S. Husin Ali

Malay Peasant Society and Leadership



east asian social science monographs

LJ
8/17/50

EAST ASIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE MONOGRAPHS

MALAY PEASANT SOCIETY AND LEADERSHIP

MALAYSIA: LOCATION OF AREAS STUDIED

PUSTAKA PERINGATAN TUN ABDUL RAZAK
BILIK STUDY
MALAYSIA

MALAY PEASANT SOCIETY AND LEADERSHIP

S. HUSIN ALI

Associate Professor
Department of Anthropology & Sociology
University of Malaya

KUALA LUMPUR
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON NEW YORK MELBOURNE
1975

Access No: 3728 85/84
Class. No:

Oxford University Press
OXFORD LONDON GLASGOW NEW YORK
TORONTO MELBOURNE WELLINGTON CAPE TOWN
IBADAN NAIROBI DAR ES SALAAM LUSAKA ADDIS ABABA
KUALA LUMPUR SINGAPORE JAKARTA HONG KONG TOKYO
DELHI BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI
© Oxford University Press 1975
First published 1975
Reprinted 1977

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press.

Printed in Singapore by Dainippon Tien Wah Printing (Pte) Ltd.
Published by Oxford University Press, Lot 3, Jalan 13/3,
Petaling Jaya, Selangor, Malaysia

To my wife, Sabariah Abdullah

Preface

THIS book orginates from a doctoral thesis submitted to the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London. It took considerable time to complete because the field work and the writing up could not be done within a continuous period of time.

The field work in the three areas studied has been intermittent. Initially I stayed in Bagan for a period of four months in 1961 to gather material for a study of social stratification (S. Husin, 1964). In 1966 about a dozen short trips were made to Bagan during the University vacation to gather additional material. In Kangkong my initial stay covered a stretch of one and a half months in 1964 and a similar period was spent there in 1965. Then there were several other short trips during 1967-8. In Kerdau I stayed for a month in 1964 and two months in 1967. In addition, I made several week-end visits there during 1968-9.

In a way, the nature of my field work influenced the method of investigation. I was not in any particular location for a sufficiently long period to observe the full cycle of activities of the villagers within a calendar year. This could not be done because of my teaching commitments at the University of Malaya. However, being ethnically of the same stock as the majority of the people in the communities studied, acceptance was not a problem and a period of familiarization was therefore not necessary.

The main part of the writing was done in London where I went for my study leave in 1967 and again in 1970. There I benefited from the seminars and the supervision which were given. A number of people have helped during the course of my work. It is impossible to name all of them, but I must record my most sincere thanks to Professors Firth, Freedman and Lewis who at different times acted as my supervisor. From Professor Firth I gained much advice that proved to be useful at the early stages of the planning of the book. On his retirement, he was succeeded by Professor Freedman from whom I was unable to receive formal supervision as I was not in London. However, informally he was helpful with many suggestions

and corrections of several parts of the manuscript that he had read. This informal assistance was given after he had already taken up the Chair in Oxford and was succeeded in London by Professor Lewis, under whom I received most of my supervision. I found Professor Lewis' criticisms and guidance to be invaluable, and I am certain that without these I would never have completed this work.

I must also express my appreciation for the help given by my friend Dr. Rajakumar. To the many people in Bagan, Kangkong and Kerdau who co-operated with me so wonderfully during the field work, '*terima kasih*'.

University of Malaya
Kuala Lumpur
March 1974

S. HUSIN ALI

NOTE

The research for this book was carried out before 1969, and post-1969 social and political changes have not been taken into account.

Contents

Preface vii
Maps x
Tables xi
Figures xi

I INTRODUCTION 1
Objectives and Methods 1
The Communities Studied 3
Concepts Used 5

II THE COUNTRY 14
Nature of Change 15
Social Implications 22
Political Development 26
Mobility and Conflict 32

III THE VILLAGE 39
Territorial Basis 42
Kinship Basis 44
Institutions Based on Territory and Kinship 51
Economic Basis 57
Religious Basis 59
Politico-Administrative Basis 65
Fission and Fusion of Villages 67

IV SOCIAL STRATIFICATION 71
Factors Determining Status 73
Basis of Economic Inequality 77
Structure of Economic Classes 83
Manifestation of Class Differences 92
Class Conflicts 96

V THE 'TRADITIONAL' LEADERS 102
Village Elders 102
Religious Functionaries 108
The Penghulu and Headman 116

VI THE 'NEW' LEADERS 132
The Political Parties 132
The Party Leaders 136
An Examination of Three Cases 143
The Three Cases: Some Observations 150
The Position of Leaders in the National Context 154

VII CONCLUSION 161

Appendixes 171
Glossary 177
Bibliography 182
Index 185

Maps

Malaysia: Location of Areas Studied *frontispiece*
1. Kangkong: Land Use and Location of Houses 4
2. Kerdau: Land Use and Location of Houses 6
3. Bagan: Land Use and Location of Houses 9

Tables

I. Distribution of Population in Urban and Rural Areas for Various Years 18
II. Percentage Distribution of Population 23
III. Employment by Socio-Economic Group and Race 24
IV. Kinship Relationship Between Husbands and Wives 48
V. Distribution of Indebtedness 81
VI. Distribution of People (in percentage) by the Size of Their Holding 83
VII. Distribution of Land (in percentage) by the Size of the Holdings (in acres) 85
VIII. Distribution of Land Ownership (in acres) According to Various Categories 86
IX. Distribution of Income (in M$) According to Various Categories 88
X. Distribution of Classes (in number and percentage) 91
XI. Non-political Positions Held by Chairmen and Secretaries of Party Branches 141

Figures

I. Extension of Kinship Group Beyond Village Units Resulting from Marriages 50
II. Marriage Between Villagers in Peragap and Parit 50
III. Marriage Between Villagers in Peragap and Telok Batu 51
IV. Flow of Influence and Authority Between the District Officer, Representatives and the Villagers 155

Tables

I. Distribution of Population by Urban and Rural Residence 18

II. Percentage Distribution of Population 23

III. Employment by Socio-Economic Group and Residence 43

IV. Kinship Relationship Between Husbands and Wives 59

V. Distribution of Independence 81

VI. Distribution of People (in percentage) by the Size of Their Holdings 85

VII. Distribution of Land (in percentage) by the Size of Their Holdings (in acres) 85

VIII. Distribution of Land Ownership (in acres) According to Various Categories 89

IX. Distribution of Income (in N@) According to Various Categories 94

X. Distribution of Classes (in number and percentage) 95

XI. Non-political Positions Held by Chairmen and Secretaries of Party Branches 141

Figures

1. Extension of Kinship Group Beyond Village Units 30

II. Marriage Between Villagers in Peragap and Pari 39

III. Marriage Between Villagers in Peragap and Telok Ijem 53

IV. Flow of Influence and Authority Between the District Officer, Representatives and the Villagers 134

I Introduction

OBJECTIVES AND METHODS

THIS is a study of rural society and leadership in Malaya.[1] The main objectives are to examine the nature of society within which the leadership exists, to identify the various types of leaders existing in the different communities, to discover their positions and functions in the context of their own social, economic and political environments and to assess their effectiveness in providing leadership to the people.

It is assumed that at the local level, the leaders are often limited in their resources to exercise leadership. This is quite in contrast to leaders at the 'supra-village' or national level who often form the apex of the authority hierarchy, and whose power and influence are usually extensive and far-reaching, as most of them have control over the complicated apparatus of power and have the means therefore to determine major social actions. The national-level leaders however do not fall within the scope of this study, but some references will be made to them in order to show their relationship with those at the local level.

To achieve the objectives of this study, three rural communities have been selected for investigation, namely Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan (see maps 1, 2 and 3). Discussion will be based mainly on findings from these studies, although some reference will be made to a few others on similar or related topics.

Among the anthropologists who have studied rural leadership in the course of their research on various aspects of Malay rural life are Burridge, Downs, Firth and Swift. Burridge spent some time in a village on the west coast of Johore, and has published a number of articles (Burridge, 1957). Downs, who carried out his research in

[1] The term is used in this study to refer to the Malay Peninsula, which as a political unit was formerly known as the Federation of Malaya. In 1963 it joined with Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore to form Malaysia, but Singapore was out of the federation two years later in 1965. Although Sabah and Sarawak are now officially known as East Malaysia, and the former Federation of Malaya as West Malaysia (now Peninsular Malaysia) the term Malaya is preferred in the present study.

Kelantan, has written about the village headman and his functions (Downs, 1967). Firth, on the other hand, was more involved in the study of the economy of the Malay fishermen in Kelantan, but in the opening chapter of his book he makes some remarks that are relevant to the leadership structure in the area he studied (Firth, 1966). As for Swift, he based his study on a village in the matrilineal society of Negri Sembilan, and has thrown some light on the question of leadership within the village (Swift, 1965).

Anthropological studies of Malay society are few and far between, and moreover, those which have been undertaken range over a wide field. Both Firth and Swift concentrate mainly on economic aspects of rural Malay communities, the former focusing his interest on fishing and the latter on rubber-growing. Downs himself deals with social change in general while Burridge investigates the social background to the racial conflicts in a village in Johore. In these works, rural Malay leadership is only mentioned *en passant* and its pattern is therefore not clearly established. This study intends to elaborate on this aspect of rural Malay society which has much been neglected.

The three communities, Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan, have been chosen after much consideration. Firstly, it was thought a good idea to choose villages whose activities represent the main economic occupations of the Malay peasant, namely, fishing, rice-growing and rubber tapping. Secondly, it was also considered desirable to select communities that are quite separated geographically, and that is why they have been selected from the northern, central and southern parts of the country. Kangkong depends predominantly on fishing and rice-growing and is situated in the north; Kerdau is dependent mainly on rice and rubber and is located in the centre; while Bagan, in the south, depends primarily on rubber together with some coconuts.

Although three communities have been chosen, the study is not strictly comparative in approach. Where comparisons are feasible, they have of course been made, but in most cases the materials have been gathered in order to present as much information as possible, supplementing information from one community with that found in the other, so that as clear a picture as possible can be constructed of Malay rural society.

The study is not entirely carried out in the traditional participant-observation method employed by anthropologists. During the longer periods of stay in these communities, the people and their activities were observed, and formal as well as informal interviews and conversations were carried out in order to understand the workings

of the communities and the positions of the leaders within their social context. In addition, questionnaires were also used, especially during the course of the several short visits, in order to obtain specific quantifiable data and other information that some of the villagers could provide. Documents were also looked into, especially those regarding land ownership, at the Land Offices, and those pertaining to appointments of some headmen, as well as their functions and duties, available in the District Offices. As for historical background, this was obtained mainly from secondary sources and stories and recollections from the elderly residents. Although historians will not approve of this method, its justification is that this study confines itself to using only such historical data as are relevant.

THE COMMUNITIES STUDIED

It will be useful to examine the three communities that form the basis of this study. Kangkong is situated on the coast of Kedah which is one of the principal rice-growing regions in Malaya. It is linked by road with the state capital, Alor Star, which is about nine miles away. The link road from Kangkong to the main highway was built in 1958, and since then Kangkong has been accessible both by bus and taxi. Before 1958 there was only a raised mud-path which was virtually impassable during the rainy season. When the path was too muddy, small rowing boats and a drainage canal were used as means of transport. The business centre for Kangkong is a township situated along the main highway, near the point where it intersects the new link road and most of the shops there are owned by the Chinese. Since the town is about three miles away, the villagers do not go there very often. In Kangkong itself, almost all the residents, with the exception of three Chinese families of shopkeepers, are Malays.

Rice-growing is the main economic activity in the community. The people grow wet padi in the fields (*bendang*) once a year, and they are occupied with this activity for only about six months, commencing before the beginning of the south-west monsoon around June. Being near the sea, there is an additional activity in fishing. Of the 90 heads of households investigated, 83 persons (92 per cent) derive the entire or a major portion of their incomes from agriculture which means primarily rice-growing and fishing; 41 persons depend on only rice-growing, 31 on rice-growing with fishing as a supplementary occupation, and 11 on rice-growing in addition to miscellaneous activities on an irregular basis such as carpentry, petty trading, poultry farming etc. Of those not dependent on agriculture, four are shopkeepers or fish dealers, and two are teachers.



1. KANGKONG: LAND USE AND LOCATION OF HOUSES

Kerdau, in Pahang, is located about five miles from Mentakab and eight miles from Temerloh. It can easily be reached by a road which was completed in 1959. Before the construction of this road, it was accessible by rail from Mentakab (the railway was completed as part of the East Coast railway in 1931), and by the Pahang river from Temerloh. Both the railways and the river are still being used, besides the road. In the vicinity of the railway station, a small rural township has arisen. Most of the shops there are owned by the Chinese, but there are also some belonging to both the Malays and the Indians. In the areas outside the township, the villagers are all Malays.

Pahang depends on rubber and timber for its main source of revenue but some rice is also grown. Kerdau reflects the same activities; the main occupation of the villagers are rubber tapping and rice-growing. In Kerdau, the rice is not grown on fields that have to be ploughed, but in natural swamps, which dry up during the hot seasons. Following the north-east monsoon in December, the natural swamps however become flooded. It is in these swamps that the padi is planted in early April, and that is why it is known as 'swamp padi'

(*padi paya*). Out of the 129 heads of households investigated, 114 persons (88 per cent) depend on rubber and rice. Of these, 85 depend on both rubber and rice, 19 on rice and/or rubber supplemented by various miscellaneous part-time jobs as farm labourers, carpenters, fishermen; 8 depend only on rice, and 4 on rubber entirely. Of the numbers who are not dependent on agriculture, 8 work with the government as teachers, policemen, survey and forest assistants, 3 are shopkeepers, and the rest undertake all kinds of odd-jobs.

Bagan is about 6 miles from Batu Pahat and approximately 26 miles from Muar, along the road that links the two towns. About ten shops line the road, and there are also a few houses. The majority of the houses are along the drainage canals and tracks that run from the main road into the hinterland. Most of the shopkeepers are Chinese, but the houses inland are all occupied by Malays. The majority of the Malays depend on agriculture, i.e., 124 of the 149 heads of households investigated (83 per cent); and in Bagan the main agricultural pursuits are rubber tapping and the plucking of coconuts. All depend entirely or partially on rubber for their livelihood, and in addition approximately half of them are also involved in the growing of coconuts. Less than a dozen of them are engaged in other kinds of work available in the area such as the making of thatched roofs (*atap*), carpentry, clearing of undergrowth and so forth. Of the 25 who do not depend on agriculture as a source of income, 12 are in the government services mainly as teachers, clerks, and policemen, 5 as labourers and gardeners, and the rest as shopkeepers, carpenters and fishermen.

It is clear therefore that all three communities can be described as agricultural which is fairly typical of Malay rural society. In fact, Malaya is still primarily an agricultural country with a large percentage of its population depending on various types of agriculture. Taking into consideration the population as a whole, a large number of the Malays are still preoccupied with the traditional activities of rice-growing and fishing; the Malays constitute 90 per cent and 67 per cent respectively of the total number of those involved in these two activities. In the planting of rubber there is an almost equal number of Malays and non-Malays. Finally, a majority of the Malay peasants, about 86 per cent of those in the rural areas, depend on rice and rubber which serve as their mainstay.

CONCEPTS USED

It is appropriate at this point to explain what is implied by the terms 'leader' and 'leadership'. The simplest definition of a leader is one



2. KERDAU: LAND USE AND LOCATION OF HOUSES

who leads others towards a specific goal. This general definition relates to all types of people who may qualify to be called leaders; from a child who leads an old man to a bus-stop, a father who provides his children with a good education, to a political agitator who directs the masses in a world-shaking revolution. This shows how important it is that the concept be general enough to accommodate a wide variety of interpretations, but at the same time be sufficiently specific to indicate a clear and precise meaning.

A number of sociologists seem to be in general agreement that leaders are normally those who can and do have influence over others, in the sense that their thinking, words and/or actions can affect the behaviour of others—conveniently referred to as the led. There are three types of formulations, for instance, which indicate the use of the term leader by sociologists (cf. Gouldner, 1965: 15) namely:

i. those whose attainments, in terms of a set of goals, are considered 'high';

ii. those whose status is recognized as superior to others engaged in the same activities; and

iii. those who emit stimuli that are responded to integratively by the people.

A poet who has achieved great acclaim may be referred to as a leader in his field, but he need not be interacting at all with any individual or group he can be said to lead. An official working in the Administration may enjoy high status, but he may not be carrying out the functions and tasks which require him to lead individuals and groups who regard him as their leader. But what is clear is that, in the case of the poet, his attainment may have influence over the world of poetry, and stimulate other poets as well as critics and lovers of poetry to change their tastes, attitudes and reactions towards different poetic forms. On the other hand, the official has the sanction of political and administrative authority behind him, so that in certain fields he can cause his subordinates, especially, to behave in a particular manner and to feel obliged to accept his influence. The nature of leadership and the response to the poet and official are different from that of a politician who leads his people in the struggle for independence. The artist becomes a leader because of his high attainment, the official as a result of his status or position in bureaucracy, and the politician, through his ideas and organizations, displays charismatic qualities that are responded to integratively by the people.

It has been assumed in the past that the conditions which enabled

an individual to become and remain a leader were often his own qualities. These qualities were believed to be located in the leader, and '. . . it was postulated that leadership should be explained in terms of "traits" possessed by the leader' (Gouldner, 1965: 21). There are several inadequacies in this approach. For instance, the traits are often enumerated but without indicating the most important one, there is no discrimination made between those that assist an individual to rise to the position of a leader and others which help to maintain it. Moreover, the question of how these traits develop is seldom asked, and certain debatable assumptions regarding the nature of personality, i.e., that personality is the sum of its component traits, are involved. It is a truism that the leader, like all individuals in society, has a network of relationships which are utilized for different goals and through various kinds of institutions. That is why it is insufficient to study leadership by focusing only on traits; there is the necessity to investigate further by considering the groups and the situations within which the leaders operate.

Leaders may play leading roles in all kinds of institutions with a variety of goals such as economic, political, military, social, religious and so forth. Leadership can and is usually exercised through these institutions. People who have leading roles to play in such institutional frameworks are expected to, and often do, perform functions, tasks and duties that involve different types of rights and obligations. These may be determined by the nature of the roles themselves as well as by the historical and socio-cultural factors prevailing in the structures within which these roles are evolved. For this reason, leadership is normally considered only in terms of the roles and not of individual personalities who play these roles. Leading roles in the institutions may be associated with high prestige or status; but although persons playing these roles may be held in high esteem by virtue of the prestigious roles they hold, there is need to distinguish between the prestige attached to the roles and the personal esteem bestowed upon their holders.

When those who are led accept the leader's right to influence their course of conduct and behaviour, this means that he has acquired not merely power but 'legitimized power' or 'authority'. In other words, leaders and leadership are closely related to the realm of authority. The concept of authority has been clearly expounded by Weber, who puts forward three typologies, namely, 'traditional', 'legal' and 'charismatic' authority (Weber, 1947). The basis of these various typologies is termed by Weber as 'legitimacy'. Therefore, leaders and leadership can be conceived of as within the hierarchy of



3. BAGAN: LAND USE AND LOCATION OF HOUSES

authority, and so the position of the leader and the response of the led towards him are largely influenced by his legitimacy. It is certainly misleading to regard Weber's typologies as being closely compartmentalized and mutually exclusive. In reality, traditional authority can be charismatic, and an authority that begins by being charismatic can eventually be routinized to develop into a legal-rational one. Although such overlapping is possible, the ideal types nevertheless can form a useful basis for analysis.

The positions occupied or roles played by a leader within the hierarchy of authority are determined by society; and so it follows that the leader or leadership may be role-determined within the framework of the authority existing at a particular time and place. In reacting to such role-determined situations, a leader may merely carry out as a matter of routine all those functions, tasks, duties, rights and obligations required of the role; he neither alters the part he plays nor changes the institutions or structures within which the role exists. In short, he maintains the *status quo* and is known as a 'routine leader'. A routine leader may be held in high esteem if he carries out his role efficiently, but he may not be highly regarded if he proves otherwise. On the other hand, there are also leaders who are not satisfied with being merely role-determined. They want to determine their roles—either by amending or altering them—and they also try to change existing institutions and/or provide new ones, so that their roles can be exercised effectively. These leaders are role-determining and are referred to as the 'innovating leaders'. In some cases innovation may be confined within the existing social, economic and political structures, while in others they may involve structural transformations. Leaders associated with the former are often known as reformists, and those who are associated with the latter are regarded as revolutionary.

It has been argued particularly by some social scientists that routine-leaders are really not leaders at all. Schmidt, for example, refuses to call such institutional heads leaders, and refers to them only as 'agents of authority', a view which is shared by McFarland (1969). Both Gerth and Mills however do not see the full justification of Schmidt's argument, though they note that it does suggest three important points, namely

> . . . it points us to the crucial distinctions between role-determined and role-determining leadership; second, to the fact that role-determined, the instituted head may be more or less determined; and third, that he is probably more determined when his institutional sphere is stable, less determined when his sphere is breaking up or at least changing rapidly (Gerth and Mills, 1970: 416-17).

It can also be pointed out that although role-determined leaders may not bring about changes in their own roles and in institutions or structures within which these roles are exercised, yet by virtue of these roles alone they exert a considerable amount of influence. Not only may their followers pay deference to these leaders, but they may also be obliged by the values, norms and controls prevailing to follow them as well, and adjust their behaviour accordingly to the dictates of the leaders from time to time. In that they are capable of influencing their followers' behaviour, they are regarded as leaders. Secondly, as implied by Gerth and Mills, leaders can be more role-determining in situations of change within society itself. This is supported by McFarland who states, 'The roles of leadership in societies that are rent by basic socio-political conflicts seem easier to understand than the role of leadership in settled societies' (1969: 175).

Leadership is the function of the leaders and the society, and to understand it fully it must therefore be viewed and studied within the context of the society itself. It is an aspect of the total social system and cannot be studied effectively in isolation; otherwise only a partial picture will emerge. Both the possession of specific traits and the socio-historical situation or events are not entirely responsible for determining leadership. Leadership is the result of the interaction between those who have the potential to exercise it and the need for them arising from certain conditions at a particular time in a particular society.

There are two terms in Malay for a leader, namely, *pemimpin* and *ketua*. The former is more specific in its meaning, for the latter can also refer to a 'head' or 'headman'. The word 'pemimpin', very commonly used in modern Malay, does not seem to have appeared in classical Malay literature. What has appeared however in both the modern and classical is its root-form *pimpin*, which means 'to go hand in hand' or 'to lead a person by the hand'. There is a slight difference in meaning between the two, and their differences are further clarified when two different prefixes (*ber*-) and (*me*-) are added to the root-form, for *berpimpin* specifically means 'to walk hand in hand' and *memimpin* means 'to lead'. The meaning of 'pimpin', 'to lead a person by the hand', is equally applicable to the following actions: a mother leading her child to a nursery, a boy scout leading a blind man across a busy road, a politician leading his party in an election or a freedom-fighter leading his people to independence.

In the mother-child and boy scout-blind man analogy what may be noted is that the relationship of the two parties concerned is rather unequal. There are certain qualities or abilities lacking in the

child and the blind man, but present in the mother and boy scout, that enable the latter to lead and be accepted by the former. This does not however make the mother and the boy scout 'leaders'; in fact neither will they be referred to in Malay as 'pemimpin' (leader). Such a description will be more appropriately applied to the politician and the freedom-fighter who operate on a higher plane. What is clear, however, is that like the mother and the boy scout, they are also individuals who lead people—the only difference being the number of those involved—towards a particular goal. This in essence is the function of a leader most of the time.

The word 'pemimpin' is formed by adding the prefix (*pe-*), which signifies a doer of an act, to 'pimpin', transforming the first phoneme of this root-form from a labial /p/ to a nasalized /m/. It means, as in the case of its English equivalent, a person who leads his follower(s) towards a particular goal or goals. In its modern usage it is mainly used in relation to those who lead in politics, especially at the higher levels. It is also applicable sometimes to leaders in other fields, for example, religion and music.

As regards the second term 'ketua', this is often used in classical literature to refer to those who occupy positions of 'headship' or 'leadership' within groups or in institutions. The verbal form *ketuai* or *mengetuai* denote the act of 'heading' an institution or leading a group. At present it is sometimes used quite interchangeably with 'pemimpin' to give the same meaning. For instance, either of the two terms can be used to refer to a 'leader' of a band or a political party. But while in normal usage the term 'pemimpin' brings out more explicitly the sense of 'one who leads', the term 'ketua' seems to give greater emphasis to 'one who heads' without necessarily exercising leadership.

At the rural level there is the village headman, whose position has been institutionalized, and who is called the *ketua kampung*. As will be shown in the following chapters, he may possess the qualities of a leader and act accordingly, but for most of the time he does not lead but only mediates in village matters. Sometimes the headman is merely the holder of an esteemed role in the village and he neither leads nor mediates. On the other hand, there are also individuals in the rural areas who function as leaders on a small scale, such as the organization of traditional co-operative groups, for example, *derau* or *gotong-royong* (see pp. 53-7), and branches of political parties. More often than not, the villagers themselves refer to their leaders as 'ketua', rather than 'pemimpin'.

In the three areas studied it was found that the villagers, on being

asked to identify their leaders, responded more quickly to the question 'Who is the "head" (ketua)?' rather than to 'Who is the "leader" (pemimpin)?'. In fact, the term 'head' is more prevalently used by the villagers than 'leader' to refer to those among themselves who occupy leading positions or/and who lead. They frequently use the term 'leader' for only those operating on the 'supra-village' levels. Perhaps these villagers, who are still quite strongly influenced by tradition, feel more at home with the concept of 'ketua' which has roots in traditional Malay culture.

It is interesting to note that the morpheme *tua* in the word 'ketua' literally means 'old', and this, apart from being used in classical literature and also to denote the position of some traditional office-holders, may suggest the cultural context of the term ketua itself. Age is certainly a quality that is much revered in many traditional societies; in fact in some of them the most elderly is regarded as the head or leader of a social group, especially if it is kinship-based. The presence of the word 'tua' (old) in the term 'ketua' suggests the significance of age as a determining factor of the position of headship or leadership in traditional Malay society. In Malay society today, especially at the rural level where traditional influence still holds strong, age is honoured and the elders are not only respected but quite often given preference over the young in terms of holding leading positions within institutions. Even when modern influence stresses the importance of achievement-oriented elements, the ascribed factor of age remains an important consideration in the minds of the Malays. For instance, even in a modern institution like a political party, there are people who stress the importance of age and who are hesitant to concede positions of leadership to the young even if they are well-qualified.

There are many people in the three areas studied who hold leading positions in their communities, and so, by the definition used earlier, qualify to be known as leaders although the villagers themselves may prefer to call them 'heads' (ketua) rather than 'pemimpin'. There are times when the villagers do not even use the term 'head', but prefer to describe them only as 'strong men' (*orang kuat*). Thus they talk about the 'strong man' in the party branch, the 'strong man' in the village, the 'strong man' in the *mukim* and so forth. Those who are considered as 'heads' or 'strong men' by the villagers together with all others who hold leading positions or roles within groups and in institutions actually make up the leaders in the rural Malay society. We find that the scope of their authority is varied, ranging from a single institution to part of or a whole village and more.

II The Country

THIS chapter aims to provide a general picture of Malaya against which the three rural communities can be viewed in their proper perspective. The focus is on Malayan history so that we can perceive not only the major changes that have taken place in the country but also to understand how these changes have contributed towards shaping the society into its present form. What is attempted here is no more than the presentation of a broad and generalized picture at the national or 'supra-village' level which may be relevant to the understanding of society and leadership at the village level.

Malaya is situated near the equator, and covers an area of roughly 50,915 square miles. Its population according to the MSSH Estimates[1] in 1967/68 is about 7·9 million. It is multi-racial in composition and made up of Malays (50·6 per cent), Chinese (35·7 per cent), Indians (12·3 per cent) and Others (1·4 per cent). Of the total population, 2·5 million (32·3 per cent) are in the urban areas which are defined as centres with more than 10,000 people, while the remaining 5·4 million (67·7 per cent) are in the rural areas. The majority of people in the urban areas are Chinese (57·2 per cent), while in the rural areas the Malays constitute the highest number (61·6 per cent). By racial composition, 51·8 per cent of the Chinese, 44·1 per cent of the Others, 35·1 per cent of the Indians and 17·6 per cent of the Malays are in the urban areas (Chander, 1970). It is clear therefore that the Malays are the least urbanized, with more than four-fifths still in the rural areas.

Of the approximately 2·4 million people who are gainfully employed, more than half of them (51·5 per cent) are found in the agricultural sector, either working in smallholdings or in the estates. An estimated 30·4 per cent of the employed are engaged in the commer-

[1] The estimates were made by the Statistics Department, Malaysia, and exclude institutional and non-civilian population. See R. Chander, *Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Household–Malaysia 1967/68*, Kuala Lumpur, Statistics Department, 1970. The last census taken in 1957 showed the population at 6·3 million. Unless otherwise stated, most of the figures given here are based on the MSSH Estimates.

cial sector—private companies, manufacturing establishments and trading firms. The government, statutory bodies and semi-government organizations absorb about 13 per cent of the total employed (Chander, 1970). Economically the country is still predominantly agricultural with a large number of people working in smallholdings. However, there is also a large proportion of them who are involved in the large-scale rubber and tin industries. Malaya is the world's biggest exporter of rubber and tin, and these two primary products are the most important sources of income for the country.

Politically the country is a federation of eleven political units known as states (*negri*), namely, Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Melaka, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Penang, Perlis, Perak, Selangor and Trengganu. For the purpose of administration each state is divided into districts (*daerah* or *jajahan*). Some of the larger districts are divided into sub-districts. The districts and/or sub-districts are further subdivided into smaller units referred to as the mukim, which is the smallest unit of administration in Malaya. There is a bureaucracy, based very much on the British model, that manages the day-to-day affairs of the Administration. Malaya is governed on the pattern of Western-style parliamentary democracy; there are several parties competing with one another at elections to form both the national and the state governments every five years.

NATURE OF CHANGE

The present economic and political system in Malaya has been very much influenced by British colonial rule. When the British arrived in Malaya, Malay society was mainly agricultural; the people lived in villages, shared a common religion and were under the administration of their own traditional authorities whose powers were highly dispersed (Gullick, 1965). On the other hand British society at that time was already both industrialized and urbanized, with a political system that was centralized through a complex bureaucracy. This contact, being of a colonial nature, created a superior-inferior relationship between the British and the Malays.

Although the British had created outposts in Melaka, Penang and Singapore which together made up the Straits Settlements (SS), British political and economic domination over the whole country actually started after 1874. In that year a treaty was signed on the island of Pangkor between representatives of the British government and a number of Malay chiefs from Perak. The chiefs agreed to accept British advice and administration on affairs of the state, except

in matters pertaining to Muslim religion and Malay customs which came under the jurisdiction of the Sultan. Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sembilan, which with Perak constituted the most important mining states, followed suit. These constituted the Federated Malay States (FMS) which were set up in 1896. The system of having Residents and Assistant Residents to advise the ruler and to administer both the affairs of the states and the judicial system were widely introduced into the states. In 1909, following an agreement between the British and the Siamese, the states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu passed from Siamese to British suzerainty. These states accepted British protection and advice, and together with Johore, which did likewise by a treaty in 1914, formed the Unfederated Malay States. The British officials took on the title of Advisers and Assistant Advisers, instead of Residents and Assistant Residents as in the FMS.

By the second decade of this century, British rule in Malaya was therefore fully established. With political power in their hands, the British were in an effective position to shape the Malayan economy, administration and education policies. In pursuance of an active economic policy, they began to invest on a large scale both in the tin industry and also in rubber, a plantation crop recently introduced to Malaya. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century some rubber and tin were produced, especially by the Chinese. Although British-owned mines were already in production, about three-fourths of the total tin output came from those of the Chinese. However, this pattern of production changed with the introduction of a highly mechanized system of mining involving the use of dredges; these new developments were made possible with British capital, and by the end of the 1920s, the situation was almost reversed. About this time, rubber estates had also begun to produce significant quantities of latex: their rapid development can be seen from the fact that while in 1910 the export of crude rubber was about 6,000 tons, in 1921 it had increased to 151,000 tons, and by 1933 to 445,000 tons (Allen and Donnithorne, 1957: 295—Appendix VI).

The growth of large-scale mining left very little scope for the traditional 'tray' (*dulang*) washers, who scoop up in their tray the soil containing tin and wash it in a stream to separate the metal from the waste matter. However, these dulang washers are on the point of being driven out of existence. Medium-scale mining based on open-cast methods is still being carried out by Chinese capital, though the most important are the European-owned mines which use dredges.

The development was quite different in the case of rubber. The planting of rubber was so economically attractive that many villagers were also persuaded to turn to it so that since the 1930s, almost half the total amount of rubber exports have come from the smallholdings. The development of both large-scale mining and planting needed labour which was supplied mainly by immigrant workers. The government therefore encouraged immigration and efforts were made to bring in contract labour from both South India and South China to work in the rubber estates and the mines respectively. At the same time however there was a constant flow of Indian and Chinese immigrants who found employment in various businesses and professions. The Malays on the other hand were originally not well-adapted to working in these industries; in fact, there was no organized effort to assist them to do so. The situation, however, has changed slightly over the years; for example, before the War there were only 20,000 Malays working in the estates, but by 1947 there were 70,000 of them, constituting a fifth of the total labour force in the rubber industry.

Economic growth brought in its wake developments in other spheres. First, efficient communication facilities were required to transport the tin and rubber to consumers overseas, and so a network of roads and railways and a number of ports were established. (Penang and Singapore, for example, expanded rapidly into important entrepot ports.) Second, the important mining centres and rubber planting areas were populated with people who were eager to do business and as a result towns and rural townships began to grow. These were the centres for commercial enterprises, not only in the selling of consumer goods to the wage earners in the estates and mines, but also in the buying of the various produce from the rural areas. Thus a greater number of people became involved in the money economy which brought in its turn a greater need for 'middlemen' to serve as sellers and buyers of goods. Wholesalers and retailers sprang up in numerous chains, serving as two-way channels for the flow of trade. Most of them were Chinese although there were a number of Indians as well. A majority of the middlemen settled in the towns and rural townships and their appearance marked the early phases of urbanization.

When the Pangkor Treaty was signed in 1874, there were hardly any centres which could be called towns in the Malay states. After the turn of the century, however, the number of centres with more than 10,000 people (these are classified as towns) increased and this is shown in Table I.

TABLE I
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS FOR VARIOUS YEARS

Year	*Population (in million)*	*As % of population*	
		Urban	*Rural*
1911	2·3	10·7	89·3
1921	2·9	14·0	86·0
1931	3·8	15·1	84·9
1947	4·9	15·9	84·1
1957	6·3	26·5	73·5
1967/68	7·9	32·3	67·7

Source: R. Chander, *Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households 1967-68*, Kuala Lumpur, Statistics Department, 1970, p. 66 (Statement 14).

With the development of these towns, schools, hospitals and offices were also established. In fact some of the towns that originally sprang up as a result of economic activities eventually became administrative centres as well.

As development became increasingly widespread, there was a greater demand for more specialized bureaucratic institutions and personnel to cope with the pressing functions of maintaining law and order, administering the collection of taxes and revenue and providing public services. Along with the development of civil and judicial administration, departments were established and officers were required to administer Muslim religion and Malay customs.

In facilitating the growth of the bureaucracy, the first line of action was to delineate the boundaries of the various states, because the jurisdiction of each of them had to be clearly demarcated. In each of the states—with the exception of Penang and Melaka—the sultan was both a ruler and a symbol of unity. Although the jurisdiction of each sultan was extended over the whole state—unlike the pre-1874 days when he had to share *de facto* control of the state with the more powerful chiefs—yet at the same time much of his real powers was in fact reduced. For example, he did not enjoy a strong economic base as he could no longer collect taxes and revenues for his own use and hence was unable to maintain a private army. In other words, the very basis of his economic and military power had been removed from under his feet, and he was left only with responsibility for matters relating to both Islam and traditional customs. The removal of the economic and military power of the sultan was

based on the principle that functions such as the maintenance of law and order, and the administration of the state rested no longer with the sultan, but with the colonially-controlled state government itself. Therefore it was right of the state to collect both taxes and revenues in order to maintain the institutions and personnel involved with the administration of the state, just as the sultan was believed to have similar rights in the context of traditional society prior to the arrival of the British.

Each state was divided into districts (daerah or jajahan) which may not necessarily cover the same area as the traditional territorial units under the chiefs. In the pre-1874 situation, some of the territorial chiefs recognized the sultan while others challenged his legitimacy. These chiefs also collected revenue and maintained their own 'fighting men'. But with the establishment of British hegemony, the economic, political and military strength of the chiefs was removed, and they were reduced to becoming only symbols of tradition, appearing mainly in traditional events and ceremonies such as the installation of the ruler, the annual investitures, and the occasional royal visits to the districts. They were replaced by the Assistant Residents who assumed control over both political and administrative matters in the districts. Through them the machinery of land administration and revenue collection was first organized and then canalized. The arms of the law—the legal, security and police officials—were also introduced at the district level and their activities were co-ordinated with those of their superiors at the state level.

Thus, while on the one hand the economic resources of the chiefs were removed from them,[1] following the undermining of their military strength, on the other, many of the political and administrative functions of the traditional aristocracy were taken over by the new state bureaucracy which was mainly manned at the higher level by British colonial officers. The process of weakening the positions of the chiefs seems to have served two purposes. Firstly it removed the possibility of any challenge from the chiefs to the sultans who were supported by the British, for deprived of their own economic and military strength they were in a weak position. Secondly, it strengthened the position of the new bureaucracy, and also ensured the entrenchment of colonial rule over the states. Without the interference of the chiefs in matters such as the collecting of revenue and maintaining of order, the way was clear for streamlining the new administrative and judicial systems on the lines of the British model.

[1] It is true that many of them were given 'royal pensions', but what must be stressed here is that they were not able to collect revenue for themselves.

These political and administrative changes which affected adversely the traditional aristocracy were naturally opposed and there were several uprisings against the British. For example, in Perak, a secondary chief, Maharajah Lela, organized an ambush and killed the first Resident there (1875). In Pahang, two well-known chiefs, the Orang Kaya Bahaman and Tok Gajah, who had originally helped the sultan in gaining a victory in the war of succession, initiated in the 1880s a rebellion against the British, which lasted for a number of years. These rebellions, however, were effectively suppressed, and severe measures were taken against the chiefs: Lela was hanged and many of his supporters were removed from office. Besides, in their absence, Bahaman and Tok Gajah were stripped of their positions and Tok Gajah's son was sentenced to death. In Perak, one Raja Yusuf, who was a contender to the throne, then occupied by a candidate supported by the British, was also exiled together with his family to the Seychelles.

