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A PLOT EXPOSED

INTRODUCTION

In the Government Publication "Indonesian Intention Towards Malaysia" published in April, 1964, a detailed account was made regarding the role played by Brigadier General Gusti Pengeran Harto Djatikusumo since his arrival at Singapore as the Indonesian Consul-General on 13 November, 1958, in carrying out intelligence and subversive activities against the country in which he was stationed. The same Publication also gave a detailed account of how extremist political personalities were involved in various aspects of conspiracy to subvert and bring the then Federation of Malaya under the domination of the Sukarno regime. The most active among these persons and who worked hand in glove with the Sukarno regime and its agents, was Ahmad Boestamam, Chairman of the Partai Rakyat Malaya (People's Party of Malaya). He had maintained close association with General Djatikusumo's predecessor since 1956 for this purpose, and in the same year he appointed Ibrahim bin Haji Yaacob as the representative of Partai Rakyat of Malaya in Indonesia. In September, 1960, Ahmad Boestamam and Ishak bin Haji Mohamed, who was then Chairman of the Malayan People's Socialist Front (MPSF), supported the formation of the Gerakan Pemuda Melayu Raya (Greater Malaysia Youth Movement) the aim of which was the "restoration of the National Sovereignty of the Melayu Raya", the term "Melayu Raya" being an adaptation of the term "Indonesia Raya" (Greater Indonesia) to cater for Malay sensibilities.

2. Ahmad Boestamam was arrested and detained on 13 February, 1963, while planning an escape route from the Malay Peninsula to Indonesia. Ahmad Boestamam, who had earlier stated "I am an Indonesian. Although I was born in Malaya, my allegiance is with the Republic of Indonesia", said after his arrest, "My long-term objective is the unification of Indonesia, the Philippines, the Borneo territories, South Thailand, Malaya and Singapore into a Greater Malaysian State. I regard the armed revolution as legal if constitutional means are not available."

3. It is against this background that this paper takes up the chain of events described in the previous White Paper to show how a number of politicians in Malaysia have treacherously conspired together to bring this country under the domination of the Sukarno regime.

PART ONE

THE QUICKENING TEMPO OF INDONESIAN CONFRONTATION

INTENSIFICATION OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Arrival of R. M. Soenita in Kuala Lumpur

4. On 29 March, 1963, in the wake of mounting opposition by the Sukarno regime to the formation of Malaysia, a senior Indonesian Intelligence Officer, R. M. Soenita, arrived in Kuala Lumpur to augment General Djatikusumo's staff of subversive and intelligence operatives based at the Indonesian Embassy. Under

cover of his appointment as an Administrative Attache in the Indonesian Embassy, R. M. Soenita set about organising an intelligence network and subverting the loyalties of the Malay population, particularly those of Indonesian origin, with the object of overthrowing the Alliance Government and setting up a puppet government under the aegis of the Sukarno regime.

Recruitment of Hussain Yaacob as an Indonesian Agent

5. One of the many agents recruited by R. M. Soenita was Hussain Yaacob, a Patani Malay (one of the Southern Provinces of Thailand) working as a reporter for the leading national language newspaper, *Utusan Melayu*, which is regarded as the organ of Malay opinion in the country. Hussain Yaacob belonged to a Malay extremist movement in Southern Thailand, the aim of which was to merge the four Southern Provinces of Thailand with the eleven Malay States of the former Federation of Malaya under a new government conforming with President Sukarno's concept of Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia).

6. In May, 1963, Hussain Yaacob was invited by Yusof Aswam, a recruiting agent for "volunteers" for Indonesian West Irian campaign (arrested in early 1964 and now in detention) to attend a ceremony at the Indonesian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in honour of the 60th birthday of President Sukarno. On arrival at the Indonesian Embassy, he was introduced to two Embassy officials—Dr John Muzhar and Toh Hassan. Nothing exceptional transpired during this first meeting except that Toh Hassan expressed a desire to know Hussain Yaacob's views on the independence of Malaya and on democracy.

7. A month later in May, 1963, Hussain Yaacob was introduced by the same Yusof Aswam to R. M. Soenita who was visiting Seremban* together with Toh Hassan.

8. In June, 1963, Yusof Aswam took Hussain Yaacob to visit R. M. Soenita at the latter's house in Petaling Jaya†, Selangor, where R. M. Soenita requested Hussain Yaacob to give him an analysis of the important articles on political subjects which were published in the *Utusan Melayu* and to give a write-up on the political situation in the country.

9. In August, 1963, Hussain Yaacob visited R. M. Soenita at the latter's house on two occasions. On each occasion he was asked to find out the reaction of the people in this country and that of members of the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) to the formation of Malaysia.

10. A close contact was maintained between the two until 21 September, 1963, when R. M. Soenita returned to Indonesia following the severance of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Indonesia. During the period of their association Hussain Yaacob who had become a paid agent of R. M. Soenita, drawing a monthly payment of \$200 introduced to R. M. Soenita a number of Malay individuals and politicians including the following:

- (a) Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah bin Haji Abdul Ghani, Vice-President of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) and PMIP Commissioner for Negri Sembilan;

* Approximately 40 miles South of Kuala Lumpur.

† Approximately 6 miles West of Kuala Lumpur.

- (b) Ishak bin Haji Mohamed, Chairman of the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM) and former Chairman of the Malayan People's Socialist Front (MPSF);
- (c) Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmy, President of the PMIP.

Developments after Severance of Diplomatic Relations

11. Contact between R. M. Soenita and Hussain Yaacob was temporarily interrupted on the departure of the former for Indonesia in September, 1963, but it was soon re-established when R. M. Soenita was posted to Tanjong Pinang in the Rhio Archipelago in December, 1963. Communication was then effected through a network of couriers, which included an Indonesian Chinese known as Ah Bee who, before the imposition in April, 1964, of the ban on barter-trading between Malaysia and Indonesia, had visited Singapore frequently. The transmission of "sealed messages" between R. M. Soenita and Hussain Yaacob was through this courier network.

12. The ban on barter trade caused a temporary stoppage in the activities of this courier network, but these activities were resumed in October, 1964, and since then messages have been passed regularly between R. M. Soenita and Hussain Yaacob as well as other contacts of R. M. Soenita.

Subversive Activities of Hussain Yaacob

13. A brief summary of the subversive activities carried out by Hussain Yaacob under the direction of R. M. Soenita is given below:

(a) FORMATION OF SECRET REVOLUTIONARY ORGANISATION

14. In May, 1964, Hussain Yaacob began to organise a secret underground revolutionary organisation in the Kuala Pilah area of Negri Sembilan.

15. During the same month Hussain Yaacob visited Kelantan where, through a contact, he recruited five Malays for military and sabotage training at Sukabumi in West Java. Meanwhile two Malays from Selangor, two from Negri Sembilan and one from Kampong Paka in Trengganu, were recruited through the efforts of Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah for similar training in Indonesia. These ten Malays left the Malay Peninsula for Sukabumi via Singapore in July, 1964, through arrangements made by Hussain Yaacob. The trainees were instructed to organise secret underground organisations in their respective areas and to send further "volunteers" for training in Indonesia on their return. Nine of the trainees returned to Malaysia in November, 1964, and five of them have since been arrested.

(b) ESTABLISHMENT OF LANDING ZONES AND BASES FOR INDONESIAN INVADERS

16. Following the receipt of a directive from R. M. Soenita to look for suitable landing zones for sea-borne Indonesian incursions, Hussain Yaacob selected Kuala Linggi and Kuala Sepang in Negri Sembilan, Dungun and Paka in Trengganu, and Banting in Selangor. In addition, Ulu Kongsu in the Paka District

of Trengganu was recommended as a suitable place for the setting up of a base for infiltrators. In this connection, it is noteworthy that one of the trainees recruited by Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah is from Kampong Paka, Trengganu, and is still in Indonesia.

