 114.
 61. R. K. Vasil, *The Malaysian General Election of 1969* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 85-96.
 62. See Khong Kim Hoong, *Malaysia's General Election 1990: Continuity, Change, and Ethnic Politics* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), p. 15.
 63. The opposition coalition with PAS, including other small Malay political parties Hamrin and Berjasa, was called *Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah* (Muslim Community Unity Movement, APU). The other opposition coalition with DAP, including PRM and a newly formed All-Malaysia Indian Progressive Front (IPF), was called *Gagasan Rakyat Malaysia* (Malaysian People's Front, *Gagasan*).
 64. On 20 September 1999, the BA issued a statement regarding its nomination of Anwar as opposition candidate for Malaysia's prime minister. Given Anwar's six year jail sentence that began in April 1999, the BA announced that there would be an interim prime minister, if it came to power, and that it would provide a fair judicial inquiry for Anwar regarding the alleged political conspiracy against him. The BA then proposed that Anwar would lead the country once justice was delivered. For the full text of the BA statement, see <http://members.tripod.com/~mahazalimd/220999x4.html>. Posted on 22 September 1999.
 65. Mahathir dissolved parliament on 11 November 1999. The 1999 general election was held on 29 November 1999 after an eight-day-campaign period following nominations on 20 November 1999. For the full text of the common election manifesto, see Kamarudin Jaffar, *Pilihanraya 1999 Dan Masa Depan Politik Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: IKDAS, 2000), pp. 71-94.
 66. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25 and pp. 97-108.
 67. For detailed election results, see <http://www.spr.gov.my/election95.html>. For further analysis of the erosion of UMNO in the 1999 elections and its impact, see *Aliran Monthly*, 1999:19(10), pp. 2-7 (Maznah Mohamad, "UMNO And Its Partners In The New Malaysia").
 68. See Francis Loh Kok Wah, 2000, p. 6.
 69. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
 70. John Funston, "Malaysia's Tenth Elections: Status Quo, Reformasi or Islamization?," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2000, p. 50, Table 2.
 71. *Ibid.*, p. 50.
 72. Figures from the Public Relations office of the Malaysian Election Commission, via e-mail from Liew Chin Tong, Political Secretary to the Member of Parliament for Seputeh, on 12 July 2000.
 73. Loh Kok Wah, *op.cit.*, p. 11.
 74. Despite an earlier anti-establishment mood in the wake of the 1987 UMNO leadership split, the 1990 general election eventually became a fight over who or which party could better represent the Malay's political mastership. That was why Razaleigh's *Semangat 46*, after its miserable defeat in the elections, became a more Malay-centric party by claiming its mission to be defending the issue of Malayness. This finally led to the dissolution of the multi-ethnic coalition of *Semangat 46* and DAP before the next general election in 1995.
 75. Loh Kok Wah, *op.cit.*, p. 13.
 76. Przeworski, *op.cit.*, p. 50.
 77. For more details, see *Aliran Monthly*, 1999:19(11/12), pp. 2-6 (Anil Netto, "A Y2K Crackdown") and *AWSJ*, 17 January 2000 (Chandra Muzaffar, "Mahathir's Clampdown").
 78. Under the newly amended UMNO constitution, an aspiring candidate for the vice-presidency must secure 10% of nominations from the 165 divisions, that is, at least 17 nominations, to be eligible to stand as a candidate. Razaleigh had received the required 17 nominations to contest the vice-presidency but his

candidacy was rejected by the Supreme Council as the nomination from Gua Musang division was declared invalid. Gua Musang nominated Razaleigh as its vice-presidential candidate at the division's committee meeting, with the endorsement of divisional delegates' meetings rather than directly through the latter, resulting in a controversial debate over the interpretation of the UMNO constitution. For more on the Gua Musang nomination issue, see *The Star*, 14 April 2000 ("Ku Li gets ticket for vice presidency race"); 14 April 2000 ("Ku Li poser still a hot topic"); 18 April 2000 ("Gua Musang nominations declared invalid"); and 19 April 2000 ("Ku Li: It's a game where players are also referees").

79. Interview with Ahmad Shabery Chik, Canberra, 23 May 2000.
80. Personal communication with Rais Yatim, a Minister in Prime Minister's Department, Canberra, 26 May 2000. The three elected vice-presidents are Najib, Muhammad Taib and Muhyiddin Yassin. Interestingly they were in the *wawasan* team that Anwar had forged in the 1993 UMNO elections, though the current election results did not necessarily reflect support for Anwar. It is claimed that Mahathir wanted Ghani Othman, Menteri Besar of Johor, and Osu Sukam, Chief Minister of Sabah, to be elected, but both failed to win.
81. See *NST*, 22 March 2000 ("Keadilan and Parti Rakyat agree to merge").
82. Similar local BA committees, called Shadow Local Authorities, have subsequently been formed in some constituencies.
83. Harold Crouch, "Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic" in Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Garry Rodan (eds.), *Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism* (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 155.
84. In the Sanggang state assembly by-election held on 1 April 2000, UMNO retained the seat, increasing its majority from 1,038 to 1,963, despite a slight increase of Chinese votes for PAS in this Malay-dominated seat. The results showed that, to some extent, Malays had moved back to UMNO.
85. The Teluk Kemang parliamentary constituency consists of 45.4% Malays, 33.2% Chinese and 20.6% Indians. For more details of the by-election results, see *The Star*, 12 June 2000 (A. Letchumanan, "Bittersweet result for both sides").
86. It was reported that the KeADILan candidate contested the Teluk Kemang parliamentary seat, allegedly a traditional DAP seat, using the DAP's banner during the 1999 general election. For the by-election, the DAP wanted the seat back. Meanwhile, KeADILan insisted the seat now belonged to KeADILan according to the new arrangement made by leaders of BA's four component parties before the 1999 general election. It was speculated that KeADILan threatened to withdraw from BA if it failed to get to contest the Teluk Kemang by-election, though the KeADILan leadership denied such rumors. For more details, see Ng Boon Hooi, "KeADILan, not DAP, to contest Teluk Kemang," 16 May 2000, *Malaysiakini.com*. <http://www.malaysiakini.com/archieve_news/2000/may/may16/news3.htm>.
87. In fact, PAS was never really satisfied with the formation of KeADILan. Instead, PAS wanted to co-opt former UMNO leaders, including Anwar, and Muslim-based reformers into its fold. To do so, PAS leadership had invited Anwar to join PAS before he endorsed the formation of KeADILan. However, that did not succeed. That was why PAS showed its uneasiness when KeADILan was formed in April 1999 by sending a lower ranking representative to the inauguration of KeADILan, whereas DAP and PRM sent their top leaders.
88. Confidential interview, Kuala Lumpur, August 1999.
89. For example, DAP has sometimes bypassed the BA structure and sent its high official delegates to meet with the Terengganu and Kelantan state leadership to discuss the latter's policies on non-Muslims. Also, the two main inter-civilizational dialogues were organized in January and March 2000 only between DAP and PAS, excluding KeADILan.
90. Case, *op.cit.*, p. 7.
91. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 54.
92. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968).
93. O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p. 3.