While strict measures were taken against rebels in the various states, the less belligerent chiefs were treated more cautiously. They were allowed to hold their positions and titles, and this at least gave them the right to function ceremonially and to enjoy certain honoraria. Also, immediately after the establishment of British control, State Councils (*Majlis Negri*) were formed under the chairmanship of the sultans, with members drawn from both the immigrant population in the respective states, and senior British officials. This gave some semblance of participation by the traditional chiefs in the deliberations over the affairs of the state. Finally, some chiefs were also absorbed into the state bureaucracy. As the bureaucracy became more specialized and complex, there were instituted, alongside the residencies, the offices of Chief Minister, State Secretary, District Officer, Assistant District Officer as well as others of lower rank. Initially, recruitment into these offices was mainly from the aristocratic groups but at a later stage it became more open and the scene was set for British rule which made use of colonial as well as local officers. Although the colonial masters were inclined to consider local opinion and even went to the extent of allowing some participation by the Malayan officers in the administration, they were certainly the first arbiters of power. They held the reins of power, and the expatriate officers invariably occupied more senior positions than the local staff.

The supply of local personnel to man the bureaucratic machinery was made possible with developments in education. Mission schools had in fact already existed in Penang and Melaka before 1874. But in

later years, many English schools were opened by the government, the most significant being the Malay College in Kuala Kangsar (MCKK) in 1905. From the very beginning it was intended that the College should provide subordinate administrative talents drawn from the Malay upper classes. Until 1921, the Malay Administrative Service (MAS) which was formed to recruit Malays into the Administration was filled almost entirely by those from the Malay College. As this college mainly catered for the sons of the aristocrats, it meant therefore that the recruitment into the service was almost entirely from the aristocracy. After 1905 a greater number of English schools were built, and the MCKK itself began to accept other deserving students even though they were without aristocratic backgrounds. That is how recruitment into the bureaucracy became more open. Along with the MAS, there was the Malayan Civil Service (MCS) which was at the beginning the monopoly of expatriate officers but it was eventually Malayanized. In terms of hierarchy, the MCS officer is emplaced in Division I while the MAS officer is in Division II of the Civil Service List. The English schools were also useful in producing the personnel to meet the demand for recruits to fill the lower posts in the Administration namely as minor officials and clerks in Divisions III and IV.

While English education developed at all levels up to that of the university—producing a select group of people who would become the administrative elite—Malay education served a different purpose. Those from the Malay schools had no prospect of being recruited into the Administration, and the best that they could hope for was to become a Malay school teacher or to hold the 'humblest clerkship'. Until the late 1950s Malay education was confined to the primary level, and it was meant only to make the Malays better peasants or more efficient tappers, as is amplified by the following:

> It is comforting to think that the vast majority of the children who go through our Malay schools stay in their kampongs and till the soil. It is not comforting to think that during the years they are under our influence in school they are taught little that fits them for that life.
>
> It is highly desirable that they should be taught the advantages of wage earning, but it is unprofitable to confine their education to book work, for there is no field for employment as clerks etc. That branch of wage earning will be more than filled by the boys from the Malay College Kuala Kangsar and other English schools. But in this state there is a great field for wage earning in rubber-tapping. No one is better fitted for the work than the Malay boys (Report of the Resident General for FMS, 1909).

Although Malay education receives financial aid from the government, it has comparatively low economic value. Muslim religious

education together with Chinese and Tamil vernacular education developed mainly as a result of financial support provided by their own communities. Among the Malays, an important religious educational institution has always been the *pondok* (literally a 'hut') which is made up of a number of small huts serving as places of residence for students who gather to study under a single or a group of religious teachers normally maintained by the local villagers. These pondok schools are in the rural areas but there are also Arabic schools financed through contributions from wealthy individuals and administered under a trusteeship (*wakaf*) in some of the towns. In Johore for example there is a fairly organized religious school system, whereby the buildings used for Malay education are also utilized in the evening to provide religious instruction. A few students from the pondok or Arabic or religious schools become teachers, prayer leaders etc., while those who are able to pursue further education in the Middle East often return to become private religious functionaries, or are absorbed into the religious bureaucracy as different grades of religious officials e.g. *mufti*, the religious head of the state; *kadzi*, the religious magistrate and administrator at the district level; and the *imam*, the prayer leader in the mosque.

SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

What are the social implications of the political, economic and educational changes that have been described? In spite of these changes, traditional Malay society continued to exist though its way of life was affected to some extent. In examining what has happened in Malayan society since 1874, it is found that the trend has been towards a complex type of 'pluralism' (Furnival, 1948: 307) which manifested itself in the multi-ethnic composition of the population. Besides this development which tended to separate the people along vertical lines, there was also the horizontal division between individuals of different classes and status that cut across the vertical ethnic lines (cf. Freedman, 1961).

By the nineteenth century, a number of migrants from the surrounding islands in the Malay archipelago had already settled in Malaya. A common ethnic background and religious belief made the process of assimilation into the Malay way of life relatively easy. Most of these immigrants settled in villages and took to agriculture, and intermarriage between them and the local population was a common practice. With the turn of the century, there came the influx of migrants from China and India and Table II illustrates how the pat-

TABLE II

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION

Year	*Malays*	*Chinese*	*Others**	*Total*
1835	85·9	7·7	6·3	376,000
1884	63·9	29·4	6·7	1,401,000
1921	54·0	29·4	16·6	2,906,000
1931	49·2	33·9	16·9	3,787,000
1947	49·5	38·4	12·1	4,908,000
1957	49·8	37·2	13·0	6,279,000
1967/8	50·6	35·7	13·7	7,892,000

Source: Census Reports and Chander, op. cit.
* These are mainly Indians and Pakistanis.

tern of population distribution had slowly changed as a result of this movement.

There are many factors other than racial origin and cultural background that have helped to separate the main ethnic groups from one another. First, in terms of demographic distribution, it has been shown that while about four-fifths of the Malays are in the rural areas, over half of the Chinese population live in the towns, with a majority of the Indians concentrated in the estates. Second, the Malays are mainly peasants by occupation although there are many who also work as labourers and members of the security forces. A few, however, are associated with the Administration. The Chinese on the other hand are mainly shop assistants, labourers in the mining and construction industries, traders and businessmen who run the retail and wholesale enterprises or are engaged in the various professions. As for the Indians, the majority of them are estate workers while there are also those who work in the government or in the business sector. Table III summarizes the situation quite clearly.

Finally, the children of the various ethnic groups attend different schools and are taught in their own vernacular languages. It is pointed out that,

> . . . there is clearly a positive correlation between the ethnic background and the medium of instruction. It is noticeable that most Malays attend Malay medium schools (89%), Chinese attend Chinese medium schools (85%) and Tamils attend Tamil schools (67%). It is only among the Indians that one can observe a significant move (amounting to 28%) to go into English schools. Among the Malays only 8% attended English schools and among the Chinese 14% . . . (MSSH, 1967/8: 63).

TABLE III

EMPLOYMENT BY SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUP AND RACE

Socio-economic group	*Employed*			
	All races	*As percentage of all races*		
		Malays	*Chinese*	*Indians*
Government departments or statutory bodies	309·0	57·9	18·7	20·7
Smallholding agriculture	533·3	77·2	20·1	1·6
Owner operator	254·1	82·3	15·8	0·5
Operator	107·1	89·3	8·0	1·2
Wage-earner	172·1	62·2	34·0	3·3
Family workers without pay	352·8	67·9	29·0	1·5
Estate worker	313·2	26·8	27·6	45·2
Private Company, partnership or proprietorship other than agriculture	718·1	27·6	62·2	9·4
Others	139·0	46·9	44·2	8·2
Total	2,365·4	49·8	36·4	12·6

Source: Chander, op. cit. p. 90 (Statement 8).

Most of the English schools attended by the different ethnic groups are in the towns. Of the total number of students who attend them 28 per cent are Malays, 39 per cent Chinese and 26 per cent Indians. Comparing this attendance with the population size of each of the races, the Indians have been more than proportionately represented, the Chinese proportionately represented while the Malays have been under-represented in the English-medium schools.

In spite of these differences, there is no absolute compartmentalization of the various ethnic groups. The English schools provided opportunities for inter-ethnic contact among the young. In the economic sphere the rural Malays as producers and consumers came into contact with both the Chinese and the Indian traders while politically, the different ethnic groups were under a common political and administrative system. Social contact among the various ethnic groups was, however, rather limited.

The class and status systems in Malaya were also transformed radically. The 'lower' classes grew and expanded with the development

of the tin and rubber industries, the majority of workers being immigrants. Moreover the process of urbanization and proletarianization also affected the Malays. Some of the Malays moved from the rural areas to the towns following the expansion of both the bureaucracy and the security services which absorbed a large number of Malay youths as soldiers, policemen and office-boys. At the same time some of the rural Malays were also turning to mining and work in the plantations but involvement in agriculture continued to predominate.

Interaction between the peasants (predominantly Malays) and the working class (mainly non-Malays) is infrequent and this has resulted in the absence of any feeling of solidarity among them. There are many areas in which the non-Malays form the minority and where the Chinese adopt not only the Malay language and food but even the Malay way of life. Due to religious barriers, intermarriage however is not commonly practised; this has also been the case with the Indians. On the other hand, it has been slightly different with the Pakistanis as their Islamic faith has made intermarriage both easier and more common between themselves and the Malays. For the majority of the population, the chances of communicating and interacting among themselves are limited, and their separation and ignorance of one another's way of life have led to the formation of stereotypes and prejudices. In other words, although the lower classes of the various races are in almost the same economic position, differences and racial antipathy are widespread among them, and these prevent the recognition of a common fate and destiny.

Among the 'middle' classes, there is also specialization in occupation along ethnic lines. From the beginning, the people drawn into the administration were mostly Malays. Working with the government carries with it prestige and respect and most often it is viewed favourably as an association with the ruling groups. At the same time, the pay and style of life offered have always been comparatively attractive. For these reasons, the Malays have not taken well to the technical, medical and other professional fields in which the non-Malays tend to predominate, possibly as a result of their difficulty in joining the Administration. In business, the Chinese were predominant. The Malay aristocracy was accustomed to utilizing its incomes for maintaining its entourage and conspicuous consumption, and was therefore unable to accumulate sufficient capital to invest in business ventures. In contrast, the Chinese businessmen have great acumen in handling money, and Chinese guilds and chambers of commerce were organized to help Chinese businessmen at the

initial stages, especially those belonging to the same clan. Credit facilities are provided, and mutual trust helps the smooth flow of business, particularly among retailers and wholesalers who can communicate with one another in the same tongue, and who are linked by common membership within the same clan, guild or chamber of commerce. At the same time, land-owners in the rural areas also constitute part of the 'middle' classes, but they are drawn from the various ethnic groups.

Among the upper classes, there also exists a certain specialization of functions determined to a certain extent on an ethnic basis. The people included here are the Malay rulers and their families, the British colonial officers, and the British, together with some of the more successful Chinese capitalists. The Malay aristocracy served as symbols of authority, with some of its members occupying subordinate administrative posts in the bureaucracy; the British officers exercised a decisive role in politics and administration, with the British businessmen enjoying more than a fair share of the expanding economy, while their Chinese counterparts played second fiddle in this field. There were definite interests that held these people together. Most members of the aristocracy and their descendants were supported by the British, and thus to a great extent they depended on British power to maintain their positions. The Chinese businessmen, who were the allies and clients of the bigger British enterprises, especially in commerce, were interlocked in their necessity to survive. Furthermore, members of the upper classes shared almost similar life styles and this tended to bring them together socially.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

It can be seen therefore that the impact of British rule resulted in many changes but as with colonialism elsewhere, it also gave rise to several kinds of discontent. It was out of this dissatisfaction with colonialism that nationalism slowly evolved.[1] Among the Malays, the early seeds of nationalism were sown by religious modernists who returned after studying in the Middle East. The most prominent among them was Syed Sheikh Alhadi (1867-1934), a student of Muhamad Abduh, the well-known Egyptian teacher and modernist at the turn of the century. These pioneers of Malay modernism were very concerned about the backwardness of the Malays and the Mus-

[1] Much has been written on the rise of nationalism in Malaya, e.g., cf. Roff, 1967, Soenarno, 1964, and Aziz and Silcock, 1952. What is attempted here is merely to outline the general features.

lims generally. They believed that in order for the Malays to progress, they must throw off the shackles of superstition and unorthodox practices, and provide new interpretations to certain aspects of Islam so that they could serve as useful guides to enable Malays to meet the challenges of the times. With his colleagues, Alhadi also preached that the Malays should adopt modern education and technology. They started newspapers, such as the *Al-Imam* (1906), and Arabic schools in Penang and Melaka, to propagate their ideas. In their attacks on certain practices considered to be un-Islamic such as beliefs in the power of the saints, overspending on marriage and death feasts, and their expositions of the need for fresh interpretations of the Quran, these people found themselves opposed to the established religious authorities. Administratively the sultan is the head of matters relating to Islam, and in each state there is a religious head (mufti) whose prerogative it is to pronounce injunctions and interpretations (*fatwa*) on Islamic problems. By introducing their own injunctions and interpretations, the modernists were seen as a challenge to the established and more conservative religious authority. Alhadi was many times at odds with different religious departments. Besides, the movement that he led was rather small, and the religious departments had their officials at different levels, down to that of the villages, who could be mobilized to combat the influence of the modernists. Although as a movement, it was somewhat circumscribed, yet its ideas were certainly significant in 'opening the eyes' of some sections of the Malay community.[1]

Following these religious leaders, there was a group of Malay-educated teachers and journalists whose concern was more secular. Initially, these people were motivated by the desire to bring about improvements in the performance of the Malays in the educational and economic fields. This feeling of concern for the future of the Malays was intensified by the knowledge that the Malays were still lagging behind and were confined to agriculture whereas both the Indians and the Chinese were making headway in industry and commerce. In the 1930s, the force that moved them was a form of Malay nationalism that was essentially directed against the 'foreign people' (*orang asing*). Several associations that were exclusively Malay in membership and directed towards the general improvement of the Malays were formed at that time. But soon the form of nationalism changed as the conflicts that resulted from colonial rule and the changes wrought by it came to the fore. For instance, the British

[1] The development of the Arabic modernist movements and their impact on Malaya has been the subject of a Ph. D. thesis, cf. Zaki Badawi, 1964.

monopoly in the major economic enterprises led to the non-British entrepreneurs being rendered less effective, and this caused a certain amount of frustration. In the Administration, local officers almost always had British superiors above them, and they were often displeased with the inequality of treatment. For some of the businessmen and administrators, British rule was seen as an obstacle to their desire for promotions, although for many it had opened up various new opportunities and privileges. Meanwhile, conditions of the masses were not improving, in fact they were getting worse. Population growth was outstripping the rate of land alienation, and the penetration of the money economy enabled a few people to buy up and accumulate land at the expense of those who were dispossessed of it. While there was impoverishment among these people, those who were in close association with the British political and economic activities were doing well, and the British themselves were not only owning and controlling the most important sectors of the economy but were viewed as foreigners who drained away the wealth of the country. Further, there were feelings of indignation that the Malay language and education were treated as inferior to that of the British, and that the traditional culture of the people was being disparaged.

Slowly there emerged leaders who could lead the country towards independence. In addition to the teachers and journalists, there were also some nationalists from the bureaucracy and the legal profession. They were the 'new men' with western training and nationalistic attitudes and who could be utilized to match against the colonial masters. In the context of the 'third world', they are often referred to as the 'social revolutionaries' (Worsley, 1964), who rejected colonial subjection and wanted freedom for their people. They received their impetus not only from the internal situation, but also from some external developments; for instance, just as some of the Chinese in Malaya were influenced by the struggles in China, and the Indians by the independence movement in India, a section of the Malays turned to Indonesia for inspiration. Two of the earliest and most important nuclei for the Malayan political movement were the Malayan Communist Party (MCP, formed in 1927) and the Young Malays Association or *Kesatuan Melayu Muda* (KMM, formed in the 1930s). During the Japanese occupation they gathered strength and after the war, the movement for independence transformed itself into a mass movement, gaining strength under the MCP and the Malay Nationalist Party or *Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya* (PKMM) which had two sections, *Angkatan Wanita Sedar* (AWAS) for the women and

Angkatan Pemuda Insaf (API) for the youths. The workers were beginning to be formed into formidable trade unions, and political parties were also mobilizing support among the villagers. The independence movement after the war was in fact successful in linking up the middle-class leadership with a large section of the workers and the peasants, and this was what gave it popular support.

In 1948 a state of Emergency was declared by the government. These radical political parties were declared illegal and most of their leaders were either arrested or forced underground. Both political and trade union activities were also restricted. A moderate group which was not hit by the Emergency emerged in importance in the form of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), with a women's section known as the *Kaum Ibu*, and a youth section called the *Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO*. The way was now clear for UMNO to lead the constitutional fight for independence with little harassment, if not encouragement, from the British. Although initially it was unwilling to use the slogan of *Merdeka* (Independence)—common among the left-wing organizations, and instead insisted on *Hidup Melayu* (Long Live the Malays)—within three years of the Emergency it had already shifted ground and adopted Merdeka as its own slogan, thus declaring that its main struggle was for independence. Undoubtedly, independence from British rule was a popular issue. During the 1950s, especially up to the time of Independence in 1957, UMNO enjoyed a wide appeal among the people. It was seen as a necessary organization in the fight for freedom, and was looked upon as the representative and defender of Malay interests. The argument that UMNO wanted Independence for the country in order to improve the lot of the Malays was widely accepted among the various sections of the Malay community. Many of the supporters and minor leaders of the nationalist party who were not affected by the Emergency drifted into UMNO, and some of them even assumed positions of leadership at various levels. The key positions of national leadership, however, went mainly to fairly conservative ex-civil servants and members of the professions, many of whom were from families with aristocratic backgrounds. Around 1954, UMNO together with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) made the initial move to form themselves into a loose front, later to be known as the Alliance. Both the MCA and MIC, which claim to represent the Chinese and Indian communities respectively, were led primarily by businessmen and traders as well as members of the various professions. Thus the Alliance was—

as it continues to be now—very much a party led by both the upper and the 'upper middle' classes.

In the 1950s there were other parties besides the UMNO but they gathered neither strength nor support. For instance, there was the *Parti Negara* (PN) which was confined only to some areas in Johore, Trengganu and Kelantan. It was led by a well-known Malay politician, Dato Onn bin Jaafar, who had been for many years the President of UMNO, and it adopted policies that appeared to have a strong Malay bias. In spite of this, it did not have much of an impact on the Malays. One of the main reasons was that both the party and its leader were trying to go against the tide of Independence. A large number of people, including those within the ranks of UMNO, wanted immediate Independence, but the PN was in favour of a slow process of transfer of power. Its leader was therefore strongly criticized by protagonists of immediate independence for the statement that the country needed twenty-five years to equip itself before independence could be made possible. For some time the PN lived on by virtue of the untiring efforts and prestige of its leader and when he died, it did not take long for the party to be dissolved.

Then there was the Pan Malayan Islamic Party or *Parti Islam Semalaya* (PAS), whose leadership is primarily dominated by the religious and Arabic-educated, and which expounds the ideology of Islam and Malay nationalism. PAS progressed very slowly before independence though it was already enjoying some support; in 1955, it won a seat in the first Federal Election. After Independence, however, its emphasis on Islam and Malay nationalism began to attract wide support, especially in the states of Kedah, Perlis, Trengganu and Kelantan which have very strong traditional roots. They are predominantly populated by Malays who are involved in peasant agriculture, and who have a strong faith in Islam. It is in these states that the pondok schools are found. The religious line of the PAS appealed to the religious teachers, who in turn took great effort to popularize PAS among the villagers as the genuine party which defended the interests of both the Malays and Islam. The peasants were beginning to feel that Independence had not brought about the prosperity promised to them. At the same time PAS was already beginning to attack UMNO for selling out the Malays to the Chinese, and that it was not the UMNO but the MCA which was in full control of the Alliance. They therefore accused the Alliance of working in the interests of the Chinese rather than that of the Malays.

At the time when PAS was mounting a campaign against the

UMNO, the latter itself was facing a crisis with the National Association of Malay Teachers. These teachers had always been active participants in the Independence movement, providing the middle-rung leadership, and forming the 'backbone' of UMNO, particularly at both the district and village levels. They desired a national system of education whereby Malay would replace English as the medium of instruction. They presented this as an important measure for promoting national identity, and perhaps also as a necessary step for improving their social and economic positions. After Independence they had not seen much progress in this direction, and they gave an ultimatum to the Government that the school system should be changed immediately. When this ultimatum was ignored, they made a public call to members of the association to withdraw their support from UMNO. Many in fact withdrew and some even joined other parties like the PAS. To forestall their influence through the opposition parties, the Government immediately passed a ruling to restrict the teachers, who were government servants, from taking an active part as either ordinary or committee members in political parties. The showdown between the Government and the Malay teachers was used by PAS to prove its point that UMNO was 'selling out' the interests of the Malays. During the 1959 Election PAS was able to capture the states of Kelantan and Trengganu; and although it lost Trengganu to UMNO in 1964, PAS retained control of the Kelantan State Government after the elections in 1964 and 1969. It also won several seats in the Federal Parliament.

The third was the Labour Party of Malaya (LPM), which was started by a few people from the professions, and which adopted a Fabian brand of socialism. Before independence in 1957, when a number of political prisoners were given amnesty, some of them joined together to form the People's Party or *Partai Rakyat Malaya* (PRM) while others became members of either the PAS or the LPM. There were also those who later drifted into UMNO. The PRM also took up a socialist stance and from the beginning based itself on the principles referred to as 'socio-national-democracy'. In 1959 the LPM and PRM combined to form the Socialist Front (SF) which gained wide support mainly in the urban areas of the relatively more advanced West Coast states where it controlled a number of municipal and town councils. However, it weakened after 1965 when the constituent parties broke apart.

When the first national election was held to elect 52 of the 99 members of the Federal Legislative Council (the remaining 47 to be held by both *ex-officio* members and others appointed by the Gov-

ernment in consultation with the majority party), only the Alliance, PAS and PN participated. The Alliance won all seats but one and this went to the PAS. When Malaya gained its independence two years later, in August 1957, power was transferred to the Alliance leadership.

MOBILITY AND CONFLICT

Since independence, the basic economic and political framework established during British rule has not altered much. The colonial pattern of economy that was geared towards the export of raw materials, and in which British interests were heavily involved has continued.[1] When compared with that of the British, the role of Chinese capital is of secondary importance. Nevertheless independence has brought about new economic opportunities. Following it, development projects have been carried out under two Five Year Development Plans (1956-1966), the Rural Development Plan started in 1959, the First Malaysia Plan (1966-1971).[2] These concentrated mainly on the construction of new roads, community centres, mosques, and temples. Some jungles were also opened up for both the timber industry and land settlement schemes. This in turn required contract jobs to be carried out, and so provided immense opportunities for local businessmen and contractors. Since the Chinese have more resources in terms of capital and know-how, they have stood to gain much more than the Indians and the Malays from these contracts. A considerable number of them are members of the MCA, which is associated with the government through the Alliance, and serves as a direct channel for the flow of these contracts. As a result of this political association with the ruling party, a number of these Chinese businessmen and contractors was able to exercise a greater share in the governing process of the country.

Politically, new opportunities were open to the Malays, particularly in terms of several high offices. The constitutional changes after 1957, among other things, provide for an elected Paramount Ruler (the *Yang Dipertuan Agung*) and his Deputy. They are elected by

[1] For example, according to J. Puthucheary (1960), the following were owned or controlled by the British: about 75 per cent of rubber estates over 2,000 acres in size, about 60 per cent of the tin produced, and more than half of the import-export trade. In 1969, the situation had not altered very much. Out of a total $4,677,540,000 share capital invested in industries, 62·5 per cent is made up of foreign—mainly British—ownership. Cf. *Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975*, p. 40.

[2] The Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975) does not fall under the preview of this study.

and from the different rulers in the states in a special conference held for that particular purpose, every five years, or earlier in the case of death. Although seniority, i.e. the length of time a ruler has held office is given preference, the choice of the rulers and the attitude of the ruling party are known to have some effect on the election. For instance, in the election of the first Paramount Ruler, although the Sultan of Pahang was the most senior among the rulers, he was bypassed. Instead, the ruler of Negri Sembilan was elected.

More significantly, both the Parliamentary and Cabinet systems of government were introduced. The previous Federal Legislative Council, whose membership consisted entirely of *ex-officio* and government-nominated members, has been transformed into a Parliament whose membership is determined by the people through General Elections. In the same way, the old State Council for each state, whose members were made up of *ex-officio* and government-nominated representatives from within the state, has given way to the State Legislative Council with a fully elected membership. Both the Parliament and the State Legislature act as policy-making bodies, and for the management of the day-to-day affairs of government, there is a Cabinet for the whole country, and an Executive Council for each state. As in most modern governments, various functions such as defence, internal security, education, finance, trade, commerce and industry, health, labour, transport and communications, and external affairs come under the responsibility of various ministers who are members of the Cabinet. The Executive Council is responsible for all matters within the state, especially in spheres in which the states have autonomous control, for instance, land, agriculture, forestry, local government, and machinery of the state government (Groves, 1964). Significantly, matters pertaining to religion are administered separately. As noted earlier, the sultan himself is directly responsible for both religious and customary affairs. Each state has its own Religious Department and its officials are directly responsible to the sultan.

The election of members of Parliament and of state legislatures have opened wide opportunities to those involved in party politics in the country. The elections held in 1959, 1964 and 1969, were won overwhelmingly by the Alliance. The UMNO is the senior partner in the Alliance, and in terms of numbers, the Malays from UMNO have more numerous representation in the Cabinet, Parliament, Executive Councils and State Legislatures than the non-Malays from both the MCA and MIC. Although there are a few doctors, lawyers and ex-administrators among the UMNO 'people's representatives' (*wa-*

kil rakyat—a term often used to include both parliamentarians and state councillors), the majority of them are teachers, clerks, journalists—individuals with a lower middle-class background. For these people, politics provide favourable opportunities for upward mobility.

There have also been good opportunities for upward mobility through the Administration. But here achievement in education plays a bigger role as the minimum qualification for entry into the services is normally a university degree. Nevertheless it is possible to join the MAS and MCS through the routine process of promotion from the clerical services. At the same time, in some states like Kelantan it is still possible for those who have kinship ties with the state aristocracy to be recruited into the State Civil Service even though they may be underqualified (Rashid Ahmad, 1969). The process of Malayanization of the public services after independence meant the replacement of expatriates by the local officers. During the time of British rule, the recruitment of Malays into the bureaucracy was expedited administratively, but the Constitution adopted for Malaya after independence institutionalized this practice by introducing a clause spelling out a quota, i.e. a ratio of three Malays to one non-Malay for recruitment into the Administration. As a result, the civil service is now predominantly manned by Malays, most of whom are university graduates who are still quite young. While there is this predominance of Malays in the civil service, the majority of those in the educational, technical and medical positions are occupied, however, by the non-Malays.[1] This has resulted not only from the absence of a similar quota requirement in these services, but also, as seen earlier, from the fact that the number of non-Malays who have taken up professional causes and training is greater than that of the Malays.

It is interesting to note that within the upper classes there has been a strong tendency for the members to be integrated inter-ethnically. The task of governing, as well as the need to maintain political unity so that they can be sufficiently strong to remain in power, hold at least the top-level leadership of the Alliance together. Since independence, there has been a greater absorption of retired Malay aristocrats, politicians and senior civil servants into some British and Chinese business enterprises, especially as directors. In addition,

[1] For instance, in 1969, out of 632 positions filled in the Civil Service, 558 (85·1 per cent) were occupied by Malays and 94 (14·9 per cent) by non-Malays. On the other hand, out of 644 medical officers, 603 (93·6 per cent) were non-Malays and 41 (6·4 per cent) were Malays, while out of 488 engineers 429 (87·9 per cent) were non-Malays and 59 (12·1 per cent) were Malays. These figures have been compiled from the *Federal Establishment List*, 1969.

there has also been the growth of a kind of association in the economic fields, referred to widely as the 'Ali-Baba' partnership. 'Ali' represents the Malays, who under the special privileges guaranteed by the Constitution can easily obtain permits, licences and contracts that are reserved for them. However he normally does not have the capital, and so he often 'sells' the right of operating these businesses to well-to-do Chinese—referred to as 'Baba'—either for an outright or monthly payment. Thus 'Ali' and 'Baba' become quite interdependent. At the same time, there is wider acceptance of both the Chinese and Indian businessmen as well as other prominent members of the public into the traditional Malay positions of honour by the conferment of titles such as *Tun, Tan Sri, Datuk,* and other awards of recognition. Members of the upper classes often attend state functions together; they belong to the same exclusive clubs, and they play games like golf, mahjong and even poker among themselves.

A small number of people, mostly from the upper classes, therefore form a 'closed circle', enjoying most of the economic and political fruits and privileges of independence. Both at the national and state levels, places within this 'circle' are limited, but there are many from the outside who wish to move upwards and who try to break into it. For instance, ambitious politicians, businessmen, accountants, lawyers, and others from the middle classes in particular, try their hardest but only to find themselves unable to secure a place within the coveted 'circle'. While the Malays themselves feel that they ought to have a greater share in commercial and economic activities, their Chinese counterparts are of the opinion that they ought to be able to participate much more in the political decision-making bodies as well as in the Administration. The Malays often become irritated at what they believe to be the excessive economic predominance of the Chinese who in turn consider themselves to be discriminated against in politics and administration, largely monopolized by the former. Besides, there are also competition over contracts and licences, employment and promotion, entrance into the university and scholarships. Therefore among those members of the 'middle-classes', in particular, who compete vigorously to improve their own prospects, there is a very strong tendency to interpret their frustrations and disappointments in communal terms. The Malays fear the Chinese and accuse the latter of depriving them of greater opportunities in the economic field; the Chinese, on the other hand, envy the Malays and level similar accusations against them in the political and administrative spheres. Yet at the same time, members of the 'closed

circle' who seem to restrict the upward mobility for those outside it, are multi-ethnic in composition and work in close co-operation with one another. In other words, a competition or dissatisfaction essentially of a class nature finds expression in communal terms in the plural Malayan society.

These communal expressions are voiced rather strongly by a number of political parties. Although the Alliance is multi-ethnic in composition, each constituent party has a membership drawn only from one ethnic group, to whom it appeals for support. The UMNO, which is the Malay wing of the Alliance, presents itself as the champion of the Malays, and defends policies that are apparently pro-Malay in nature. It puts forward the Rural Development Plan mainly as one for the economic alleviation of the Malays, and upholds the special privileges of the Malays as being necessary for their protection. While these issues enable them to win extensive Malay support, they tend to alienate the Chinese, and therefore makes the position of the MCA, which is the Chinese wing, rather tenuous in the Alliance. On the other hand, the MCA claims that it has been able to obtain financial aid for Chinese education, and to defend strongly the free enterprise system of the economy which benefits the businessmen and supporters of the MCA more than others. But this system, however, appears clearly to a number of Malays in the Alliance as being quite meaningless for the poverty-stricken Malays who give their support to UMNO. Although the conflict of interests is quite extensive between the two main constituents of the Alliance, they have so far been able to hold together.

Strong communal pressures are exercised by some parties outside the Alliance. There is the PAS, which as we have seen earlier, stands for Islam and Malay nationalism and which considers the Chinese as a threat to the future of the Malays. The extremist elements in the party have long accused leaders of UMNO of 'selling out' to the Chinese in MCA, and warn that the economically more powerful Chinese will drive the Malays to extinction. They repeatedly use proverbs such as 'ducks in water dying of thirst' (*itik di air mati kehausan*), and 'chicken in rice-bin dying of hunger' (*ayam di kepok mati kelaparan*) in order to convey a pessimistic picture of the fate of the Malays in a country which is their own. On the other hand, there are the Peoples' Progressive Party (PPP) and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) which champion non-Malay (mainly Chinese) rights, although the latter also claim to stand for democratic socialism. The extremist elements within them accuse the Malays first of exercising political hegemony, second of treating the non-Malays as 'second-

class citizens' in the country of their own adoption, and finally of threatening the non-Malay languages and education systems with extinction. In fact, the religious and cultural issues have been increasingly used by both the Chinese and the Malay communal elements to gain support, and by doing so the gravity of the ethnic problem is increased.

The increasingly communal nature of Malayan party politics, spear-headed mainly by the middle class leaders, has also spread downwards to the lower classes. For instance, both the peasants and the workers, who are made up mostly of Malays and non-Malays respectively, are the most deprived groups in the country. Although much has been said to them about Malay privileges, the Malay peasants themselves have gained the least in terms of scholarships, civil service jobs, permits and licences that are reserved for them. With regard to the opportunities for employment and facilities for education and health, both the Malay as well as the non-Malay peasants and workers are equally discriminated against, especially compared to the opportunities open to their counterparts in the middle and in particular the upper classes. Again in terms of development, the most that they can see are new roads, mosques, temples, community centres and a number of schools and land schemes. Although these have brought about increasing fringe benefits, they are actually far from being the solution to basic problems of poverty, unemployment (and under-employment), and landlessness. Generally, it may be said that these people share similar interests and although the major problems cut across ethnic communal lines, yet their discontentment is canalized more often than not in communal terms.

The communal claims and counter-claims of the different political activities and parties strike familiar chords among a large segment of the lower classes. The Malay peasants not only see themselves as being poor, but have also noticed especially after the differences have been indicated to them that most of the wealthier people around them and in the towns are Chinese. At the same time, the Chinese middlemen who buy up the agricultural produce from the peasants and sell consumption goods control not only the prices but to some extent their lives as well. This quite often leads to unpleasant relationships. On the other hand, the non-Malay workers or hawkers, for instance, are faced with Malay officials whom they find difficult to communicate with when the former have to deal with the 'government'. What is worse is that when some of these hawkers operate without licences or in places normally not allowed to them, unpleasant acts such as the confiscation of their goods are carried

out by the policemen who are mainly Malays. When Chinese workers go on an illegal strike, they are disbanded or even arrested by the predominantly Malay-uniformed personnel also. With these existing situations, members of the lower classes can easily be swayed by the argument of communal politics, especially when there are no effective parties to rally them according to their own class interests.

While communal political parties have been able to operate freely, those that are class-orientated have not been given similar treatment by the Government. The MCP, for example, remains an illegal party. The Socialist Front (SF) which was formed in 1959 with the merger of PRM and LPM stands for the principles of socialism (leftist but non-communist). They see the peasants and the workers as being the most exploited of the classes, and stand for an alliance of these groups to replace the Malay and Chinese upper classes who already have the Alliance to defend and promote their own interests. They point out that the Malay privileges benefit mainly the 'haves' (both politically and economically) and that the poorer Malays are as much discriminated against as the poverty-stricken Chinese. In this sense they both form the real 'second-class citizens', just as those in the upper classes who enjoy varied privileges are the real 'first-class citizens'. The SF has also been subjected to several kinds of harassment, such as having many of its leaders detained without trial.[1] The increasing activities of the communcally-orientated political parties, and the weakening of those which are class-orientated only helps to aggravate the sensitive communal situation in the country.

Communal clashes have occurred in this country several times.[2] The most traumatic, however, erupted with much bloodshed in Kuala Lumpur, three days after the 1969 General Election.

[1] In fact, at one stage before the Election in 1964, successive groups of national leaders were arrested and branch activities were disallowed. It was largely as a result of the incarceration of these leaders and activists who could hold and guide the party along class and non-communal lines that it later weakened, resulting in the break-up of the membership with the PRM and LPM.

[2] Examples of communal clashes are those in Batu Pahat (1946), Penang (January 1958) and Pulau Pangkor (May 1959). Reports on these clashes were carried by the local newspapers such as the *Straits Times* and the *Utusan Melayu*. A study has been made on the racial conflict in Batu Pahat by Burridge (1957).

III The Village

IT was noted in the last chapter that the smallest administrative unit in Malaya is the mukim. The term mukim has sometimes incorrectly been translated as 'parish'. This rendering is not appropriate because a 'parish' brings to mind a social unit that is closely linked with the church, whereas the mukim does not have any religious connotation at all. In fact, a mukim is established and recognized by the Government as an administrative unit mainly for purposes of land administration, particularly those pertaining to registration of titles and deeds, and the collection of revenue. The boundary of a mukim is determined in quite an arbitrary manner, sometimes cutting across both rivers and villages. All plots of land within a mukim are registered in the Mukim Register which shows the location, acreage, crop planted, ownership, transactions of each plot; this Register is kept in the District Land Office which is a part of the District Office. The origin of the word can be traced to mean roughly 'place of settlement'; the word 'settlement' is however not only rather vague and general but also fails to bring out significantly the meaning of a mukim as an administrative unit. Using a term such as 'sub-district' is of course out of the question as such a unit already exists.

Although determined as an administrative unit, some mukims have developed certain elements which can qualify them to be called communities. Hillery (1956) has suggested that there are three major elements found in a community, namely, (a) common area, (b) common ties, and (c) social interaction. Looking at the three mukims of Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan, for instance, these elements are certainly present. Firstly, like all mukims, they each have a common area. Secondly, most of the people in the mukim are of the same ethnic origin, sharing the same cultural heritage, and holding the same religious faith; and all these provide the basis for common ties among members of the mukim. In addition, a number of the people are related to one another consanguineously and/or affinally. Thirdly, the people in the mukim do interact with one another. Those who are kinsmen have an important basis for their social interaction in

kinship. Also, there are other institutions, for example, the schools in the mukim which bring the children and some of the parents into regular contact, and the mosques are important focal points where the people can congregate. Above all, the mukim is under the jurisdiction of an official known as the *penghulu*, whose functions are traditionally related to his role as leader of the people, but today he serves mainly as an intermediary between the Government and the villagers.

Based on the above analysis it is possible therefore to say that a district, a state and a country each constitutes a community. This, however, is most unsatisfactory. On closer examination we find that the mukim does not appear to be a closely-knit social entity. The population in each mukim is fairly large, ranging from less than 1,000 to over 20,000 (Chander, 1970). Although there are kin groups, these are not all related to one another. The number of kinsmen who are closely related on the other hand are confined to a very few. There are also some people in the mukim whose relatives live beyond its boundary. Further frequent interactions occur, and most of the social, economic and political activities are carried out within smaller social units. These are the villages (kampung). Several villages make up a mukim: in Kangkong there are seven, in Kerdau twenty, and in Bagan twelve.

The Malay concept of a village is basically, though not exclusively, related to the rural society. It is sometimes applied to a community even in an urban area; for example, a settlement in the midst of the capital city of Kuala Lumpur is also called a kampung by virtue of its name, Kampung Baru. Although there are many communities within the town centres in Malaya that are referred to with the prefix kampung, this does not however alter the fact that the word pertains more to rural society. For instance, *orang kampung* (rural people) describes person(s) who usually come from rural areas—and certainly those from the urban community referred to earlier will not be called orang kampung. Secondly, *kerja kampung* (rural work) is normally related to agriculture, the main economic occupation of the rural people. The application of the word kampung to communities within an urban environment only illustrates the flexibility of the language in extending the meaning of the word to accommodate a wider application.