(c) FORMATION OF RECEPTION COMMITTEES FOR
INDONESIAN INFILTRATORS

17. To facilitate Indonesian infiltrations, Reception Committees were formed in Banting, Selangor and in Dungun and Paka, Trengganu. The Reception Committee in Banting was formed by Datu Kampo Radjo, and those in Dungun and Paka by friends of the trainee who is still in Indonesia.

18. On 18 January, 1965, Hussain Yaacob warned R. M. Soenita not to land further Indonesian troops along the West Coast of Johore because of the reverses suffered by the early Indonesian landings. On the other hand, he suggested that plans should be made to turn the Natuna Islands (which belong to Indonesia) off the East Coast of the Malay Peninsula into staging posts for future Indonesian incursions on the East Coast of the Malay Peninsula.

(d) REQUEST FOR ARMS FROM INDONESIA

19. In January, 1965, Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah requested R. M. Soenita to despatch light automatic weapons to Paka and Dungun in Trengganu. However, there is no indication that the weapons have been sent.

INDONESIAN FINANCIAL AID DURING THE ELECTIONS OF 1964

20. The main issue in the last Elections which were held in the eleven States in the Malay Peninsula on 25 April, 1964, was a plain and clear-cut one of Malaysia. Because of this, the Sukarno regime provided substantial financial assistance to political parties, such as the MPSF and the PMIP which opposed the formation of Malaysia. The details of this financial assistance are set out below.

21. In December, 1963, on completion of his training in Medan, Sumatra, Kassim bin Ahmad, the Vice-Chairman of the Ulu Pandan Branch, Partai Rakyat Singapore, and a former official of the Bukit Timah Branch of the Peninsula Malay Union in Singapore, received \$10,000 from the Sukarno regime to subsidize Partai Rakyat in its pro-Sukarno subversive activities, together with a credit note for \$6,000 for Jailani Sulaiman, Secretary-General of the National Convention Party (NCP) for expenses involved in finding suitable accommodation for Indonesian infiltrators. After his return to Malaysia in late February, 1964, he delivered the credit note for \$6,000 to Jailani Sulaiman in Kuala Lumpur and shortly later delivered the sum of \$5,000 to Tajuddin Kahar, Secretary-General of Partai Rakyat Malaya in Johore Bahru. Even then Tajuddin Kahar expressed the opinion that the chances of the opposition parties including Partai Rakyat Malaya winning the Elections were remote and that therefore they had to resort to armed revolution to overthrow the Malaysian Government. He also expressed the hope that the Sukarno regime should seriously consider invading the Malay Peninsula particularly near Polling Day. Furthermore, Tajuddin Kahar in March, 1964, wrote to

Major Manan, an Indonesian intelligence officer in Medan, Sumatra, requesting \$200,000 for the Partai Rakyat Malaya to contest the Elections. The courier was arrested en route.

22. In a statement made after his arrest, Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah admitted that he had received a total of \$105,000 from the Sukarno regime as financial aid for PMIP election expenses during the last Elections. The payment was channelled through a member of the staff of the Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, and brought in several instalments by a courier to Penang where, according to Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah, the money was collected by a member of the PMIP. Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah himself accompanied this member on one occasion going from Kuala Lumpur to Penang to meet the courier at the Peking Hotel in Penang. All the money was handed to Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah who then distributed various sums to the different PMIP candidates contesting the elections.

23. Nazar Nong, who became Acting Chairman of Partai Rakyat Malaya after Ahmad Boestamam's arrest in February, 1963, received a total sum of \$145,000 as financial aid from Sukarno regime in five instalments in March and April, 1964. The money was directed through the Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok through a courier. The Sukarno regime had originally agreed to grant a sum of \$250,000 to Partai Rakyat Malaya to meet its election expenses, but eventually only \$145,000 were delivered.

24. Ishak bin Haji Mohamed admitted that he had received \$5,000 from the Sukarno regime through Hussain Yaacob for his expenses in contesting the Elections. In addition to this, he received from Hussain Yaacob small sums of money from time to time for his own personal use.

25. The land-slide victory of the Alliance Party in the Elections clearly show that the people have made their own choice and have chosen Malaysia. To the disgruntled pro-Sukarno leaders of the opposition, here was a clear indication that they could not hope to make any headway in a democratic constitutional process to put themselves into power, so they sought the only alternative—that of subversion, sedition and eventual armed revolt to overthrow the democratically elected constitutional government, and they hoped to achieve this with the aid of the Sukarno regime.

INDONESIAN LANDINGS ON THE MALAY PENINSULA

26. Other events of significance took place in the Malay Peninsula which were closely connected with the subversive activities listed above. The conspirators must have been sending glowing reports of their own progress in the underground activities in the early part of 1964 which the Sukarno regime would seem to have accepted as basis for their planning, for soon the "confrontation" of Malaysia took a new turn in the form of direct military incursion on the Malay Peninsula itself.

27. On 17 August, 1964, Sukarno's forces landed in three parties by boat in the Pontian area of south-west Johore. This was followed on 2 September, 1964, by air-borne landings in the Labis area of Johore. On 29 October, 1964, there was another sea-borne landing at the mouth of the Kesang River along the Malacca-Johore border. Jakarta's attention then switched to the East Coast of Johore when a sea-borne landing took place on 15 November,

1964, at the Kuala Sedili area, after which its attention returned to the Straits of Malacca with a sea-borne landing on 10 December, 1964, in the Semerah area of Batu Pahat District, Johore. On 23 December, 1964, Sukarno's forces made another sea-borne landing near Kuala Buntu in the Pontian District of Johore, and on the following day, 22 armed invaders in seven motor boats were intercepted and captured while heading into the North Channel, Port Swettenham, Selangor.

28. There were other minor attempts at sabotage and infiltration in the southern part of the Malay Peninsula and Singapore during the same period.

29. All these acts of aggression proved abortive with the complete elimination of the armed infiltrators within a comparatively short period, often within a day or two, after landing. The expected Reception Committees had been disrupted by prior Police action, and the local inhabitants rendered ready assistance to the Security Forces in rounding up the infiltrators.

30. Meanwhile, Indonesian radio stations, some of which masquerading under assumed names indicating association with supposedly indigenous anti-Malaysia movements in Malaysia, were blaring out reports of fictitious successes of the Indonesian infiltrators and alleged public support for them. According to some of these highly imaginative broadcasts, parts of the Malay Peninsula were occupied by the so-called "volunteers" within days of their landing and droves of local inhabitants rushed to join their ranks. It would seem that the Sukarno regime was so encouraged by the fictitious results that its propagandist machines repeated the boastful announcement made by President Sukarno that Malaysia would have been crushed by the time "when the sun rises on 1 January, 1965." *

31. In view of the crushing defeat of his forces in Malaysia President Sukarno ordered the massing of troops along the Borneo frontier as well as in forward island bases flanking Singapore and the South-West coast of the Malay Peninsula in order to revive the momentum of the "confrontation."

PART TWO

THE PLOT TAKES SHAPE

THE PATTERN OF INDONESIAN AGGRESSION

32. An analysis of the hydra-headed attack against Malaysia by the Sukarno regime shows that its plans may be briefly classified under five main categories:

- (a) *Military*—Massing of troops on the Sarawak and Sabah border, and in forward island bases off Sumatra in the Straits of Malacca as well as the Rhio Archipelago south of Singapore, in readiness for launching further military attacks and landings against Malaysia. The main objective is to pose a military threat as part of Jakarta's war of nerves rather than to obtain actual military results, but should the opportunity present itself massive military action cannot be precluded.

* National Resurrection Day speech on May 20, 1964, in Djakarta—Reuter.