Notwithstanding the possible variations described above, the term kampung refers normally to the most coherent social unit or community in the rural area. Many anthropologists have attempted to define the Malay village, and quite often their definitions tend to be

as varied as the villages that they study. In his Kelantan study, Firth (1968: 4) says that 'A kampong is not normally an administrative or religious unit, but it is a social unit with some degree of solidarity and neighbourly feelings'. In contrast, Wilson, in a study of a village in Selangor, describes it as, '. . . primarily a co-residential unit, and it displays little or no unity arising out of social relations among villagers' (Wilson, 1967: vii). What Firth and Wilson have described may typify two different kinds of villages found in Malaya. The heterogeneous nature of these rural communities may be further perceived when we examine the study of a village in Johore by Burridge. He showed that in the village, especially among the Malays in contrast with the non-Malays, interrelationship and unity among its members in kinship and also in the political sphere are strong indeed. As he described it, 'All who live in the village consider themselves to be members of it, but the Chinese as it were transient. . . . The Malays of the village on the other hand, form a closely interrelated and integrated group' (Burridge, 1956: 60). In addition, there are also many other types of villages. Mazidah studied a village in Perak that began as an administratively-sponsored community. The area of settlement was declared a Malay reserve to be settled only by the Malays themselves who were displaced as a result of the expanding tin-mining industry which encroached upon their original village. Over a period of time, what started originally as an administrative unit also developed later into a meaningful social community. Needless to say, most of the people there already had social interactions before they were resettled (Mazidah, 1967). This, however, was not the case with an urban community in Selangor made up of people with a rural background but who have been absorbed mainly into the urban environment through the work they have undertaken. Here Rokiah in her study amply showed that the numerous ties and interactions which developed have qualified it as a community (Rokiah, 1969).

In the context of Java, Boeke, a Dutch economist, has defined the Javanese village (*desa*) as,

> . . . more than just a corporate body; it is a natural community. Three fundamental principles may be distinguished as playing a part in its determination—a genealogical, a territorial and a communal one. The first and the second are not always both present at the same time, but each invariably appears in a combination with the third (Boeke, 1953: 21).

How relevant is this definition to the Malay kampung? The studies of Malay villages mentioned above have shown that these kinship ties exist, but in varying intensities, in the various villages. Common

social, economic and even political activities and institutions provide in varying degrees the bases for close interaction among their members. In addition to the genealogical, territorial and communal determinants suggested by Boeke, the administrative factor also comes into play, as pointed out by the studies of Mazidah and Rokiah. The Malay village appears to be a community or a coherent social unit within which all kinds of ties and interactions occur; and although its territorial basis may not be very clearly defined, nonetheless it is quite often definable. This is especially because 'we-group' sentiments often develop among the people, and these are strengthened by the various social, religious, economic and political interactions they have with one another.

It can therefore be said that the coherence of the village as a social unit depends on the genealogical, territorial, communal and administrative factors. These factors are in turn subject to the interplay of both traditional and modern forces. Thus, in the course of these changes, we see in the villages different traits in varying combinations which show both the continuation of the past social and cultural heritage as well as the accommodation of elements that may be called modern. These traditional and modern traits manifest themselves in the political, economic and social systems existing in the societies, in the values and attitudes expressed by the people, and in fact, the general way of life of the village people as a whole.

TERRITORIAL BASIS

The discussion and conclusions drawn above have been rather general. What is the nature of things in the three areas studied in particular? Do these areas reflect in any way the general conclusions? To answer these questions it is necessary to examine the areas of Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan in some detail.

The term 'area' has been deliberately used when reference is made to Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan as all the three areas studied constitute neither a full mukim nor a village. They form only a part of their respective mukim; each area consists of different clusters of houses, and each cluster in turn is considered by the people themselves as a village and given a separate name. Some of the villages are quite clearly distinguishable from others, at least in the physical areas that they occupy while a few tend to merge with one another. For example, in Kangkong, there are two such villages, namely, Kuala Kangkong and Permatang Kangkong. Most of the houses in Kuala Kangkong are in a nucleated form at the mouth of the river, and the rest run southward

in a long ribbon on either side of the bridle path to join with Permatang Kangkong, which is in a linear pattern all the way. The border between Kuala Kangkong and Permatang Kangkong appears to merge, and only a mosque and graveyard that are situated in between appear to separate them.

In the Kerdau area, there is the nucleated settlement of Pekan Kerdau, which is the township for the whole rural area and is made up of shophouses and a few residential houses. To the east of this township there are about thirty houses that are scattered, separated from one another by about 50 to 250 yards. There is a main road that cuts across this cluster of houses. With this road as the boundary, the houses on the town side of it are known collectively as Kelibang, while those on the other side are known as Guntung. The people in these two units regard themselves as being in two entirely different villages. To the south of Kerdau township, there are two nucleated settlements of about twelve houses each, situated on rather high ground near a fairly extensive stretch of swamps used for the growing of 'swamp padi'. These settlements are known as Macang Manis and Huma Luas. Then further to the south is a stretch of linear settlements made up of several villages along the left bank of the Pahang river, four of which are Kuala Kerdau, Parit, Peragap and Teluk Batu. These four villages are more easily distinguishable from one another than those in Kangkong, for there are open spaces of up to half a mile between them.

In Bagan, the two villages in the area are clearly separated from each other because they follow in linear pattern two irrigation 'canals' (*parit*) running parallel to each other with a distance of about half a mile in between. Alongside these canals run the village paths, and it is on both sides of the canals and paths that the houses in the two villages are situated. They are known as Parit Besar and Parit Bengkok.

From the above it seems to be clear that the location of houses and the pattern of settlement determine to a great extent whether villages are easily distinguishable from one another. When a village is nucleated and separated from a similar unit, they may be viewed quite easily as two different entities. On the other hand, the line of demarcation between one village and another can be quite obscure in the case of linear settlements that are adjacent to one another. In the case of Kangkong, the linear settlement actually continues further along the path to join other villages in another mukim. In the Kerdau area, the settlement on the left bank of the river is only a small section of the continuous rows of villages that are found on both sides

of the river, all the way to its mouth. The houses in each village are usually located side by side and often less than ten yards away from one another, although those bordering the different villages are very far apart. In the case of the two villages in Kangkong they are separated only by a mosque and a graveyard. The almost parallel linear settlements following the irrigation canals in Bagan is not only a feature peculiar to the area for this is also common along much of the west coast of the Johore state. The villages along the canals are often easily distinguishable from one another. It will be seen later that when a linear village consisting of many houses stretches for a long distance there tends to be subdivisions created within the village itself.

Although there are cases when villages are not easily distinguishable from one another as in the case of Kuala Kangkong and Permatang Kangkong, yet to the villagers themselves, the boundaries are clear and familiar. Whereas the observer or an outsider can only distinguish one village from another if they are physically separated by distance, most of the villagers when asked could specify clearly to which village they or their neighbours belonged. He is therefore dependent on the villagers themselves for the specification of the boundaries of villages in cases when these are rather blurred, and for the information as to which village they belong to, especially when they live along the boundaries of different villages. What makes the matter simpler is that the villagers normally give a name to each village, and it is with each of these named villages that they identify themselves by saying, for instance, 'I belong to this and not to that village'.

KINSHIP BASIS

The village is not conceived of as an entity merely on the basis of the physical or territorial area it occupies. There is often a strong element of kinship connexion among many members of the village, and a few of them can trace their common ancestry to the people who first came to or opened up the village.

There are different ways in which villages are known to have been established. Firstly, they developed after mobile bands of indigenous hunters and food-gatherers settled down to agriculture. One or two villages in Kerdau on the other side of the river—the right bank—are believed to have been started by the aborigines (*orang asli*) who used to roam the area at one time. Secondly, there are villages that began as splinter groups of others that have grown too big. For instance, Kelibang was said to have been started by some individuals

who left Guntung and subsequently the number of people was increased with the arrival of migrants from Sumatra, while Peragap and part of Kuala Kerdau originally grew from a few families who left Huma Luas. Thirdly, there are villages that have developed mainly as a result of the inflow of migrants. For example, a number of people in Kuala Kangkong who believed themselves to be the original settlers in the area claim that many in Permatang Kangkong had settled there around the end of the last century as a result of a series of Thai incursions which forced many to move southwards. In Bagan, a small group in Parit Besar claim that they are the descendants of the people of Melaka who fled the kingdom after it was vanquished by the Portuguese in 1511; and many of the villagers in the hinterland of the village together with most of the people in Parit Bengkok are migrants from Java or the descendants of earlier migrants.

There is a considerable number of people in the various villages who share a common ancestry. Many people in a village thus tend to consider themselves to be relatives (*saudara*), while a majority refer to each other as 'relatives-in-one-village' (*saudara sekampung*). There are two types of relatives that they distinguish. One is 'close relatives' (*saudara dekat*), who include parents, grandparents, children, grandchildren, parents' siblings, in both the paternal and maternal lines, and parents and siblings of spouses. The line between the 'close' and 'distant relatives' (*saudara jauh*) is not clearly defined. Often when a person vaguely knows that another individual is his relative, he often refers to him as a distant relative. There are, however, two other expressions that are used to describe both close and distant relatives. The very close kinsmen, especially those who are related to one another consanguinally, are often referred to as being 'of one blood and flesh' (*sedarah sedaging*), while those who are very distant relatives frequently describe their relationship merely as being a 'smell of mango' (*bau bacang*). Thus a person can refer to his relationship with *X* and *Y* as being 'of one blood and flesh' or only just a 'smell of mango'.

Within the group of relatives, the smallest unit of organization is the household, and most of the households consist of a nuclear family living in a single house. Taking the meaning of a nuclear unit as being made up of only the father, mother, and child(ren), the following percentages of nuclear family households are obtained for the three areas: Kangkong, 49·4 per cent of the 87 households, Kerdau, 64·4 per cent of 123 households, and Bagan, 80·5 per cent of 149 households investigated. Not all the nuclear families in these areas, however, are in this ideal form. There are some nuclear families that

have been denuded owing to divorce or death of a parent; then there are also those which include in addition a young child or children who have been adopted into the family, or an old parent who is entirely dependent on the nuclear family of his or her child. If these variations are taken into account as forming nuclear families also, then the percentages for the three areas would be 77·0 per cent for Kangkong, 82·9 per cent for Kerdau and 87.6 per cent for Bagan.

While the proportion of denuded families in these areas is quite even, the tendency for a parent or some other close relatives to stay with a nuclear family is more marked in Kangkong than in the case of the other two areas. Whereas young couples in Bagan tend to build houses on the land they own or cultivate, this is not always the case in Kangkong. There is less land in Kangkong, and compared to Bagan a larger number of people are not landowners. As a result two situations develop more often in Kangkong than in Bagan; firstly, some of the well-to-do families adopt a member or two of their relatives' families in order to relieve the latter of some economic pressure; and secondly, young couples continue to live in the home of their parents, especially when the latter are already old, and when they themselves do not have the means to start a new home. Other than those already described, there are still a small number of households that are made up jointly of two nuclear families—in the three areas these are in the region of 10 to 15 per cent of the total households—consisting either of an ego's family with that of the father or an ego's family with that of the brother or sister. Normally these joint-family households are found among the more wealthy who have large houses that can accommodate more than one nuclear family.

Some households whose members are closely related tend to be near one another. It is quite common to see in some villages the house of an old couple situated by the side of those occupied by the children. Members of these households are closely associated socially with one another, with the parents' household acting as a focal point. They often say that when they are thus closely located they can always be of some help to one another—'they can borrow salt and tamarind from one another, and can always be of some help when anyone is sick or has a headache'. These small clusters of houses of close relatives form what can be regarded as homesteads. It is in fact possible to regard them as forming a kind of extended family whose membership is determined both consanguinally and affinally. Members of these homesteads are normally close relatives.

Since there are no rules regarding the place of residence after marriage, residence at the initial stage can either be virilocal or uxorilocal

with parents who are more well-to-do and with a bigger house having the greater pull, and neolocal especially after the first few months of marriage. Therefore there is no set pattern in the membership of the households. Also, because of the neolocal tendency, young couples have the choice of either being near or away from their parents. Sometimes some parents try to persuade their children to stay nearby, and strengthen their persuasion by helping to finance the building of a new house. This is especially so in the case of the youngest child (*anak bungsu*) who is often most loved and pampered. At other times, however, the decision to live near the parents is determined more by force of circumstances than by an act of choice. This refers to those who do not have their own land, or even if they have, it is not suitable for the construction of a house. In such cases, these people often build a house on the very plot of land owned by their parents or other close relatives. In this way homesteads are also formed.

Most of the homesteads are made up of three to five households. Each one of the villages studied has such homesteads. Among those dependent on rice cultivation in both Kangkong and Kerdau, the homesteads are bigger, consisting of four or five households; in fact, in the village of Huma Luas in Kerdau there is a homestead that is made up of as many as eight households. Among those involved in the growing of rubber, the homesteads are made up of a fewer number of households. This is especially so in Bagan, the probable reason being that many more people have land in this area. Moreover, the rubber plots are more suitable for the building of houses than the rice lands, and even if a person does not have his own land in Bagan he may build his home on the plot that he operates.

Kinship relationship, however, is not confined only to those living in the same homesteads. There are many members of households who are related to one another even though they do not live nearby. What seems to emerge from each of the villages is that it is often made up of one dominant kinship group whose members form between 40 to 60 per cent of the villagers, and members of this group regard themselves as being relatives. In Kuala Kangkong the dominant group is related to the headman there, while in Permatang Kangkong, it is centred around the ex-penghulu of the mukim. As for Kerdau, only a small proportion of the villagers are related in Pekan Kerdau itself since it is in this area that a majority of the Chinese and Indian shopkeepers, policemen and other minor government officials congregate. In Guntung and Kelibang, the headman is related to a large number of people while in Huma Luas, almost

everybody is related to one another. In Peragap there are two prominent groups existing side by side while in Bagan, there are two big family groups in Parit Besar, one belonging to those who consider themselves to be its original settlers, and the other is made up of immigrants or their descendants from Java, majority of whom are related to the penghulu. At the head of the main family group in Parit Bengkok is one of the most wealthy persons in the area. A descendant of an immigrant from Java, he was the first to introduce rubber into Bagan.

The number of relatives grows not merely because of natural increase, but also through marriage. There are many cases of marriages between members of the same village where young people grow up together and come into contact with one another frequently. However, they do not become endogamous on the basis of the village for a number of marriages occur with others outside it. No records have been made of those marrying within or outside the villages for each of the areas studied. Figures for the Kangkong and Kerdau areas, however, show that in the former, 49 out of 73 household heads are married to those within the same area, 20 to those outside it but still confined to rural communities, and 4 to those from the urban areas; while in the latter, 94 out of 123 household heads are married to those within the same area, 21 from outside but still confined to rural communities, and 8 from the urban areas. As regards the kinship relationship of marriage couples, on an average about half of them in the three areas are not relatives, and the rest categorize their wives as first, second or third cousins, either on the male or the female side. Table IV shows the distribution.

These marriages have two effects on the village communities. On the one hand, marriages among relatives may further reinforce the already existing blood ties while those among non-relatives within

TABLE IV

KINSHIP RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUSBANDS AND WIVES

Relationship	*Kangkong*	*Kerdau*	*Bagan*
First Cousin	11	18	20
Second Cousin	6	27	21
Third Cousin	4	17	23
Not Related	54	61	76
Total	75	123	140

the same village bring the families together to form a bigger kinship group. Both these types of marriages, however, help to bring the people of the same village unit closer together. On the other hand, marriages with relatives or non-relatives outside the village, and which sometimes extend beyond the mukim or even district, link up several individuals from different villages. These people therefore begin to have kinship relationships that cut across village boundaries, and these relationships sometimes provide the basis for activities and interactions which further draw some of the villagers out of their own village confines.

A few examples will serve to illustrate what actually happens. A straightforward case is that of a widow in Permatang Kangkong. She owns some padi land, and lives with two of her grandchildren who are both in school. She has three daughters and a son. One of her daughters is married to a well-to-do peasant, and they live in a house just beside that of the widow. Although they maintain separate kitchens, they are very close, and the two grandchildren living with the widow are in fact the children of this very daughter. Another is married to a small landlord who is also a religious official in Kuala Kangkong, and in this case they are therefore in different villages but are linked by kinship. The last daughter is married to a peasant in Sala which is a village outside the Kangkong area. As for the son, he went off to study in an Egyptian University. He is now a university lecturer and married to someone outside the district. The first two daughters visit their mother almost every day, and often after harvesting they help their mother to pound padi to remove the husk. Although the youngest daughter lives too far away to assist daily, she comes irregularly to help. In addition, she also visits the mother quite often at other times. As for the son, the only occasion when he returns to see his mother is during some big religious festivals, for example, *Hari Raya Puasa*, which follows the fasting month. Even then he does not visit the mother regularly. Therefore as a result of the children's marriages, the widow develops kinship relationships outside the village, and to different degrees of intensity, maintains interrelations with them. There are several similar examples not only in Kangkong, but also in the other villages.

A second example is the one found in the Bagan area. Here there are two rich families, one in Parit Besar and the other in Parit Bengkok. These families who did not claim any kinship relationship before have now become integrated as a result of two recent marriages. It is interesting to note that the family in Parit Besar is also related to the penghulu (*J*) by marriage as well. Following their marriages *C*

and *D* have moved to Parit Bengkok; *C* is with *H*'s father (*F*), while *D* with his wife *G* are living with his in-laws (*E*) whose other children have married and who live in their own homes. (Fig. I.)

A third example comes from the Kerdau area—a fairly interesting case in Peragap village. In this small village there are only fourteen households divided into two families who claim that they are not related to each other. Marriages do occur among some of the relatives, but it is more common for recent ones to be made with those from outside the village. It is observed that while members of one family unit tend to marry those from the village of Parit, members of the other tend to marry those from another village, Teluk Batu. Figure II shows the marriage alignments.

FIGURE I

EXTENSION OF KINSHIP GROUP

BEYOND VILLAGE UNITS RESULTING FROM MARRIAGES



FIGURE II

MARRIAGE BETWEEN VILLAGERS IN PERAGAP AND PARIT



FIGURE III

MARRIAGE BETWEEN VILLAGERS IN PERAGAP AND TELOK BATU



▲● In Peragap
△○ In Telok Batu

In the above *A* married *B* and built a house in Parit, while *C* after marrying *D* went from Parit to Peragap to start a new home. These marriages, taking place between individuals from different villages, brought the two families together. The same result occurred with the marriages between *M* and *N*, *P* and *Q* and *S* and *T*. Both *Q* and *T* left Peragap for Teluk Batu after their marriages, while *M* shifted from Teluk Batu to Peragap. These alignment of marriages also emphasized further the separation between the two families in Peragap and how their relationship was extended with families in villages outside their own.

Looking at all the villages, it is seen that there are kinship links among some members of Kuala Kangkong and Permatang Kangkong. In Kerdau there is close kinship relationship among a large number of people in Kelibang and Guntung, and the same can be said of Huma Luas, Macang Manis and Kuala Kerdau. What happens in Peragap, Parit and Teluk Batu has already been described. Finally, in Bagan—besides the example that has been given—there are also other links between some members of Parit Besar and their counterparts in Parit Bengkok. Today, the process of the widening of kinship relationship beyond the village unit continues.

INSTITUTIONS BASED ON TERRITORY AND KINSHIP

There are two institutions that are closely related with the territorial and kinship groups. These are the 'feast' (*kenduri*) and 'co-operation' (*kerjasama*) or 'mutual help' (*tolong-menolong*). As in other Malay communities, feasts are often held in the three areas studied. In some of them only a limited quantity of beverages and sweet dishes are served to a small number of people—about twenty to thirty—and by their very nature are called small feasts (*kenduri kecil*).

However there are also others which involve more than a hundred people, with rice cooked in ghee and spices and curried meat dishes being served to those present: these are the big feasts (*kenduri besar*). There are various kinds of occasions occurring at different times of the year when the feasts are held. Sometimes they are held annually to mark certain auspicious days, like the Prophet's birthday and as part of several *rites de passage*, such as cutting of the hair (*potong jambul*), completion of Quran reading *(khatam Quran*), circumcision (*bersunat*). At other times they are held irregularly to celebrate a marriage or for thanksgiving in cases of recovery from an illness or a safe return from a long journey etc.

Feasts in connexion with the Prophet's birthday are usually big and held at the mosque. The villagers, especially the men, usually attend these feasts which are often financed by the government through the religious department. Those who attend the feasts are not confined to any particular village or kinship group. In contrast, the ones held as part of the *rites de passage* and thanksgiving are normally quite small, and most of the people invited are usually relatives and neighbours from the village itself.

The marriage feast tends to be big also and the wealthier the people the more lavish it becomes. In preparing for the feast a number of people are normally expected or invited to help with the cutting of onions, ginger and lemon grass, the erection of temporary constructions to accommodate the guests and to do other chores that may be necessary. Normally, the people who help in the preparatory work are either close relatives or neighbours of the person holding the feast. They often come from the same village, but there are some from other villages as well. When it comes to the inviting of guests, two categories of people are given priority, namely, close relatives in and outside the village, and the immediate neighbours, the latter often being given preference over more distant relatives. If the feast is a small one, then the close relatives and immediate neighbours form the majority of the people invited. Very often members of the same village, especially when it is a small one, are all invited, and in addition, relatives and friends from other villages are asked to attend. On the occasions when individuals of considerable status in the village hold marriage feasts, these may even be attended by officials from the nearby towns.

These feasts bring the people closer together. In fact, the bigger ones bring together people who are beyond the confines of just one village and this is especially true of the one given on the Prophet's birthday. In the case of marriage feasts, the guests from outside the

village tend to vary, but those from the village, however, remain the same. Therefore interaction among members of the same village occur more often than those between the villagers and the people from outside. Furthermore, the small feasts which are confined to the neighbours and close relatives also promote more regular interactions among people of the same village. Thus the feasts not only help to strengthen primary group solidarity among the village members, but they also have the potential when they are sufficiently big, to include guests from the adjacent villages, of bringing those from different villages into closer contact.

During the preparations for feasts, relatives and neighbours give a helping hand. This is actually a form of co-operation or mutual help that occurs quite often among the rural Malays. Co-operation occurs not only in the social context, but also in the economic field, especially for providing labour needed at some stages of agricultural production. The underlying principle is that of giving help or service in the expectation of getting the same in return later on. A person normally does not refuse to give help because he knows that at some future date he himself may need assistance from those to whom it has been given. Through this process a chain of reciprocal obligations exists in the village which acts as a binding factor among the villagers. While co-operation or mutual help at feasts or in economic production mainly benefits the individual directly, there are also other types that are beneficial to the whole village unit or a part of it. For instance, members of a village may be requested or organized to co-operate in the cleaning of drains and canals, building of roads, repairing of mosques and prayer houses, or the weeding of graveyards. The motivation which often drives the people to join in these co-operative activities is not the same as that for reciprocal help in the future; it is the need to identify oneself with village life that prompts the individual to participate in its activities. A person who does not participate in these co-operative activities, without any satisfactory reason, invites ostracism.

The term 'kerjasama' (co-operation) and 'tolong-menolong' (mutual help) are quite general in their usage but there are more specific terms used by groups of villagers to describe different types of co-operation or mutual help, such as *gotong-royong* and *derau*. Gotong-royong is used more commonly among the Javanese communities to describe co-operation or mutual help (cf. Koentjaraningrat, 1960). It applies to both forms of co-operation: that for individual and collective benefit. A large number of people in Bagan are of Javanese descent, and therefore this term is frequently used among them. In

Bagan most of the co-operation is associated only with social activities and not with those of an economic nature. As for Kangkong, the most important type of co-operation is carried out in padi production, and to describe it, the term 'derau' is used specifically by the people there. The term 'kerjasama' is often used in an all-inclusive manner to describe all forms of co-operation or mutual help. In Kerdau, the term 'kerjasama' is used in an all-inclusive sense as in Kangkong, while to describe co-operation or mutual help in economic production, the term 'gotong-royong' is specifically used.

The derau in Kangkong and gotong-royong in Kerdau both mean co-operation or mutual help in the work related to padi production. A co-operative group of this kind varies in size—in Kerdau they normally consist of between six to fifteen persons, while in Kangkong they are made up of eight to ten persons. Members of the group co-operate most often during the planting and harvesting of padi. A majority of the members of the co-operative groups have either their own land or that of others to work on most of the time. They work in rotation from one plot to the next until all land belonging to every member has been attended to by the group. The amount of time spent or the area covered by each member is the same, and this may or may not be sufficient to complete all the work that has to be done. In cases where additional work remains to be done, the individual is then responsible for completing it either on his own or by employing others. Members of the co-operative group bring their own food when they go to work.

This kind of co-operation fulfils the purpose of providing short-term labour. The basic unit of production in the past, as it is to a great extent today, is the household unit, and its head provides the main source of labour. He may be helped by his wife and some grown-up children at different stages of agricultural production. In padi growing especially, there are definite stages of work that need to be done quickly, such as the transplanting of seedlings and harvesting. A man may be able to cope with the work of ploughing by himself with the help of a buffalo, but he cannot possibly harvest his crops alone, not even with the help of his wife, at the time of the short dry season during which the rice needs to be harvested quickly. Harvesting needs to be done immediately when the padi is ready, and a little delay can cause damage and incur losses. The need to do a job quickly which is beyond the capacity of a farmer and his family helpers gives rise to the demand for outside labour. In the past, labour that could be obtained by payment in cash was non-existent

and thus the co-operative practices helped to solve this problem. Today, several forms of these co-operative institutions continue to exist.

Although these co-operative institutions remain in existence, there is no doubt that they are slowly waning away. One of the reasons is that a person who depends on traditional co-operation for his supply of labour has to become a member of the co-operative group himself. Those with numerous pieces of land find it unnecessary, and besides, they often do not want to be involved with the co-operative work. These people prefer to hire labour which is now available in quite an abundant supply. In Kerdau, for instance, there are people who form themselves into work-teams which they call *syarikat kerja*, consisting of between two to six persons, and they offer to do work of all kinds for payment at piece or time rate. In Kangkong, labour is plentiful and cheap especially during the harvesting season for during that period a considerable number of people migrate from the East Coast, and offer themselves individually or in groups as hired labour. The widespread use of money makes the employment of such people easy; and even if they do accept payment in kind, they can always sell it for money which can easily be taken home. In Bagan especially, and also in Kerdau to some extent where rubber instead of rice is produced, the traditional form of co-operation for production does not exist at all. Unlike rice, rubber is tapped daily, and does not require work that needs to be done quickly and by many people at any stage of its production. There are, of course, occasions when some mutual help is required, for example, in the mangling of solidified latex into rubber sheets. If a person is not helped by his wife or child, then the assistance of a peasant may be sought in order to turn the handle of the mangle while he feeds the machine with the solidified latex. Otherwise, most of the co-operative work that exists in Bagan in particular is confined to occasions like marriage, or activities like the repairing of mosques, the clearing of drains, the building of roads and so forth.

Certain co-operative activities are carried out only by the women or the men although most of them involve both the sexes. In the transplanting of padi in both Kangkong and Kerdau, the co-operative groups are made up entirely of women, while both the men and the women are engaged in harvesting. As regards the relatively heavier work of building roads and repairing mosques, the co-operative groups are made up of people who are relatives and/or in the same neighbourhood; in other words they are often from the same village. There are, however, two other factors that have to be taken into

consideration. The first is the factor of choice of association, that is, some members may not be able to get along well with a number of their relatives and/or neighbours, and so they prefer to be associated with those who are their close friends, perhaps from other villages. The second is the factor of the location of the farms. The members of the group often choose to co-operate with those people whose farms are quite near to one another. They always try to avoid those whose land is quite far away because this will involve walking long distances which can be inconvenient. This being the case, we find that non-relatives, and also others who come from the adjacent villages may sometimes be brought together in the same co-operative group.

In the Kangkong area, there are two co-operative groups to assist with agricultural production in Kuala Kangkong and another two in Permatang Kangkong. Each of them is made up mainly of people who are related to one another, and entirely of those from the same village. There is one group, however, which has members from both Kuala Kangkong and Permatang Kangkong; this group has as its members the widow mentioned earlier, her daughters and a few of her friends. In Kerdau, there are three co-operative groups: two are relatively big with twelve and fifteen members respectively while the other is small with only six members. The group with fifteen members is made up mainly of people living in Kelibang, and is led by the wife of the headman there. A majority of the members are either relatives or neighbours and there are also some who are friends from Kelibang or friends and relatives from Guntung. The group of twelve is centred at Huma Luas, and is made up also of people from Kuala Kerdau and Macang Manis. As for the smallest group which is in Peragap and Teluk Batu, some are relatives while others are close associates. In Bagan there are no co-operative groups to assist with production but in Parit Besar, there have been two major co-operative works undertaken, one for building a laterite road into the village, and the other for repairing a prayer house (*surau*),[1] near the main road. For road building, most of the able-bodied men were organized to work in rotation, and so this activity involved almost the whole village in a co-operative effort. The repair of the 'prayer house' was done mainly under the direction of two village carpenters and they

[1] The surau or 'prayer house' is normally a small wooden building used mainly for group prayers. It may also be used for other purposes, such as the holding of meetings or a place for people to rest and converse. It is smaller than the mosque, which serves almost the same functions. The main difference between the two is that Friday congregations are held in mosques, but not in the surau.

were assisted occasionally by some people in the neighbourhood who normally make use of the same 'prayer house'. This activity therefore involves only a section of the village in co-operative work. With regard to co-operation or mutual help in the preparation of feasts, we find that in all the villages the people who come to help are mainly close relatives and immediate neighbours. We find therefore that co-operative activities mainly involve people from the same village although in some cases it may be confined only to some members of the village, and at other times to individuals from other villages.

ECONOMIC BASIS

If co-operation in agricultural production is already a basis for bringing together people from the various villages that are often located quite near to one another, there is yet an additional economic activity which has brought a number of villagers into wider interactions with others beyond the village and into the national framework, namely marketing. The fish caught and the rice harvested by the people in Kangkong is partially consumed by the villagers themselves and partially sold. In Kerdau, the rice produced is almost entirely consumed by the producers themselves while their rubber is marketed through a series of intermediaries before it reaches the ultimate consumers who are mostly overseas. The same can be said of the rubber produced from Bagan where some coconuts are also grown. Of the latter, only a small amount is used for home consumption while most of it is sold. The emergence of two institutions at the village level, namely, money economy together with the shops and retailers who act as 'middlemen', have made the marketing of produce possible.

In Kangkong, some of the fish brought in by the smaller boats is sold to the local dealers—there are two of them here—who in turn spread them out on a wooden platform in a small shed near the river mouth. These are sold to the villagers. This place therefore acts as a fish market, and people from Kuala Kangkong and Permatang Kangkong who do not do their own fishing go there to buy their daily supply. In the case of the bigger boats with large catches, the fish is sold to the dealers who act as middlemen and they in turn market the fish in the town of Alor Star. One of these middlemen owns two of the motor-boats rented out to the fishermen. Through these middlemen the fishermen in Kangkong are therefore linked to the broader framework of the economic system.

The same can be said of rice farming. After the harvest, the peasants put aside the portion they want to take home and the rest is sold off from the field itself to a local shopkeeper or to a nearby rice mill. Normally at harvest time the price of rice is lower than when supply is limited during the planting season. Therefore the few who are not pressed for immediate cash after the harvest season take home the padi for storage, and dispose of it only when the demand is greater or when their need for cash arises. In fact the rice produced in the area is not exported; from the shops and other intermediaries it goes to the rice mill which acts as a general distributor of the rice to various retailing shops in the district, including Kangkong itself. In spite of the fact that Kangkong is a centre for rice production, rice is in great demand especially from the planting season to the period before harvest.

In Kerdau very little of the rice produced is known to be sold. The little that is disposed of is not sold through shops but at the weekly bazaar which is held in an open space near the rural township of Kerdau. At this bazaar a great deal of local produce like coconuts, tapioca, bananas, vegetables, and also cakes, sweets and drinks are sold. At the same time there are also Chinese, Indian and Malay vendors from outside the village who come to sell dried fish, plastic utensils, textiles, medicines etc. These vendors move from one bazaar to another as they are held on different days of the week in various places within the district. The weekly bazaar is often welcomed as a small-scale festivity, and attended by most villagers especially the young who either come to buy or merely to have a look. For the young the bazaar also acts as a useful centre for them to meet and such contacts between the boys and the girls may later develop into marriages. At the bazaar all kinds of produce is sold except rubber. Rubber may be bought only by licensed dealers, and in Kerdau there are two, both of whom are shopkeepers in the township. There are also small provision shops in the villages which buy rubber direct from the peasants, and sell it with a small margin of profit to the licensed dealers. One of these dealers is a Malay who sells all the rubber that he can gather to a bigger dealer in the town of Jerantut about 30 miles away; another is a Chinese who sells the rubber to a dealer in Temerloh which is only about nine miles away. Through these dealers in the bigger towns the rubber is ultimately sent to the exporters in Singapore.

In Bagan there is only one dealer who buys coconuts and copra directly from the villagers and then transports them by lorry to Batu Pahat town. For rubber, there are two licensed dealers, a Chinese shopkeeper for Parit Besar and a Malay shopkeeper for Parit Beng-

kok, both with shops near the main road. Some people sell their rubber direct to these dealers, but a few go through smaller shops within the villages. There are also some landlords who accumulate their rubber over a month and then transport it to Batu Pahat town to be sold to the bigger dealers at relatively higher prices than those offered in Bagan itself.

The shops and dealers in all the three areas do not confine themselves only to the buying of village produce. They are also retailers for provisions that are brought into the village from the outside world. There are three such provision shops in Kangkong, and they get their supply partly from the Malay shopkeeper there who was mentioned earlier as being a rice dealer, and partly from some shops at a township about six miles away. In Kerdau, each village has a small provision shop which gets its supplies from the larger shops in the Kerdau township. The latter also act as agents for the bigger shops in Mentakab, Temerloh and Jerantut. As for Bagan, there are two small shops in Parit Besar and three in Parit Bengkok. Their supplies are furnished from the two shops referred to earlier as being those of the rubber dealers; they in turn get their supplies from Batu Pahat.

The significance of all this is that the villagers are linked through the market with economic units more extensive than those of the village. The life of the villagers is also closely related to the economic activities in the outside world. This is especially so with those who depend on rubber as the price of this commodity in the villages fluctuates with that of the world market. As for the provisions that reach the villages, their prices are again determined by forces of supply and demand operating in the most part outside the village itself. All these have the effect of making the villagers feel that they are part of a bigger economic entity. Nevertheless, it can also be noticed that members of the village who are in direct contact with the business groups outside the village is quite small in number, and are mainly confined to the shopkeepers, dealers and other middlemen. The majority of the villagers, however, have not yet been frequently drawn out of the village to interact with those outside it.

RELIGIOUS BASIS

Close interactions and feelings of solidarity also arise among the villagers as a result of the common religious faith that they hold. Most of the villagers—in fact all the Malays—are Muslims. In Islam they have a religious as well as a cultural and social bond that holds them together. They strongly identify themselves with Islam to show that

they are Malays. The feeling that normally prevails is found in expressions such as, 'We Muslims are all relatives, and we are in a big family'. Ideally of course the spirit of 'brotherhood-in-Islam' is shared among many.

Islam first began to spread among the Malays during the height of the Melaka kingdom in the fifteenth century. Since then it has penetrated extensively into many aspects of Malay life, to the extent that now the profession of Islam is almost inseparable from the acceptance of an individual as a Malay. Culturally speaking, the expression 'enter into Islam' (*masuk Islam*) is regarded as being synonymous with 'enter into or become Malay' (*masuk Melayu*). Legally, it has been embodied in the country's Constitution that by definition a Malay is someone who speaks the Malay language, practises Malay customs and professes Islam.

Ideologically, those who profess Islam believe that God (*Allah*) is supreme and that he is the ultimate source and cause of everything. The unity of God is an important doctrine of Islam, but it also tolerates the existence of other supernatural spirits, like the *syaitan* and *jinn* which are also the creation of God. Through the process of magic, man is able to 'tame' these beings and use them as agents of either good or evil. Their powers, however, are limited and they cannot have any effect unless God wills it.

Villagers often carry out their religious rituals on the basis of existing social units or institutions. One such unit is the family. The daily prayers and the fasting during the month of Ramadhan are done mainly at home. Often the reciting of these prayers are led by the father and followed by the wife and children. This collective prayer is practised as often as possible, especially in families where the father is quite old and religious, and it is believed that the virtues bestowed by praying together are much more than those obtained by praying alone. Again, during the fasting month, the breaking of the fast at sunset is normally looked forward to, especially by the younger children. Quite often sweet dishes are prepared, and the food served is normally much better than the usual dinner eaten at other times. When they break the fast they are together most of the time. In fact, during the fasting month the household members are closer together than usual, and among various households in the homesteads or neighbourhood, they normally exchange sweet dishes. When the wooden drum at the mosque is beaten and the call to prayer is made to indicate that it is time for the breaking of fast, the members of the household will first of all take a date and then drink some beverage or other sweetened water. Then, quite often, they

perform the evening prayer together, after which they sit down cross-legged around the food to have their dinner.

Another important institution is the prayer house (surau) and the mosque. Usually there is a small prayer house in a village, but there can be more than one if the village is sufficiently large. These prayer houses, like the mosques, serve mainly as religious centres; the only difference being that the Friday congregations are not held in them but in the mosques. The prayer house is constantly used by a few elderly people in the village to perform both their evening and night prayers. During the day the people are often involved with their own work, and so they seldom say their two afternoon prayers (*Zuhur* and *asar*) at the prayer house. By the evening, however, most of them are already free and so they are able to gather together and perform their evening prayers (*maghrib*) at the prayer house. Some may even linger on and then recite the night prayers (*isyak*) collectively before going home. In between the two prayers they may read a chapter from the Quran or perform a kind of mystical ritual known as the *tahlil* in praise of God and the Prophet. In the course of this ritual, the participants utter repeatedly, 'There is no God but Allah' (*Lailaha illa Allah*), slowly at first before picking up speed. While doing so they move their heads or bodies sideways from left to right with each utterance, and have their eyes closed in full concentration. Besides these utterances, there are others in praise of the Prophets, and some verses of the Quran are also repeated together. Finally the leader of the ritual ends by reciting a prayer in Arabic to ask for blessing for the dead and protection and long life for the living. The tahlil is normally performed on Thursday nights, on the eve of Friday which is the day for the weekly congregation, and regarded therefore as the most blessed day of the week.

It is during the fasting month that the prayer houses and mosques are most often used. After breaking their fast, some of the people, adults as well as the children, and a few women, congregate at the prayer house or mosque. First they perform together the night prayer, led by the imam (literally a 'prayer leader'), and this is followed by what is known as the *tarawih* which is also a prayer, but performed only during the fasting month. The tarawih is performed at night, and is only commendable (*sunat*) and not compulsory (*wajib*) like the five daily prayers. There are more people participating in these prayers held in the fasting month than those carried out at other times of the year. After the tarawih most of the people go home, although some would stay behind, and together they read the Quran by turns prior to the performance of the tahlil. This goes on

until about midnight when they return just in time for the late supper (*sahur*) which is also provided in some mosques.

In the Kangkong area there is only one mosque and there is no prayer house for the two villages. It is in this very mosque that most of the religious rites described above take place. At one time it used to be the focal point for villagers from both Kuala Kangkong and Permatang Kangkong, but after the occurrence of some political conflicts between the followers of the two political parties in the area (see Chapter VI), some of the villagers in Kuala Kangkong ceased to go to this particular mosque, and instead joined the congregation at the mosque in a neighbouring village. Since that mosque is rather far away, more and more of the villagers have begun to return to the one in Kangkong.