- (b) *Diplomatic*—Intensification of the diplomatic campaign to prevent Malaysia from participating in the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference and to isolate her internationally. A new move is noticed in the form of exploiting individuals belonging to some political parties opposed to the Government particularly those disgruntled and unsuccessful pro-Sukarno politicians with the object of using them as the mouthpiece of the Sukarno regime. This mouthpiece will then form a Government-in-Exile serving as a facade for President Sukarno's so-called war of liberation directed against Malaysia.
- (c) *Subversive*—Intensification and consolidation of subversive activities in Malaysia, by the formation, again by unsuccessful and disgruntled pro-Sukarno politicians in the country, of a so-called National Front as a complement to the so-called "Malayan" Government-in-Exile, in order to:
- (i) Direct subversive activities in Malaysia and co-ordinate these activities with Indonesian infiltrations and landings;
 - (ii) Give substance to the so-called "Malayan" Government-in-Exile to be set up under the aegis of the Sukarno regime;
 - (iii) Lend credibility to the propaganda claiming that President Sukarno was sending "volunteers" to help the people of Malaysia liberate themselves from neo-colonialism;
 - (iv) Create internal disorder and chaos, by sabotage, assassination and inter-communal riots in Malaysia;
 - (v) Render all assistance to future Indonesian landings;
 - (vi) Finally to stage an armed revolution with the aim of setting up a government of their own under the aegis of the Sukarno regime.
- (d) *Economic*—Severance of the large volume of trade between Indonesia and Malaysia even at considerable sacrifice to Indonesia's own economic interests, in order to cause hardship particularly to the people of Singapore and Penang. This is supplemented by blatant acts of piracy in the Straits of Malacca, attacking, killing and kidnapping Malaysian fishermen whose boats are also confiscated and later utilised for the purpose of landing armed infiltrators on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula.
- (e) *Psychological*—A common objective of the above four categories is to wage a war of nerves in order to wear down the resistance of the people of Malaysia. The following are the basic ingredients of the psychological warfare campaign:
- (i) Threat of war to exploit normal popular desire for peace and to agitate public resistance to National Service, increase in taxation, the Internal Security Act and other government measures the purpose of which is solely to safeguard national security in the face of Indonesian aggression;
 - (ii) Agitation to exacerbate inter-communal distrust in Malaysia in order to split national unity and to play upon regional interests in order to undermine the authority of the Central Government of Malaysia;

- (iii) Exploitation of sabotage activities to provide ground for wild rumours in order to cause public disorder and eventually to paralyse the normal civil and administrative functions in various localities in the country;
- (iv) Agitating and rallying all opposition elements of whatever political persuasion or creed to oppose and eventually to overthrow the existing popularly elected Malaysian Government.

Communalism

33. In addition to the methods of attack described above, the Sukarno regime assisted by its local agents, has been actively agitating mutual distrust and racial hatred between the various races that comprise the plural society of Malaysia. By this, the Sukarno regime hopes to create internal dissension which would lead to inter-racial disturbances involving blood-shed and thereby bring about political instability and economic chaos.

34. There is concrete evidence to show that underground organisations which were set up by the Sukarno regime in Singapore for this task were responsible for the racial disturbances in Singapore during July and September, 1964. The work of these organisations was supplemented by vicious and malicious propaganda disseminated from Indonesia through the radio and through anti-racial pamphlets distributed in Singapore.

35. A salient characteristic of the present campaign is that it follows closely Indonesia's previous campaign to "liberate" West Irian, in which, through adroit psychological warfare, the maximum diplomatic and operational effect was extracted from a minimum of actual military activities. Hence the tactic of "fighting and talking" at the same time. This accounts for the refusal of the Sukarno regime to withdraw its troops from Malaysian soil and to stop its blatant aggression against Malaysia and at the same time offering to negotiate "without pre-condition" while insisting on its own pre-condition that Malaysia should negotiate with it at its gun-point.

THE DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

36. The Summit Conference held by Tunku Abdul Rahman, President Sukarno and President Macapagal in Tokyo on 20th June, 1964, ended in a deadlock on the same evening, over President Sukarno's refusal to withdraw his troops from Malaysia until a political settlement had been reached between the two countries. Finally President Macapagal suggested the establishment of a Four-Nation Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission which could study the problems existing among the three parties and to submit recommendations for their solution.

37. President Sukarno declared his acceptance of the proposal and gave assurances that he would abide by the recommendations of the Commission. It may be recalled that President Sukarno had given similar assurances in the Manila Agreement signed by Tunku Abdul Rahman, President Macapagal and President Sukarno on 31st July, 1963, to abide by the findings of U Thant's fact-finding mission for Sarawak and Sabah but because they did not meet with his own wishes he rejected its recommendations.

38. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman also agreed with the proposal in principle but "with the proviso that all acts of hostilities against Malaysia must cease forthwith." President Sukarno refused to accept the proviso and left the conference for a television interview. He returned two hours later and launched a tirade against Malaysia which brought the conference to an end. His Foreign Minister Dr Subandrio made a statement that his Government no longer considered itself bound to any previous agreements so that "confrontation" against Malaysia would be "intensified".*

39. Nevertheless, the proposal of a Four-Nation Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission had been accepted in principle. President Sukarno then concentrated his efforts to influence Afro-Asian opinion against Malaysia.

40. The Second Conference of Non-Aligned Nations was held in Cairo on 5th October, 1964. President Sukarno himself led a large delegation to the Conference which was preceded by an extensive Indonesian propaganda campaign against Malaysia in all Afro-Asian countries. Although Malaysia was not represented at this Conference a considerable number of delegations showed sympathy for and understanding of the Malaysian position. This was reflected in the Cairo Declaration which upheld the principles, *inter alia*, of peaceful co-existence, respect for territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. President Sukarno did not sign this Declaration.†

41. A major event in Africa and Asia will be the 2nd Conference of Afro-Asian Nations to be held in Algiers which originally was scheduled to be held in January, 1965. It has now been postponed to June, 1965.

42. Since the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in October, 1964, there has been an increasing support for Malaysia among the Afro-Asian countries. Apprehensive at the possibility of its anti-Malaysia policy being rejected at the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference the Sukarno regime began to implement its plan of forming a "Malayan" Government-in-Exile.

* Statement made to the Press in Jakarta, June 22, 1964—Reuter.

† Extract of relevant principles of The Cairo Declaration of 10th October, 1964.

Peaceful Co-existence and the Codification of its Principles by the United Nations.

Principle 5. States must abstain from all use of threat or force directed against the territorial integrity and political independence of other States; a situation brought about by the threat or use of force shall not be recognised, and in particular the established frontiers of States shall be inviolable. Accordingly, every State must abstain from interfering in the affairs of other States, whether openly, or insidiously, or by means of subversion and the various forms of political, economic and military pressure. Frontier disputes shall be settled by peaceful means. Moreover they declare that it is the duty of states not to recognise any situation brought about by the threat or use of force in violation of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Principle 7. All international conflicts must be settled by peaceful means, in a spirit of mutual understanding and on the basis of equality and sovereignty, in such a manner that justice and legitimate rights are not impaired, all States must apply themselves to promoting and strengthening measures designed to diminish international tension and achieve general and complete disarmament.

43. The following events are closely connected with the next move made by the Sukarno regime :

- (a) The attempt made by Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, Chairman of the National Convention Party (NCP) and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi, Chairman of the Malayan People's Socialist Front (MPSF) to attend the Cairo Conference.
- (b) The visit of Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah, Vice-Chairman of the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP) to Tokyo ostensibly to attend the Olympic Games in October, 1964.
- (c) Decision made by the Government to send a Malaysian Delegation to attend the forthcoming Algiers Conference.