In Kerdau there are a number of prayer houses and mosques. The people in Pekan Kerdau have none of these and they normally join the Friday congregation at the mosque in Ketam or in Kuala Kerdau. There is a prayer house shared by the people of Kelibang and Guntung, but there is none for Macang Manis, Huma Luas and Kuala Kerdau. These last three villages share a common mosque situated in Kuala Kerdau, and in addition to the people from these three villages, those from Kelibang and Guntung also congregate here for their Friday prayers. The prayer leader for this moque is also the headmen for Kelibang and Guntung. Parit and Peragap do not have their own prayer house, but there is one in Teluk Batu, and it is to this surau that most people in the three villages go. There are also some, however, who go to the mosque in Kuala Kerdau. As for the Bagan area, there is a mosque at the end of Parit Besar, furthest away from the main road, and there are also two prayer houses situated near the roadside and around the middle of the village. The prayer house near the road holds evening prayers and also tahlil and tarawih, but the people around it join the rest of the village for Friday prayers in the mosque. There are also some others from Parit Bengkok, living at the furthest end of the village and away from the main road, who also join the Friday congregation at the mosque in Parit Besar. As for the rest of the people in Parit Bengkok, they perform their Friday prayers in a mosque that is by the roadside. There are at the same time two prayer houses in the village.

These prayer houses and mosques are not only used for religious purposes but also occasionally for meetings that are held to discuss village matters. There have been many occasions when the mosques and prayer houses have been used as a meeting place to elect the headman or penghulu. In fact they are also used by some villagers to

discuss the need to carry out some rituals that are related to magical powers.

Although Islam is strongly entrenched in Malay society and culture, this does not mean that it has displaced the traditional beliefs. Traditional beliefs coexist with Islam in most of the villages. In traditional Malay beliefs, there are ghosts (*hantu*) and spirits (*jembalang, penunggu, semangat*). These supernatural beings are believed to reside in all things in nature—mountains, hills, seas, rivers, land, trees, rocks and so forth. In the daily activities of the people, due respect must be shown to them, otherwise they are capable of causing pain, suffering and disaster. Therefore if a person wants to go through a forest or climb a hill, for example, he has first of all to ask for permission by saying, 'Salutations venerable one, may I pass' (*Tabik datuk, saya tumpang lalu*); or if he wants to open up a piece of land, either for the construction of a house or for cultivation, it is necessary to pacify the spirits guarding the place or to drive them away. In the same way, evil spirits are driven away before the planting season, and due care must be taken not to upset the spirit or vital spirit (semangat) in the crop before harvesting, as this is believed to be responsible for bringing about good harvests.

Now from the ideological or doctrinal point of view, these spirits upheld in traditional beliefs fall outside Islam, for unlike the syaitan and jinn they are not mentioned in the Quran. Furthermore, the traditional spirits are believed at times to be the source of power and the ultimate cause of anything which occurs. Such a belief therefore runs counter to Islam because it encourages a form of polytheism (*syirik*). But in spite of this, the traditional belief systems still prevail, primarily because they are deeply embedded and they have defied many an attempt to uproot them. Also, the existence of the spirits has been rationalized by the acceptance of God as the final arbiter and that their powers are subject to the overriding power of the Almighty. Anything that happens is explained in terms of His power and will. A healthy body or a good harvest is not in the final analysis attributed to the power of things such as fertilizers or medicine, just as a bad harvest or illness cannot be attributed to the power of evil spirits or witchcraft. The fertilizer and medicine, like the spirits and witchcraft, are not the 'ultimate' but only the 'immediate' causes; they are mere agents whose effectiveness is subject to the power and will of God.

The belief in magic is related mainly to both the productive and protective aspects of the life of the people in the village. By the productive aspect is meant the process of economic production. At

some stages of this production a number of rituals involving magical beliefs are still carried out by people individually or collectively in the hope of getting a better harvest or driving away pests and other evils that can cause damage or destruction to their produce. By the protective aspect is meant practices believed to protect people who have been inflicted by evil spirits. When Muslims resort to the help of the spirits through their mediums for curative or productive purposes, they are doing so simply as an 'attempt' (*ikhtiar*) to ward off any ill-fated consequences. This is in line with the doctrine that although man's fate is fundamentally predestined, he is free to make an 'attempt' in the hope that it may be changed. It is through such rationalization that ideologically the belief in traditional spirits is tolerated to some degree by many Muslims, although strict doctrinarians among them continue to insist that beliefs in spirits and the evil practices associated with them are non-Islamic.

With regard to rites, the position is slightly more complicated. There are rituals that can be said to be purely Islamic in nature, such as the daily prayers, fasting and pilgrimage. Of course it may be argued that even in these rites, particularly fasting and pilgrimage, their origins can be traced to the influences of certain pre-Islamic practices. When we say that these rites are purely Islamic in nature, it means that they have become an integral part of Islam. In these rites, the incantations uttered and the acts performed are regulated by the Islamic teachings, and they are followed rigidly according to the forms specified, without allowing themselves to be modified by any cultural influences.

At the other extreme, there are rites that are primarily if not entirely the product of traditional culture. Examples of these rites in the three communities studied are those relating to the planting and harvesting of crops, the opening of new residential sites and the protection of the villages from evil (see Appendix I). They are related to the belief in the existence of different spirits, and distinctly belong to traditional sources quite unrelated to Islam. Today, they have, however, imbibed certain elements of Islam in their practices. The magicians who perform the rites normally begin by uttering 'In the name of Allah the Merciful and Compassionate' (*Bismillah ir-Rahman ir-Rahim*) which is a definite admission of the Omnipotence of God. The Muslim form of greeting is used, and praises to the Prophet are also invoked. Apparently in the rather lengthy incantations recited by the magicians during these rites, the Prophet and God, besides the spirits, are also invoked to give assistance. There are times when the Quranic verses are used as they are believed to have

supernatural efficacy, and are regarded as effective means through which help can be asked for directly, not from the spirits but from God Himself. It is not surprising therefore that during some of these rites, religious men are often invited to conclude the ceremonies by saying prayers in Arabic. All these ritual practices therefore show not only the influence of Islam, but also the symbols of acceptance of God as the supreme being. As one person aptly sums it up, 'We are all human beings. We carry out all these rites only as an "attempt" (ikhtiar) to change our fate. But we submit everything to God, because He determines all.'

In contrast to the purely Islamic rites and those which are predominantly traditional, though displaying certain Islamic influences expressed mainly in the invocations, there are also many others that combine both these forms within the same rite. These rites can be placed in between the purely Islamic and traditional forms. Examples of these are found in the *rites de passage* and those related to hair-cutting, marriage and death (see Appendix I).

As described in Chapter IV, there are several practitioners of traditional beliefs found in the rural communities. Some of these practitioners operate in specified areas; sometimes their activities cover a village and at other times areas beyond it. In Kangkong there are three practitioners who practise only within their own villages and the rites that they carry out often involve merely some of the members of the village. In Bagan, there are those who carry out rites involving only some of the members within the village, but there is also one individual who is sought after and who performs the rites in a wider area beyond that covered by Bagan itself. As for Kerdau, the situation is more well-defined. Besides the single practitioner who carries out these traditional rites in the whole area of Kerdau, there are also two others, one having jurisdiction over Kelibang and Guntung and the other presiding over Huma Luas, Macang Manis and Kuala Kerdau. Although the areas of 'jurisdiction' of these practitioners vary, some rites that they carry out are sometimes confined to the household, the neighbourhood, and at other times to the village. Of the rites that are applicable to the whole village, the best-known is that which protects the village (*membela kampung*). Such activities, like other religious practices, tend to bring into closer relationship members within the same village.

POLITICO-ADMINISTRATIVE BASIS

Administrative and political changes that have been introduced into the rural areas have also affected the solidarity and coherence of the

village as a social unit. Administratively the various states have been divided into districts which in turn have been subdivided into mukim, each of which has a penghulu as its head. A number of villages are integrated within this administrative unit. Both Kuala Kangkong and Permatang Kangkong are part of the Kangkong mukim which is made up of a total of seven villages. As for the mukim of Kerdau, there are no less than fifty clusters of houses. Each cluster, consisting of five to thirty houses, is given its own name and regarded by the villagers themselves as a village. The Kerdau area which is the focus of this study is made up of a township and eight villages. In the mukim of Bagan there are altogether twelve villages and the two referred to in this study are therefore only a part of the mukim. The administrative link between the mukim and the district is provided by the penghulu who is a subordinate of the District Officer.

The penghulu, however, has to be distinguished from the village headman, who is head of either a village or a number of them. Though often regarded as a subordinate of the penghulu, the headman is not a part of the administrative hierarchy; he is regarded merely as an elder or leader of the village community. In the Kangkong area the penghulu, who lives in Permatang Kangkong, at the same time acts as the headman of the village. In Kuala Kangkong there is another headman whose area of jurisdiction covers the whole of the village. So here is a situation where each village has a headman of its own, unlike that in Kerdau where the villages of Kelibang and Guntung are under the same headman. It may be noted that the two villages are also linked up in other ways, as has been described earlier. A second headman has jurisdiction over Kuala Kerdau, Huma Luas and Ketapi and a third over Parit, Peragap and Teluk Batu. Compared to Kuala Kangkong and Permatang Kangkong which have more than forty households each, the villages in the Kerdau area have an average of only fourteen households. It is probably for this reason that the villages, especially the neighbouring ones, have the same headman. In Bagan, each of the villages has a headman of its own; in other words, the situation there is very much like that of Kangkong. It is different from Kangkong only in the sense that the penghulu of Bagan who lives in Parit Besar does not serve as a village headman at the same time. His elder brother is the headman there.

Politically, there are several branches of the national political parties existing in most, though not all of the villages. In Kangkong there are the branches of UMNO and PAS. As will be explained in a later chapter, the villagers are divided according to their party affiliations; most people in Permatang Kangkong support UMNO while

many others in Kuala Kangkong support PAS. In Kerdau there are branches of UMNO, SF and PAS. There are altogether three branches of UMNO; one centred in the rural township with members from the township itself, Kelibang and Guntung, one centred in Huma Luas with members drawn from the village as well as Kuala Kerdau, Macang Manis, and Purun, and a third centred in Peragap with members from Teluk Batu as well. The SF membership is mainly centred in the township and in two or three nearby villages. There are also some members in Kuala Kerdau who are associated with a branch in Ketapi, which is outside the area of study. PAS, like the other two, has also a branch centred in the township and another in Peragap. In Bagan there is a rather extensive UMNO branch with a membership of more than fifty, and it covers both villages although most of the members come from Parit Besar. Support for PN is centred within a small part of Parit Bengkok.

While support of political parties tends to be distributed on a village basis in Kangkong, this is not the case in Kerdau at least if judged from the membership of the various parties. There the different parties not only have their respective branches in the same rural township of Kerdau or in a small village of Peragap, but there are also members from different villages who are affiliated to the same party branch. In Bagan, PN has never enjoyed any support in Parit Besar, but UMNO is strongly represented in both villages; after the 1964 election these villages have been more influenced by UMNO than by any other party and in fact they have become the strongholds of the latter.

FISSION AND FUSION OF VILLAGES

From the preceding discussion it can be seen that there are two main forces of interaction which influence the affairs of the village. On the one hand there are interactions that tend to keep the village together as a coherent and significant entity. On the basis of a common area and kinship relationship among many members within the village, there have developed several institutions and activities such as the holding of feasts and the various types of co-operation. A common prayer house, mosque and headman and affiliation to the same political party can further strengthen village solidarity. What is also important is that all these shared bonds, together with the various types of interaction among many of the people in the village give rise to an *esprit de corps* or we-group feeling. It is largely this feeling that makes the villagers so ready to identify themselves as members of a

particular village, and it is probably this too that leads them to distinguish by different names one village from another. On the same bases of kinship, religion, social and economic co-operation and political affiliation, some of the villagers or its entire population are linked on the other hand with members of another village, partially or even wholly. In addition, new developments in both the economic and political fields bring most of the villages into contact with the outside world; in fact, they become part of a bigger economic and political entity. These forces therefore have both a centripetal and centrifugal effect, bringing members of the village together at one time, and drawing them away to other villages or units bigger than the village itself at another. There is therefore a dynamic factor within the village and among its members whose interrelations affect it as an entity. This dynamism has the potential of changing the social boundaries of what can be termed a village.

There are shades of differences in the villages within the three areas studied. Firstly there is a village—known as such and given a name of its own—which in reality forms a social unit that not only has a common territory and common kinship ties but it also has interactions and interrelationships of a social, religious, economic and political nature. The best examples of these are Kuala Kangkong, Permatang Kangkong, Parit Besar and Parit Bengkok. Even in these villages, while there are many factors that hold them apart, there are also at the same time some that tend to bring them together, for example, Kuala Kangkong with Permatang Kangkong, and Parit Besar with Parit Bengkok. In the case of the villages of Kangkong, there are those with relatives in both the villages which are also under the same penghulu and consequently within the same administrative unit. As for the Bagan villages, marriages between some of the members of both the villages link them up socially, and at the same time the existence of a common penghulu within the same mukim and the affiliation of many members of the villages to the same political party tend to bring them together. However, in the case of all these four villages, there are more numerous and stronger forces that tend to retain them as separate entities than there are those which tend to link them up together in a wider network of interrelationships.

Secondly, there is an entirely different situation in Kerdau. Although the units are given separate names and regarded as different villages by the members themselves they tend to be closely linked with one another. One can take the case of Kelibang and Guntung. The location of their houses is quite scattered so that the physical

distance between them enables the villagers to distinguish the homesteads in Kelibang from those in Guntung. There is also the main road which acts as a boundary between the houses in the two separate units. At the same time, there are the same kinship ties that link both villages, and the co-operative activities which bring together many members of these two units. Besides, the villagers also go to the same mosque for Friday prayers. Many of them are members of the same political parties, and above all both units are under one headman. The forces of interaction which tend to bring them together are certainly more and stronger than those that tend to keep them apart. In fact, the real situation seems to be that whatever the villagers themselves may say, Kelibang and Guntung may be more appropriately considered as one village community rather than two separate units. This, however, is not the case with Parit, Peragap and Teluk Batu. Whereas Peragap is considered and given a name as a village, yet kinship ties, economic co-operation and political affiliation tend to divide the members with one half of the villagers more closely linked with Parit and the other closely associated with Teluk Batu. At the same time all the three units are under the same headman. As will be seen later, the split within Peragap gives rise to divided and opposed relationships between members of the village and the headman, and also their affiliations with political parties. In this particular example, the various forces that pull in different directions have resulted in social groups which are very difficult to perceive and define as a community. The villages as recognized by the villagers themselves do not actually constitute different social entities. At the same time there are insufficient ties and interactions between these three villagers for them to be considered as a village unit. Besides, there is no we-group feeling to enable one to conclude that Teluk Batu and half of Peragap is a single village, while Parit and the other half of Peragap form another.

The main criteria used in the Kerdau area to define the different units called villages by the people themselves seems to be their size. Whereas the villages in Kangkong and Bagan are made up of between forty to eighty households, those in Kerdau consist of only between twelve to twenty-five households—nearer to twelve than twenty-five for most of them. It is these small units that tend to be more closely linked with one another.

While there is a tendency for fusion where different villages begin to develop links and ties with one another, it is also interesting to note that an opposing trend towards fission is also developing, whereby the village tends to divide into smaller perceptible units.

This development can be seen most clearly in Parit Besar in Bagan. Parit Besar is the biggest of the villages studied and is made up of 79 households. The pattern of settlement of the village is linear, with houses lining both sides of the canal and path for about two miles. Physically, the whole length of the village seems to be made up of three clusters of houses, with quite a distance separating one cluster from the other. The cluster of houses near the main road is occupied by people who claim that they are descendants of those who fled from the Melaka kingdom in the early sixteenth century. They consider themselves to be the real Malays (*Melayu jati*). On the other hand, those in the middle cluster are mostly immigrants or their descendants from Java, while the cluster that is furthest away from the main road is occupied by a mixture of people from different places and families. There are no close consanguineal kinship ties within the middle cluster and the one near the main road, although marriages has brought some families in both units quite close to one another. In each of the units there is a prayer house or a mosque, and based on the prayer houses, close interaction does occur within both the religious and social spheres. What is clear, however, is that in spite of some interactions that tend to divide Parit Besar into smaller units, those factors that tend to hold it together are still very strong. For example, the we-group feeling is strong within the whole village, and it is this that gives it the psychological basis which further strengthens the significance of the various types of ties and interaction that already exist within the village community.

In conclusion, it needs to be stated that although there are many factors that form the bases for retaining the Malay village as a coherent social unit, yet these very factors have the opposite effect of bringing the village into closer ties with others and also of making it a meaningful and inter-connected part within a more extensive national framework. An observation by Diaz and Potter on the peasant village generally is applicable to the Malay case, namely, that 'The peasant village is thus clearly not an isolated whole; it has both vertical and horizontal ties extending from the village to the larger society and civilization of which it forms but a small part' (Diaz and Potter, 1967: 167).

IV Social Stratification

IN the previous chapter it was noted that some of the villagers refer to themselves in such terms as, 'We are all the same', or 'We are all relatives belonging to the same village'; in fact there even exist among some of them the belief that they are all of one kind or are equal. A common ethnic and cultural background together with a certain amount of social solidarity which is further strengthened by the faith that believers are equal before God all contribute towards this egalitarian emphasis among the villagers. Although this can and does influence the conceptions of the villagers regarding the nature of their own society, it does not, however, reflect the real situation. With things as they are, not only are objective differences easily perceived but the villagers themselves tend to differentiate between one another on the basis of various criteria.

If there are those who claim that all villagers are the same, there are also others who point out that differences are many. In actual fact, there are several proverbs known to the villagers which explain such differences. Within the context of Malay society proverbs seem to have a special meaning. Not only do they crystalize the very essence of Malay folk philosophy and outlook, or sum up some of the important experiences of Malay life but they are often used to explain things more clearly, or sometimes taken as simple guides to certain social behaviour. The traditional Malay life is ruled by what is often referred to as *adat* which is often translated as 'customs' but which actually embodies all the shared norms, values, beliefs, folkways, mores and traditions that are held by the society. In the matrilineal society of Negri Sembilan, there exist *perbilangan* (sayings) which embody the codes of conduct and rules of relationships, and regulations regarding the ranking and power distribution among the traditional office-holders. These sayings explain the working of the *Adat Perpatih* which is the idealistic 'customs' of the society there (de Jong, 1958; Swift, 1967). Outside Negri Sembilan such sayings do not exist at all. Several proverbs, however, are known. For instance, in the three areas studied, various people, especially those who are elderly, know the proverbs which refer to differences and

inequality among the people well. Very often they quote, 'Sparrows with sparrows, and ravens with ravens' (*Pipit sama pipit, enggang sama enggang*), and 'Like cucumber and durian' (*Macam timun dengan durian*). The sparrows and ravens do not merely indicate two species of birds, but they also offer a contrast between a small species that is unable to fly very high and a big one that can reach great heights in the sky. Applied to the human race, the proverb points out how the origins of birth can give rise to different potentiality for achievement among various people, and they also express that those who are of the same standing tend to react more with one another than with others. On the other hand, the cucumber and durian demonstrate different degrees of strength; the former being quite soft with a thin skin, while the latter has a very thick thorned covering. When describing the relationship of people as being like the cucumber and durian, what is meant is that it is unequal and that a collision between the two will only harm the cucumber or the weak.

These two proverbs are rather general in the sense that they describe the situation of inequality within society as a whole, without indicating what the nature of the relationship between unequals is like and how in their behaviour signs of social differences are shown. It is commonplace to have various forms of address for people who enjoy different social standing in society. Among the Malays, for example, there are several formal ways of addressing a ruler. A person of lower status, in communicating with him, most commonly refers to himself in the first person as *pacal, patik* or *hamba* which may be roughly rendered as 'slave'. He also refers to the ruler in the second or third person as *tuanku*, meaning 'my master'. As for the ruler, only he alone can use the term *beta* to mean 'I'. In addressing a person of lower status, he often uses the term *engkau* or *kamu* for the equivalent of 'you'. It is inconceivable to have a commoner use 'beta' for the first person, or to use 'engkau' or 'kamu' when addressing in the second person someone of a higher status. The first person 'patik'—but certainly not 'pacal'—is also used by commoners of lower status when communicating with those related to royalty who often bear the honorifics *tengku* or *engku* before their names. Besides that, the terms *hamba tengku* or *hamba engku* (tengku's or engku's slave) are also used as pronouns in the first person. Between equals, the most common practice is to use the first person *saya* (I) and the second person *awak* (you), but there are also variations of these according to the various dialects in the different states.

In Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan, the crude and familiar terms of *aku* (I) and engkau or *hang* (you) are used among those who consider

themselves socially equal and quite intimate with one another. A person who considers himself to be of a higher standing than the individual to whom he speaks will also use similar terms of address. On the other hand, a person who speaks to someone he considers his social superior will use the more refind word 'saya' (I), and for the second person *cik*—the short form of *encik* (meaning roughly 'mister') before the shortened version of the person's name, e.g., *Cik* Mat for *Encik* Muhammad. To a stranger the same form of address is used for the first and second persons but when the individual's name is not known, a shortened version of his occupation, especially when he is a teacher, is resorted to, e.g., *cikgu*, the shortened version of *encik guru* which means 'Mr. Teacher'. In the case of the second person being an elderly man, he is referred to as *pakcik* (uncle) or *pak aji* if he is someone who has gone on a pilgrimage. These terms of reference demonstrate therefore that the process of estimating the social positions of people does occur, and is expressed, among other things, in the use of the different terms of address.

In terms of behaviour, those who consider themselves as one another's equal joke freely and sometimes in a most boisterous manner. This situation, however, changes when some one who is held as socially superior appears. They tend to keep silent, and when they speak, they do so in a more formal manner. Often a person does not either talk back to his social superior or occupy a higher place; thus, when a person is seated in a position higher than his superior, he moves himself down to make sure that at least they are on the same level. In ceremonial gatherings—and even in informal ones—when a person wants to pass in front of those whom he considers in particular to be socially superior, he has to move with his body bowed low, a practice which is not normally carried out by those who have high status. All these modes of behaviour which constitute the various forms of etiquette to indicate deference or respect of one person or group for another are often observed as part of the 'customs' (adat). By using the correct term of address and demonstrating the right etiquette, a person is displaying his 'respect' (*hormat*) to his social superior. An observation of who shows respect and to whom within a group of people can indicate roughly how they estimate one another in terms of a scale of honour. It is this very 'estimation of honour' within the social sphere that is taken to mean status.

FACTORS DETERMINING STATUS

There are many factors which determine status, and among the most important that operate within the three areas studied are age, per-

sonal qualities, religious roles, education, occupation and wealth. It is not just a single factor that determines the status of a person, although this is possible, for normally his status is the result of the concentration or interplay of several factors. A person may enjoy status because he plays an important role in religion, but this status may be more strongly buttressed by the fact that he may be both quite old and wealthy at the same time. On the other hand, the presence of one or more status factors need not automatically make a person respected or bestow him with high status. It all depends on how these overweigh or are outweighed by opposite factors which are able to negate them. For example, a person may be rich and well-educated, but if he is crude in his ways, disrespectful towards religion and is known to squander his wealth in the town, then very few people will have respect for him, and he may therefore enjoy only a low status.

Many of the factors determining status reflect the values, attitudes, beliefs and traditions within that society—and all these, as mentioned earlier—are embodied within the 'customs' (*adat*). Traditionally the adat acts as a strong social control and the people are expected to conform to the 'customs'. Those who go against them often have to face strong sanctions from the rest of the community; in fact a person who defies the 'customs' or any aspect of it may be insulted or referred to rather contemptuously as '*tak ber-adat*' which can be literally translated as 'without customs', though it really means 'without breeding'. It is believed that old people who have gone through life within the village have come to know of various 'customs', and some of them as they grow older regard these 'customs' more reverently. They are often considered as advisers if not arbiters concerning what may be regarded as being right or wrong from the point of view of 'customs'. Thus because of all this, they are respected; and at the same time, the 'customs' themselves entreat that the children should respect their parents and that the young should honour the old. In this way age becomes an important factor. Among the Malays, however, there is neither a status hierarchy based on formal age sets nor does the society have any organization based on a similar structure.

Age may also be considered as a personal quality, although there are other qualities that are respected in a person such as kindness (*baik hati*), honesty (*amanah*), cleverness (*pandai*) and piety (*warak*). There are many villagers who have these qualities but, of course, their degree differs among various people. It is not just that such qualities like kindness, honesty and piety conform with the

ethical values upheld by the adat, but they are also regarded as being important for measuring the extent to which a person can be relied upon to carry out some social responsibilities that may be required of him within the community. These status-giving qualities, together with cleverness—which means among other things being 'clever' at talking, giving ideas, organizing people to achieve specific goals and arbitrating in conflicts—are also sought by most villagers in those whom they feel should play leadership roles.

Piety actually falls within the realm of religion. Islam is important among the Malays and it permeates their social life; in fact, it is considered to be an important aspect of the adat itself. However, there also exist the traditional beliefs which have either been integrated into or coexist side by side with Islam. Besides piety, a knowledge of Islam and traditional beliefs, especially when it is profound, is respected, probably because this occurs quite rarely. Almost every villager has the knowledge related to the practice of Islam, but very few are in a position to explain or to teach the meaning of these practices, or to expound on the philosophical assumptions behind certain fundamental aspects of the faith. Those who have this knowledge are normally highly regarded, and so they often become both prayer and tahlil leaders and assume other religious roles that give them status. However it is not only the knowledge alone that is respected. The degree of adherence and the practice of Islam is also important. Those who show deep religious feelings may be equally respected, even though they may not know much about the theoretical aspects of the faith.

In the practice of Islam, there are five fundamental practices that good Muslims are obliged to perform, namely, accepting that Allah is God and Muhammad the Prophet, praying five times a day, fasting during the months of Ramadhan, giving/paying alms (*zakat*) and going on a pilgrimage. These are often referred to as the Five Pillars of Islam. The most difficult of the five pillars to fulfil is the pilgrimage, mainly because it involves considerable expense. In the village, most of those who can afford to go to Mecca are the relatively wealthy, or old people who have accumulated life-long savings. Furthermore, those who go on the pilgrimage normally consider this rite as the climax of their religious achievement, after which they know that they have to act in ways that are expected of a religious man. As such, after returning from Mecca and bearing the honorific 'Haji' before their names, they often enjoy a position of status. In the same way also, traditional beliefs have their own practitioners who are required to perform rites mainly for productive and protective

purposes. As will be described in Chapter V, these practitioners are quite important and respected in the three areas studied.

The concept of adat is not rigid and it is flexible enough to accommodate the various changes that have come together with educational, political and economic influences which spread in the wake of British rule. New values, attitudes and beliefs have come to be accepted into a more enlarged body of the adat, and they also influence the acceptance of new criteria for determining status. Education, in its formal and modern sense, is quite a new thing in the rural areas and it exists mainly at the primary level. A person has to study for many years outside the village if he wants to obtain a good education. There are not many, however, who have the opportunity or can afford to do so. Achievement in education whether of a religious or a secular type is favourably regarded, and those with high educational qualifications are looked up to, sometimes even with undue awe. This expresses not only the general respect for learning and knowledge but also the recognition that a sound education, particularly of the secular type, but to some extent true of the religious one also, is the prerequisite of a good occupation and a lucrative income.

Lucrative occupations, especially those that are associated with the Government and Administration, carry a great deal of prestige. Within the confines of the village communities, those with non-agricultural occupations are few; there are some teachers, clerks and other minor officials from various departments who have dealings with the rural population. Both the religious and non-religious teachers are revered, not only by virtue of their occupations but also because they have a good education. The minor officials, including clerks, also have the force of government authority behind them, and this lends greater weight to what they say and do, and thus their status is enhanced.

Wealth, in itself, is not greatly respected, and is often sceptically regarded as the root of many evils that are detested by the villagers. A mean or squandering wealthy man is detested, but on the other hand, those who are generous with their money are often held in affection and respect. Furthermore, with the penetration of the money economy, the importance of wealth becomes greatly appreciated. New styles of life can be adopted with the acquisition of wealth, and hence houses with furniture resembling those commonly used among the 'town people' can be acquired. Sometimes the attempt to indulge in conspicuous consumption by imitating the urban ways is viewed with cynicism and envy, but undeniably, it also leads to the feeling that those who can afford this way of life are, in

fact, superior to the rest of the villagers. Moreover, generosity with wealth can be demonstrated in a number of ways, such as the giving of alms to some needy relatives and neighbours, especially during the fasting month, contributing to the repair costs of prayer houses, providing meat for feasts during auspicious days and so forth. Thus, with wealth a person is able to do many more things that can further improve his status.

BASIS OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY

Although there are people in the villages who are respected and enjoy higher status, they do not form what is normally referred to as a class. By class here is meant a group or category of people who are in the same station in life and generally share common interests, owing to similar positions they occupy in relation to the means of production and/or similar roles that they play in society, particularly with regard to economic production. So, while status falls within the social sphere, and takes into account mainly how people rate one another in terms of respect and honour, class on the other hand takes into consideration factors that are primarily economic and objective. Class and status are, however, not mutually exclusive, and very often there are certain degrees of interrelationship between them.

In the three areas studied, the introduction of cash crops, the penetration of money economy and the increase of population have brought changes into the village scene. Although cash crops such as rubber were not introduced, and the people of Kangkong have continued with rice planting, yet with the increasing use of money and the establishment of shops this produce—besides being consumed at home—is now being sold. In Kerdau, rubber was introduced into most of the newly opened areas for cultivation, but the production of 'swamp padi' continued. In Bagan, the whole area has been cultivated with rubber and coconuts, both of which are produced for cash.

At the same time there were people who migrated into these areas from other parts of the country and also from across the Straits of Melaka. The migration, together with natural increase, explains the fast population growth. While land was becoming more important as a means of producing income and wealth, it was also getting more scarce. People not only wished to acquire land on which they could subsist but they also began to want it for the purpose of accumulating wealth. Before the introduction of new land administration at the turn of the century, anybody could open up land for himself

anywhere and up to any amount. However, with the streamlining of the administration and the introduction of a system of registration of land titles known as the Torrens System (Meek, 1966: 40), land to be alienated had first to be surveyed and plotted and its ownership recorded in the Mukim Register deposited at the District Land Office. Such registration facilities applied not only to the determination of land rights but also to the collection of land revenue. When the new system was introduced, accumulation meant only the process of applying for and acquiring newly alienated land. However, as village land becomes more scarce, accumulation can take place only through purchase.

There are several factors which make accumulation possible. These can be discussed under two headings, namely, (a) the presence of economic and social motivation, and (b) the presence of an institutional framework which promotes accumulation. Peasants want more land because it is a source of both economic and social advantage. Having more land means not only a source of higher income but also a greater access to consumer goods and a better style of life and thus achieving a higher status. Status obtained from a better style of life which is based on economic strength, can be further buttressed, when by virtue of his wealth a villager can afford to go on a pilgrimage; and being a haji a person enjoys respect. Having this motivation to accumulate wealth is, however, insufficient. There is little point in accumulating land which cannot be worked to produce a surplus to provide the extra income. Economic changes that have taken place have, however, provided the institutional framework to overcome this. The expansion of both cash crops and money economy have given rise to shopkeepers and middlemen who can act as intermediaries to channel agricultural produce to the final consumers. Furthermore, labour is available for employment on the extra land that a person and his family can operate. This labour is provided by immigrants without land and also villagers who have been dispossessed of their land.

Nowadays, the main form of accumulation is through the purchase of land. A person must have ready cash or assets that can be readily converted into cash in order to purchase land. The cash must be available at the time when an individual wants to sell his land. The more cash a person has the more land he can accumulate and with this accumulation his power to amass further wealth also increases. There are at least three groups of people who are in the position to accumulate land: (a) those who manage to save in spite of limited resources; (b) those fortunate enough to inherit or own a large

amount of land; and (c) those in business, e.g. shopkeepers, or in the government service, e.g. teachers and clerks who are earning incomes that enable them to save.

These categories of people are found in the three areas studied although some are more prominent in one area than others. The people in category (a) above are those who begin their lives without anything; but by sheer hard work and determination they have slowly managed to accumulate. The best examples are a case in Kerdau and another in Bagan. The former, who came from Sumatra with nothing to his name now owns over sixty acres, and is quite easily the most wealthy person in Kerdau; the latter who did not own any land at birth has at present over thirty acres. Both of them related the same story—hard work 'from morning till night', doing everything they could to bring in some money. Besides, they restrained themselves from spending their money on anything that was more than basically necessary for the subsistence of the family, and saved as much as possible with the idea of purchasing land whenever the opportunity arose.

The best examples of category (b) are to be found in a widow in Kangkong and two brothers and a sister in Bagan. The former inherited from her father about ten acres of land, and with good management she was able to rent out part of her land to get not only sufficient income to spend but also some to save. Slowly she accumulated more land, and now owns more than twenty acres. The three in Bagan are the children of the first man who introduced rubber into the area and he used to be very wealthy. The eldest and the youngest brothers inherited about twenty acres while the sister gained about ten acres on the death of their parents. Both men managed to save the income obtained by working part of the land and renting out the rest. The eldest now owns more than ninety acres while the youngest owns over fifty acres. As for the sister, she now owns together with her husband about thirty acres.

As for those in category (c) the best examples come from Kangkong and Bagan. The man from Kangkong started as a peasant with little land. He then invested in a shop which flourished and he was able to save for land accumulation. As for those in Bagan, one inherited some land from the father, a part of which he sold for capital to open up a shop. In his case also he was able to save and accumulate, and he now owns more than forty acres. The other was a teacher who was quite thrifty, and he always saved a little from his salary. Then he used his savings to buy up land and by the time he left teaching, he was already a landlord with more than twenty acres.

In a situation where accumulation is through purchase, one man's acquisition is another man's dispossession. In fact, the processes of accumulation and dispossession are interlinked in the situation where the supply of land has remained constant. Dispossession of land under the present circumstances results from the sale of land, either in a straightforward or roundabout manner. A straightforward sale is one when a person sells his land to the buyer at the price normally prevailing in the market. In the three areas studied there is, however, a tendency for the value of land to be depressed. This is because they are within Malay Reservation areas and this means that it can be sold only to a Malay. In other words the scope of the market becomes more limited. As such the seller gets a relatively low price while the buyer is able to get land cheaply. A roundabout sale is often the culmination of earlier entanglements which have nothing to do with the intention to sell the land. For instance, it is often that peasants use their land as security for obtaining loans or credit. In some cases, verbal or written agreement is reached that when a person is unable to settle his debt including the interest within the specified period, he may be forced to sell his land to his creditor at a price much lower than that prevailing in the market. This, together with the factor of a limited market in the Malay Reservation means that the poor man, who is more often the seller of land, is always adversely affected by such a transaction, while the rich man, who more often than not is the buyer, enjoys a greater advantage.

In fact, there is a need to distinguish two types of situation under which land is sold by the villagers. First, land is sold voluntarily with the intention of obtaining cash needed for some specific purpose, for example, to start a shop, to go on a pilgrimage or to meet the expenses of a marriage or a death. Normally in this case, only a part of the land owned is sold, but there are also other instances, especially when the ownership is small, of the whole property being disposed of. Sales are often straightforward. Second, land is sold often by force of circumstances in times of great stress. Sometimes a good bargain is arrived at but at other times whatever price is offered has to be taken without much bargaining. The reasons for such sales are death, dispute, debt-bondage, etc. The death of a bread-winner in the family can put the members in a situation when the little land owned has to be sold in order to meet the funeral expenses incurred. On the other hand, there are times when land left behind after a death is too little to be divided, and it is therefore sold either to one of the inheritors or some other persons. The money is then divided. At other times, the land left behind may be a substantial amount but

when disputes occur on how it should be divided, they are often resolved by selling the land and dividing the money also. As for indebtedness, we find that a substantial proportion of the peasants are in debt. As shown in the following table, the rate of indebtedness is higher in Kangkong than in the other two areas.

TABLE V

DISTRIBUTION OF INDEBTEDNESS

Amount (in $)	*Kangkong*	*Kerdau*	*Bagan*
0-50	7	19	26
51-100	8	9	23
101-200	21	2	12
201-500	27	3	4
501-1000	11	—	2
Over 1000	3	1	3
Total persons	77	34	70

Note. These figures are based on the amount of debts incurred by heads of households at the time when they were interviewed. Among the padi farmers in Kangkong, there is the tendency for the amount of debts to vary seasonally but such variation is less likely among the rubber tappers in both Kerdau and Bagan.

There are comparatively more people involved in padi planting and fishing who are in debt and to a greater amount also than those engaged in rubber. The incomes of padi farmers and fishermen are seasonal and normally they have to borrow or take provisions from shops on credit during the off-seasons in order to support their family. Among the rubber tappers, incomes are more steady, and credit taken from shops does not accumulate over long periods. Besides getting credit from shops or borrowing from some relatives to meet certain household expenditure, debts are also incurred because of deaths, illnesses and marriages. The burden of indebtedness is heaviest among the poorer peasants.

In Kangkong and Kerdau, there are two consequences of indebtedness. Firstly, indebtedness to shops and mills often leads to a situation where the peasants are obliged to sell their produce to these creditors. A peasant is allowed a certain amount of credit, with the promise that he will repay with a fixed quantum of padi during harvest time. In Kangkong a mill and two shops are known to allow for credit between M$40 and M$50 during the off-season, and this is to

be repaid with ten *naleh* (about 160 *gantang*) of padi. The market price for each *naleh* is about M$8. This means that both the millers and shopkeepers actually charge interests to the amount of about 60 to 100 per cent on the credit that they offer the peasants. Thus the incomes of the peasants are always considerably reduced by this system of marketing which is known as *padi kunca* (one *kunca* is made up of 10 naleh). This usurious system is found most extensively in the rice cultivating areas, and Kangkong is also affected by it. Secondly, peasants who want to raise loans often have to offer their land as security. This they do by allowing the creditor to keep their land-deed during the period of debt. The peasant normally has to promise that his land will be considered as having been sold to the creditor at a price equal in amount to the loan with interest, at the date when final settlement of the sum borrowed ought to have been made. If its repayment does not meet the deadline, the amount of loan plus interest is recorded as the 'price' for the 'purchase' of the land. This system is known as 'promised sale' (*jual janji*) and is based on almost the same principle as pawning. Through this system a number of peasants have lost ownership over their land. During the period of investigation, eight cases were traced in Kangkong, three in Kerdau and one in Bagan. There may be other similar cases but the peasants are reluctant to disclose them.