Visit of Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi to Cairo

44. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi, went to Cairo with the intention of attending the 2nd Conference of Non-Aligned Nations. The background of this may be traced to on or about 21 September, 1964, when according to Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, a leading member of the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM) met him and suggested that he (Abdul Aziz bin Ishak) should represent the Malayan People's Socialist Front (MPSF) at the Cairo Conference. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak replied that he could hardly do so because he had no invitation from the organisers and was not in a position to arrange for such an invitation. This person said that he would try to arrange for an invitation.

45. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak then suggested that he would require the assistance of an active, energetic and intelligent person to attend the Conference, and that he had in mind the Chairman of the Socialist Front, Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi. According to Abdul Aziz bin Ishak the LPM member undertook to persuade Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi for this purpose.

46. The question of expenses was then discussed. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak disclosed that he had only about \$1,500 which would not be sufficient. He was advised to arrange with a travel agency to pay for his journey by instalments, and he was promised repayment.

47. A meeting was held towards the end of September, 1964, at the Socialist Front Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur during which talking points, newspaper cuttings and other material were made ready for Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi so that he and Abdul Aziz bin Ishak would be adequately prepared to carry out their task of convincing the Afro-Asian countries that their assistance was needed by the people of Malaysia to rid themselves of the existing "British-controlled" government.

What Happened in Cairo

48. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak left for Singapore on 2 October, 1964, where he was joined by Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi. They left Singapore on the same day by air and arrived at Cairo on the following morning, where they were placed under quarantine owing to their health papers not being in order. They made no contact with Malaysian Embassy staff in Cairo while under quarantine. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak was released from quarantine on 6 October, 1964, and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi a day later.

49. A telegram had been sent from Malaysia in advance by the MPSF Secretary-General, Tajuddin Kahar, to the Conference authorities in Cairo to facilitate the admission of the two representatives to the Conference. Immediately upon his release from quarantine, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak contacted various officials of the United Arab Republic to gain admission to the Conference but was unsuccessful. Accommodation was short in Cairo at that time and Abdul Aziz bin Ishak had to put up in the cabin of the steamship Lotus on the River Nile where Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi joined him a day later. Both of them then tried their best to gain admission into the Conference but all their attempts were in vain.

50. They then tried to contact delegates to the Conference outside the Conference hall, but again the attempt brought no results apart from a few chance encounters during which nothing useful was discussed. Meanwhile they somehow managed to obtain accommodation at the Hotel Longchamps where certain Indonesian officials attending the Conference also had rooms.

Secret Meeting with General Djatikusumo

51. On the evening of 8th October, 1964, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi were visited by an Indonesian official who introduced himself as the private secretary to General Djatikusumo and who declared that he had been sent to meet them to arrange for their meeting with General Djatikusumo on the following morning. They agreed to the meeting but preferred it to take place away from the Indonesian Embassy in order to avoid attracting attention. On the next morning they were taken by an Indonesian official in a private car which drove around the town before stopping at a private house where they met the private secretary and General Djatikusumo himself.

52. According to Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, although the atmosphere was cordial, it appeared to him that during the meeting General Djatikusumo was trying to "dictate terms" to him. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak told General Djatikusumo that he and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi had come to Cairo as representatives of the MPSF to attend the Conference, but that they could not gain admission to the Conference. General Djatikusumo replied that since the Conference was by then almost over, it was pointless in pursuing the matter further. He did not offer any assistance to Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi to gain admission at all.

53. General Djatikusumo then asked Abdul Aziz bin Ishak about events in Malaysia. General Djatikusumo appeared impressed by what Abdul Aziz bin Ishak told him and enquired about Abdul Aziz bin Ishak's plans. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak stated that he planned to leave Cairo for Jeddah, Algeria and, if possible, Ghana, but that these plans were still indefinite.

Suggestions Regarding Forthcoming Conference in Algiers

54. General Djatikusumo then disclosed that a Conference would soon be held in Algeria and asked what assistance this Conference could provide for Socialist leaders in "neo-colonialist" and newly independent countries. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak replied that this was the first occasion he heard of the forthcoming 2nd Afro-Asian Conference to be held in Algiers, and that off-handedly he could not think of what assistance he and his colleagues would

require. General Djatikusumo then informed Abdul Aziz bin Ishak that he would be leaving Cairo on the following night (9 October, 1964) with President Sukarno for Paris, and that he would get in touch with the latter but did not specify when, where and how this would be done. The meeting lasted about half an hour, at the end of which Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi were taken by car back to their hotel.

55. On the following night Abdul Aziz bin Ishak received a telephone call from General Djatikusumo proposing another meeting that night. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi readily agreed. But when the Indonesian official arrived at their hotel to take them to the venue of the meeting, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak had two local radio and news reporters and an official of the Malaysian Embassy in Cairo in his room. He panicked at the arrival of the Indonesian official and told Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi to tell the Indonesian official that under the circumstances he could not attend the meeting as arranged.

56. It would seem that the attempts by Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi to gain admission into the Cairo Conference was carried out without co-ordination with the Indonesian delegation. However, their presence in Cairo provided the Sukarno regime with a further opportunity to use them for their purpose. This would make it appear that there is credence in President Sukarno's claim that Malaysia is opposed by the people in the country.

57. President Sukarno was very much in need of evidence to support his claim that Malaysia was "neo-colonialist" and opposed by the people of that country. Already he must have sensed that there is every possibility that Malaysia would be invited to the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference. If Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi could be persuaded to stay overseas and together with a few other political leaders would form a "Malayan" Government-in-Exile, President Sukarno would then be emboldened to press for the participation in that Conference of the "Malayan" Government-in-Exile as the legitimate Government of the people of Malaya and Singapore while A. M. Azahari * would represent the Government of the Unitary State of North Kalimantan comprising Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei.

Indonesian Attempts to induce Abdul Aziz bin Ishak not to return to Malaysia

58. During his return journey from Cairo, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak stopped at Jeddah where he was told by an Indonesian who claimed to be an ex-Malayan that he (Aziz) would be arrested upon his return to Malaysia. Later on when he stopped over at Karachi, he was again warned of his impending arrest by a Sukarno agent who tried to induce him to wait there for the arrival of an unspecified Indonesian official from Djakarta to discuss

* A. M. Azahari was active in Brunei politics although he is not a Brunei subject. He collaborated with the Sukarno regime to stage a rebellion in Brunei on December 8th, 1962, claiming himself to be the Prime Minister of the exile Government of the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara which is an Indonesian term for the States of Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei. A discredited character, Azahari did not gain the support which he claimed to have and his rebellion was condemned by all political parties in Sabah and Sarawak. The rebellion fizzled out after a few days.

some matters of importance. However, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak left Karachi for New Delhi without meeting this official. At New Delhi Airport, he was again met by the same agent who introduced him to an Indonesian official who was also a member of the Indonesian Parliament (People's Representative Assembly Gotong Royong). This Indonesian official repeated the warning to Abdul Aziz bin Ishak that the latter would be arrested by the Malaysian authorities upon his return to Malaysia and tried to persuade him to stay back and have further "talks".

The Idea of a Government-in-Exile

59. The Indonesian official told Abdul Aziz bin Ishak that while Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah was in Tokyo during the recent Olympics the latter contacted high Indonesian officials there and suggested that Indonesia should initiate the formation of a "Malayan" Government-in-Exile. The Indonesian official asked Abdul Aziz bin Ishak to remain longer in New Delhi because he had several issues to discuss with Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, who was also told that the Sukarno regime would be quite willing to finance a tour by him to any country he liked as long as he liked. Moreover he would also be made a member of this Exile Government.

60. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak claimed that he turned down the offer because he had to return to Malaysia where he had various family commitments.