Borrowing and obtaining credit are common practices in the three areas and in fact, in the economic life of the Malay peasants generally. It is not quite correct to think that the peasants become indebted and have to sell their land only because they are prone to conspicuous consumption or if they want to go on a pilgrimage. Swift argues that besides commercialization, the response to 'extraordinary expenditure' (which he explains as 'non-recurrent financial obligations too large to meet from current income, while the peasant possesses no adequate savings'), is a major reason why land sales occur. It is true that peasants do sell their land because of 'extraordinary expenditure' arising from feasts, pilgrimage and so forth but Swift does not consider 'selling land to maintain consumption income' a major cause of land transfer, although it does occur (Swift, 1968). However, what seems to be significant from the findings in this study which are quite different from those of Swift is that: (a) there are a number of peasants who are forced into indebtedness owing to a lack of land, low income and the seasonal nature of their agricultural pursuits. Their debt becomes increasingly chronic until they are forced to sell their land; and (b) that there are also those who sell their land in order to have capital to invest, either in business or land elsewhere.

In the case of (a) dispossession occurs, while in the case of (b) accumulation takes place and this leads to a more uneven distribution of land ownership.

STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC CLASSES

The processes of accumulation and dispossession have led to changes in the ownership of land and equipment. In fishing the most important equipment are boats and nets; in Kangkong there are nine persons who own boats and nets, while there are twenty-two without them. The fishermen with boats take along those without them to sea, and a type of share system is devised to divide the catch among themselves. After allowing for members of the team to take away some fish for household consumption, the rest of the catch is sold and the money is divided among themselves in shares known as *pang-gu*. The small boats using small nets have a share reserved and then a share each is given to every member of the fishing team. On the other hand, in the case of the three rather big motor-boats which go far out to sea and which use bigger nets, there is a share for the boat, and another for the net and the remaining share to be divided among the crew members. The owners of these big boats and nets seldom go out fishing themselves.

In the planting of rice, coconut and rubber, the most important means of production is the land. Just as there are people in the fishing occupation who have neither boat nor net, or who own them in

TABLE VI

DISTRIBUTION OF PEOPLE (IN PERCENTAGE) BY THE SIZE OF THEIR HOLDING

Size (in acres)	*Kangkong*	*Kerdau*	*Bagan*
0	33·3	7·8	12·8
½-3	34·4	18·8	43·6
3½-6	15·6	27·3	22·1
6½-9	6·7	18·8	5·4
9½-12	2·2	12·5	5·4
12½-15	2·2	6·3	3·0
15½-18	—	2·3	0·7
18½-21	2·2	—	—
Over 21	3·3	6·3	8·1
Total Number	90	128	149

varying sizes, in the same way also, the distribution of land ownership is unequal. This can be seen quite clearly from Table VI.

The table opposite shows that in Kangkong 67·7 per cent of the people own less than three acres, while in Kerdau it is 26·6 per cent and in Bagan 56·4 per cent. The percentage is rather low in Kerdau because there is still land available for cultivation there, but in the case of Kangkong, the area for rice cultivation is already exhausted as the population has been increasing and land has therefore become more minutely subdivided. It is because of this that a much higher proportion of people in Kangkong (33·3 per cent) is without land, compared to 7·8 per cent in Kerdau and 12·8 per cent in Bagan. On examining the table further it is found that the percentage of people owning over eighteen acres is quite low and it does not vary much in the three areas: Kangkong 5·5 per cent, Kerdau 6·3 per cent and Bagan 8·1 per cent, and in each case the percentage is much smaller than those who have no land at all.

Table VII gives the total acreage of land according to the various sizes of land, and it shows that holdings below three acres constitute 19·2 per cent of the total land owned in Kangkong, 6·0 per cent of that in Kerdau and 11·1 per cent of that in Bagan. As for the holdings in categories over eighteen acres, the total makes up 33·0 per cent of the land in Kangkong, 24·9 per cent in Kerdau, and 54·7 per cent in Bagan. Taking the two tables together and comparing the percentage of people in each category (in acres) in Table VI with the percentage of land distribution in a similar grouping in Table VII it is found that a higher proportion of people own less land. For instance, for those under three acres, 67·7 per cent of the people in Kangkong are in this category and they own only 19·2 per cent of the land; in Kerdau 26·6 per cent of the people own only 6·0 per cent of the land, while in Bagan 57·4 per cent of the people own 11·1 per cent of the land. In contrast, those within the categories above eighteen acres present the reverse picture: in Kangkong 5·5 per cent of the people own 33·0 per cent of the land, in Kerdau 6·3 per cent of the people own 24·9 per cent of the land, and in Bagan 8·1 per cent of the people own 54·7 per cent of the land. These figures show the degree of concentration of ownership.

The concentration of ownership in the three areas has not led to a clear-cut two class system made up of landlords on the one hand and tenants on the other. The situation is in fact more complicated. There are the owners whose land is operated by others through the sharing and/or renting system; and there are also the individuals who only operate the land for others without owning any themselves. Yet

TABLE VII

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND (IN PERCENTAGE) BY THE SIZE OF THE HOLDINGS (IN ACRES)

Size (in acres)	*Kangkong*	*Kerdau*	*Bagan*
0	0	0	0
½-3	19·2	6·0	11·1
3½-6	20·9	14·9	13·6
6½-9	13·0	19·6	5·8
9½-12	5·6	16·9	8·1
12½-15	8·2	12·5	5·1
15½-18	—	5·3	1·5
18½-21	11·0	—	—
Over 21	22·0	24·9	54·7
Total Acreage	354·0	959·8	1,104·7

in between there are the owner-operators, namely those who operate the land which they own. To complicate matters further, there are also people who operate only part of their own land, and others who for a living work partially on other people's land and at other times they are engaged in different types of odd jobs available in the village. Thus there are different categories of people according to the nature of their relationships with the means of production, namely, the owners, the owner-cum-owner-operators, the owner-operators, the owner-operators-cum-operators and the operators themselves.

The term categories has been used advisedly above because the classifications have been made mainly to facilitate analysis. Persons who are categorized as owners are those who own land and do not operate it, either because they can afford to do so or they are unable to as a result of old age or illness. As for the owners-cum-owner-operators, they normally own more land than they can work on, and so besides tilling a part of their land, they also let out the remainder to others to operate on the basis of the share, rent or lease system. With regard to the owner-operators, all that they work on are the plots that they own, some units of which are economical to operate while others are not. Those who continue to work on uneconomical units do so primarily because they cannot obtain other land to work on. The owner-operators-cum-operators mainly work on the little land that they own in addition to plots owned by others which are operated on the basis of rent, share or other payment. As for the opera-

tors, they are clearly those who do not have land but operate on plots belonging to others, either as tenants or casual labourers or as both at the same time.

The distribution of land ownership according to these categories shows similarity of pattern in the three areas. As can be observed in Table VIII, the operators are those who either do not own any land or have the least amount of it, while the owners have the largest portion. As for those in between, the owners-cum-owner-operators on the whole own more land than the owner-operators who in turn

TABLE VIII

DISTRIBUTION OF LAND OWNERSHIP (IN ACRES) ACCORDING TO VARIOUS CATEGORIES

Categories/ Ownership		*0-3*	*3½-9*	*9½-15*	*15½-21*	*Over 21*	*Total*
Kangkong:	a.	—	2	—	1	3	6
	b.	—	5	2	1	—	8
	c.	7	8	2	—	—	17
	d.	16	5	—	—	—	21
	e.	32	—	—	—	—	32
		55	20	4	2	3	84
Kerdau:	a.	—	2	2	1	6	11
	b.	—	5	8	1	1	15
	c.	8	32	11	1	—	52
	d.	11	16	1	—	—	28
	e.	8	—	—	—	—	8
		27	55	22	3	7	114
Bagan:	a.	—	—	1	1	12	14
	b.	—	3	7	—	—	10
	c.	12	20	2	—	—	34
	d.	21	9	—	—	—	30
	e.	35	1	—	—	—	36
		68	33	10	1	12	124

Key. a = owner
b = owner-cum-owner-operator
c = owner-operator
d = owner-operator-cum-operator
e = operator

possess more than the owner-operators-cum-operators. Whereas most of the owners have more than eighteen acres, the majority of the operators have less than three acres.

An almost similar pattern emerges when the distribution of income is tabulated, as presented in Table IX. The lowest income earners are the operators while the biggest are the owners. However there are also operators who earn much more than the owner-operators, and some of the latter in turn earn as much as a number of owners. This is because among those who are dependent on land for a living, its acreage is not the sole determinant of income. Other factors such as the type of crops, the productivity of land and the sharing system also determine the possible amount of income earned.

Tables VIII and IX both show that the owners stand out both in terms of land ownership and income. They are in fact the village landlords. They form a class of people who own land but do not operate it and instead they live on incomes derived from the labour of others, either through the share, rent or the lease system. Most of the landlords own more than twenty acres of land and there are also a few with more than fifty acres, although none of the pieces exceed a hundred acres. They each have between four to twelve persons working on their land. By and large their incomes are quite high; in Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan there are altogether over a third of the landlords whose incomes are more than $400 a month which is certainly very high when compared to the average income of the peasants in the rural areas. Some of these landlords save to open up shops or they even provide loans to a number of the peasants. However, there are also others who become landlords only after they have been successful as shopkeepers. In the three areas, the land-owners and the shopkeepers tend to be the same persons. Thus, through the control over production and marketing resources, many of the landlords have a strong influence over a large number of the peasants.

The term 'peasants' is freely used here for people who work on land, irrespective of whether they own it or not. Actually they are distinct differences among the peasants in terms of land ownerships and incomes. Their positions in society differ from one another to the extent that they can be said to belong to different classes. The landlords are certainly set apart from the peasants economically and socially, but even among the peasants, they can be perceived and sometimes consider themselves as belonging to different classes. Based on these differences, they fall into three main classes, namely, the well-to-do peasants, the middle-range peasants and the poor peasants.

TABLE IX

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME (IN M$)
ACCORDING TO VARIOUS CATEGORIES

Categories/ Income		*0-60*	*61-120*	*121-180*	*181-240*	*Over 240*	*Total*
Kangkong:	a.	—	1	1	1	3	6
	b.	1	4	1	2	—	8
	c.	5	7	4	1	—	17
	d.	11	8	2	—	—	21
	e.	29	3	—	—	—	32
		46	23	8	4	3	84
Kerdau:	a.	1	2	1	3	4	11
	b.	2	6	4	3	—	15
	c.	18	25	5	3	1	52
	d.	19	6	2	1	—	28
	e.	7	—	1	—	—	8
		47	39	13	10	5	114
Bagan:	a.	—	—	—	3	11	14
	b.	2	3	3	2	—	10
	c.	8	19	5	2	—	34
	d.	3	20	7	—	—	30
	e.	18	17	1	—	—	36
		31	59	16	7	11	124

Key. The letters a-e represent similar categories as in Table VIII.

Note. The incomes have been estimated in different ways. In the case of those dependent on rubber where monthly incomes do not vary very much unless there are big price fluctuations, their incomes have been estimated over a period of one month. In the case of rice, however, the income over a year is calculated, and then a monthly average is worked out. Incomes from working wives or children are considered as supplementary incomes of the heads of households. The figures given in the table represent incomes of heads of households during the period of research.

The well-to-do peasants are those who sometimes describe themselves, but more often are described by others, as living comfortably (*senang*). They are comfortable not only in the sense that they have steady and reasonably good incomes that are above the average in

the villages but they also live in reasonably big wooden houses with sufficient food to sustain themselves and their families. They seldom agree to the fact that they are referred to as being rich (*kaya*), because this description is more often applied to the landlords who have plenty of land, large incomes, big houses and probably cars. Most of the well-to-do peasants are mainly owners-cum-owner-operators, in other words, people who have land of their own, part of which they work themselves and part of which they let out to others to work. However, there are also some owner-operators in this class, especially those who own a unit of productive land that is big enough for them to work on with the help of the wife or another member of the family, and which also brings in a good income.

The middle-range peasants often describe themselves as being moderate (*sederhana*) or ordinary (*biasa*) in their lives. In other words they do not consider themselves to be either well-to-do or poor. Most of them have their own land to work on, in other words, they come mainly from the owner-operator category. Their incomes on the whole are lower than those of the well-to-do peasants. However there are also some in the lower and upper rungs of the owners-cum-owner-operators and operators categories respectively, who, on the basis of their station of life, can be and are considered as middle-range peasants.

As for the poor peasants, they are quite badly off in contrast with the well-to-do. Coming mainly from the operators category, and often working as share-croppers and/or tenants and casual labourers, they are normally without any or insufficient land to sustain them. Although the term poor (*miskin*) is often used by others to describe their condition, they themselves often prefer to call it difficult (*susah*). In a tone of almost self-pity some of them say that they are usually treated and often feel like 'the rubbish of society' (*sampah masyarakat*). This class of people form a big, if not the biggest, segment of the village communities.

So far the above classes deal with only those within the agricultural sphere. In Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan, there are people who do not depend on agriculture for their livelihood. This has resulted from the many educational, economic and political changes that have reached these areas. The educational changes which brought Malay schools into the areas have enabled some of the villagers to become teachers. Besides, there are also a number of teachers from outside who live in the villages. Administrative changes have not only led to the recognition of the penghulu as a government official but have also brought in some minor officials to serve in the various

departments, like police, agriculture, forestry, survey, etc. At the same time, small-scale business enterprises which have taken root in the villages have given new opportunities to shopkeepers and middlemen. Most of the teachers, government officials and shopkeepers own land also, either through inheritance or through purchase. In the case of many of the teachers and other government servants, the older they become and the longer they have lived in the village, the greater is the tendency to acquire more land so that by the time they retire, they have already become landlords. As for some of the smaller shopkeepers and middlemen, many of them work on the land at the same time. Even if their entire income is not from agriculture, these earnings normally supplement the incomes obtained from their small business enterprises. The more successful shopkeepers are landlords as well. The teachers, government servants and shopkeepers are quite apart from the various classes of peasants; they have better stations in life although they do not fall, however, into the landlord class unless they become one of them in the course of time. In fact they constitute what may often be referred to as the 'middle' class. Although their positions may be high in the villages, they seem to belong to the lower strata of the 'middle' class within the national context.

Alongside these classes there have also come into being in the villages a group of people who constitute the workers. They do not depend on agriculture but instead they sell their labour for payment in other spheres of economic activities. There are a few who work as gardeners in the nearby schools and earn regular salaries. Many of them, however, are engaged as labourers in nearby towns—either with the Government or in private industries. Among the heads of households investigated in Kangkong, none of them work as a labourer. In Kerdau there are a few who are employed in the government survey, forest departments and also in the private logging enterprise not far away from there. Those in Bagan work mainly as ferry labourers and school gardeners. The number of workers in the three areas is therefore quite negligible and even when there are some, they are not really involved in any industries. It shows therefore that the people in these areas are still very strongly rooted to agriculture, and modern developments which are normally responsible for the emergence of the working class have not affected them very much.

In conclusion, there are different classes of people in the rural communities that were studied. The various classes and their distribution in the three areas are shown in Table X.

How are the classes related to status? If the factor(s) determining status in the village communities are mainly economic, i.e. land-ownership, occupation and income, then it will be easy to say that class and status are closely correlated; in other words, status can be taken mainly as the social expression of class, which is basically economically determined. However, this is not true, because, besides occupation and wealth, there are several other factors which determine status, like age, personal qualities, religion and education. As the forces of modern influence become more felt, factors like wealth, occupation and education become increasingly important in determining status. The factors of education and occupation are closely interrelated, while those of occupation and wealth are clearly within the economic sphere. Just as the economic factors are important in determining class, so are they also becoming increasingly significant in determining status.

It is quite possible to say that by and large the landlords, and the well-to-do, middle-range and poor peasants can be stratified in that order. It must be borne in mind, however, that there are people of the lower classes who enjoy higher status and vice versa. For example, a headman or a religious instructor or even an elderly person

TABLE X

DISTRIBUTION OF CLASSES (IN NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE)

Classes	*Kangkong*		*Kerdau*		*Bagan*		*Total*	*Average*
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Landlord	6	6·7	11	8·6	14	9·4	31	8·2
Middle-class	6	6·7	6	4·7	15	11·7	27	7·4
Well-to-do Peasant	8	8·9	15	11·7	10	6·7	33	9·0
Middle-range Peasant	17	18·9	52	40·6	34	22·8	103	27·9
Poor Peasant	53	58·9	36	28·1	66	44·3	155	42·6
Workers	—	—	6	4·7	5	3·4	11	3·3
Others*	—	—	2	1·6	5	3·4	7	1·6
Total	90	100·1	128	100·0	149	100·1	367	100·0

*This includes old people or widows who live by themselves. They do not work and they depend on help given by their children or relatives.

who is not economically well-off can still enjoy status well above the others. At the same time, among the landlords and the 'middle' class who represent more-or-less higher levels of society within the three areas, individual status allow for the position of some landlords to be higher than that of some of the teachers, for instance, or vice versa. While there are landlords who are able to use their economic position in order to buttress their social position, there are at the same time those in the 'middle' class, already enjoying status, who further enhance their economic strength by accumulating land.

MANIFESTATIONS OF CLASS DIFFERENCES

It may appear that what has been done so far is mainly to use the objective basis for dividing society into different classes. These divisions, however, are not merely statistical, for they are closely related to the real situation in the three areas studied. For one thing the villagers recognized that differences do exist, and these are often expressed. For another, several interrelations and interactions among the villagers are partially determined by and also manifest the class and status differences. These may be illustrated by the interactions that occur within the institutions of feast, co-operation and marriage.

In Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan, as has been explained earlier, there are many occasions when feasts are held and the people invited are normally relatives, neighbours and friends. The frequency of feasts that are held by a person and the sort of people who are present at these feasts are quite important indicators of his class and status positions. A rich landlord who keeps to the 'customs' (adat) can afford to hold the kenduri (feasts) very often for the different *rites de passage*, but a poor peasant, on the other hand, may be able to hold them only to celebrate a marriage. Whereas in the case of marriage feasts, the former often makes them big and lavish so that they can satisfy both his own bride and the expectation of the villagers, the latter often celebrates on a more modest scale. The poor peasant often confines his guests only to relatives living close by, neighbours and friends, while the landlord may invite the whole village. In addition he also takes pride in inviting a number of respected people and officials from the neighbouring villages or towns. This adds to the prestige of the host and it also demonstrates to the villagers that unlike those of lower class and status positions, the landlord has a wide range of people who know him. Also, during the feast itself, there are differences noticed in seating arrangements which

are largely influenced by consideration of factors pertaining to class and status. There is no formal or rigid rule regarding this arrangement, but what can be seen is that it is arranged so that the elders, the wealthy, the religious functionaries and the teachers can sit near one another at one end of the house or the *balai* (temporary building normally erected for the occasion). The host will make quite a fuss if the guests are not seated in their proper places and he will eventually persuade them to move.

Turning to co-operation, it has been noted that in the economic sphere in Kangkong, the most important form is the derau. An essential feature of this co-operative group is that its members must possess some land of their own which they work themselves. Those who have a great deal of land, especially the landlords and some well-to-do peasants, are often not involved. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, these people do not work on their land themselves, and so they depend on the labour of others. Secondly, the availability of people who are willing to work on land as share-croppers, tenants or farm labourers enables the landlords and some of the well-to-do peasants to have their land operated by these categories of people. If ever there are those who enter into the derau groups, it is the operators of land. On the other hand, those who do not have any land to operate at all are also not members of the group. This is mainly because the principle of derau is service in return for service. When a person does not have any land to operate, those people to whom he can give his service will not immediately be able to return it. In such circumstances, money would have to be paid for the service, but during the planting period especially, many of the peasants do not have sufficient ready cash to pay for the labour. Through derau, labour that is needed can therefore be obtained without payment in cash. So as a result, the derau group becomes an institution that normally excludes the rich as well as the poor, and becomes important particularly for bringing the middle-range peasants into closer association with one another. As for the poor peasants, the nature of their association is quite different.

In Kangkong itself, there are farm labourers who come seasonally from the East Coast and offer themselves in small work teams for payment in cash or kind. Most of them do not, however, stay long in Kangkong. In Kerdau, the situation is quite different. Here there is no seasonal labour coming from outside, but some of the local poor peasants form work teams here. There are no landlords or members of the middle class in these work teams because they do not have to sell their labour for odd jobs in order to earn some money. In the

same way, the well-to-do and middle-range peasants are seldom involved for they are most of the time tied down to working their own land. Therefore the people who associate themselves in the work teams are mostly either those without or with insufficient land to work on or those with no steady source of income. There are some of the poor peasants who work on land which belongs to others, but in Kerdau a number of them will stop working on the land for a considerable time if there is a casual job to be done with a work team as the latter brings in a better income. In Kerdau there are people who just work seasonally on the 'swamp padi'. Some of them do not have enough rubber or other land to work on when the task of padi cultivation is over and so they are ready to offer themselves in work teams for the clearing of undergrowth, the digging of drains and other casual jobs on land belonging mainly to the landlords. Thus the work teams bring together some of the poor peasants just as the derau bring the middle-range peasants into closer association.

In Bagan there is no derau, and existing work teams are not as organized as those in Kerdau. But there is another activity that tends to bring the peasants together. Normally peasants who are working for a particular landlord go to mangle the day's rubber at the mangle hut near the home of the landlord. Also other peasants who do not have a mangling machine work in the same hut, and there are some landlords who charge them a small sum of money for the use of the machine although the majority do not. The rubber tappers usually return from their latex collection around the same time before noon. First, they have to harden the latex and this process is speeded up by the use of acid. Then the hardened latex is pressed with their hands or feet before it is fed into the machine. All these processes take more than an hour. The peasants are all together at the hut while this work is being done. They talk, joke and sometimes complain about the difficulties in life which face them. This happens every working day and thus a close bond of friendship exists among them, often strengthened by the feeling that they share the same fate. What happens at the mangle hut is as important as the co-operative efforts made through the derau and the work teams in bringing the peasants together. The only exception is that here the people are not drawn from a particular class, because those who go to the mangle hut are not only the poor peasants who operate land belonging to the landlords but also some fairly well-off peasants who do not have their own mangling machines.

As for marriages, the choice of partners not only manifests class and status differences but also strengthens relationships along both

class and status lines. Many marriages are still being arranged by parents or relatives, but recently among the youths, their own choices are becoming more important. When parents and relatives play a big part in the marriage, then the choice is normally confined within the same kin group and those who are of about the same social standing. This is not to say that parents and relatives will not arrange a marriage with non-kinsmen or those with different social backgrounds. The main tendency is certainly for children of families with almost the same class and status positions to intermarry. This is because these people want to ensure that those married will be claimed as being 'fit for one another' as expressed by the term *padan* (suited) and being of the same social position (*sekupu*). Many villagers believe it is Islam that urges people of the same social position to marry. Although there are many cases when people who are not of the same social position have married, the tendency in these marriages is more for the man to marry a woman of a lower class and status than himself, rather than for a woman to marry a man of a class and status position which is below hers.

There are several procedures in the marriage customs by which the parents of a girl can reject a suitor who is considered socially unacceptable. According to 'custom', at the very initial stage the suitor's family has to send some elders to the family of the girl to find out if she is available for marriage; this stage is known as the 'sounding out' (*merisik*). During the 'sounding out' stage, representatives of the girl's family can easily indicate rejection by saying that she is 'still too young to be on her own', or that she has already been betrothed to somebody else. Such rejection, however, is difficult to make when it is well-known that the girl is definitely of marriageable age and that she has not been engaged to anyone. In this case then, obstruction may be laid at the next stage—the 'asking for the girl's hand' known as the *meminang*. During this stage, representatives of both sides meet again. The most important thing to happen at this stage is when the representatives from the man's side state their intention to ask for the hand of the girl to her parents or their representatives. If this is accepted they next discuss the items of expenses which include mainly gifts to the girl, made up of cash that is sometimes used for the marriage feast and jewellery—often ring(s) and ear-rings, dresses and shoes. During the next stage these 'expenses' or gifts are normally ceremoniously delivered by a delegation from the man's side to that of the girl; this is known as 'sending of expenses' (*hantaran belanja*). Thus, if the girl's parents want to reject the suitor, they can at the 'meminang' stage demand an unreasonably large

amount of expenses and gifts. For instance, in Bagan, there was a young middle-range peasant who was very interested in a lady teacher who happened to be the daughter of a landlord. She was quite interested in him also but her parents had other plans, and so they obstructed the peasant's wishes by demanding $1,000 cash, a diamond ring, a pair of diamond ear-rings, two Malay dresses and a pair of shoes. The young man would thus have to raise more than M$2,500 which was much more than he could afford. He therefore had to give up the idea of marriage to this particular girl. Had he been able to meet this demand, the girl's parents would be unable to do anything more, other than to refuse to give her away.

There are times, of course, when rather wealthy parents cannot hold out too long against a prospective son-in-law from a lower social category, especially when their daughter does not possess many qualities that are considered attractive. Parents become very ashamed when their daughters have long passed the normal age for marriage without having men to come along to ask for their hand, for these girls will then be made the butt of jokes as being 'unsaleable' (*tak laku*). In such cases the parents may be quite ready to accept anyone so long as he is not a drunkard, a gambler or is disabled. In fact there are cases when such parents help to lend money to the suitor so that he seems able in the eyes of the public to pay for the expenses demanded which are kept at quite a high level to suit their social standing. Furthermore, to make sure that the daughter will be quite secure economically, the girl's parents may even give their son-in-law a piece of land to work on. It must be stated, however, that although there is a strong desire among parents to see their children being married to those who are of the same social position there are certainly many marriages among those of different classes and status within the three areas. Social differences within the same village or even mukim are not really very great. Furthermore, personal choices are becoming more important now in determining marriage partners, and the influence of the parents is diminishing. This does not deny the existence, of course, of choices that are guided by an awareness of class and status differences.

CLASS CONFLICTS

While co-operation and marriage tend to bring together people from about the same class and status, there is another factor which not only strengthens the association of members of the same class and status but at the same time has the potentiality of widening the gap between those from different class and status groups, even causing

them to oppose one another. Thus there appear signs of class conflict. There are two aspects of this conflict, one, the existence of a latent situation of opposed values and interests among various classes, or at least some members of these classes; the other, the manifestations of these opposed situations. These manifestations may be passive or active: passive when members of the different classes just stay away from one another as much as they can, and active when it involves opposed actions of a verbal and even physical nature. Whereas at the verbal level they confine themselves to abusing one another face to face or behind each other's back, at the physical level it may involve violence as well as infliction of damage.

The latent situation of conflict exists in the three areas studied. The interests of some members of the different classes are opposed to one another, especially in the areas of production and marketing. In production the landlord and some well-to-do peasants always look for shares and rents that are favourable to them. These high shares and rents will certainly be obtained at the expense of, and so against the interests of the poor peasants who are share-croppers and tenants. Those poor peasants who cannot meet the demands of some landlords to raise shares and rents in their favour may even be replaced. Thus the cause of conflict is ever present. In marketing, the shopkeepers and middlemen try to maximize profits by 'selling high' and 'buying low' in their economic dealings with their clients. As noted earlier, many of the shopkeepers and the middlemen are also landlords at the same time. Thus there is a situation of conflict between, for example, the middle-range and poor peasants with the landlord-shopkeepers. The most clear-cut situation of conflict is, however, between the poor peasants, both as sellers of their produce and as buyers of some of the consumer goods, and the landlords who are sometimes the shopkeepers also. The different usurous practices, for instance—padi kunca and jual janji—as explained above (pp. 81-2), lead only to further sharpening of these conflicts.

In Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan, the manifestations of class conflict have been confined mainly to the verbal level. Some peasants express contempt of landlords who are mean and show their anger towards those who take advantage of them through debt-bondage. For instance, in these areas a number of peasants do not hide their feelings towards some landlords and shopkeepers who try to take advantage of them and they go a degree beyond verbal abuse by trying to inflict damage to property belonging to the latter. In Kerdau and Bagan, some poor peasants practise slaughter-tapping—careless stripping of the bark—so that the rubber trees belonging to some of

the landlords are harmed. Although more latex is obtained through the act of slaughter-tapping, this is done at the risk of destroying the trees before long. However, the act of slaughter-tapping is seldom done consciously as an act of protest and it appears to have been motivated by the desire to increase the amount of latex so as to obtain better incomes, but this very act causes anger among the landlords and the relationship between the owners and the tappers becomes further strained.

It has been suggested that there are three processes involved in class conflict, namely, comparison, frustration and oppression (Marshall, 1958). Perhaps the degree that these occur and the extent to which the people are conscious of them will influence the nature of the conflict in any particular area. In the three areas, the comparison between those who have more land and those who have less of it is quite clear. There are about 5·4 per cent of the people owning more than 18 acres of land but they control around 30 per cent of the total acreage of land. In Kangkong, six landlords (6·7 per cent) own 35·3 per cent of the 354 acres of land; in Kerdau 11 landlords (8·6 per cent) own 29·6 per cent of the total 960 acres of land, while in Bagan 14 landlords (9·4 per cent) own more than half of the total of 1,047 acres. Most of the poor peasants have little or no land at all. The comparison is not merely statistical, for many of the villagers realize it, and this is made amply clear to them by the different styles of life of the various classes.

The poorer people always find it much more difficult to improve their conditions than the more wealthy. In Kangkong, only 3 out of 53, in Kerdau only 2 out of 36, and in Bagan only 4 out of 66 poor peasants have been able to purchase land. Even so, the average amount they have been able to purchase is only about 2½ acres. On the other hand, the landlords find it much easier to purchase land; the richer they are the greater is the amount they can accumulate. Some of the government servants are also able to outbid the poorer people in the competition to buy land. While it is difficult for the peasants to improve their economic position, it is relatively easier on the other hand for their position to deteriorate. Even if peasants are not forced to part with their land for reasons already explained earlier, it is often the case that over a generation, the children of the poor peasants tend to become much poorer than their parents. This is because the Muslim law of inheritance (*faraid*) (see Appendix II) often results in land and other property being subdivided in the event of death. Of course the law affects all persons; while children of landlords can be reduced to well-to-do or middle-range peasants,

those of well-to-do and middle-range peasants can also become poor peasants. However, while the children of the rich landlords have better chances of inheriting a substantial amount of wealth, and thereby placing them on a rather strong economic footing to ensure both a comfortable life and perhaps an accumulation of land, this opportunity is almost denied to the children of the middle-range and poor peasants. Thus their situation inevitably becomes worse.

It is true that education does provide a channel for upward mobility but even here the peasants find that the opportunities are better for the children of the landlords and those in the middle class. In Kangkong, from a total of 104 children who are being educated, eight are in English schools and out of this, six are the children of landlords and middle-class parents; in Kerdau, out of a total of 119, only twelve are in English schools, out of which eight are the children of landlords and those in the middle classes; and in Bagan, from a total of 264, only 31 are in English schools and out of this small number only 11 are children of those in the peasant classes, the rest being from the landlords and middle classes. The English schools have always been the better equipped of the government schools generally and those who pass from them have better opportunities for employment. While education in the Malay schools is free, fees and cost of textbooks are relatively high in the English schools, and that is why the children of the landlords and those in the middle class have an advantage over the others. As for those who have been able to receive a University education, the number until lately is negligible; there is only one each from Kangkong and Kerdau and two from Bagan. The one from Kangkong is the son of a rich landlord while the other from Kerdau is the son of a senior teacher who also owns land. From Bagan, one of the graduates is a teacher's son and the other is the son of a very wealthy landlord there.

These comparisons in positions and opportunities do cause a certain amount of frustration among the poorer people. However, there are many factors that tend to submerge their feelings towards the rich. Kinship affinity and territorial proximity make it rather difficult for them to express their real feelings because this can cause great disturbances to a harmonious way of living in a society (*hidup bermasyarakat*) which is very much cherished by many of them. Sometimes, whatever the treatment they get in terms of the interest imposed or the price of produce that they are given, they take in a rather philosophical way as something which is inevitable. Some pacify their frustration by saying, 'Well, the landlords and shopkeepers have to go in search for a living too' while others feel thank-

ful that they are trusted by some of the landlords to operate their land or by the shopkeepers for allowing them to take provisions on credit arrangement. Nevertheless, it is certain that a number of the verbal and physical expressions of the poor peasants, as noted earlier, are indications of their frustration.

Although there are those who can see and feel the many socio-economic inequalities and be frustrated by them, yet many do not fully understand and are unable to pin-point the root causes of these inequalities. The majority resign themselves to the belief that their fate is predestined. Those who try to find an explanation feel that the non-Malays are to be blamed. The stereotype of the Chinese among the Malays has always been that of a rich businessmen (*taukih*) and a Chinese, even if he is not a businessman is often addressed by many Malays as taukih while the stereotype of the Indian—especially of the Chettiar and Sikh communities—is as a money-lender. In fact, the very term *ceti* (chettiar) is used for a money-lender. Of course the people in the three areas have come into contact with both the Chinese businessmen and the Indian money-lenders. However, many of them, because of the stereotypes, tend to ignore that: (a) the businessmen and the money-lenders form only a small proportion of the Chinese and Indian communities, and that there are among them workers and peasants who are as badly off as the poor Malays themselves and (b) even among the Malays in the three communities, there are those who act as businessmen and even money-lenders and who also take advantage of their own kind through various types of usurious practices. Thus, although in reality exploitations is not on racial lines, they are felt and believed to be so among many of the Malay peasants.

It is true that by comparison on the national scale there are more Chinese in the higher income bracket than Malays; and the former predominate in the business sector. To some extent this causes communal resentment which are both expressed and further inflamed by political movements that exploit this feeling. At the same time in the urban areas, there are also political expressions that are highly pro-Chinese and which argue that the Malays—by virtue of the fact that there are more of them than others in the Cabinet and Administration—control the Government and that they are using this very control to discriminate against the non-Malays. The development of communal politics in the country has great impact on the villagers and causes stronger group identification to take place on the basis of race rather than class. Furthermore, political expressions and movements that are based on class ideology have not been able to gain a

foothold among the villagers. On one hand, they are quite influenced by the propaganda that class ideology is foreign-inspired and opposed to Islam, and on the other, the Government, through various laws and regulations, does not take kindly to people and parties that try to spread class politics and ideology. As a result, class consciousness that cuts across racial lines is still at a low level when compared to that along the line of racial groupings.

Organizations that are political in nature have not really made such headway as to polarize the mass of Malay peasants and workers together with their non-Malay counterparts along class lines. The peasants have not really looked at their economic and social positions and problems as being caused by what some politicians term as exploitation resulting from the politico-economic system that they live under. Many poor Malay peasants regard with some pride the achievement of a few Malays as a symbol of Malay success to 'catch up' with non-Malays in the economic field, and they consider some of the Malay politicians in power as their protectors. Thus the existing relationship between the rich and the poor Malays does not have great disintegrative effects as yet.

Although the level of class consciousness among the Malays in the rural areas and the policies of the Government have restricted the growth of political movements and actions by the poor peasants, yet observations in Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan clearly show that classes do in fact exist within the village communities. There are criteria of differences that are primarily economic which differentiate them, and while there are certain institutions that bring people of similar classes together, there are also other factors which cause these classes to draw apart, if not to be in conflict with one another. Owing to the distribution of a number of status factors and also the possibility of acquiring social standing through economic strength, it can therefore be said that social stratification does exist in the rural communities and it affects the rural Malays also. Thus, the life of the villagers, their interactions and interrelations are governed by several things, among which are the kinship, territorial and class/status structures.

V The 'Traditional' Leaders

IN Chapter III the nature of the village as a social entity was examined. Then it was shown in Chapter IV that people in the villages are stratified according to different status and class bases. The discussion in these chapters immediately brings to mind two questions relating to leadership. Firstly, is the village the only unit on which rural leadership is based? Secondly, does the village leader, as a rule, come only from among those who enjoy positions of high status and class? The answers to these questions will become clear subsequently, but before proceeding to deal with them, it may be useful to look first into the various types of leaders that have traditionally existed in the rural Malay communities.

VILLAGE ELDERS

One category of leaders that still enjoy some, though perhaps steadily reducing, significance in the three communities studied are the village elders. They are often referred to generally as *orang tua kampung*, which literally means 'village old men'. It is not too rare that in a nuclear family the father is referred to by his children as their 'old man'. The usage of the term is, however, often extended to mean particularly those elderly people within the bigger kinship and village units who are often regarded with respect. These elders often regard themselves as being head and shoulders above the rest in the village because they are more experienced and have accumulated greater wisdom with their increasing age. They express this superiority with the saying that they have 'tasted salt earlier' (*lebih dulu makan garam*).

The superiority or dominance of the elders is most commonly accepted in matters relating to the family and 'customs' (adat). Many villagers, even some elders themselves, admit that sometimes the elderly people do involve themselves in the family affairs of their young relatives. This is more frequent during an illness, death and other family crises, such as quarrels and divorces. There was a case of illness in Kangkong which may illustrate the point more clearly. A

man was coughing out blood and he was getting increasingly thinner every day. Some of his relatives believed he was poisoned, while others thought that his illness was caused by witchcraft. His brother was the only one who suspected him of suffering from tuberculosis and so insisted that he should be taken to a hospital for treatment. His father-in-law, however, suspected it was witchcraft and insisted that the hospital was not the proper place for treatment. He finally prevailed over the sick man's wife who was convinced that only a magician could handle the case. A few months later the man died, and although many of his relatives and fellow-villagers were greatly concerned, it was the father-in-law, together with some elderly people, who were most busy and they took a leading part in arranging for the burial and following that the holding of a small feast and tahlil.

In matters of family quarrels and divorce, especially between young couples, the elderly people quite often try to exert a sobering influence. They usually take the view that the young people are 'hot-headed' and thus need to be cooled down. Moreover, they have little experience of married life and they therefore need guidance and advice. Since they and the village at large consider that marriage is not merely a legal contract between two people but an important institution bringing families together, the elders consider it their bounden duty to lend a helping hand, especially in times of difficulties. There are, however, occasions when quarrels between husband and wife spread and cause strain among both families, or when the young couple refuse to allow elderly people to interfere with their lives.

Perhaps it is in marriage that the elders are most influential. This is because marriage is regarded as an important family affair and it also involves many traditional customs in which the elders are normally most well-versed and which they usually insist on being observed. So it is common for the elders to play an active role in marriages, particularly in preparation of and during the wedding ceremonies. The parents of both the bride and the groom never organize the occasion on their own. At the various stages of the marriage, the elders are deeply involved in customary practices such as the 'sounding out' (merisik), 'asking for the girl's hand' (meminang), 'sending of expenses' (hantaran belanja), 'solemnizing of marriage' (*nikah*)[1] and 'sitting in state' *(bersanding).*[2]

[1] This rite is often carried out by an accredited religious official. It is done in accordance with the Islamic requirement, with the official first asking the bride and then the groom if they agree to be husband and wife. Quite often the

There is no time period specified between one stage and the other, except for the 'solemnizing of marriage' and the 'sitting in state' which are more often than not held on the same day. What is of interest, however, is that at these different stages it is sometimes the same elders and sometimes different ones who play the more prominent roles. For the 'sounding out' elderly women relatives are usually sent. When the way is clear for the 'asking of the girl's hand', then the parents from the male side send their representatives, consisting normally of elderly couples, some of whom are their relatives while others are merely friends. During the 'sending of expenses' the same people may be sent again, but this time they are joined by many more who help to carry the items included in the 'expenses' (*hantaran*). During the 'solemnizing of marriage' (nikah) the official witnesses are often invited from among the elderly people present.

All preparations for the marriage day, such as the 'sitting in state' (bersanding) and the feast are planned long beforehand by the elders who have been invited by the bride's or groom's parents or guardians to help and act as their representatives. For instance, in Bagan, for the marriage between the children of two landlords from Parit Besar and Parit Bengkok referred to above (pp. 49-50), the bride's father called a meeting of a few relatives and friends. After serving them with some food, he asked them for their help, and such a request is never turned down. It was during this meeting that they agreed to divide the duties: some to prepare the dais for the 'sitting in state', some to organize the cooking of the food for the feast, some to supervise the erection of temporary huts or tents to house the guests, some to invite and receive guests, and so forth. In most cases these elders only supervise, for the harder work is done by the younger people, with the more laborious tasks often falling on the shoulders of those from the lower status positions.

Besides being more knowledgeable about certain customs, the elderly people in the villages also tend to be more religious. There is some tolerance towards young people who are more lax in their attitudes towards religion, but an old man will be subject to a lot of

---

bride is asked in the privacy of her room, but the rite is carried out with the groom in front of guests invited for the marriage. There are four official witnesses who must hear the acceptance of the marriage by the groom. When the rite comes to an end, it means that the marriage, from the point of view of the Islamic religion, has been contracted.

[2] It is customary for a newly-married couple to sit on a decorated dais built for the occasion so that they can be seen together by their relatives and other invited guests. During the bersanding they are regarded as 'king and queen for a day' (*raja sehari*).

cynicism, ridicule and even contempt if he shows himself to be somewhat frivolous and irresponsible, especially when he is considered to be already 'seven feet from the grave'. In other words, during old age a person is expected to 'repent' (*bertobat*), to fulfil all religious duties and 'perform good deeds' (*beramal*) in order to accumulate 'religious virtue' (*pahala*) which can serve as 'provisions' (*bekalan*) for the 'next world' (*dunia akhirat*). Because social sanctions are quite strong, it is not surprising therefore that as people grow older they become more religious. As such it frequently happens that during certain group prayers or tahlil which involve a small number of people and in which a religious functionary is not present, the 'old man' among them is often quietly persuaded to lead. However, in a bigger group where a religious functionary has been invited to lead in the tahlil, it is quite a common practice for him, before he starts to make a token gesture of request, though without much fuss or insistence, for some of the elderly people present to lead the group. Normally, the elders will politely refuse, and so the religious functionary proceeds with the performance of what is usually understood to be his role.

It is true that some villagers look upon the elders as the embodiment not only of experience, but also of tradition and religion at the village level. So when these elders assert their authority by insisting that they know better and have 'tasted salt earlier', there are always those who are ready to acquiesce. On the other hand, there are also groups among the villagers, particularly the younger and more educated, who may feel indignant over such insistence by the elders. For instance, a young teacher made a striking remark when he said, 'Why bother about salt? Nowadays people are taking "ajinomoto".' He was of course referring to a Japanese imported product consisting of mono-sodium glutamate which, besides serving as salt, also gives an additional flavour said to be derived from vegetable and meat extracts. Being a new product and a little costly, it is rarely used by the villagers. What is striking about this remark is that it expresses the need to have a different set of criteria upon which respect and authority can be based. Although this is a new trend, the elderly people as seen in the three areas nevertheless still play quite a prominent role in certain fields.

However certain changes now seeping into the villages are slowly eroding the influence of the village elders. While most of the elders have not been to school, or at most have studied between two to four years, an increasing number of young people have enjoyed the benefit of formal education, even if it is mainly confined to the primary

level. They read newspapers and visit the towns more often, and so, in contrast to the elders who jealously guard the 'village ways' (*cara kampung*) and try to resist the new influences which tend to undermine their position, the young people are more exposed to some of them. A number of youths imbued with the spirit of change tend to disregard the old people, or even make fun of them behind their backs. They also become involved with new activities through different kinds of organizations, such as youth clubs, political parties etc., and they look up to new qualities to respect. A few of them may also become active in some of these organizations and become leaders themselves, with a following of their own.

All these developments create a situation favouring the rejection of old ideas and values, as can be seen from the following instances. Firstly a growing number of young people not only choose their own spouses, but also believe that their family affairs are their own. So, even well-meaning concern on the part of the elders in their family affairs may sometimes be looked upon as an unwelcome interference on the part of the latter. Secondly, some elders arrogate to themselves the role of guardians of traditional customs, such as those concerning marriage. The seriousness with which they look upon the adat may be perceived from the oft-quoted saying 'Let the child die but not the customs' (*Biar mati anak jangan mati adat*). As mentioned previously, the elders, according to the 'customs', have prominent roles to play. Among some of the young and educated people, certain customs are regarded as wasteful and a hindrance to progress. They consider the future of their children as being more important than the 'customs', and so they occasionally reverse the saying into 'Let the "customs" die but not the child'. Attitudes such as this, and the undermining of the 'customs' by modern changes tend to weaken the position of the elders. In fact, when their involvement is not welcome in the family affairs of their younger relatives, then even their importance within the kinship group is diminished.

Nevertheless, in the three areas studied, there are still a few elders who hold prominent roles and have influence, not only among their kinsmen but also upon a large section of the village communities. An examination of their backgrounds will show whether the basis of their influence lies entirely in age, or age together with some other factors.

In Kangkong there are two persons, both well over 60 years of age, and one is respected and influential in Kuala Kangkong while the other is in Permatang Kangkong. Both have many relatives, and in

fact their lineages represent the main ones in their own respective villages. The former is a haji and used to be a religious teacher as well as an imam (prayer leader) of the local mosque. For a long time he enjoyed high prestige. He was believed to have supernatural powers and could cure illnesses by using verses from the Quran. However, of late, some villagers have grown sceptical towards him. This began soon after he was finally persuaded by two Chinese merchants from nearby Alor Star town who had heard of his supernatural powers, to indulge in forecasting the possible winning numbers in the 'three digit' (*tikam ekor*), which is a form of betting based on a lottery drawn after the horse races. Although it is explained that he stopped after two or three occasions, he has never recovered his old prestige. As for the latter, he was a penghulu in the mukim and is also a haji. He is still influential among his relatives and neighbours although not as popular as he used to be among the others. This is due mainly to his relationship with the present penghulu who is his son-in-law, and as will be further explained, is disliked by a segment of the people in Kangkong.

In Kerdau there is an old man, over seventy years of age, who is held in high regard not only by his relatives and neighbours, but also by those outside that particular group. He was the previous penghulu in the area, and is now an imam of a prayer house. Many villagers point him out as an example of an old man who has become increasingly respected with age. He is a devout Muslim, helpful to people in trouble and modest in nature. There is yet another old man who is both a landlord and a shopkeeper and also an imam of a prayer house. Although quite well-respected for his age and religious role, he is not popular because both as landlord and shopkeeper he is regarded as a mean character. In Bagan, there is an old man of over seventy also, who has many followers despite the fact that he has no formal education at all, owns hardly any land and is not even a haji. However, he is known to be intelligent, a persuasive speaker and usually a prompt helper during illness, death and such like. He is liked by the younger people, not only because of his light-heartedness, but also because he is not conservative in outlook and is willing to understand them. There is another person who is a haji and owns a great deal of land. Although he has been acting as chairman of a school committee, he is only tolerated—probably because of his money—and not much respected. Some people consider him to be proud and quarrelsome and one of them said that 'he does not behave like an old man'.

The examples above show that there are other factors besides age

which determine a person's influence, for instance, his former and present roles, his wealth and some personal qualities. There are in fact many old people in the villages but most of them do not play leading roles, except in some matters relating to marriage and the family; and even in these they are declining in importance. Those who are held in esteem and hold important positions in the village are often able to exercise influence, but they do so in an informal way. There is no such body as a formally instituted 'council' of elders. The elders may be approached for help and advice, or they may themselves initiate the giving of this to their relatives and neighbours in trouble, but this is done on a very informal basis and at a very personal level.

RELIGIOUS FUNCTIONARIES

It has been shown that some elders in these communities also play certain roles in religion, for instance as prayer leaders. Actually, leading roles in religion are normally held by specialists in the field who act in various capacities. By religion here is meant both Islam and the traditional belief system, and it follows therefore that there are also religious functionaries who play leading roles in the Islamic and traditional religions. Among the religious functionaries, besides those who specialize in either the practices of Islam or traditional beliefs, there are also others who combine their roles in both fields. The people who play leading roles in Islam are mainly the religious persons who are known by various names, such as imam, *lebai,* and *ustaz,* while those who play leading roles in traditional beliefs are known as *pawang* and *bomoh.* Their roles will be explained subsequently.

Among the villagers the most important criterion used for assessing whether a person is a good Muslim is whether or not he carries out the Islamic rituals. The majority of the villagers observe at least the daily prayers, the month-long fast during the month of Ramadhan and the payment of annual tithes (*zakat fitrah*) following the fasting month. Although as part of the Five Pillars of Islam they are considered to be obligatory, yet there are those who do not perform them, or perform them only irregularly. The social sanction on fasting seems to be more severe than that on praying. Not only is a person normally more strict with himself on fasting than praying, but also the attitude of the public and the religious authorities towards those who do not fast is more stern than to those who do not pray. For example, officials of the religious departments and also

police officers are empowered to arrest and prosecute Muslims who are seen eating or drinking during the fasting month, but there is nothing similar that can be done to those who do not attend Friday prayers, and what is more those who do not perform the daily prayers. In spite of this, fasting is less strictly observed by the young than the old, especially the former who have undergone an English education and are without a firm religious foundation.

In fact, those who pray and fast during the times specified by Islam as 'compulsory' (wajib), and who in addition also observe the prayers and the fasts which are categorized as only 'commendable' (sunat), are regarded as highly religious and they earn the respect of the villagers. If they have also gone on a pilgrimage and have therefore become hajis, they often rise further in status. There are many religious persons of this type in the three areas studied. They can easily be distinguished from other villagers for they normally wear white caps daily—even at home—and during Friday congregations, religious festivals (e.g. the *Id* to mark the end of the fasting month and that which commemorates the pilgrimage), or other auspicious occasions, such as the attending of marriage feasts. Some put on the cap of the haji, even though they may not have gone to Mecca. Those who have, including the imam, wear the loose frock-like dress (*jubah*) in addition to the cap during important functions. They also hold a rosary in their hands. All these are symbols that make them appear to be and recognized as being religious.

Among the broad categories of religious men, the most important one is the imam. There are two types of imam, one for the mosque and the other for the prayer house. As explained earlier the mosque is a more important institution for worship than the prayer house, and it is only in the mosque that the Friday prayers are held. Further, the imam of the mosque is an official appointed by the Government religious department, and is therefore a member of the religious hierarchy, while the imam of the prayer house is the choice of its members, especially the more respected ones, and is not absorbed into the same hierarchy. The mosque imam have to face certain qualifying examinations in order to be initially appointed and later to be promoted, and it is often the case that they are more knowledgeable on the rules and laws of Islam than the imam of the prayer houses. All these factors contribute to making the mosque imam more highly regarded than the imam of the prayer house.

The most important function associated with the imam is that of a prayer leader. However, just as the mosque and the prayer house are not only used for group prayers but also for other purposes, such

as the giving of religious instruction and the holding of meetings to discuss religious and other village matters, so too the role of the imam is not confined solely to that of a prayer leader. Outside the mosque or prayer house, an imam may also be required to lead the tahlil associated with various types of rites, to say prayers at the end of religious as well as non-religious ceremonies, and also to give advice on matters pertaining to Islam. During marriages, some of the mosque imam are empowered by the religious department to solemnize and register them, and also to record divorces. Once a year, for the collection of the religious tithe (*fitrah*), he may be accredited as the chief collector or one of the 'collectors' (*amil*). He may also give regular instructions on certain fundamental aspects of the beliefs and practices of Islam.

The imam of the prayer houses and other religious people, such as the lebai and ustaz, do not lead the Friday prayers, although they may be invited to do so with other group prayers when the mosque imam is not present. They do not have the power to solemnize marriages, although they are often invited to be official witnesses. However, some of them give instruction on Islam in the mosque, prayer houses or in their own homes. It is these people who give such instruction who are normally termed by the villagers as ustaz. Some of them are also teachers in schools, such as the pondok school in Kangkong, the Arabic school in Kerdau and the religious school in Bagan, all of which give instruction on Islam. The lebai is regarded merely as a religious person, without having any specialized functions. In fact, the term 'lebai' itself is used generally for religious persons other than the imam and ustaz. Some of them teach the children to read the Quran in their homes.

The functions of these religious persons are mainly spiritual, being concerned with purifying the soul, so that it will not suffer in the after-world. For themselves, they are able to do this by 'fearing God and performing His bidding', and for others, they lead in certain rituals that need to be carried out within the community and also teach the fundamentals of the doctrines and practices of Islam. Thus they are more than just pious followers for they are also quite conscientious perpetrators of Islam at the village level. Most of them fulfil their functions 'for God' (*kerana Allah*) and not for money although occasionally some receive presents and alms for their services to others. Only the imam of the mosque and some religious teachers earn regular salaries from the Government.

As regards the main functionaries in the traditional belief system, they are known as the bomoh and the pawang. In fact, these

terms do not refer to two different types of functionaries but they can be used interchangeably to refer to the same kind, the only difference being that in some areas pawang is more widely used and vice versa. Firth in his study of the Kelantan fishermen calls the bomoh 'spirit-medium healer' (Firth, 1966: 13). Perhaps his rendering of the term may be acceptable, subject to certain qualifications. It is true that the bomoh or pawang is in most cases a spirit-medium, but healing is only one of his functions, albeit the most important one. Associated with the power to heal is the power to cause affliction in the body or the heart of others; in other words the bomoh or pawang can also practise sorcery. Some of them may also act as diviners, specializing particularly in the prediction of the future and the tracing of lost or stolen property. The powers of sorcery and sometimes divination are ancillary to their curative powers. Finally, the bomoh or the pawang very often act as leaders or main performers of several rites associated with protective and productive activities such as have been described above. Most of these rites are waning; in fact they have even disappeared in some areas so that these traditional religious functionaries are left mainly with the work of healing. Although mainly a healer, they may possess many-faceted powers and functions. It may be more appropriate to consider the pawang and the bomoh simply as magicians as most of them derive their powers from spiritual sources.

In the three areas studied there are four persons who function as magicians: one in Kangkong, who specializes mainly in the healing of the sick and the tracing of lost property; one in Bagan who is known for his sorcery, healing and divining abilities; and two from Kerdau, one practising as a sorcerer, healer and diviner and the other one as a healer. All four of them also perform rites connected with protective and productive activities. They operate primarily within their village and among their neighbours, but the one from Bagan and one of the two from Kerdau operate in the villages as well although their activities are confined to the mukim.

The stories of how these magicians first obtained their skills are quite varied. The one from Bagan said that it took him a long time to become a magician. According to him, he was an apprentice to a famous magician in Java and after a considerable period he was asked to go away and to spend some time in a mountain cave as a hermit. One night, in a dream, an old man with a flowing white beard came before him, and this apparition told him that he had already obtained the necessary knowledge to practise as a magician. When he came out of his hermitage, he followed his teacher for some

time after which the latter told him to go away and practise on his own. In contrast to this, two persons, one from Kangkong and the other from Kerdau, obtained their skill simply from their parents, who practised magic and whom they used to follow as assistants. They observed the different rites which were carried out, and learnt the various incantations. The one from Kerdau was able to practise on his own when his father was still alive, while the other started only a few years after the death of his father. As for the remaining one from Kerdau, he was neither an apprentice nor an assistant in the ways described above. It all started one day when he was possessed by a spirit, and spoke in a language that the villagers did not understand. From that day onwards he began to practise as a healer and also performed rites for both protective and productive purposes.

Besides these magicians, there are also others who are religious men, who act as healers and diviners. In the three areas studied, there are three persons, one from each area, who are the most prominent. The one from Kangkong is the elderly ex-imam, mentioned earlier as the person involved in the 'three digit' forecast. He is a healer as well as diviner. The one in Kerdau is the elderly ex-penghulu who is now an imam of the prayer house near his home; he functions primarily as a healer. As for the one in Bagan, he is an ex-teacher of a religious school and occasionally teaches Quran-reading to the young children of his neighbours. He is a healer, but is also sought after at times to trace lost or stolen property. All three claim that they depend entirely on the supernatural powers derived from the verses of the Quran: the incantations that they recite over drinking water to cure illnesses, and the inscriptions used in 'amulets' (*tangkal*) to drive away diseases and spirits from the persons who put them on. Two of them say they are helped by jinns of the Muslim kind. It is clear therefore that these people derive their magical powers not from the traditional magic but from Islam. As a result of this, and also the fact that they are considered to be religious men, they are rarely viewed disapprovingly, unless of course they start involving themselves in practices such as gambling which are forbidden by Islam.

Attitudes towards the magicians differ. The religious men—especially the mosque imam—tend to look down upon the magicians as individuals indulging in 'practices opposed to Islam'. Quite often these magicians are at pains to explain that they submit themselves to the power and will of God and to stress that by helping people in trouble or in pain, they are in fact giving their services 'for God'. They have never challenged the authority of the religious men who

symbolize Islam at the village level and because of this they often respect the imam. Thus, the relationship between the religious men—the imam in particular—and the magicians is rather asymmetrical. The position of the imam is buttressed by his role within the hierarchy of Islam, which enjoys special status as the official religion of the country, while that of the pawang or the bomoh is considerably weakened by the disapproving attitude of the official religious authorities towards traditional magic, as will be explained presently.

The positions of the various religious functionaries depend a great deal on the general views of people on traditional beliefs and Islam. The traditional beliefs are fairly deeply rooted in the culture of the rural people who still have faith in the magicians. However there are two factors that tend to undermine the positions of traditional magic and magicians, namely, Islam and modernization.

As early as the turn of the century, modernists have tried to combat what they term as 'nonsensical beliefs' (*kepercayaan karut*) and they argued that beliefs in the supernatural other than God is anti-Islamic. However they were not effective and could not get the support of the religious departments and their officials whom they accused of being too conservative and also of perpetrating outdated 'innovations' (*bida'ah*) that are not consistent with the true form of Islam as upheld by the Quran and *hadith* (traditions). Nevertheless the religious departments and the officials, perhaps in their anxiety to prove themselves as the custodians of Islam, slowly made their voices heard against the 'non-Islamic practices', especially through the Friday sermons. However, they focused their attack mainly on the *puja pantai*, a ceremony popularly carried out by fishermen in the East coast of the country, mainly in the state of Kelantan, before the fishing season. A white buffalo is often sacrificed and then allowed to float into the sea to appease the sea spirits. After the War, several articles appeared, particularly in a daily Malay newspaper, the *Utusan Melayu*, condemning the ceremony as wasteful, besides being non-Islamic in nature. Then in the 1950s the political party PAS which is Islamic in orientation also came out against it. When the party captured power in the state of Kelantan in 1959, it banned the ceremony, and since then it has never been known to be practised. This action had an effect on several religious departments in the other states and they were encouraged to take a more determined stand against similar ceremonies. In the three areas studied, in Bagan especially, the rites associated with productive activities exist mainly in the memory of old people. In Kerdau, the productive rites are still practised by a few, but the last known preventive

rite was carried out in 1962. However, the rites that are associated with curative activities are still practised by magicians in the three areas.

The weakening or the disappearance of these rites has also been due to the process of modernization. Economic, technological and educational changes that are seeping into the rural society are slowly weakening some of the bases on which magic thrives. Looking at the three areas, it is seen that in Kangkong, where the main economic activity is rice-growing, traditional magic prevails to some extent in both economic production and medicine, although in the former it is confined only to rice and not to the rubber economy, while in Bagan, it remains almost entirely in medicine and is no longer apparent in the economic field of rubber production. In fact, in so far as the economy is concerned, there are hardly any magical practices associated with rubber in the whole country. Unlike rice, which is a crop closely linked with the traditional Malay way of life, rubber is a modern crop which came together with the spread of the money economy. The output of rubber is not as vulnerable to factors beyond the control of a peasant's knowledge and technology, like droughts, pests and diseases as is rice. There is a tradition of magic, associated with rice production, which peasants resort to in order to overcome natural difficulties but this, however, does not exist in the case of rubber.

Although certain rites have disappeared, it does not mean that the magicians have lost their roles in Malay society. It is true that the use of machines, fertilizers, insecticides, pills, injections and clinics has spread into some of the remotest villages. These have not, however, wiped out the magicians; they only supply the villagers with alternative means of solving their problems. There are times when the villagers combine the use of supernatural powers and science, but there are also other times when, as an 'attempt' (ikhtiar), they may turn to science after having failed with supernatural powers or vice versa. The spread of literacy and education has made some people sceptical of traditional magic and Islam. But most of them do not disbelieve totally in ghosts and spirits or in God. At times of great crises, there is in fact the tendency for them to revert to Islam and traditional beliefs. This was seen very clearly after the communal clashes referred to as the 'May Thirteenth Incident'. There was a sudden upsurge in the faith towards Islam and magic. Several magicians who suddenly came to the fore claimed the power to make people invincible, and the Malays from different walks of life and educational backgrounds began to turn to them. They have to participate in rituals, undergo

certain tests, and also to perform the daily prayers regularly, for failure to do so will destroy their invincibility.

The influence of Islam is very strong among the rural people. Where Islam is strongly ensconced, and among groups that are religiously orientated, religious persons have a high standing in the public eye. In the three areas studied there are varying attitudes towards Islam not only in the different areas, but also among certain categories of people within the same area. Comparing the three, the impression gathered is that the people in Kangkong are generally more religious or at least more conscious about religion than those in Bagan, while the latter are generally more knowledgeable in Islam than the people in Kerdau.

Kangkong is in Kedah, and like the other padi-based states of Perlis and Kelantan which are also more predominantly settled by the Malays, the influence of modernization is least felt there. Islam enjoys a strong position and a large number of people who study religion, for instance in the Middle-Eastern countries, are from these areas. Also, the centres of pondok education are located here. Although Kangkong is only about ten miles away from Alor Star and about sixty miles from Penang, it has been relatively isolated for a long time. Until the road linking it with the state capital was opened in the late 1950s, very few people have really gone outside the village. There is a rather strong pondok school nearby and a good number of people have received their education there. Furthermore, the teachers in Kangkong have regularly been giving lessons on Islam in the local mosque. Above all, the elders of the most important lineage in Kangkong are religious men who have studied outside the village, some of them in the Middle East.

As for Bagan, though still essentially an agricultural area and based almost entirely on a cash economy, it is relatively accessible to Batu Pahat town about six miles away and Muar about twenty-eight miles away. Yet, when compared with Kerdau which besides rubber-growing depends on padi farming, and whose road communications linking it with the towns of Temerloh and Mentakab—both about eight miles away and dating only from 1959—it is found that the people in Bagan generally feel more committed to Islam than those in Kerdau. There seems to be two main reasons for this. Firstly, in Bagan, as in the rest of Johore, religious education has been relatively well-organized for a long time. The Malay schools, which function in the morning, are converted in the afternoon into religious schools. Education is free, and schools and teachers are maintained by the Government. Almost all the children go to religious schools for up to

six years, thus giving them some knowledge of Islam. Secondly, after World War II, there was an eruption of communal clashes in several parts of the country and Batu Pahat was one of the badly hit areas (Burridge, 1957). Bagan also experienced some clashes between the Malays and the Chinese. One of the effects of these clashes was that people began to turn more intensely to religion for identification as well as protection, just as many people have done after the May Thirteenth Incident. This intensity of feeling towards Islam is not apparent in Kerdau. Also, here as in the rest of Pahang generally, the system of religious education is not as widespread or well-organized. There is an Arabic school, but school-going children have to choose between this and the secular vernacular schools since all of them are held in the morning. Only a small number choose to go to the Arabic school.

Between the young and the old in each area there are also some perceivable differences in the way religion is generally regarded. Proportionately more young people are sceptical about magic and they are also more indifferent towards Islam than the older people. There is a tendency for some of these young people to ridicule some of the religious functionaries. A number of them seldom pray and sometimes they quite openly stay away from Friday congregations. There are also those who ignore rebukes and use the mosque or prayer house verandahs occasionally for playing cards. It is certain that new values and attitudes are influencing them. This being the case, it becomes more noticeable that among them religion is not considered a very important factor in determining leadership. Only those religious persons who are known to have some exceptional qualities and whose abilities extend beyond religion are looked up to and are given leading positions either in some communities or organizations. Otherwise the religious men will be confined only to carrying out the limited religious functions that may be required of them.

THE PENGHULU AND HEADMAN

It was indicated earlier that the term 'ketua' for 'leader' may also refer to the 'headman' (see Chapter I); and at the rural level, the most common name used for the village headman is 'ketua kampung'. He can be the headman of only one village or of a number of villages. There are in fact several other terms applied to village headmen; these are the result of language and dialect differences in the various areas and may reflect ethnic variations. For instance, while he is known as ketua kampung in Bagan and Kangkong, he is referred to in Kerdau as *tok empat*, a term that is quite commonly used among

communities of Minangkabau origin. There are other terms used elsewhere, for example, *sidang* among some communities of Javanese origin in Selangor and penghulu in Kelantan. In the subsequent discussion only the term 'ketua kampung' will be used to refer to the village headman, irrespective of whatever term is used within a particular locality.

Traditionally, the position of the village headman is passed on from father to son. If a headman vacates the position, due to death or illness, without having a son who is old enough or sufficiently fit to succeed him, then his position may be passed on to his brother. A person is considered old enough when he already 'has a responsibility as a married man' or is 'of marriageable age' and fit enough if he does not suffer from any physical or mental weakness that may prevent him from carrying out his functions as a headman, or if he is not thought of as someone who 'often goes against customs and religion'. In the event of there being no son or brother who is old or fit enough to succeed him, then the position may be passed on to a close relative of the ex-headman, normally on the paternal side or to someone who is considered to have a 'headman's blood'. It is the elders, religious men and other people with status in the village who determine the choice through 'consultations' (*perundingan*) with one another. The position of any successor is fully legitimized when he receives a letter of authority (*surat tauliah*) from the Sultan or an official empowered to do so by the Sultan.

This traditional process which is primarily hereditary is now slowly giving way to a new method of election. In the 1950s the democratic or elective process was slowly introduced into the country, and by 1955, elections were held to elect a number of members into the Federal and State Legislatures. Also around the same time, it was felt that the villagers ought to have a say in determining the choice of their own headman through an election. However there was no sudden change in the method of election and the headmen who inherited their positions maintained their offices. What happened was that whenever a headman died or retired, his successor was to be determined by the elective rather than the hereditary method. At the beginning the election was rather restricted and quite disorganized. Only the men were allowed to vote, and voting took place by a show of hands in the local mosque, usually after a Friday congregation. Later, the franchise was given to all members of the village over eighteen years of age, and the secret ballot was used.

What often happens is that when a post falls vacant, the local penghulu reports the matter to the District Officer (DO) who has

jurisdiction over the village. Then the DO puts up a notice inviting applications from those who wish to stand and the list of applications is examined by the former with the help of the penghulu. Only the names of those who meet certain requirements such as the ability to read and write, a fair knowledge of the fundamentals of Islam and residency in the village are acceptable as candidates. A date is fixed for voting; ballot boxes are placed at the mosque or prayer house and near the penghulu's office or house, and the whole election is supervised by the Assistant DO with the help of the penghulu. The winner in the election is declared by the ADO on the same day but his position as headman is only confirmed after he receives an authority letter, not from the Sultan as in the past, but from the District Officer.

As the change from the hereditary to the elective method is gradual, the present incumbents of the offices of headmen may have either inherited their positions or have been elected into them. In Kangkong two out of three, in Kerdau two out of four, and in Bagan one out of two of the present headmen inherited their positions—either from their fathers or brothers. As for the rest, they have been elected by the villagers, although their own fathers acquired the positions through the traditional hereditary process.[1]

In the past the headman was regarded as a representative of the ruler. He would collect taxes or mobilize labour through the system of corvée *(kerah)* for his immediate chief or ruler as requested (cf. Gullick, 1965). Today, among those who acquired their positions in the traditional way, the link with the ruler is only symbolic—through the letter of authority. Some of them take pride in this symbol; three of them in the areas studied have these letters beautifully framed and hung on the walls of their homes. For those who have been elected, even the symbolic link has ceased to exist. Although he receives his letter of authority from the DO who is head of the Administration in the district, this does not make him a member of the bureaucracy. The elected village headman is not a government servant and does not receive any salary. However, like all other headmen including those who inherited their positions, he receives a nominal 'bicycle allowance' which varies from state to state and is between M$120 to M$480 a year.

While the headmen who inherited their positions can only be removed with the agreement of the ruler, those who are newly elected

[1] Of late the method of appointment has been introduced. The headman is appointed by the District Officer on the recommendation of the penghulu but such an appointment is made only after the *Mentri Besar* has given his consent.

can easily be dismissed by the DO without referring to the villagers who have elected them. The shame more than the fear of dismissal and the small advantage in the nominal allowance are probably the main factors which induce the elected headman to serve the Administration more than his counterpart who is appointed by the ruler. On the other hand, an association with the Administration provides a headman not only with added status but also powerful support to buttress his own authority. Therefore there are generally more reasons for most of the headmen to maintain a harmonious relationship with the Administration rather than a conflicting one. The common practice is that the headman does not deal with the Administration directly, for he has to go through the penghulu. He is looked upon by the Administration and by the people as being subordinate to the penghulu.

The penghulu, except in Kelantan, is head of the mukim which, as has already been explained, is the smallest territorial unit in the Administration. Since the term means village headman in Kelantan, there is therefore a different name for the head of the mukim, i.e. *penggawa.*[1] The term 'penghulu' seems to be uniformly used in the whole country and the Kelantan usage is the only variation. In the past the penghulu, like the village headman, was part of the traditional political hierarchy, and under the patronage of the territorial chief and/or Sultan. But with the development of the bureaucracy, following the establishment of British rule from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, he has now been transformed into the smallest cog of the new administrative machinery. He is directly responsible to the DO and through him to the Government.

Being part of the Administration, the penghulu is in receipt of a monthly salary with an annual increment, and promotion in his grade depends on his general work performance as well as the passing of examinations. Although in some areas such as Perak and Perlis he may be transferred from one mukim to another within the same state, the penghulu of Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan have all the time been within the same administrative unit. The one in Bagan, however, has been given the responsibility of an additional mukim—Peserai, which is adjacent to Bagan—ever since its penghulu passed away. There has been some talk, in fact, that the units be merged and managed under just one head. As a government servant, he is com-

[1] In Kelantan the area over which a penggawa has jurisdiction is actually called a *daerah* (district) and not a mukim as in the other states. However, the equivalent of a daerah in Kelantan is the mukim in the other states, whereas what is known as daerah in the other states is called jajahan in Kelantan.

pletely subject to the rules and regulations that normally affect other employees in the public services. Not only can the Government transfer him, and alter the area over which he has jurisdiction, but it also has the power to dismiss him.

The methods of recruitment of penghulu are still not uniform and are even more complicated than those for the headmen. In addition to the hereditary and elective methods, there is also the selective method, and all three now exist side by side, sometimes within the same district or state. The hereditary method is traditional, and as in the case of the headman, a penghulu may inherit his position from his father, brother or relative. All the penghulu who held office before the present ones in Kangkong, Kerdau and Bagan inherited their positions from their fathers. However, in the case of the present incumbents there are variations: the penghulu in Kangkong and Bagan were elected while their counterpart in Kerdau was first elected as an assistant penghulu and then succeeded his retiring superior by undergoing the process of bureaucratic selection. Today, the present holder of the position in Kerdau has an assistant who was selected from a number of applicants. Although in Bagan there is also the post of a deputy penghulu, it has not been filled since early 1950s, and in Kangkong, the position *panglima* (literally 'warrior') who used to assist the penghulu has been abolished.

The method of election of a penghulu was introduced about the same time as that of the headmen. In Johore it is still in practice, but in Kedah the state government decided that all 'succession' to any vacancy after 1965 would be determined by selection, a method that was enforced in Pahang as from 1961. This method is not at all new because it has long been practised in Perlis and Perak, and in the case of the latter it started almost with the beginning of the new administration in the state. Today, the trend all over the country is certainly towards the replacement of the hereditary and election methods by that of selection. The hereditary and election methods are seen especially by the Government as being inconsistent with the normal method of recruitment for all public servants. It is to rectify this that in almost all states the penghulu are beginning to be selected like all other government servants.

By whatever method the position of the penghulu is determined, he is absorbed into the Administration, and given a letter of authority signed by the State Secretary who is head of the Administration in the state. The penghulu is the most important statutory authority at the village level. His duties, as spelt out by the Administration, are quite numerous. He acts according to instructions from above, and

sometimes on his own initiative. He represents the Administration in the village and also acts as a channel from the grass roots level to the Administration above. As a representative of the Administration, he deals with regular as well as irregular matters. The main regular matters form a part of his administrative, religious and judicial duties.

Perhaps the area of duties which occupies the penghulu most is connected with land administration and rural development. The former involves the registration of titles, collection of revenue and settlement of land disputes. However he does not deal with these directly. There is a section in the District Office headed by an ADO which deals mainly with land matters. It is this department that actually handles most of the work, and what the penghulu does is to render assistance of a peripheral nature when needed.

In the first place, when the time for paying land revenue falls due, he often reminds the villagers under his jurisdiction by making announcements after Friday congregation and putting up notices in coffee shops, mosques and community halls. In most cases the villagers go to the Land Office themselves in order to settle debts. Occasionally, when some villagers continue to fail in their payment, in spite of warnings, then the penghulu may have the unpleasant task of delivering notification for auction of the land belonging to them. It is rarely that he accompanies the villagers for the payment of land revenue but he does so more often for the registration of land titles and settlement of land disputes. In these cases, the parties concerned have to see the officer-in-charge, and the presence of the penghulu helps the villagers who are more often than not full of trepidation when coming face to face with 'big officers' in the Government. On the other hand, there are also occasions when the ADO himself goes on his rounds to the various mukim. Before his visits he often informs the penghulu first, asking him to gather all who wish to make new title deeds or who want to settle disputes or small misunderstandings involving the division of property land. The penghulu tries to make sure that all the information is gathered, and the appropriate forms are completed, so that the ADO can be well-briefed before or on his visits.

As regards duties under the Rural Development Programme, these have recently been included in the other administrative work of the penghulu. The programme itself was introduced in Malaya in 1959. The projects to be carried out at national, state and district levels are planned and then compiled into 'Red Books' for the various levels. There is a Red Book for the whole country, and at the same time there is also one for each state and each district. At the planning

stage for the District Rural Development Programme, various departments like Agriculture, Drainage and Irrigation, Public Works, Co-operatives and so forth are asked to submit projects that can be carried out in the rural areas of the district. Besides that, various penghulu in the district are also consulted about projects that need to be carried out in their mukims. At the mukim level there is normally a Mukim Development Committee, headed by the penghulu, with local headmen and some of the leading figures in the mukim as members. This committee is meant to help the penghulu in selecting projects to be carried out under the programme, and also to take the initiative in organizing development work on their own. As will be seen later, most of the committees exist only in name, and the role of the penghulu in these bodies and in the carrying out of development work within the mukim is very limited indeed.

In the religious field, he is sometimes authorized as a collector (amil) or co-ordinator for a number of collectors within the mukim to collect the annual tithes (fitrah). In judicial matters he helps in the registration of births and deaths that occur in the mukim. He has the authority to arrest people suspected of a crime on condition that he gives them up to the police, and he can even sit in judgement on minor cases and impose sentences of not more than M$25. However these powers are very seldom exercised by the penghulu; in fact, no penghulu in Kangkong, Kerdau or Bagan has ever arrested or tried anyone during the period they have been in office.

Actually, the penghulu has become a means of contact for officers from all government departments who have to deal with the villagers. Most of these officers have to do with Co-operative, Agriculture, Welfare and Forestry Departments, which grew along with many others as a result of the development of the bureaucracy. These government servants live in the towns and spend most of their time in offices which are also centred there. They make visits only occasionally, and so do not have any permanent kind of relationship with the villagers. Furthermore, most of the villagers do not fully appreciate what the officials are trying to do. As a result of this, they do not have effective means of exercising their authority over the villagers, particularly when they are first posted in a new area. They are thus forced to depend considerably on the penghulu, especially at the beginning of their appointment in a given area. However, many of them still continue to be dependent on the penghulu for help after this initial stage.

It is a common practice, more often than not, that any government official who has to go to a village in the course of his duties sees

the penghulu first in order to ensure the right introduction into the village. After that, he may seek the help of the penghulu so that he can begin to perform his duty. In Kerdau there is an Agricultural Assistant who is posted there to advise the farmers on the use of fertilizers, good seeds and new techniques. He is quite a young boy and is new to the area. Therefore he depends very much on the penghulu to persuade people to come to his talks and observe his demonstrations. It is the same with a junior rubber instructor in Bagan who is posted there to advise on correct methods of tapping, replanting etc. In Kangkong, there is an officer from the State Welfare Department who annually organizes youth groups to help with the harvesting of padi. The initial planning is carried out between the officer, some youth leaders and the penghulu. Then there is the Co-operative Department, but although there is a Co-operative Society with its own committee in the area, the officer from the department who comes for his occasional visits seldom fails to meet the penghulu to discuss problems and seek assistance.

The penghulu usually has to co-operate with these officers because he is expected to do so in the course of his duties, and also because some of them may complain if he is not co-operative, and this can affect his prestige as well as his promotion prospects. At the same time, these officers have to respect the penghulu, because they realize fully that without his help it may become quite difficult for them to carry on their work in the mukim. This is especially so for those who have to deal with the villagers themselves.

Turning to irregular duties, these are usually performed by the penghulu whenever the need arises. When the Government needs something to be done or certain information to be conveyed to the villagers, and there is no machinery or personnel in existence to facilitate it, then the office of the penghulu is inevitably made use of. One example is when the country was involved in its confrontation with Indonesia at the beginning of 1963. During this period, which lasted for more than two years, a great deal of anti-Indonesian propaganda was issued by the Government. Several meetings of the penghulu were called at the District Offices where briefings were given by security officers. These penghulu not only helped to distribute propaganda sheets, but they also arranged and gave talks in mosques and community centres exhorting the people to support the Government. When the vigilante corps were organized, the penghulu were also responsible for organizing them at the village level. As in many other matters the penghulu are of course helped by their headmen. There may also be other government officials

who may work in conjunction with them as more government projects are organized.

Both the regular and irregular functions turn the penghulu very much into a middleman (Bailey, 1970: 167-76) serving mainly as an instrument for the government administration. He is alone in dealing with a rather large number of people in the mukim. As he cannot reach all of them on his own, he has therefore to depend on the help and support of his headmen to whom at times he has to delegate some of his duties. As noted earlier, the headman is not a member of the bureaucracy, and although he is regarded as being subordinate to the penghulu, he is not obliged to serve the latter on a straightforward legal-rational basis. However, the penghulu is an official representative of the Administration, and the headman has all the reason not to appear spiteful towards the Administration by being unco-operative to its representative. Added to this is the factor relating to traditional respect for authority which prevails quite strongly among the headmen and the penghulu, who after all are nominally the representatives of the ruler also. Some regard the obedience to a penghulu and the headman as being symbolic of the obedience due to the rulers. This point is stressed in Kedah, for instance, where it was stated in the letter of authority to the earlier headmen and penghulu, especially, that disobedience to them 'is tantamount to an act of treason to the ruler' (see Appendix III). It is true that such a statement does not appear in the appointment letters for the heads of villages or mukim who were elected or selected later. Nevertheless many headmen feel that it is in keeping with the 'customs' (adat) of loyalty and obedience to the ruler that they should be the first to help, support and even obey the penghulu.