Abdul Aziz bin Ishak's Activities on his Return

61. Upon his return to Malaysia Abdul Aziz bin Ishak discussed his trip with Ishak bin Haji Mohamed, and told him about his (Aziz) having been contacted by Indonesian officials on his return journey. Meanwhile Hussain Yaacob received instructions from R. M. Soenita to contact Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and to find out Abdul Aziz bin Ishak's reactions to the Indonesian approaches. Hussain Yaacob could not go to Penang to see Abdul Aziz bin Ishak then, but later on when he met Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, the latter merely mentioned that he had met several Indonesian officials at the Conference in Cairo but did not elaborate, the reason being that by this time Abdul Aziz bin Ishak was becoming suspicious of Hussain Yaacob and Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah. In particular, he suspected Hussain Yaacob of being a government agent.

62. However, the conspirators considered Abdul Aziz bin Ishak so important in their plan that between December, 1964, and January, 1965, they visited him in his Penang home on no less than five occasions—one visit by Ishak bin Haji Mohamed and four by Datu Kampo Radjo whom Abdul Aziz bin Ishak trusted. The latter assured Abdul Aziz bin Ishak of the trustworthiness of Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah and Hussain Yaacob. When Datu Kampo Radjo read from the newspapers on 1 January, 1965, about Djakarta's announcement that she would quit the United Nations Organisation if Malaysia assumed her seat in the United Nations Security Council, his sense of urgency was quickened because he felt the situation would worsen and the Malaysian Government would become more vigilant and would act against persons whom it suspected of having dealings with the Sukarno regime. He was

therefore anxious to get Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and other "representatives" for the forthcoming Algiers Conference out of the country as soon as possible to avoid the possibility of their being arrested by the authorities.

63. Another person who was anxious to discover Abdul Aziz bin Ishak's reactions to Djakarta's overtures made during his Cairo trip was Dr Burhanuddin. He went to Penang to see Abdul Aziz bin Ishak after the latter's return. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak told Dr Burhanuddin that the latter should accompany him to the forthcoming Conference in Algiers for the purpose of persuading the Afro-Asian countries to regard Malaysia as a "neo-colonialist plot". Abdul Aziz bin Ishak emphasised that if Dr Burhanuddin agreed to the proposal, both of them should make plans to leave the country in good time before the Conference, so as to be able to visit various Afro-Asian countries in advance of the Conference to canvass support for their cause. Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah was informed of this by Dr Burhanuddin during one of his meetings with the latter at the house of a member of the PMIP in Kuala Lumpur some time in November/December, 1964.

Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah's Visit to Tokyo, Japan

64. The 18th Olympic Games was held in Tokyo, Japan on 10 to 24 October, 1964. Some time before that Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah received several letters from R. M. Soenita delivered through Hussain Yaacob instructing him to go to Tokyo ostensibly to attend the Olympics. The actual object was however to meet certain high officials of the Sukarno regime who would also be ostensibly attending the Olympics in Tokyo, to discuss anti-Malaysia activities. According to him "I did not have sufficient fund, then. However, my close friend, Enche' Mohd. Asri, who is now Menteri Besar of Kelantan, gave me a loan of over \$1,000 to enable me to go to Tokyo." He arrived at Tokyo on 21 September, 1964, and left on 6 October, 1964, before the opening of the Olympic Games.

65. Prior to leaving for Tokyo Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah discussed his secret mission with Dr Burhanuddin and Ishak bin Haji Mohamed who each gave him a letter of introduction giving him full mandate to discuss anti-Malaysia activities, particularly the formation of a Government-in-Exile, with R. M. Soenita in Tokyo. They also advised Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah not to return to Malaysia but to proceed to Indonesia and remain there after his Tokyo mission. It would therefore seem that the idea of getting out of the country had already been conceived by the conspirators at this juncture.

66. Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah in a statement following his arrest admitted that he met R. M. Soenita and another senior Indonesian official on two occasions during his stay in Tokyo and discussed with them the proposal to form a Government-in-Exile and a National Front as well as the question of financial aid from Djakarta for anti-Malaysia activities. He was offered \$30,000 cash on the spot but he requested that this money be sent to him through a courier as he was afraid of having this large sum of money on his person in the event of his being searched at the airport on his return to Malaysia.

67. Upon his return he reported to Dr Burhanuddin, Ishak bin Haji Mohamed and Hussain Yaacob what had transpired in Tokyo.

Government's Decision to send Delegation to Algiers Conference

68. During the Budget Session of Parliament held in November, 1964, in Kuala Lumpur, it was made known by Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah to a member of the PMIP, that the Malaysian Government would be sending representatives to attend the Afro-Asian Conference scheduled to be held in Algiers in March, 1965, and that one of the Malaysian representatives would be selected from members of the opposition.

69. A meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the PMIP was held on or around 23 December at the PMIP Headquarters in Kuala Lumpur to discuss this question. Dr Burhanuddin, Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah and that a member of the PMIP were present. The meeting decided that the PMIP, being in the opposition, should not agree to the inclusion of a PMIP representative in the Government Delegation, but should send its own representative instead. No name was nominated for this separate PMIP representative during the meeting.

70. On or about 16 January, 1965, Dr Burhanuddin met Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah at the house of the previously mentioned member of the PMIP during the evening. Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah reminded Dr Burhanuddin to be prepared to attend the forthcoming 2nd Afro-Asian Conference at Algiers. Dr Burhanuddin replied that his passport was in order but he was not in a position to go owing to financial difficulties. Later in the same evening, Dr Burhanuddin met Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and discussed the proposed trip to attend the 2nd Afro-Asian Conference with Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, Hussain Yaacob and Datu Kampo Radjo. Hussain Yaacob suggested that Dr Burhanuddin should be prepared to attend the Conference where the three leaders should issue a proclamation on the formation of a "Malayan" Government-in-Exile.

71. According to a statement made by Dr Burhanuddin after his arrest on 28 January, 1965, his standing as a political leader required something more substantial than an empty emigre Government-in-Exile which had no control over events in Malaysia. He asserted that no politician of his standing would venture to entertain such a move as had been made by A. M. Azahari when the latter proclaimed the formation of a Government-in-Exile for the so-called Unitary State of North Kalimantan in Manila in December, 1962. So the idea was born to form a National Front to co-ordinate subversive activities in the Malay Peninsula as a counter-part to, and in co-ordination with, the Government-in-Exile abroad. This seems to have satisfied even the fastidious sensibilities of Dr Burhanuddin, for he readily made himself available to go on the trip abroad.

FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL FRONT

72. Ishak bin Haji Mohammed stated that he had already heard about the National Front (Front Nasional) some time after the 1964 Elections and believed that it was a secret movement. On

and off he was approached by persons connected with this National Front for his opinion. They were Dr Burhanuddin, Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, Datu Kampo Radjo and Hussain Yaacob. He did not commit himself on the subject of the National Front then because he did not want to be directly involved in such activities which he also believed to have been connected with pro-Sukarno activities judging by the personalities involved.

73. Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah admitted that some time immediately after the Elections held in April, 1964, together with another member of the PMIP, he approached one or two PMIP leaders in each of the States of Pahang, Trengganu, Kelantan, Penang, Perak, Kedah, Johore, Malacca and Selangor, to organise underground movements in their respective States. He used to obtain advice on the formation of the underground organisation from Dr Burhanuddin who often advised him to be cautious in carrying out the organisation's work. However, he claimed that he did not know how much progress had been made in such activities, as later on he was mainly occupied in arranging to send Dr Burhanuddin, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Ishak bin Haji Mohamed on the proposed Afro-Asian tour. On 7 December, 1964, Datu Kampo Radjo wrote from Kuala Lumpur to R. M. Soenita in Indonesia reporting that he had been contacted by Hussain Yaacob on the formation of the National Front. He had in turn discussed the matter with Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, Ishak bin Haji Mohamed and Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah, and an unanimous agreement had been reached. He expressed the hope that the task would be carried out after Hari Raya Puasa* which fell on 3 February, 1965.