In the three areas studied, there are examples of headmen who will not have anything to do with the penghulu, quite contrary to the normal practice. The reasons seem to stem from either the non-recognition of the legitimacy of the penghulu, the questionable personality and integrity of the penghulu, or from a conflict of political interests.

The first case occurs in Bagan. Here there is an old headman who inherited his position about forty years ago, and is very proud of the fact that he was given a letter of authority by the late Sultan himself. He upholds tradition fanatically, and will not recognize any headman or penghulu who acquires his position other than by traditional means. He maintains that the present penghulu has no right to be there because he was elected; he has no 'penghulu blood' and besides, his letter of authority is not signed by the Ruler. He therefore

withholds his co-operation from the penghulu, refusing to attend meetings called by him, and ignoring directives or instructions from above passed through the latter. The penghulu often has to by-pass him and as will be seen shortly, the headman's attitude eventually caused his own unpopularity.

The second case occurs in Kerdau. Here the penghulu was selected to succeed in office after having served as an assistant to his predecessor. Formerly he used to be hard-working and helpful, and went along quite easily with the headmen in the area. However, soon after being appointed, he started becoming complacent, and spends much of his time at the back of a coffee-shop, playing oakum with some of the local Chinese shopkeepers. For this reason, all the four headmen in the area feel that he is not behaving as befits a person of his position, and for this reason, most of the time they prefer to deal with his assistant who is much younger, more active and more conscientious.

The third case occurs in Kangkong where the main cause of differences can be traced to different political party affiliations. There are two political parties which seem to be equally strong in the area, the UMNO and PAS. While the penghulu has always been an active supporter of the former, one of the headman is a supporter of the latter. Their competition for a following climaxed during the Federal Election in 1964, turning them into bitter enemies. As a result, co-operation between them has been quite impossible.

The relationship between the penghulu and the headman can affect administration at the village level. The existence of conflicts between them can lead further to the polarization of support not only between the two, but also to non-co-operation and clashes between factions in the village. This has happened particularly in the case of Kangkong, where for some time a number of followers of the headman had refused to go to the mosque that the penghulu attends, and chose instead to go to another which is in an entirely different mukim. Once an incident occurred at a bridge which spans the stream near the place where most of the followers of the headman live; and this led to an accusation by the penghulu that there was an attempt to assault him. He took the unpopular step of reporting the matter to the police, and so his relationship with the headman and followers became more untenable.

In the case of Bagan, the unharmonious relationship between the old headman and the new penghulu had a different effect. Under the Rural Development Programme, the latter was obtaining red earth for most of the villages in the mukim to improve the existing muddy paths and tracks. While the material is provided by the Government,

each village under its own headman was supposed to organize work teams to make bunds from the earth dug out of the canals alongside, and then put the red earth over them. Most of the villages did this, but in the case of the old headman, he refused to organize anything in his village. Unfortunately, he had no means of getting the red earth on his own because he could not go directly to the DO or any member of the District Development Committee. Besides, the DO seldom entertains any request from a headman that goes above the head of his superior, the penghulu. As a result, a number of people in his village accused him of being a hindrance to a good job that was being done by the penghulu, and blamed him because the village canal remained dirty and the path muddy. Following this a petition against him was organized by a young landlord and sent to the DO.

Actually the duty of the headman is not merely to assist the penghulu, but he is also looked upon as a leader and expected by his villagers to provide some form of leadership. There is the kinship as well as the traditional basis for this, as can be observed in the manner in which he is addressed. The headman is often addressed by his followers and by others who are aware of his position as *tuk*, a short form of *datuk*. This term can either mean 'grandfather' or be the title of honour associated with a traditional chief. Thus within the kinship framework he may be looked upon as an elder, while within the traditional one he is considered as a chief. As for the villagers under the headman, they themselves as well as others—including the headmen—refer to the former as *anak buah*, a term which embraces children and relatives in its meaning. Again the term 'anak buah' applies not only to the children and relatives of any person, but also to the followers of a traditional chief. It is true that often the headman has quite a close kinship link with a number of people in his village, but he is no more a chief than a government servant. Nevertheless, whether young or old, acquiring his position by inheritance or election, he is still addressed as 'tuk'.[1]

There are also some headmen who are quite old, and are regarded as important elders, as are those who are religious and perform as imam in the local prayer house. At the same time there are also a few who become actively involved in party politics. There are villages in which almost all its members give undivided support to their own headmen. However, in cases where the village community is split for one reason or another, the headman does not have full control over

[1] Of course this has to be distinguished from the title 'Datuk', bestowed by the ruler as an honour, in the same way as 'Sir'—an ordinary term of address to someone we respect—is different from the title obtained through knighthood.

them. This not only makes it more difficult for him to carry out his duties as he is directed from above, but may also render him less effective as a leader.

The headman is not in any way a 'patron' (Wolf, 1966) who can deliver to the villagers what they need. Most of the time he has to go through the penghulu, who in turn has to go to the DO, who is merely an administrator himself. There is no guarantee therefore that any request made by the villagers through the headman as their spokesman, for land or a community hall, for instance, will be met. The penghulu himself, being more and more a government servant, and at the lowest rank at that, may be of no more help than a headman either. Furthermore, changes taking place which have brought forth new institutions and personnel related to the political parties, and the centre of power and influence at all levels, including the village, is gradually being shifted to them. Many headmen are becoming involved in the new party politics, partly in search of new patrons.

The headman is, however, not so free in his choice of the political party which he wishes to be involved in. There are certain procedures for ensuring that the headmen are active members of the ruling political group in the state. There is a committee headed by the DO (or just the DO himself), to short-list prospective candidates in the election for a headman. Some of these candidates are put up by political parties. Furthermore, the chief minister of the state, whose position is political in nature, or someone who is his political subordinate, can have a say in the names of those to be included in the final list. Since the Administration also prefers to deal with those who are easy to get on with, prospective 'trouble-makers' can then easily be eliminated. Among those who can be categorized as 'trouble-makers' are people who are known to be in opposition to the ruling party. This does not mean, however, that some of the headmen who hold different views are not elected at all because the villagers as the electorate may have different views from those of the Administration or the ruling party. Nevertheless, their chances of being elected will be reduced.

In addition, after their appointment, the headmen are often sent to training or civic courses, at which talks and lectures on the policies and achievements of the Government are given. In due course they tend to become committed to the Government and the Administration. In this way they become either very popular or very unpopular, depending on the nature of the political orientation of the villagers. Of course there are some who, because of their influence, can swing the support of the villagers from one political party to another, thus

making their own positions even stronger. Besides, there are those who tend to be respected by their anak buah, when they remain above the party political factions of the villagers. However, there are also those whose positions as headmen for the whole village become untenable when they align themselves with any particular faction in the villages that are torn by conflicts.

Like the headman, the penghulu is also addressed as 'datuk', and members of the administrative unit under his jurisdiction as his 'anak buah'. So there are both the kinship as well as the traditional framework through which he is regarded as holding a position of leadership. In the past, the group of people under a penghulu was relatively small and mainly related to him. By now, owing to the delineation of the new administrative unit, the migration of people from outside into that unit, and the natural rate of increase, the group under him has become not only bigger but also more heterogeneous. The penghulu is unable to know and to show an interest in the affairs of every individual, and at the same time, not everyone looks up to him in kinship terms. In the past also, he was regarded as the representative of the ruler or chief, and thus, although a member of the village community, he stood above the others as a result of his association with the ruler. He was regarded as the 'ruler's man' (*orang raja*) who derived his authority from that of the ruler. Today, his old ties with the ruler have shifted to the new link with the Administration, determined by his absorption into the bureaucracy. If this new link has turned him into a 'government man' (*orang kerajaan*) it does not mean that he acts only as an instrument of the Government, and has completely lost his role as the leader of his people.

The institution of penghulu has traditionally been looked upon by the villagers as one of leadership, and important as a unifying factor for their community. There are still many villagers who continue to regard him as their leader. Furthermore, the penghulu in the three areas studied were elected, and they became the choice of their people because they were considered at least by the majority to be 'good men', intelligent, helpful and capable of 'becoming a head'. Before being elected penghulu as in the case of those from Kangkong and Bagan, and assistant penghulu as in the case of the present penghulu of Kerdau, they were serving as 'strong men' (orang kuat) in many organizations, political as well as non-political. To mention just a few, the penghulu of Kangkong was chairman of the local school committee and secretary of the local UMNO branch; his counterpart from Kerdau was an active chairman of the local welfare body; and the one in Bagan was an imam of a prayer house and secretary of a

local UMNO branch. As a result of the traditional role of the penghulu associated in the minds of some of the villagers, and the backgrounds of the penghulu themselves, it is not surprising therefore that there are people who turn to them for counsel and leadership.

Being considered a leader who can be a unifying factor, the help of the penghulu is often sought as an arbitrator to assist in resolving conflicts among the villagers. It is true that attempts are always made to settle quarrels at the lowest possible level. For instance, quarrels among relatives are, as far as possible, settled with the help of some elders, and those among members of the same village by the headman himself. This is done in the spirit that difficulties should be overcome and conflicts should be resolved 'among ourselves' (*kita sama kita*) first. However, when problems or disputes are bigger, and involve especially people from different families or villages in the same mukim, then the services of the penghulu are usually welcome. This also depends, of course, on the attitudes of the people involved towards the penghulu and how he is generally regarded within his own administrative unit. In Kangkong, for instance, most of the followers of the headman who are opposed to the penghulu seldom go to him, but among his own followers his council and advice are sought and listened to. In Kerdau, although the penghulu does not enjoy very high prestige among the people, he is nevertheless approached to arbitrate in conflicts. It is in Bagan that the role of the penghulu as an arbitrator is more often seen because the people there have great respect for him.

The most common method used by the penghulu is to invite the conflicting parties to meet together in his house. He serves them light drinks and sweets, and over these they discuss their problems. It seems to be the normal practice for him to stress the virtues of goodwill and understanding, and to entreat the parties concerned not to cause rifts within the community. Actually the titbits served are to encourage, and if possible to symbolize that all parties have agreed to 'forgive and forget', in the same manner that feasts are sometimes held by some political leaders to bring together and resolve differences among conflicting factions. Where commitments are weak and no fundamental principles are at stake, the desire to maintain harmony and unity is overriding. Then the titbits and the feasts become meaningful. Otherwise, the parties involved may stay away, or attend and appear superficially amicable, while still retaining their old positions.

Besides being sought as an arbitrator, the penghulu is also expected by some of the villagers to try and do things for their benefit.

There are times when they expect him to protect them from some of the unpopular actions taken by the Administration. For instance, a poor peasant who has failed to pay up the annual land revenue after repeated warnings, and is going to have his land auctioned, may expect the penghulu to plead his case. There are also times when some of them expect the penghulu to apply for land on their behalf, or to have a community hall built for their area. These expectations arise out of the fact that the penghulu is regarded by some villagers as their representatives to the Administration. With the introduction of elections, some penghulu, like those in Kangkong and Bagan, become the choice of a major segment of the village community, or at least by the villagers who voted for them. In the sense that the penghulu is an expression of their choice, then he is always referred to by his close supporters, as 'our man' (*orang kita*) and they expect him to act in their interest. However, the moment he is elected, he is absorbed into the Administration, and they soon find him turning into a spokesman who delivers the notification for the auctioning of land, and voices the wishes of the Administration more than those of the voters. When he takes his job too seriously and acts more and more as an instrument of the Government, they begin to have doubts about him and he is considered as a 'government man' (orang kerajaan).

The penghulu, especially the elected ones, are in a constant dilemma. Since they are popularly elected they feel obliged to and sometimes under demand to act in the interests of the villagers. Yet they are in receipt of a salary from the Government, and are consequently obliged and expected to serve it in the most efficient way. As elsewhere, there are times when the interests of the government conflict with those of the villagers. Therefore, the position of the penghulu may be said to be 'inter-hierarchical' (Gluckman, 1970). As the penghulu becomes more and more absorbed into the state machinery, his relationship with the villagers becomes increasingly impersonal. This is especially so in the case of those whose positions are filled by selection rather than by election. They may be posted to a mukim not of their own origin, and they may also be transferred from place to place. Although the penghulu of Kerdau and his assistant were bureaucratically selected, they are not regarded as being alien to the villagers. This is mainly because they were brought up in the area and have all the time been serving in the same place. Thus their personal relationship with the villagers is quite good.

Being a 'government man' does not, however, automatically put all penghulu in an antagonistic position with the villagers. For instance, the penghulu of Bagan and his counterpart in Kangkong were

active in UMNO, but they still have a number of strong supporters. As will be discussed further in Chapter VI, the people in Bagan are solidly behind UMNO, while those in Kangkong are split mainly between UMNO and PAS. These people also elect their representatives to the State and Federal Governments. Since the Federal Government and the State Governments in Kedah (where Kangkong is situated) and in Johore (where Bagan is) are formed by the Alliance (in which UMNO is the main component), the UMNO members and supporters in Kangkong and Bagan also look at these governments as 'our government' (*kerajaan kita*). Whereas almost all in Bagan view their penghulu as 'our man' serving 'our government', about half of those in Kangkong view their penghulu in the same way, while the other half look at him as a 'government man' in the service of a ruling body that is not 'our government'. In the case of the penghulu of Kerdau, because he is selected and the people in the area are divided between those who support UMNO, which controls the State Government, and those who support other parties, he is often viewed as a 'government man' in the service of what may be to some as 'our government' or to others as 'not our government'.

The point that is being made here is that the attitude of the villagers towards the penghulu as a leader may be determined by the nature of his role as well as by his own affiliations and those of the villagers to party politics. These factors have to be taken into account in relation to his own merits as a leader, and his ability to balance between his obligations to the government and those to his anak buah. However, it is impossible for him to do this all the time. When the crunch comes, he will have to consider his 'pot of rice' (*periuk nasi*) and serve the 'government', which means the Administration or the ruling party or both. In such a situation he becomes no more than just a 'government servant'. As a result, the villagers begin to turn to other types of leadership, and this is when political party leadership becomes more relevant.

VI The 'New' Leaders

THIS chapter will attempt to examine new types of leadership that have emerged within the rural communities. The previous chapter was concerned mainly with the people who play leading roles within the framework of traditional institutions. Many of them—particularly the penghulu who has been absorbed into the modern type of bureaucracy—have been affected by these changes. While there is the process of the traditional being modernized, there has also been the development of new activities and institutions. As described earlier (see Chapter II), the rise of nationalism in Malaya saw the formation of several political parties at the national level. These political associations are actually foreign in origin and have no roots in the traditional social structure, but they have however spread, and through them new types of leadership, quite easily distinguished from the 'old' or traditional ones, have come into being in the rural communities. The question is: are the leaders who acquire power in these associations also new? Before attempting to answer this question, it may be useful to look briefly into the parties involved.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

The UMNO undoubtedly has the greatest number of branches in the rural areas and they cover all the states. There are local UMNO branches in the three areas studied. After the Emergency began in 1948 and the left-wing parties were banned, the way was open for UMNO to organize support. Undoubtedly independence from British rule was a popular issue, and under its banner, UMNO found it very easy to gain supporters and to open branches in the rural areas. During the 1950s, especially up to the time of Independence in 1957, UMNO enjoyed wide popularity among the people. It was seen as a necessary expression in the fight for freedom and looked upon as the representative and defender of Malay interests. The argument that UMNO wanted Independence for the country in order to improve the lot of the Malays was widely accepted among various sections of the Malay community.

The most important initiators of the UMNO branches in the rural

areas were mainly the penghulu and school teachers who often enjoyed great respect among the villagers and had contacts with the outside world. It was they whom the organizers of UMNO first contacted for help in starting the party branches at the village level. Besides them, the help of certain outstanding villagers, known for their ability to talk and organize, was also sought after at times. In Kangkong, the prime mover for the formation of an UMNO branch in the area was a religious teacher who is the present penghulu there. He gained strong support from his father-in-law who was then the penghulu. Through their influence and persuasion, they were able to persuade a few of their kinsmen and neighbours to become members. In Kerdau, the first person to respond to the idea of organizing an UMNO branch was the penghulu, who managed to induce a few of his friends and relatives—among them a teacher, a couple of landlords and a few peasants—to join the party. Then he was able to persuade two of his headmen to become members, and through them he was successful in mustering more support from among the peasants. In Bagan, the UMNO branch was initiated by a school-teacher together with an owner-peasant who was also a minor imam. (The latter is now the present penghulu.) Both enjoyed good status and were highly respected by the villagers and so they did not find much difficulty in gaining support. At first they started with some of their kinsmen and neighbours, and very soon they were able to enlist the support of a large number of the villagers in the area.

Next to UMNO, PAS seems to be the other influential party in the three areas studied, and it has branches in Kangkong and Kerdau. Kangkong is essentially agriculturally based and the people are more religious than those in the other two areas. There is a pondok school nearby, which constitutes a ready-made stronghold for PAS. Then there is a headmaster of the local school who left UMNO during the crisis between the party and the Malay school-teachers as described earlier, and a headman of Kuala Kangkong who was not very happy with the penghulu of the area. It was in fact the headmaster who first organized PAS in the area, and how he did it will be discussed later (p. 148-9). In this area PAS has managed to muster the support of various sections of people—the elders, religious men and youths also. Its influence has been increasing over the years, very much at the expense of the local UMNO. A number of known UMNO supporters have been attracted to PAS. However, the situation is quite different in Kerdau.

It has been noted earlier that in Kerdau, the religious commitment of the people is not strong; in fact, by comparison it is the weakest

among the three areas. Although there is a religious (Arabic) school here, the headmaster and a teacher who run it are both committed to UMNO. The reason is perhaps mainly economic. The school, although privately run, has been in receipt of financial help from the government, and this help goes partially to pay the teachers and to maintain the school. Many people believe that without being associated with UMNO, the headmaster would not have been able to get government aid. The leading personages of the PAS here are two businessmen, one of whom is also a haji. Although the religious arguments of PAS do not seem to break much ice among the people here, it has become more evident, especially of late, that many of them are becoming attracted to PAS, which they believe is the true fighter for the Malays. But this has not resulted in an increase in membership of the local PAS branch as such.

As for PN, it had a branch in Bagan and even here it was centred mainly among a small group of people in Parit Bengkok. Most of them belong to the same lineage, and among them were some of the rich landlords in the village. One of these landlords was close to a penghulu in a nearby mukim, and the latter in turn was a personal friend of the national leader of PN. It was through him that the landlord became attracted to the party. This landlord managed to influence some of his kinsmen; at the same time the headman also joined the party, but he was unpopular in the area and was never able to draw any support. For some time a small branch of PN continued here, but it slowly weakened as a result of a conflict between the headman and a young landlord who was the son of the landlord mainly responsible for starting PN in the village. Following the disintegration of the party after the death of its national leader, the branch of PN in this village also disappeared, with many of its members turning to UMNO.

Finally, the SF has a pocket of members and supporters in Kerdau. As already explained, this party is made up of the LPM and PRM, and came into the field of Malaysian politics much later than the other parties mentioned above. In Kerdau, there were some villagers who became members or supporters of the PKMM (or API and AWAS). When these radical parties were proscribed, those who did not go underground or to the jungles either joined the UMNO or just remained unattached to any party. Later, when the PRM was formed, some of them joined this party. These 'old hands' (*orang lama*), as they are often referred to, joined forces with some young peasants to form a branch of the party in the area. On the other hand, some tappers working as labourers in a nearby medium-sized estate owned

by a Chinese were already giving their support to the LPM. When the LPM and the PRM at national level formed the SF, members of these two parties in Kerdau soon constituted the SF at the rural level there. For some time the SF and the UMNO in Kerdau became the most influential groups in Kerdau, much more than the PAS.

From the above, it can be seen that in Kangkong there are branches of UMNO and PAS; in Kerdau, UMNO, SF and PAS; and in Bagan, UMNO and PN. All these parties, except for SF, are made up entirely of Malays. The SF, through the supporters of LPM, has working-class Chinese membership. In fact, in all the three areas, there are also a number of Chinese shopkeepers, a number of them who are members of the MCA or are known as its supporters. However, they do not seem to have formed branches of the party in their own areas, and instead claim membership of those in the nearby towns. Most of these shopkeepers are also associated with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce which is primarily a business organization, but at the district, state and national levels, many of the Chinese business leaders are also leading members of the MCA.

These political party branches at the rural level normally do not have a large membership—usually between fifteen to forty members —although some of them have a larger following. Members are defined formally as those who have applied and been accepted into the party; they have at least paid up the membership fees although many of them are often irregular with their annual subscriptions. However there are also those in the areas who claim to be members of one or the other party, without properly registering themselves, or merely because they often appear at the various functions held by that party. It is not unusual for some of them to claim, or to be regarded, as members of different parties at different times, depending on the company they are in at a particular time and what they hope to gain by it. Sometimes, this practice occurs even among those who have already registered themselves as members of one party, for their registration may have been the result, not of conviction, but only respect for someone who might have persuaded them to join. Thus only the 'core' of a particular branch is fully committed to it, and they often show their commitment by their willingness to work for the party, for example, to campaign whole-heartedly during the election period. As for the others, who may or may not be considered as followers, the nature of their support can be quite unpredictable, for many of them prefer to follow a policy of 'wait and see', and then throw their support either according to 'where the wind blows' or the inducement that will be given to them at a particular time. The

inducement may be in the form of a tea-party, a feast, a present in the form of a *sarung* or cash, and also promises of future gains. This is not to deny that there are also individuals who are motivated by issues and ideologies, and although they may accept the 'inducements' given to them, they may still quietly support those whom they feel represent their interests.

Of course most of the branches measure their strength by the amount of support that they can muster from among the villagers, either for the different events that they organize or for the election. To attract wide support, they often do not confine their activities only to those that are directly political, but broaden them to include welfare, cultural, social, sporting and educational activities also. The most hectic times for the branches are the few weeks during the election campaigns; the elections are welcomed in a festive mood, and there is of course plenty of drama, which includes verbal arguments from the election platforms, and also physical fights elsewhere. There is a tendency for them to associate politics and political parties mainly in terms of elections. On the other hand, there is also the mood of disappointment among some, for elections, like Independence also, have not brought the changes promised to the villagers. As many of them often grumble, 'Why do we bother? Whoever wins, we will still remain the same'. Nevertheless, from the various activities of the parties, especially during the election, the nature and processes of party political leadership at the rural level are easily perceptible.

Generally, the people who are active in the branches are small in number, and are confined mainly to a few leading members in the branch committees. They are often chosen by general consensus or by a show of hands during general meetings, and usually the same people seem to occupy the more important posts. In the various party branches in these three areas, it is the main office-bearers who completely dominate the branches. They are the ones who normally initiate activities, discussing among themselves and at times making decisions over the heads of the other committee members and the general membership. They are also seen to be the most active during elections. More often than not these few people keep the branches alive and are therefore often regarded the 'strong men' of the branches.

THE PARTY LEADERS

From what categories of people do most leaders of the party branches at the rural level come? On examining the members of committees in the various branches, it is found that they come from different

backgrounds: ex-officials, teachers, peasants and labourers. However, what seems to be significant is that most of the leading office-bearers—the chairman, secretaries and treasurers—are mainly people who are respected, or in other words, enjoy high status within their own communities. Two processes have led to this. The first one is initiated from above. Quite often branches are first organized on the initiative of organizers from the nearest district or state organizations. In making their initial move, these organizers attempt to interest some respected villagers in joining the party and then persuade them to start a local branch. The latter often prove to be more efficient in drawing the support of their relatives, friends and clients. It was on the basis of this that the UMNO, during the early period of its expansion, chose the village teachers, headmen and penghulu to organize village branches. In the same way also PAS makes contact with religious teachers and other religious men to organize some of their branches.

The second process is initiated from below. With or without the initial 'push' from above in the formation of the branches, these branches do in fact have a say in the choice of their leaders. The normal practice of having branch members elect their own committee is often followed, and this is actually enforced by the government. Political parties, like all other associations (societies, clubs, unions etc.) have to be registered with the government and are governed under the Society's Ordinance. One of the provisions of this Ordinance is that members of committees serving in the various parties and their branches must be elected in a general meeting and their names submitted to the government. In the process of election, members tend to choose the more respected among them to occupy leading positions in the committee.

At the beginning UMNO was able to recruit its leaders from among those who were in government service at the rural level. However, things have altered, especially after Independence. There were some who were beginning to be disappointed with UMNO and slowly they drifted away from it. What is more important, however, is that the ruling against government servants holding office in political parties prevented many teachers and penghulu, who were the main source of strength for UMNO at the rural level, from being active openly. However, it did not prevent them from being active behind the scenes and strongly influencing some of the branches. For example, a headmaster in Kangkong and a penghulu in Bagan wield strong influence in their areas through the party branches, although both of them are no longer committee members.

An interesting development has taken place as a result of the government restriction. Some branches have had to turn to other people and persuade them to become leading office-bearers, now that many of the serving teachers and penghulu are not easily available. One category of persons taking over the leading positions is the ex-government official, particularly retired teachers, penghulu and clerks. These ex-officials have several advantages. They are often quite advanced in age, and because of this they may be respected so long as they are not considered senile. Of course, being ex-teachers and ex-penghulu, they enjoy high status. Furthermore, some of them are also owners of land, for as already noted, the tendency for some officials to become landlords is quite common (see Chapter IV). A second category consists of the relatively well-to-do, especially landlords who may be distinguished from those in the first category above because they have never been in government service. Most of them may not have the advantage of education enjoyed by those in the first category. Although wealth as such may sometimes be despised as a source of evil, yet it is a great advantage if it is combined with other factors which give status, either ascribed or achieved. A third category are the peasants themselves, especially those who are fairly well educated and show the qualities of integrity, sincerity, eloquence and ability to organize, to compensate for their lack of wealth and previous experience in government service. Finally, there are still some teachers who continue to be openly active. Most of them do not work with the government, but there are also a few, who in spite of the government ruling are able to ignore it, either because they have important people to protect them or because the implementation of the ruling is not so rigid in their areas.

It is found that out of the seven chairmen of the party branches in the three areas, three are ex-officials, two landlords and two peasants; out of seven secretaries, one is an ex-official, two are landlords and two peasants; while out of the seven treasurers, three are landlords, and the rest an ex-official, a teacher, a peasant and a labourer. Judging from these figures, it appears that the ex-officials are mainly put up as chairmen, while the landlords serve mainly as treasurers, although some of them are also chairmen. As for the secretaries, most of them are teachers but there are also some peasants among them. In terms of age, most of the chairmen are already old, usually around sixty years of age, while the secretaries are relatively young, still in their thirties and forties. Most of the work in the branches is done by the secretaries. They are active and often in effective control, while the chairmen frequently serve more as symbols. This

pattern is common particularly in UMNO and PAS, while in the SF, most of the office-bearers are peasants and also a labourer.

A majority of these leading office-bearers enjoy high status in the village communities. Many of the ex-officials, and of course the landlords, have control over land, and this places them in better positions than others to mobilize and influence some of the villagers, especially those who operate their land as tenants or labourers. To some extent, the nature of influence the landlords have over the tenants and labourers may be explained on the basis of what is often typified as the relationship between 'patrons' and 'clients'. However it is often more complex than that. In so far as the landlords control their land and are free to choose the people to operate it, and in so far as the lives of the tenants and labourers depend on the 'kindness' of the landlords, then it can be said, at least in economic terms, that the landlords are 'patrons', and the tenants and labourers their 'clients'. Economically the 'clients' are tied down to the 'patrons' because the amount of land available for operation is small compared to the supply of labour. For fear of offending the landlords and consequently losing the opportunity to work on their land, the tenants and labourers may sometimes have to—or at least appear to—support them. This is more so when the landlords are highly respected, and above all have kinship relationship with the tenants and labourers. For all these reasons, the landlords are able to determine to a certain extent the political behaviour of the tenants and labourers.

However, there can be a certain amount of class conflict between the landlords and the tenants and labourers (see Chapter IV). The peasants are often polite and seldom express their antagonism against their landlords openly. In the areas studied at least, the peasants always try to avoid a direct confrontation especially with those who are considered to have some status, for it can become unpleasant and the former may also be condemned as 'ill-mannered' (*kurang ajar*). In such a situation, the peasants may hide their true feelings, and while openly saying that they support the politics of their landlords, they may also quietly go against him, especially during the general elections. As some of them quite often say, 'Wait till the election; we will see how'. It appears that at a time when they are unable or not organized to express their class conflicts or show dissent against the landlords, they hope that the election, which ensures them of some secrecy about their true feelings, will bring about changes for them.

In contrast to the landlords who have control over the land, there are those who have control over various aspects of communications;

they include the ex-officials, teachers and peasants elected to leading positions. They are often more literate than the others in the villages and can talk fluently and persuasively during meetings. Also, they know how to write letters to officials and departments in the towns and how to keep minutes and records. Some of them do not feel 'ill-at-ease' or afraid in the company of these officials who may be associated with the political parties or government departments. Besides, the teachers, especially, are quite close to the villagers, because their work involves them with the village children, their parents and the general upliftment of education at the rural level. They are in more constant touch than the other villagers with news not only of their communities but also of the outside world because they read newspapers and quite often maintain contact with their colleagues in the towns.

All these qualities and activities give them a position of respect among the villagers, who also go to them for help from time to time. Some of the children may pass the examinations which enable them to go to secondary schools, and their parents often consult the headmaster or the teachers about what to expect and what preparations to make. These parents may also try to get their help in recommending their children for some welfare aid or 'minor scholarships'. Furthermore, some of the villagers may also ask the help of not only the teachers but also of their more educated colleagues to fill up forms or write letters of application for land or financial aid for the replanting of rubber on their land. As a result of the help and favours that the educated can give, the peasants tend to feel a sense of obligation towards them. Such feelings of obligation is often expressed as 'kindness debt' (*hutang budi*), and according to a common Malay saying such a 'debt' may be more difficult to repay than gold and may well be remembered unto death.[1] Even when this feeling of 'indebtedness' does not really result in a strong relationship of obligation, it may at least strengthen the bond of friendship and respect which can be very useful for the mobilizing of support.

Most of the leading personalities in the party branches do not confine their activities only to politics; they are also involved in non-political activities. In the three areas there are various types of associations. For example, in Kangkong there is a Youth Club and Co-operative Society, in Kerdau there is a Youth Club and a Welfare Society, and in Bagan there is a Youth Club, a Welfare and a Co-operative Society. All these associations are normally run by com-

[1] *Hutan emas boleh dibayar, hutang budi dibawa mati.* (Debts in gold can be repaid, but debts in kindness will be taken unto death.)

mittees elected by their members. In addition, institutions such as the schools and mosques also have their own committees. Although the headmasters and the imam are often the secretaries of the schools and mosque committees respectively, other members of the committee are elected, in the case of the schools, by parents of students and ex-students, and in the case of the mosques by regular members of the Friday congregations.

In the committees of these associations and institutions, the teachers and the penghulu are not restricted from active participation. Many of the leading posts as chairmen and secretaries are taken up by the teachers, but there are also some ex-officials, landlords and peasants who hold these offices. A number of the leading members in the party branches sometimes compete for, or more often than not, are persuaded to take up offices in the associations and institutions. In addition, some of them play leading roles within the belief systems also, either as pawang or imam (usually of prayer houses but

TABLE XI

NON-POLITICAL POSITIONS HELD BY CHAIRMEN AND SECRETARIES OF PARTY BRANCHES

	Youth	*Welfare*	*Co-operatives*	*Mosque*	*School*	*Headman*	*Imam/Pawang*
Kangkong							
A1	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
A2	–	–	–	1	–	1	–
A5	–	–	1	–	1	–	–
A6	1	–	–	1	–	–	–
Kerdau							
B1	1	1	–	–	1	–	–
B2	–	1	–	–	1	–	1
B3	1	–	–	–	–	–	–
B4	–	–	–	1	–	–	1
B5	–	1	–	1	–	–	–
B6	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
Bagan							
C1	–	1	1	–	1	1	–
C2	–	–	–	–	1	–	–
C3	–	1	–	1	–	–	–
C4	–	–	–	1	–	–	1

Source. Questionnaires

Note. Figures 1, 2, 3 in the first column denote chairmen and figures 4, 5, 6 denote secretaries of branches.

not the mosques, since the mosque imam are usually government servants who are not allowed to hold offices in party politics). In situations where the same persons hold different leading positions in different political and non-political associations and institutions or play leading roles as religious functionaries, then there is a tendency towards what may be called 'concentration of leadership' at the rural level. Such concentration, as shown in Table XI, is found in the areas studied.

Table XI opposite shows the leading positions held outside their branches by seven chairmen and seven secretaries of the various party branches which are listed in the first column. By leading positions is meant the offices of chairman, secretary and treasurer in committees of the various associations and institutions, and as functionaries in both the belief and traditional political systems. It is observed that most of them hold two or three leading positions outside the party branches. It is not implied that such concentration of leadership results from deliberate attempts by the leaders in the various party branches to capture other associations or institutions in order that they can be manipulated for their political advantage. In fact, such deliberate attempts seldom take place. What it really indicates, however, is that there is a small number of people in the rural areas who tend to be repeatedly chosen for positions of leadership as a result of their popularity and the recognition of their ability or because they enjoy the high status derived from them.

It is interesting to note that some of them hold positions within the traditional framework (two as headmen, two as imam and one as pawang). In the case of these people it is mainly as a result of the respect that they enjoy by virtue of these traditional roles that they have been elected to take up leading positions in the party branches. This shows a continuity in leadership; from being leaders in the traditional institutions, they are later elected leaders of the modern associations. Some villagers still attach great importance to traditional factors in their choice of leaders, even for those in the modern associations. For instance, in Kerdau, the local UMNO have for a long time been continuously persuading an ex-penghulu to remain as their chairman, although he has repeatedly asked to be relieved of the post because of old age and general weakness in health. Finally, when he succeeded in being relieved of the office, they made sure that it was his son who succeeded him. Although the son is not well-educated and does not display much ability either as a speaker or an organizer, yet he was appointed to the position in order to indicate to the villagers that the ex-penghulu is still associated with UMNO.

Although there are still indications as to the importance of traditional factors, those which are new, such as education and wealth, are beginning to grow in importance. Ex-officials, landlords and teachers are often chosen by the villagers to be their leaders and some of these people do not have any link at all with the past. In that sense they represent a new type of leadership.

AN EXAMINATION OF THREE CASES

Several points regarding leaders who operate actively behind the scene, the concentration of leadership, the continuation of traditional leaders in new institutions/associations, and the ways in which they obtain support—which have been referred to previously, can be discerned more clearly in the examples of the three leaders to be discussed presently. They are in fact the most influential leaders in their own respective areas. A person is said to be influential if his thoughts, words and/or actions can affect or motivate the behaviour of others in the way that he wants them to; and the number of people whose behaviour can be affected by him shows the degree of his influence. In other words, a person is influential when he can mobilize people to act according to what he advises, directs or leads, and the more people he can mobilize the more influential he is. Thus in quantitative terms the influence of a person can be assessed by the number of people who follow him. In the case of the three persons to be discussed here, they all have many followers in their respective areas.

The first example is a personality in Kerdau. He has for a long time been a religious functionary, having served as an imam of a minor mosque in the area for more than twenty years. About ten years ago he also started to practise as a pawang. As an imam his main function is to read the text of the sermons and lead the prayers during Friday congregations; but he does not officiate in marriages because another imam has been authorized by the religious department to do this in the area. As he is not a government official, he does not receive a salary. However, he does receive some gifts in the form of cash and kind from the villagers for the occasional functions he performs, and also receives commissions from the Religious Department for his services as a 'collector' of the annual religious 'tithe'. As a pawang he is in demand, especially in the case of an illness, but he does not practise magic that is often associated here with rites connected with the production of rice. Although he does not charge people for his 'medical' services, he nevertheless seldom rejects money or other

gifts that are left behind for him by his clients. He does not depend on the irregular income from his roles as imam and pawang, for these only supplement his main earnings from the land. He is a landlord although he cannot be included among the most wealthy in the area. Also, he has gone on the pilgrimage to Mecca.

As a result of his roles in religion and his relative wealth, culminating in the fact that he is a haji, he is highly respected. He has often been proposed by the villagers for posts in various committees, but he has not been enthusiastic about them. However, there was one that he agreed to take up, namely, that of chairman of the committee supervising a school in which he used to study. About five years ago, the post of headman of Kelibang-Guntung village fell vacant. The penghulu of the mukim thought that he was the most appropriate person to be recommended to succeed as headman. He was at first reluctant, explaining that he preferred to be left alone with his work and family; this was the same explanation that he offered when declining the various posts in committees previously. Nevertheless, a number of people in the village also voiced their preference for him. Most of these people, like him, are immigrants from Sumatra. Apparently he agreed, though rather reluctantly, when no other candidate was thought to be good enough. Since he was the only candidate, no selection was held for the post, and he became the headman by unanimous consensus.

At about the same time that he became headman, some of the UMNO leaders in the district wanted to persuade him to take an active part in politics. They hoped at least that he would remain neutral, and not be identified with PAS as a result of his religious tendencies. For most of the time he had in fact been indifferent to party politics. However, his commitment was needed by UMNO because he commanded a substantial following which could be swung to any political party that he supported. Soon after becoming headman, he felt he had to serve not only his people but also the government. Since the state government was led by UMNO, he explained that it was logical that he should affiliate himself with that party. A few months before the 1964 election, he agreed to become a member of UMNO. During the election, he did not help very actively in the campaigns, but the few times that he appeared with some UMNO canvassers were enough to communicate to the villagers in the area where his sympathy lay.

After the election, a number of adult classes were opened in pursuance of the promise by the Alliance to overcome illiteracy among adults in the rural areas. Many such classes have been turned over to

UMNO activists to organize; they are designated as teachers and given some allowances. Some of them are qualified to teach, in the sense that they are literate, and can show the illiterate how to write; but others use the classes mainly to earn some money, without doing even the least amount of teaching. It is no wonder, therefore, that these adult classes have often been effectively ridiculed, particularly by opposition groups as being paltry spoils given to UMNO officials who have helped in returning UMNO (or more correctly the Alliance) to power. The headman was also appointed as a teacher for the adults, but he confined himself to the teaching of Islam to the old people in the area. Prior to this appointment, he had in fact been teaching the same subject in the local mosque once a week, but he is now allowed to make some claims for an allowance from the Government, a privilege that he did not enjoy before. The important thing is that he is at present committed to the Government, not only through his office as headman but also as an UMNO member and teacher in one of the adult classes. He is therefore one of the UMNO key men in the local area.