74. Meanwhile Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah received instructions from R. M. Soenita in December, 1964, to take the initiative in forming a National Front to consist of all opposition political leaders and personalities in the Malay Peninsula. On or around 13 December, 1964, Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah said that he received a telephone call from Tajuddin Kahar to attend a meeting at the Golden Hill Hotel at Klang Road, Kuala Lumpur which was attended by Hussain Yaacob (representing Ishak bin Haji Mohamed), Tajuddin Kahar, Datu Kampo Radjo (representing Abdul Aziz bin Ishak), Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah (representing Dr Burhanuddin) and a member of the PMIP.

75. Hussain Yaacob revealed during the meeting that there was a letter from Indonesia addressed to Ishak bin Haji Mohamed requesting the formation of a National Front as soon as possible and with the support of Abdul Aziz bin Ishak.

76. This meeting agreed in principle to form the National Front and to convey this decision to the leaders whom the participants represented. The meeting also agreed to send Dr Burhanuddin, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Ishak bin Haji Mohamed abroad as the representatives of the National Front.

77. According to Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah, another meeting was held at Tajuddin Kahar's house in Petaling Jaya about a week later. All those present at the first meeting also attended this meeting. Datu Kampo Radjo reported that Abdul Aziz bin Ishak

* Aidil-Fitri—Muslim festival marking the end of the fasting month.

had agreed to go abroad and that the latter would inform Hussain Yaacob as soon as he had decided on the date of his departure. This meeting also decided that Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, Dr Burhanuddin and Ishak bin Haji Mohamed should attend the forthcoming 2nd Afro-Asian Conference.

78. On 7 January, 1965, at the suggestion of Hussain Yaacob, Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah wrote a cryptic letter to R. M. Soenita reporting the formation of the National Front which had the approval of Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, and requesting financial aid for the project. The following is a translation of the relevant excerpts from this letter:

"Matters concerning the "NAS" Front's Shop have been discussed and the friends have agreed that it should be implemented by co-operative method, but this was not made official due to tactical reasons. By the Will of God, we may be able to meet in Karachi. How about Bangkok? Probably the climate there may be hot? We here are following the move taken by 'ayah' to quit the United Nations. The people here are getting disgusted. Prices of commodities are beginning to rise. We are forced to think of a method of playing rough. The longer the delay, the more our friends will be trapped. Therefore, I hope you will be able to get a large sum of money ready in order that preparations may be made. It is imperative that our representatives should be sent out first before....."

79. It is clear that an attempt was made to disguise the contents of the letter. Although the last sentence is unfinished, it is obvious that Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah was worried that the three representatives of the National Front might be arrested before they could leave the country.

Destination Karachi

80. On 11 January, 1965, R. M. Soenita, following the receipt of Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah's letter, wrote to Ishak bin Haji Mohammed as follows:

"I jubilantly welcome the formation of the Front. Let us hope that its members will not be drawn from the Opposition groups only, but also from the broad masses of men, women, youths, intellectuals and others.

"I just want to know for certain when the elder gentlemen are coming to meet us, so as to enable me to get everything ready and to render all assistance. Destination Karachi! As for you, I think it is better that you come along also. The question whether to return (to Malaysia) or not will be brought before a meeting at which everything will be discussed in detail. It is hoped that this question will be settled smoothly. Amen. But I earnestly hope that the meeting will be on, in the interest of the struggle of the elder gentlemen and the friends here, and also in the interest of the realisation of a new world.

"I hope, if possible, your representative who is to meet me in Bangkok will come between 28 and 30 January, 1965. I hope you will give me his name and photograph, and also let me know the person he usually contacts in Bangkok, so that it will be much easier for me to contact him".

81. On the same day in a letter addressed to Hussain Yaacob, R. M. Soenita said, among other things:

"Che Jusof (code name for Hussain Yaacob) requested the meeting at Bangkok to be held in the middle of the fasting month (i.e. January, 1965), but Salleh (code name for Ishak bin Haji Mohamed) asked it to be held in the middle of February. If possible it is better to hold it between 28th to 30th January, 1965. I want the photograph of the

courier and his name. The venue of the rendezvous is as indicated by Pak Salleh (code name of Ishak bin Haji Mohamed). If agreed, please let me know immediately so that I can get ready.

"Regarding the meeting at Karachi, I request that the date be positively ascertained in order to enable me to get everything ready including assistance for expenses for the trip".

82. In another letter on the same day addressed to Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah under the latter's code name of Doctor Hady, R. M. Soenita said, among other things:

"Thank God and I am happy that the Front's shop has been established. Its members will not only be drawn from party members but also from the broad masses, organisations, intellectuals, men, women and progressive youths, who share the same struggle as our leaders. Besides facilitating to unite the opposition parties, it will also draw and influence the abovementioned masses for the purpose of strengthening the Front. It is hoped that we shall meet soon in Karachi and be able to have a lengthy discussion together. I have heard from Che Yusof (code name for Hussain Yaacob) that your Towkay (code name for Dr Burhanuddin) will also be coming to meet us. Is this true? I hope to get the information on this early. As for our meeting, it is hoped that Che A (code name for Abdul Aziz bin Ishak) and Pak Salleh (code name for Ishak bin Haji Mohamed) will also be in attendance".

83. On the same day, 11 January, 1965, R. M. Soenita also wrote letters to Datu Kampo Radjo and his other contacts expressing satisfaction at the formation of the National Front and the hope that its membership would not be confined to members of opposition political parties only.

Plans of the National Front

84. On 14 January, 1965, a meeting of the same plotters was held at the house of Tajuddin Kahar at Petaling Jaya, during which it was disclosed that the consent and agreement of Dr Burhanuddin, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Ishak bin Haji Mohamed had been obtained for the formation of the National Front. The meeting decided that:

(a) The objectives of the National Front should be:

- (i) to make known to the people of the whole world that Malaysia was a British plot;
- (ii) to overthrow the existing Alliance Government in Malaysia and to replace it with a pro-Sukarno Government.

(b) Dr Burhanuddin, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak and Ishak bin Haji Mohamed who had agreed to form the National Front, should leave the country as soon as possible to tour the Afro-Asian countries in general, and to visit Karachi, Algiers, Cairo, London and Bangkok in particular, to announce that Malaysia was a British plot imposed upon the people against their wishes, and that they were the genuine representatives of the people seeking assistance against this British plot.

(c) Other leaders of the National Front were to stage an uprising or create civil disorder and chaos in Malaysia in order to give substance to the propaganda made by the three leaders abroad.

(d) If encouraging response was forthcoming from the Afro-Asian countries, the three leaders abroad would proclaim a Government-in-Exile with themselves forming its Cabinet.

The Trip Abroad

85. During the meeting Hussain Yaacob brought out the question of expenses for the trip of the three leaders, and was asked to write to R. M. Soenita for financial assistance. If the reply should fail to be received in time from R. M. Soenita and if "the situation in the country should become worse", that is, should the authorities get wind of the proposed trip, then the three leaders should leave for Bangkok as soon as possible without waiting for R. M. Soenita's reply. On arrival in Bangkok the three leaders should contact the Indonesian Embassy there to make arrangements for contacting R. M. Soenita for financial support. The meeting agreed to these arrangements.

86. On the following day, 15 January, 1965, Datu Kampo Radjo was sent to Penang to inform Abdul Aziz bin Ishak of the decision of the meeting. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak agreed to the decision and accompanied Datu Kampo Radjo back to Kuala Lumpur on the next day to make arrangements.

87. On 17 January, 1965, in Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah's car cruising from Treacher Road to Gombak, Kuala Lumpur, a meeting was held among Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, Hussain Yaacob, Datu Kampo Radjo and Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah himself, during which Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah and Hussain Yaacob offered Abdul Aziz bin Ishak \$1,500 for the latter's expenses for the proposed trip. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak refused because the sum was too small. He also asked Hussain Yaacob for financial support for his family during his absence abroad. Hussain Yaacob and Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah finally agreed to raise more money by 30 January, 1965, and promised to look after Abdul Aziz bin Ishak's family during his sojourn abroad.

88. They then took Abdul Aziz bin Ishak back to his father's house at Gombak and drove to the former PMIP Headquarters at Jalan Raja Uda, Kampong Bahru, Kuala Lumpur where they met Dr Burhanuddin. Dr Burhanuddin was told of what happened and expressed the desire to speak to Abdul Aziz bin Ishak. Leaving Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah and Hussain Yaacob behind, Datu Kampo Radjo took Dr Burhanuddin in the car back to the house at Gombak where Dr Burhanuddin in the presence of Datu Kampo Radjo advised Abdul Aziz bin Ishak to obtain information on the following items during his forthcoming trip to the Afro-Asian countries before taking any positive steps:

- (a) Support for Sukarno regime in her Confrontation against Malaysia;
- (b) Communist influence in Indonesia;
- (c) Reaction to the banning of the Partai Murba by President Sukarno.

89. On the following day Datu Kampo Radjo called upon Abdul Aziz bin Ishak at the house at Gombak again to tell him that Hussain Yaacob had failed to raise more money. Abdul Aziz bin Ishak wanted to go on the trip as soon as possible, and set the date of departure for 22 January, 1965. He needed \$3,000 to \$4,000 to cover his travelling expenses instead of the \$1,500 offered him by his colleagues, apart from additional funds for his family maintenance.

Progress Reports to R. M. Soenita

90. On 17 January, 1965, Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah wrote from Kuala Lumpur to R. M. Soenita to report progress:

"With regard to the question of finance, your courier has sent 2,500 sheets (meaning dollars). There is still some more to come. He will sent it by instalments.

"The NAS Front shop has decided to send Bapah A (code name for Abdul Aziz bin Ishak) to Karachi on 22 January, 1965, and he will proceed to other places to carry out his mission, but unfortunately he had to book for a return journey or has to take along money for expenses and the return fare, otherwise he might be intercepted at the airport before departure. Therefore, his trip has to be postponed for the time being. This is a problem of finance. Of course it has been the intention of Bapah A (Abdul Aziz bin Ishak) to leave for good in order to carry out his mission from abroad.

"Bapah B (code name for Dr Burhanuddin Al-Helmi), Salleh Fadhill (code name for Ishak bin Haji Mohamed) and I shall definitely be leaving after Hari Raya if there are no obstructions, but consideration has to be given on the question of finance in view of Bapah A's case. There should be at least \$16,000 ready cash for four persons."

91. On 18 January, 1965, Ishak bin Haji Mohammed wrote to R. M. Soenita saying that Rais Anwar, who originally came from Java, would be leaving for Bangkok immediately on a business trip and providing the latest information on the proposed trip:

"I will be leaving. A.A. (Abdul Aziz bin Ishak) will leave first. Dr Burhanuddin and his assistant will follow later, then I—all heading for Karachi. By the Will of God we will meet there. There is a possibility that others will follow. Confirmation will be notified."

92. R. M. Soenita received another progress report dated 18 January, 1965, from one of the conspirators which provides the following information:

"The departure of B. A (Abdul Aziz bin Ishak) depends on the preparation of Comrade Yusof II (Hussain Yaacob). At the earliest it will be on 22 January, 1965, at the latest on 30 January, 1965. A final discussion on the subject between Bp. A and Dr B (Dr Burhanuddin) was arranged by me on 16 January, 1965, and a discussion between Bp. A and Bp. Salleh (Ishak bin Haji Mohamed) took place a week later. Salleh and Dr B will be following in mid-February. After the departure of Bp. A the form of the business will have to be changed until the conditions and the situation become favourable."

93. On the same day, 18 January, 1965, Hussain Yaacob wrote a long report to R. M. Soenita from which the following excerpts are taken:

"As I have already given nearly \$200 to DKR (Datu Kampo Radjo) during this week, I handed over to him only \$300 today. As usual he approaches me when he is short of money.

"I shall use the balance of the money for Singapore, Kuantan, Kelantan and other places.

"Recently I have been compelled to assist several friends who are 'badly in need of assistance'.

"I shall use the balance of the money for paying the fare to Bangkok for R. Anwar (Rais Anwar) at the end of the month.

"According to the decision of our F.N. (Front Nasional), A.I. (Abdul Aziz bin Ishak) will leave for Pakistan on January 22nd. He has given his assurance to abide by the decisions of our Front".

"After he had discussed with us various matters in connection with his trip abroad (on the night of January 15th) he had a final meeting with Dr B.D. (Dr Burhanuddin) a few hours later.

"On the evening of January 16 I brought \$1,500 as required by him for his passage and family expenses. When we met that night he said that a number of his friends had advised him to 'bring a little more money than the sum given'.

"'Because', he said, the authorities would ask 'how much money is being taken abroad?' According to the regulations in this country, anyone leaving the country has to inform the authorities how much money he is taking with him.

"If one has only just \$1,500 certainly the sum is insufficient for a return journey to MALAYA, and the Malaysian authorities will suspect that he (A) (Abdul Aziz bin Ishak) is expecting money from a foreign country for his return journey'.

"It is on these grounds that he is holding off his trip to Karachi on January 22."

"However it is certain that he will leave for Karachi when the conditions are complied with."

"He asked us to look after his wife and children so that they will not starve."

"He said that from his meeting with several Afro-Asian Embassies here, he had found out that there was variation in the present attitude of a number of Afro-Asian countries towards Indonesia. This, he said, 'must be put right as early as possible'.

"He did not disclose the identities of these countries, but one of them is the United Arab Republic."

"A week ago he sold his car to pay his bank loan, etc."

94. The letter goes on to disclose arrangements for sending Rais Anwar to Bangkok at the end of January, 1965.

Instructions from R. M. Soenita

95. R. M. Soenita wrote to Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah on 21 January, 1965, with the following instructions:

"I have just seen father (General Djatikusumo) and he explained that:

- (a) It is not certain yet when the Afro-Asian Conference in ALGERIA is to be held, because the preparations for the accommodation of delegates have not been completed yet.
- (b) The question of setting up a Government-in-Exile should, to the best advantage, be *preceded by an armed struggle* by the local people themselves. God be thanked if it is possible to occupy an area, however small, for a de-facto recognition. This is one of the factors to gain sympathy from abroad.
- (c) Alternatively, if it is possible to establish a 'Delegation in Exile of the Malayan People's Struggle'.
- (d) It is better to discuss (b) and (c) at the meeting."

"I hope our meeting can be fixed some time in the middle of February in Karachi. I will be waiting there. Please contact the (Indonesian) Ambassador if you are to meet me."

Promise of More Funds for the Trip

96. The letter continues with a promise to make more funds to finance the trip:

"Passages, etc. (with the exception of Bapah A.I. (Abdul Aziz bin Ishak)) which has already been arranged by Che' Yusof (Hussain Yaacob), money for Bapah B (Dr Burhanuddin) Bapah Salleh (Ishak bin Haji Mohamed) and others, I send herewith \$6,000 Malayan currency. If it is not sufficient, use the money from JI's batik. I shall arrange to have it reimbursed later."

97. A similar letter was sent by R. M. Soenita to Hussain Yaacob on the same day, but in this letter the sum of money to be sent by him for passage and other expenses is given as \$5,000 instead of

\$6,000. A short note was also sent to Ishak bin Haji Mohamed asking him to contact Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah for the money for his passage and Hussain Yaacob for further briefings and instructions.

Courier to Singapore and Bangkok

98. According to Ishak bin Haji Mohamed he met Rais Anwar at a hotel room in Kuantan, Pahang some time in June, 1964. During this meeting Rais Anwar told Ishak bin Haji Mohamed that a Military Attache from the Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok by the name of Sudarto would be willing to offer the two of them a sum of \$100,000 to set them up in business. The money could be easily brought in through arrangements with a bank. The proceeds of the business enterprise would be used as funds to assist opposition parties in carrying out activities in furtherance of Djakarta's "confrontation" of Malaysia.

99. Sometime in September/October, 1964, Hussain Yaacob visited Rais Anwar in Kuantan and recruited the latter to carry out anti-Malaysia activities. Upon receiving a telephone call from Hussain Yaacob from Kuala Lumpur asking him to go there on some important business in connection with the organisation, Rais Anwar rushed to Kuala Lumpur on 23rd January, 1965, and stayed with Hussain Yaacob.

100. During his stay with Hussain Yaacob, Rais Anwar was told by his host that the organisation wanted him to deliver a sealed letter and a sum of \$100 personally to a person named Jukri bin Parjo who was working as a cinema-projectionist at the Alhambra Cinema in Singapore. This Jukri was an official of the Partai Rakyat Singapore. The letter, the contents of which Rais Anwar declared complete ignorance, was addressed to Jukri bin Parjo, Singapore, and dated 24 January, 1965, from Hussain Yaacob, Utusan Melayu, Kuala Lumpur. The following excerpts are taken from this letter:

"Bearer of this letter is my personal representative who will discuss our struggle with you. His name is R. Anwar. You are requested to give him a written report on the situation in Singapore. Your report should be addressed to 'Yusof Dua' (a code name of Hussain Yaacob). Bearer of this letter will immediately bring your report to me.

At present in the Federation of Malaya a National Front has been formed secretly among the opposition parties which are anti-Malaysia. I have been directed to inform you that you and your friends should endeavour to form a similar organisation in Singapore as soon as possible. In addition I request you to work out the plans which I discussed with you recently.

Bearer of this letter will explain to you further on this question. Enclosed is \$100 for Hari Raya expenses."

101. Hussain Yaacob also told Rais Anwar that after delivering the letter and money to Jukri bin Parjo in Singapore, Rais Anwar should proceed to Bangkok before the end of January, 1965, because on 2 or 3 February, 1965 an Indonesian named Sartono would be arriving in Bangkok from Djakarta. Rais Anwar was told to call upon Sartono at the Plaza Hotel in Bangkok to receive a sum of money of unspecified amount from the Indonesian, after which he should return to Kuala Lumpur and hand over the money to Hussain Yaacob himself.

102. On 25th January, 1965, Rais Anwar left Kuala Lumpur by taxi for Singapore to deliver the letter and the money. On the same afternoon he managed to contact Jukri bin Parjo at a coffee stall near the Alhambra Cinema, Singapore, and completed his mission. Later on Jukri bin Parjo handed Rais Anwar two letters for delivery to Hussain Yaacob. Upon his return to Kuala Lumpur on the following day, he was arrested by the authorities before he could proceed by air to Bangkok to carry out the second part of his mission.

103. The expected financial assistance from Sukarno regime therefore failed to reach the plotters in Kuala Lumpur and the trip of the three leaders had to be delayed for lack of funds.

Futile Last Efforts

104. Despite the delay, the conspirators were making every effort to send the three leaders, namely, Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, Ishak bin Haji Mohamed and Dr Burhanuddin to meet R. M. Soenita at Karachi to finalise arrangements for the formation of the "Malayan" Government-in-Exile. The date of their departure was set at 28 January, 1965. There were also indications that Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah would leave the country to join the three leaders as soon as arrangements were made for someone to take over his responsibilities in this country.

The Trap is Sprung

105. This called for quick action to be taken by the authorities, and so on 26 January, 1965, Dato' Raja Abu Hanifah, Datu Kampo Radjo, Hussain Yaacob and Rais Anwar were arrested, followed by the arrest two days later on 28 January, 1965, of Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, Ishak bin Haji Mohamed and Dr Burhanuddin. Subsequently, Tajuddin Kahar and Hasnul bin Abdul Hadi were also arrested on 13 February, 1965.

CONCLUSION

106. Since the Federation of Malaya became a completely independent national entity on 31 August, 1957, the progress achieved by the country has become a shining light in South-East Asia. The overwhelming public support for the formation of Malaysia in Sarawak and Sabah,* Singapore and the Malay Peninsula, which culminated in the Elections held on 25 April, 1964, on the main issue of Malaysia, and the land-slide victory of the Alliance Party led by Tunku Abdul Rahman in the Elections, provide indisputable proof that the great majority of the people have chosen Malaysia.

CONCLUSIONS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS ON 14 SEPTEMBER, 1963

* Please refer Report of "United Nations Malaysia Mission" and Supplement No. 1 (A/5801) page 26.

"Having reflected fully on these considerations, and taking into account the framework within which the mission's task was performed, I have come to the conclusion that the majority of the peoples of Sabah (North Borneo) and of Sarawak, have given serious and thoughtful consideration to their future, and to the implications for them of participation in a federation of Malaysia. I believe that the majority of them have concluded that they wish to bring their dependent status to an end and to realize their independence through freely chosen association with other peoples in their region with

whom they feel ties of ethnic association, heritage, language, religion, culture, economic relationship, and ideals and objectives. Not all of these considerations are present in equal weight in all minds, but it is my conclusion that the majority of the peoples of the two territories having taken them into account, wish to engage, with the peoples of the Federation of Malaya and Singapore, in an enlarged federation of Malaysia through which they can strive together to realize the fulfilment of their destiny.”

.....
 “Whatever the origins of the proposal of Malaysia may have been, it seems to me in the light of actual events, including the present exercise, that we have witnessed in Sarawak and North Borneo (Sabah) the same process leading to self-government. I fervently hope that peoples of these territories will achieve progress and prosperity and find their fulfilment as component States of Malaysia.”

107. It is crystal clear that the political process in the country is one of liberation from colonial rule followed by the de-colonisation of the two Borneo States of Sarawak and Sabah—an indisputable victory for genuine nationalism and self-determination.

108. What the conspirators were trying to do, is to turn back the clock by reverting Malaysia as an independent national entity to become once more a colony or a vassal state under the Sukarno regime.

109. Such political atavism and self-contradiction are symptomatic of the twisted minds of the leaders of the conspiracy, and are the very tangible reasons why they and their political platform do not receive the support of the people of the country who showed their choice in no uncertain terms during the last Elections in April, 1964.

110. The people of Malaysia are fully conscious of President Sukarno's flirtation with Communist China and his inclination towards the PKI* which has grown from strength to strength with the President's patronage, protection and encouragement. They are also aware of the chaotic conditions in Indonesia which provide a distinct contrast to the increasing prosperity and progress in Malaysia and they refuse to be dragged into the mire of political instability, corruption, despotism and general mismanagement of the Sukarno regime.

111. A number of persons have been involved in this plot. Amongst them are politicians who failed to win public support by constitutional means in order to get themselves into positions of power. To achieve their ambition and for the sake of money, they were prepared to become instruments of a totalitarian regime which is becoming increasingly communist in character and neo-imperialist in design. By taking these steps they were therefore actively and positively collaborating with the Sukarno regime in encouraging the growth and expansion of communism and thereby paving the way for a Communist domination of South-East Asia.

112. Now that this conspiracy has been exposed and the people concerned have been apprehended the people of Malaysia will be able to see them as they really are, torn of the mask of false nationalism and in their true colour as betrayers of the nation and self-seeking agents of the Sukarno regime. Their case is now open to the people to judge for themselves.

* Partai Komunis Indonesia which claims membership of approximately 2 million.

MAP OF MALAYSIA

Scale 1:4,350,000