The second influential person is from Bagan; he is the penghulu himself. The penghulu is more than just an ordinary government servant who only carries out orders from above. In the case of the one in Bagan, he has great initiative, possesses strong leadership qualities and did in fact provide leadership to the villagers, even before he became penghulu. In addition, he comes from a rather important family in Bagan which has landlords, teachers and headmen among its members, and this also helps a great deal in giving him a position of prominence in the area. The cluster of houses around his home is mostly owned by his relatives. Although he finished his six years of Malay education and was offered an opportunity to be trained as a teacher, he chose to remain in the village. He worked on a piece of rubber land inherited from his father and then opened up a small provision shop in front of his house. This shop became a focal point for his relatives and neighbours to frequent; they came not only to buy their daily requirements but also to chit-chat in the evenings. At the same time, he was also made an imam of the prayer house situated just next to his shop, his father being the previous imam. With his religious role and also his relatively good educational background, he was therefore highly respected.

When the UMNO branch was started here, he became its first secretary. In the committee were also two Malay school-teachers, one of them being the chairman. Together they formed the backbone of the local branch and with their influence, they managed to

gain wide support, except in a small part of Parit Bengkok where there were some who favoured the PN. It was at this time, as UMNO's Secretary, that he initiated the move to obtain some red earth from the then Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA), and to organize the villagers in Parit Besar into work teams to build a road into the village. The foot-path that was in existence then was often muddy, and almost impassable for bicycles during the wet seasons. He called a meeting in the local mosque to discuss his plan, having been promised support from elders and other influential people in the village. The headman in the village, a teacher and an elder were appointed together with him to approach the people, household by household, in order to get a volunteer from each house to work, and then to draw up work teams from among these volunteers. Although he himself was allocated to only one group, yet he took the trouble of coming out to work with different teams every day. His dedication was very much appreciated by the villagers. They look upon him as a person who can organize and is willing to work very hard to ensure that the project he initiates will succeed. Soon after that, his prestige increased even further.

When the post of penghulu fell vacant, a number of people persuaded him to stand for the election which was to follow. Those who were most enthusiastic about him were the local imam and the headmaster and a number of elders. He stood against those who were then considered as formidable contenders. One was an ex-Arabic schoolteacher and the other was a clerk, a son of the ex-penghulu. Both were educationally and administratively more qualified than he. However, many of the villagers considered the other two as outsiders for they had left the area for a long time. On the other hand, he had continuously resided in the village and was involved with the people there. He eventually won the contest, though by a narrow margin. The key to his victory was the support he obtained from many of the influential people in the area who could mobilize the support of their relatives and friends. For three years, he served as a probationary and after having passed an examination set by the Administration, he was confirmed as penghulu.

With the achievement of this office his status increased again. Not only is the office an honoured one among the rural people, but he himself also possessed personal leadership qualities. He extended the effort to build a road in his own village to the other villages in the whole mukim. He was always ready to help people; he used his office to recommend some students for minor scholarships and for some old people, especially widows, to get welfare aid. He was also ever

ready to help the villagers in land applications or applications for grants to replant their rubber. In fact, on several occasions he took the trouble to go to the various departments concerned in order to put the cases of the villagers before the appropriate authority. He has risen with the support of the people in the area and he has not forgotten them. In the words of many villagers, he has not become 'proud' (*sombong*), and does not behave like 'a bean that has forgotten its pod' (*kacang lupakan kulit*). As one who is held in high esteem, he is much in demand to become adviser to various associations in the area and also to serve in committees both inside and outside the village. For example, he is adviser to a youth club and two parent-student bodies, and is also an assistant-secretary to the penghulu association for the state. Although he is no longer the secretary to the local UMNO branch since becoming penghulu, he still continues as an imam of the prayer house in front of his house.

From the point of view of the Administration, especially of the District Office, he is considered to be an ideal penghulu. He not only gets along well with the villagers but also carries out the work that the Administration requires to be done rather efficiently. He explains government development projects to the villagers, and because of his popularity, is able to persuade them to support some of these projects. It is because the District Office is satisfied with his previous performance that he has been recommended recently to take charge of a neighbouring mukim also, when the post of penghulu became vacant there.

The third influential personage is the headmaster of a Malay school in Kangkong. He is an 'outsider' in the area, having been transferred here from another district; and neither he nor his wife has any relative in Kangkong. He is a likeable person, friendly both to the old and the young, and being a headmaster, he naturally enjoys high status. After having been in the area for about six years he has come to know almost everybody. As a headmaster, he is also secretary of the school committee and he has proved to be a good headmaster and an efficient administrator. His experience is not confined only to the school, because for some time he has also been secretary of the Teachers' Co-operative in the district. This co-operative society not only gives loans to members, but also carries out some business through a co-operative store. Through this position he comes into contact with a greater number of teachers and also other government servants in the district.

As stated earlier, he was at first a keen UMNO supporter, but following the conflict between the Teachers' Association and the

Government over the language and education policies, he left to join PAS. As soon as he arrived in Kangkong, he began to organize a PAS branch there. He did not try to establish a branch straightaway; but instead he slowly gathered a basis for support. In his school, there were a few teachers who were beginning to be disappointed with the Government, and two of them were attracted to the policies of PAS. He became quite close with these two, one of whom is an 'outsider' like himself while the other is married to a local girl. The latter was also in close contact with the youths in the village because he often organized chartered trips by bus to Penang and Kuala Lumpur, especially during the school holidays and after the harvesting season.

Meanwhile, outside the school, the headmaster was able to win over the support of the local village headman and a religious man. Both, like the headmaster himself, live in Kuala Kangkong. The people in this village are mainly fishermen, owning little or no land at all. If they do work on the land during the off-seasons for fishing, it is often rented from the landlords who stay mainly in Permatang Kangkong. The last penghulu was from Permatang and so also is the present one. Furthermore, most of the committee members of the local UMNO are also from there. The penghulu has for a long time been closely associated with this party as well. The headman's association with the penghulu has not been very good, because he feels that the latter often favours the people from Permatang. For example, some of his friends and relatives living in the village were recommended for new land that was opened in Sanglang, about twelve miles away. According to the headman, this was unfair, as the people in Kuala Kangkong are more worse off economically. With the existence of this kind of relationship, it was not difficult for the headmaster to explain to the headman that the true salvation for the Malays could be sought only through PAS. Being neighbours, the headmaster could visit the headman and have talks with him quite often, and it was not long before the headman became a member of PAS. Once he did so, many of his relatives and followers also followed suit.

As for the religious man, he is quite closely connected with the pondok school nearby; he was one of the first students from there and knows the teachers quite well. The people in this institution were attracted to PAS for a different reason. As teachers at an Islamic educational centre, they find that of all the various parties, only PAS states clearly that the support of Islam is part of its ideology. Unlike the Arabic school in Kerdau, the pondok here does not receive any financial aid from the Government. In the national as well as the state leadership of the party, there are also many religious

teachers and other persons connected with the religion. It was therefore quite natural for the teachers and students in the pondok to find greater affinity with PAS. In Kangkong, the headmaster of the pondok, who is a much-respected teacher and theologian, is not openly active in party politics, but most of his teachers and students are very enthusiastic about PAS. They in turn are able to attract some of the villagers, including the religious man mentioned above.

Through the headman, the teacher and the pondok, the headmaster has been able to build strong support for PAS in Kangkong. In the local branch, he does not, however, hold any office for as a government servant he is prevented from doing so. The headman is the chairman, and the religious man, together with a teacher from the pondok constitute the chief committee members of the branch. The headmaster enjoys the confidence of these people who often go to his house for advice. Therefore informally he is able to wield a great deal of influence and give guidance as a leader. At the same time he is also in close contact with some of the state leaders of PAS and some government servants in the state capital. As far as the PAS leaders above are concerned, the headmaster is their most important link in that rural community. As regards his contacts with the government officers, this has been developed over the years through his activities in the teachers' co-operative. He goes to considerable trouble to help the villagers, should they have to deal with some of the government servants. In fact, what is more important is that the headmaster, through a petition that he organized among the villagers and his contact with some officials in the Government, was able to persuade the Government to build a road linking the area to the main highway over two miles away. For the first time Kangkong was easily accessible by motor vehicles from outside, and the villagers gave credit to the headmaster for this.

The influence of the headmaster over the villagers in Kangkong was enviously regarded as a challenge to the penghulu as well as to the position of the governing party there. There was constant friction and quarrelling between the followers of the headmaster and those of the penghulu. The latter and the local UMNO leaders reported to the higher authorities that the headmaster was causing disharmony within the mukim. Their allegation was somewhat substantiated when after the Federal Election in 1964, the supporters of the two rivals were completely split, and even refused to go to the same mosque. They put the blame for this development on the headmaster. With the pressure imposed by some UMNO state councillors on the education department, the headmaster was finally transferred

from the village about a year later. With his departure, the influence of PAS did not weaken but rather increased. Nevertheless, with the intervention of the District and Welfare Officers who came to the area to advise the villagers not to allow party politics to spoil their community life, the latter slowly returned to pray in the same mosque.

THE THREE CASES: SOME OBSERVATIONS

Several observations can be made from the above three examples. Firstly, from a position of high status a person can, on his own and with the support of others, take up new roles which enable him to wield additional authority and power and to exercise some form of leadership. The headmaster of Kangkong was able to do this in a subtle way by recruiting the support of others who are also respected in the village; the imam in Kerdau was persuaded to accept the position of headman which provided him with a stronger traditional basis of authority, and then to become a political functionary, which further enhanced the strength of his position. As for the penghulu of Bagan, he was first involved in politics and thence through an election, was admitted into the bureaucracy, an institution which provides him with a framework within which to lead the villagers, while at the same time serving the District Office and the Administration generally. The Kangkong headmaster is associated with a new type of occupation—teaching—and he involved himself mainly with new kinds of associations, e.g. co-operative and political parties. The headman in Kerdau is still strongly rooted in tradition—in his economic, religious and later traditional political role—but is being absorbed to serve in new institutions, namely, the political party and in adult classes. In between is the penghulu of Bagan, who moved from a political party into the bureaucracy as a penghulu, a role that is actually old in form but new in content.

Secondly, these three leaders each hold more than one leading position in the various associations and institutions. Like the many others listed in Table XI, they display concentration of leadership, and are often referred to by the villagers as 'strong men' (orang kuat). They are called 'strong men' merely because they are prominent members of their village communities who play leading roles and are regarded therefore by many of the villagers as their leaders. However, not all three of them can be called 'strong' leaders in the sense that is suggested by Bailey (1970: 73-85). He suggests that 'strong' leaders are the ones who in effect lead and not merely appear

to lead. For instance, those who are put up only to serve as symbolic leaders cannot be said to be 'strong'; in fact, they are referred to as 'weak' leaders.

Of the three examples given, both the headmaster and the penghulu can easily be categorized as 'strong' leaders. In the case of the penghulu, he held office both in political as well as non-political associations, and the headmaster, while taking office in non-political associations, operated unofficially from outside a party branch. In PAS he is in fact the effective leader, with the Kuala Kangkong headman and the branch chairman being much more the symbolic leaders. The headman lacks the ability to lead the branch by himself, but he is needed as chairman because he is respected and has many followers. It is the normal practice for discussions often to be held first in an informal manner at the headmaster's house, with the headman, religious teacher and the religious man in the committee present, regarding matters that are going to be raised at committee or branch level. The decisions that are made in the committee or branch meetings later are simply endorsements of what had been concluded at the informal meeting with the headmaster.

As for the penghulu of Bagan, although he is still a member of UMNO, is consulted by office-bearers of the branch from time to time, and continues to campaign actively for the party during elections, he does not play the same role as the headmaster in Kangkong *vis-a-vis* the political party. However, it is certain that in his capacity as penghulu, he is providing effective leadership within the mukim community. He is not merely a symbolic leader, unlike his own headman of Parit Bengkok who does not in any way exercise effective leadership at all.

As regards the headman of Kerdau, he does not provide the type of 'strong' leadership as do the headmaster and the penghulu. In fact, he was given a position in the local UMNO branch mainly as a token of his support. By comparison with the other two, he certainly cannot be regarded as an equally 'strong' leader. In the school committee, of which he is chairman, he does at least provide effective leadership. So, although a 'weak' leader in party politics, he appears to be a 'strong' one in a non-political body. This can hardly be said of the headman in Bagan or the son of the ex-penghulu of Kerdau who was persuaded by the local UMNO branch to succeed his father as chairman, only to serve as a symbol of continuity of his father's support and leadership. In both cases, they are certainly 'weak' leaders, and unlike the headman of Kerdau, they do not play any leading role at all in non-political associations.

Thirdly, for a leader at the village level to be effective, he needs to have not only a following in the village itself, but also access to the authorities above. This access serves two purposes, namely to provide the village leaders with a stronger backing of more powerful people from whom patronage can be obtained, and also to help to increase the prestige and authority of the leader in the eyes of his followers. The penghulu of Bagan, for example, enjoyed considerable popularity and therefore exercised an influence over the villagers. At the same time, he also had the full support of both the Administration and the governing party. The opposition provided by his own headman was very weak; he was unpopular and had no contact with the Administration, and he had the support of a political party which was of little significance at that time. This wide popularity ensures the penghulu of ready support from most of the villagers for whatever he tries to do in the course of his duties. The backing he obtains from the Administration and the governing party greatly facilitates a relatively quick response to certain requests made on behalf of the villagers, either for land, red earth or small welfare aid.

In contrast to the above, although the penghulu of Kangkong had the backing of the ruling Alliance party in the state, he did not enjoy a wide support from the villagers in his mukim. His influence among the villagers was challenged by the headmaster who, no doubt, had a strong following in the area, but being involved with PAS, he was regarded with a certain amount of antagonism by the ruling party. Another feature is that although the headmaster occasionally succeeded in getting the help of some government servants on the few occasions he represented some of the villagers in their requests, the Administration, on a strictly official plane, deals directly with the penghulu because he is its official representative in the area. There is therefore a stronger basis for the Administration to support the penghulu rather than the headmaster. Thus with the availability of stronger people to depend on, the penghulu managed to move successfully against the headmaster when the latter's influence among the villagers was becoming a cause of great discomfort to the penghulu as well as to the UMNO leaders.

The situation was quite different in Kerdau. Here the penghulu was not popular among the villagers and he continuously refused to be involved with any political party. He therefore had neither support in the area nor backing from the ruling party in the state; but he is recognized, for all his shortcomings, as the official representative of the Administration in that area. This recognition proved to be of

great significance, as will be shown presently. A government allocation was given in 1960 for the building of a new mosque in Kerdau to replace the old one; this was one of the projects under the rural development programme for the district. At the request of the District Officer, after a Friday congregation the penghulu held a meeting at which it was agreed that the old mosque should be demolished and a new one built on the same site. Following the meeting, however, the state councillor representing the constituency which includes Kerdau indicated that he was not in favour of this. He wanted the mosque to be built in Kampung Ketam, the reason being that during one of his campaign speeches in the Election a year before he had promised a mosque for the villagers there. This councillor was not present in the meeting but he managed to get the local UMNO committee members, some of whom had agreed with the decision taken in that meeting, to adopt a stand in his support.

The penghulu found himself in a difficult position and he therefore sought the help of the District Officer. The DO suggested that another meeting be held after a Friday congregation and that the councillor should be invited to present his case. When this meeting was held, the councillor once again was not present. Apparently he found that his suggestion, though backed by the UMNO committee members, was strongly opposed by many of the villagers. They argued that the old site was the best as it is situated by the main road and within easy reach of the surrounding villages. If the councillor's wishes were to be followed, then the mosque would be close to only one village but quite far away from the main road as well as from the other villages. During the meeting it was clear to the villagers present that the penghulu was strongly backed by the DO, although the latter did not speak very much. Most of the talking was done by the penghulu who emphasized that it was up to the congregation to decide. The fact that the councillor was not present weakened his case entirely and so the penghulu easily carried the day.

In the case of the penghulu, the backing of the DO is the most important and consistent buttress to his position. However, the deciding factor which enabled him to defeat the councillor was that, although normally unpopular with the villagers, he was able to get their support on this particular issue because it was they themselves who wanted the mosque to be built on the old site. What the penghulu did was only to defend their decision. Although after that meeting he was praised and enjoyed great personal satisfaction, this did not last for long because soon after he continued his old ways of

spending most of his time playing oakum which the villagers regard as 'not fitting for a penghulu'.

The difference between this case and that of the penghulu in Kangkong is that the latter was able to have his own way against the 'strong' headmaster mainly through the support of more powerful people in the governing party, while the former was able to defeat the 'strong' councillor through the support of the people on that particular issue. These two officials are quite different from the penghulu in Bagan who enjoyed support from both the people and the Administration as well as the governing party.

THE POSITION OF LEADERS IN THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

It should be clear by now that in party politics, some of the members of the party branches such as the leading committee members who have been described earlier, and some outside them such as the penghulu and headmaster, have a great deal of influence. Serving as important links for their parties with the rural people, one of their major roles is to ensure the support of these people for their parties, for instance, during the General Election to elect representatives to the State Legislative Council and the Federal Parliament. These elected representatives, irrespective of whether they are state councillors or federal parliamentarians, are generally known as *wakil rakyat* (people's representatives). Although there are branches of different parties, most penghulu, as exemplified in the cases of those in Kangkong and Bagan, tend to serve the party in power in the state only. The penghulu and the leading members of the branches whose party candidates have been elected as representatives, often become middlemen between the representatives and their voters. It has been emphasized earlier that the penghulu, as a government servant, is a subordinate of the District Officer within the structure of the Administration but in addition he may also be a middleman for the elected representatives within the framework of party politics. As for the leading members of party branches, they are middlemen for their respective parties only, or for the parties as well as the 'representatives'—if their parties have succeeded in the Election—without in any way being obliged to serve the DO.

As middlemen in party politics, the penghulu and some of the leading committee members in the party branches act as channels for the councillors and parliamentarians to reach at least a segment of the villagers within their constituencies and vice versa. The flow of influence and authority between the elected representatives and DO with the rural people is shown in Figure IV. It can be seen from here

that the DO as head of the district administration can reach the villagers through the penghulu who in turn contacts the villagers either personally or through the headman with whom he has a harmonious relationship. The penghulu is legally bound to serve the DO and at the same time has the force of the law behind him to make sure that the villagers respect and follow whatever directives or orders that come from above, for instance, the payment of revenue. In contrast to the DO, the 'people's representative' may reach the villagers through the penghulu or the headman who supports him, and the leading members of the branches; he may even have access to the villagers directly, in fact, personal and direct contact with their voters is a good way of ensuring one's popularity. However, the penghulu and the leading members of the branches are not legally bound to serve the representatives in the way that the penghulu is obliged to serve the DO; instead they become 'middlemen' on account of their allegiance to the representative or/and the party. Although it is a combination of many factors, such as the personality of the representative, the standing of the party, the policies of the party which attract such allegiance, there is no doubt that the ability of the representative and the party to meet certain requests for the benefit of the 'middlemen' or the villagers is an important factor also.

FIGURE IV
FLOW OF INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY BETWEEN THE DISTRICT OFFICER, REPRESENTATIVES AND THE VILLAGERS



The villagers may make a request for land, mosques or roads, for instance, from the Government. There are two channels at the rural level which can normally be used for making such requests, namely, through the penghulu or through the leading members of the party branches. These people, as 'middlemen', may convey the requests either to the DO or the elected representative or both. While the penghulu can present the request to both of them, the leading branch members often go to their elected representative first. Of course there are also villagers who ignore the middlemen and go straight to the elected representative or the DO. The DO is no more than an administrator, and the extent to which he can meet these requests is determined largely by the resources made available to him by the Government and the plans of the latter for that area. Subject to these, his decisions are made mainly on the basis of his administrative judgement, without taking into much consideration their possible effects on his personal popularity among the voters, as his office does not depend on their choice. What the DO can do is quite limited. Nowadays, there is a greater tendency for the villagers to make their requests through the elected representatives who, after all, have made several promises during election campaigns. The villagers realize that these representatives, as members of the policy-making bodies—the Legislative Council and/or Parliament—are the real source of power. The latter, on the other hand, are under pressure to do what they can to meet the requests of the villagers who, with the voting power in their hands, have a great deal of influence over their future.

These representatives are not always able to meet the requests of the villagers. The promises made during elections and the publicity given to government programmes to raise the standards of living, particularly in the rural areas, increase the expectations of the villagers themselves. When these expectations are not realized, they tend to react in different ways. On the one hand they may try to shift their support to a different party, with the purpose of returning another person as the elected representative. The shifting of support from one party to another and even among those who are considered to be the 'strong men' of one party or the other is quite a common feature; it is often jocularly referred to as 'leap-frogging' (*lompat-melompat*). Although this practice is quite common, it has not resulted in the changing of the representatives of the constituencies in the three areas studied. In Kerdau and Bagan, the candidates from UMNO have been successful in the three General Elections that have been held. However, in Kangkong, although the UMNO candidates

were victorious in 1959 and 1964, they lost to PAS in 1969. This defeat of UMNO cannot be attributed wholly to the dissatisfaction of the majority of voters in that constituency with the performance of their representative. What was more important was that the persistence of the PAS propaganda finally convinced the majority of the voters that UMNO (through the Alliance) has not been fighting for the interests of the Malays and therefore it ought to be replaced.

When people shift their party support or try to change their representatives, they are still acting within the framework of the law. On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the Government and disappointment with the representatives in their inability to meet their requests and demands may also lead the villagers to adopt methods that are considered to be outside the framework of the law. For instance, many villagers in the three areas studied have been applying for land but they have failed to obtain any, even after having waited for several years—a quite common situation elsewhere. They try to enlist the help of their elected representatives but to no avail. Therefore, what many of them have done is to organize themselves into small groups, choose their own leaders and then illegally open up the land on their own. There is, however, little chance of doing this in Kangkong as most of the surrounding land has been cultivated. In Bagan, some villagers have gone further inland or to other areas but in Kerdau, where there is still a lot of jungle land available, many of them just clear the land in or near the area. What is interesting is that these activities give rise to leaders from among the peasants themselves. They do not get the support of the authorities for what they do but they hope that whatever pressure may be brought to bear from outside, that the Government will finally give them the land that they have opened up illegally.

In the three areas studied, the movement by peasants to open up land illegally has not been very extensive. One of the biggest of such movements occurred in the state of Selangor and was led by H.T. Although both he and the movement are outside the three areas, they will be examined here as an example of a new development in the nature of rural leadership.

H.T. was an auxiliary police constable, and on leaving the service in 1955 he was given a piece of land on which he worked and built a house. He was often visited by a number of people living in an area on the coast of Selangor, most of whom were without land or regular jobs. They had made applications for land from the Government through the local penghulu and political leaders but without success.

They often discussed their plight with him, and one day they agreed that the best line of action was to take matters into their own hands and open up new land without going through the normal government procedure. That was in fact how the fifty of them, led by H.T., occupied a piece of land in Sungai Sireh in 1960. Apparently the land was already earmarked to be alienated to some of the villagers. The penghulu and then the DO tried to persuade these 'illegal squatters' to leave but they refused. Soon the Chief Minister stepped in, and when persuasion failed, a squad of policemen was finally sent to evict them. The leader was arrested and then subjected to restricted residence. Meanwhile the vernacular newspapers gave wide publicity to the incident and the public was sympathetic. The evicted peasants then began a sit-down strike in front of the state Chief Minister's office and this lasted for more than two weeks. It ended only when the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaya stepped in and promised that land would be given to the peasants.

After a few years, H.T. was again approached by a greater number of peasants to lead them in another land-opening movement. Among them were those from the previous group who had not been given the land which was promised earlier, and in addition there were many others who followed. Finally, about 400 of them occupied a part of the Teluk Gong area in 1967. They erected small huts and some of them even brought their wives and children. Soon the authorities stepped in and once again much publicity was attracted. This time, the action of the peasants was vocally supported by university students and some members of the academic staff. The students held a demonstration in front of the State Secretariat and drew the attention of the people to the serious problem of land-hunger among the rural population. Eventually a group of lecturers and writers offered to mediate between the peasants and the state government. Finally, the Government conceded to give the land in Teluk Gong and in some other areas to these peasants.

In 1969, H.T. again led a similar kind of movement but this time involving a larger group of people estimated at about 1,000. Coming from the coastal area of Selangor and neighbouring Perak, they occupied a jungle area at Binjai Patah and started to clear the forest. At that time the country was in a state of emergency, following the 13 May Incident. The Government decided to move fast. A 24-hour curfew was imposed over the area and the police moved in to disperse the peasants. About a hundred of them were arrested while the others went away. However, when the police withdrew, the peasants came back to the area. This time the students and some of the polit-

icians again mounted their support, but the newspapers, owing to stricter control over them during the emergency, played the incident down. A number of local penghulu in the coastal area, backed by leading members of some of the UMNO branches, organized a campaign to condemn the 'squatters' and tried to persuade the villagers in the area to support them. Once more the security forces moved in to surround them; a curfew was declared and workers from the public works department were mobilized by the Government to destroy the temporary shelters that were built by the peasants, and to confiscate their tools and utensils. Again many people were arrested, including H.T. While the peasants arrested were charged in court, their leader was detained until early 1973.[1]

For the peasants involved, H.T. acted mainly as a symbolic leader. There were at least six group-leaders during the Binjai Patah incident and they were the ones who were on the spot to direct the peasants. They were in consultation with one another, supervising the movement of the peasants, the building of their sheds and shelters and the forming of work teams to clear the jungle. These peasant leaders did not emerge through any formally instituted kind of associations. They acted in defiance of the authority and were therefore without the support and sympathy of the leaders from the bureaucracy and the governing party. They also acted independently of any political party. They argued that the Administration and the ruling party were not interested in their plight, and that the other political parties were not willing to help them beyond the making of verbal demands. That was why they had to take matters into their own hands.

The movement did not support any particular political party. In fact, among those who participated in the Teluk Gong and Binjai Patah movements were several members of the different political parties from the Government as well as the opposition. What brought them together was their common lot as peasants who wanted land. In this type of movement, leadership, rather than being fashioned or persuaded from the top, developed from among the peasants themselves. With their action, they forced their problems and issues before the public. Some of the members of the public who belong to student or political bodies acted in sympathy, and in this way the basis of support for the peasant movement was broadened. The pressure was brought to bear upon the Government to act: it could either concede to the peasants as in the case of Teluk Gong, or suppress them for fear that it would grow into a bigger and more powerful force as in the case of Binjai Patah.

[1] He was released in January 1973.

In these movements leadership is exercised from the lower ranks upwards. The peasant leaders act fully as instruments of the peasants to put their demands before the higher authorities, in contrast to the penghulu and the main party functionaries at the rural level who, while trying in limited ways to voice and meet the requests of the villagers, actually act mainly as instruments for the authorities above. They often act in consonance with the interests of the higher authorities, and for most of the time their role is to act as 'middlemen' for the leaders at the top to exercise their leadership downwards.

As mentioned earlier, although there are people who open up land illegally in the three areas studied, there has been nothing on the scale of the one described above. Most villagers in these areas express their support for what the peasants in Selangor have done. In fact, some of the villagers in Pahang who live quite near Kerdau apparently approached H.T. before he was detained to lead a similar movement in the state. However, nothing happened after he was detained.

The penghulu and the leading members of the party branches in the three areas still dominate, and although they may occasionally serve to transmit upwards the wishes of the villagers, most of the time they serve the interests or wishes of the representatives and administrators above them. The penghulu have to do this because they have their jobs to maintain. The leading members of the branches of the governing party have already gained some benefits for themselves in terms of their appointment as adult teachers, or their acceptance of land granted to them. That is how they differ from the leaders who develop among the peasants themselves in the course of their movements to open up land on their own.

VII Conclusion

IN Chapter II the major changes at the national level that followed in the wake of British rule were outlined. These changes covering various spheres—economic, political and social—have altered the structure of Malayan society quite radically. However, it must be noted that the speed and the extent to which these changes occurred have not been identical for the society as a whole. Within the same time perspective, different sections of Malayan society reveal different levels of development. Perhaps the greatest impact of these changes may be perceived at the 'centre' of change which is concentrated on two areas. Geographically, it is usually situated in the urban centres, and socially, it is often found among the groups or strata of people who have been most affected by the processes of modernization, namely the modern elite.

At the centre, following the various changes, new types of leadership have also come into being. The political leaders of the past were made up entirely of what may be termed the 'aristocracy of birth'. The basis of their power lay largely in their control over both economic and military resources. They served as 'real' and not merely as 'symbolic' leaders. However, with the superimposition of Western-style political and administrative systems and institutions, many direct and indirect changes occurred in the nature of this leadership. The government and administration became centralized and the boundaries of the states and their smaller constituent administrative units were clearly demarcated. A ruler to symbolize authority and unity for each state, and above them, a 'paramount ruler' for the whole country, have been constitutionally installed. However, they have been stripped of the real political and military powers enjoyed by their predecessors although they still retain some political influence and high social positions which can be used to their personal advantage; and their functions are restricted mainly to ceremonial occasions.

The new government and administration have given rise to the development of a bureaucracy whose most important function is the

execution of policies in civil, judicial, security and other matters. With the establishment of a bureaucracy, new personnel are needed to serve as the main channels between the government and the public. Besides that, the adoption of parliamentary democracy as the underlying basis for politics and government has not only brought about new institutions, but also new political personalities. Leadership and power are determined through the process of election, and although the top order requires only a small selected number, yet there has grown beyond it a large body of people who, although they do not seem to assume very important functions in politics and government, nevertheless appear to be necessary appendages in the whole system. These are the parliamentarians and councillors who, together with the bureaucrats, constitute the largest segment of the present Malay political leadership at the supra-village or national level.

At the periphery, i.e. in the rural communities, changes in leadership have also occurred. The elders and the religious functionaries still exist with limited functions and are of some social standing and influence. Among the religious functionaries, the imam has been absorbed into the bureaucracy. As regards the penghulu, although he has strong roots in the traditional political structure, changes in the Administration have transformed his functions and made him the smallest cog in the administrative machinery. Within the context of the traditional and religious values which are still strong among the villagers, the imam and the penghulu are held in high esteem. The Government is regarded with respect also, and their absorption into the bureaucracy therefore enhances their prestige. Thus they often manage to maintain their influence and so continue to be looked upon as leaders.

The penetration of new political and administrative institutions into the village communities have also given rise to a new type of leadership which has little or no traditional roots. This leadership is made up of a triad consisting of landlord, party functionary and government official. They often have overlapping roles; the landlord may be a strong political functionary while the government official may be a rich landlord. Some of them are relatives, and there is also a great likelihood of blood relationship being strengthened by marriage. These make the triad constitute a strong and stable combination within the village community. Its status and influence is derived largely from its control over economic resources and communications. At the same time, as the rural elite, it has easier access to some of the higher authorities in the town who may be manipulated to

give stronger backing to its position and hence to increase its own prestige.

The various rural leaders generally have their own areas of influence; some are based on the village unit while others rely either on smaller units within the village or bigger units that extend beyond the confines of the village itself. For example, the elder is mainly influential within his own family circle while certain religious and party functionaries as well as the village headman have influence mainly over the village group. The influence of some other religious and party functionaries and the penghulu extends beyond the village to a wider area of the mukim. However, the geographical area over which an individual leader has influence is not rigidly demarcated. It goes according to the roles that he plays and the esteem with which he is held by the people. For instance, a highly respected penghulu or imam may be sought to help in family affairs, or an elder can influence a wider group which is not limited only to his kinsmen. In contrast it is possible to have a headman who has no influence at all in his own village, or a penghulu who has influence only on certain groups within his own mukim.

In the three areas studied, the different leaders need not function only as leaders of their own communities. This is determined by the nature of these communities. Like other rural communities, they do not exist by themselves but form part of the bigger national entity. The government and administration between the local and national levels are often conducted through a specialist who serves somewhat as a political go-between. In political activities, this specialist is often referred to as a 'broker' or 'middleman'. It may be useful to examine to what extent those who have been identified in this study as rural leaders also act as brokers.

On the basis of the broker-model, much has been written analysing the political relationship which exists between the smaller local communities and the larger structures. There seem to be two types of conception which actually differ only slightly in their views; they are represented by Bailey (1970) and Mayer (1966). Bailey sees the 'broker' as the person who bridges the gap in communication between a smaller 'encapsulated' structure and a bigger 'encapsulating' one. The gap between the two structures may be the result of either a radical divergence in their 'cultural base' or in their 'cultural values'. Owing to these divergences, there exists between the smaller and bigger structures a state of discontinuity and conflict, and the success of the broker lies therefore in his ability to mediate between them, and this 'can depend upon his ability to deceive: to misrepre-

sent the strength and intentions of both sides to each other' (Bailey, 1970: 168). On the other hand, Mayer does not stress the aspect of discontinuity and conflict very much, but in fact, perceives the possibility of a broker existing when the central government or administration permeates and affects local level politics. Nevertheless, like Bailey, he also relates the success of the broker with his ability to deceive, especially within the framework of political 'action-sets'. For him the broker carries out a kind of transactional relationship, 'and the transaction is one in which he promises to obtain favours . . . [and] . . . the broker cannot maintain his reputation if too many of his efforts are unsuccessful' (Mayer, 1966: 114).

A gap does exist to a certain extent between the three rural communities studied and the wider structures that 'encapsulate' them, but it is more in the nature of some divergence in their cultural values rather than their cultural base. The people in these communities are mainly peasants. In contrast to the urban people, they are still strongly dominated by tradition and religion; in fact, even the implications of such simple things as dress, housing, manners and family life tend to set off the villagers from the townsmen. At the same time, although within the rural communities themselves there have arisen economic and social differences which form the basis for a more stratified society (see Chapter IV), yet taken within the context of social stratification for the country as a whole, the majority of the rural people occupy the lowest class and status positions, in contrast with those people in the towns who occupy the highest positions. Therefore, there is a basis for regarding the rural people or the peasantry in this country as largely forming what Kroeber calls 'a part society, with part culture' (Kroeber, 1923: 284).

The rural communities do not, however, exist as isolated entities. As pointed out earlier (see Chapter III), there are factors such as kinship, common territory and religion which tend to bind each community—especially the village—into a coherent whole, where its members often interact more closely among themselves than with those of other communities, thus setting them quite apart from the rest of society. At the same time there are several factors, such as the economy, politics and administration, which have the effect of integrating the rural communities into the bigger national framework. There is contact between the people in the urban areas which constitute the centre of economic and political power and also of change, and the rural population. To maintain these contacts, particularly for the purpose of ensuring that political and administrative decisions made at the centre reach and are executed at the periphery,

then there is a need not only for government servants, but also party functionaries. More in the sense of the word as used by Mayer than Bailey, they constitute the brokers. The most prominent of the brokers among the government servants is the penghulu, while from among the party functionaries they are represented mainly by leading committee members of the local ruling party branches.

To what extent can the role of these brokers be characterized by the ability to deceive? As has been described (see Chapter V), the penghulu serves as a broker for the Administration, acting mainly upon decisions and directions that come from above. He depends on the Government for his salary, and being a member of the bureaucracy, is expected and obliged to carry out the bidding of the Government without question; and failure to do so can jeopardize his position. He is therefore not in a position to carry out much bargaining or negotiation. However, as has been noted, it is often the case that the penghulu is also involved with party politics, particularly that of the ruling party, and this puts him into contact with the politicians. The 'people's representatives' who are responsible for legislation and policies within the larger political institution, have to seek the mandate of the people at regular intervals. The governing Alliance party, particularly its UMNO component, depends largely on rural votes. The penghulu is in a position to influence the voting behaviour of at least a section of the people in his mukim, and he is therefore able to use this influence in order to bargain for certain favours from the politicians and the government. In this way he can act in roughly the same manner as the broker described by Mayer.

Perhaps those who most closely resemble the broker as defined by Bailey and Mayer are the leading party functionaries. They consist of mainly ex-officials, landlords and teachers (see pp. 136-43). The ex-officials and landlords enjoy more freedom of action than the teachers and the penghulu because they are not dependent upon the Government for their income. They do not have to worry about financial loss before taking any action, unless of course they have been awarded some pecuniary benefits, like the post of an adult education teacher or supervisor, in return for services rendered to the party. Furthermore, although the various political parties provide for the power to impose party discipline, in practice, none of them are strict about it. The party functionaries have their own followers who may count as important votes to determine which candidate or party is returned in an election. Obviously, the political party at both the state and national level, and more so, the candidate for the constituency would want to win these votes. The party func-

tionary, being the person at the local level who holds the key to this support, can strike a bargain—guaranteeing to mobilize his followers in support of the candidate or party in return for a promise or pledge of favour for his own followers or even for himself. Quite often, it is dissatisfaction arising from pledges not being fulfilled, or the attraction of a better offer from a rival party, that leads to the process referred to earlier as 'leap-frogging' (see pp. 156-7).

From the discussions in the preceding two chapters, it is quite clear that the penghulu and the party functionary are the most important leaders in the rural society. Within their own communities, goals are not only limited but are sometimes quite trivial. In order to achieve broader and more significant goals, such as the provision of amenities for the community or even to determine the nature of the government that should come to power, they have to link themselves with stronger forces such as the political party. Although they are important leaders in their own communities, yet within the context of wider national leadership they are of little consequence. That is why they often fulfil the functions of a broker only. The position of the penghulu and the party functionaries in the three communities studied may be more aptly described as that of a leader-broker.

Such a position cannot be attributed equally to the lesser leaders in the rural society, such as the elder, religious functionary and the village headman. In this study they have been described as performing certain leading roles in their own institutions. It is in this sense, following the rather wide definition given at the beginning of this study (see pp. 5-11), that they are also categorized as leaders. However, in the context of state administration and party politics they play minor roles compared to the penghulu and the leading party functionaries. Nevertheless, some of them do have a little influence arising from the status they enjoy and also the kinship and friendship ties they have. For this reason they are approached for political support. As their following is small, they are not, however, in a strong position to bargain or negotiate for favours. Furthermore, the penghulu or the party functionary, more often than not, can mobilize the support of their followers without necessarily going through them. Thus they are unable to become effective brokers.

The elders, religious functionaries and even the village headmen are on the decline. As traditional leaders, they perform roles that are required within the framework of a traditional society. However, changes taking place in the rural society are slowly modifying the social structure, altering economic relations and transforming the

patterns of leadership. Traditional leaders perform important functions, especially for initiating co-operative activities in both the social and economic spheres as well as in the general care of the environment. Today, co-operative activities occur less frequently and in fact do not exist in the production of rubber. The tasks of providing drainage and irrigation and the building of roads and bridges are now increasingly undertaken by the Government. The traditional leaders may be able to acquire a new lease of life by trying to achieve new bases of status and influence, and by participating in the activities of the new political institutions. For many of them, advanced age has made it almost impossible to achieve more in the way of education and wealth. It has been possible, however, for some to participate in political activities. In Kangkong, for instance, the religious functionary plays important roles in the branches of PAS. In the state of Kelantan, which is ruled by PAS, it is well-known that the basis of strength of the party lies with the local Islamic religious functionary.

As for the principal leader-brokers, namely the penghulu and party functionaries, even they are becoming more circumscribed in their power and influence. The penetration of a money economy and party politics into the village communities integrate them more strongly into the broader society. The authority of both the central and state government is felt almost everywhere, as a result of the extensive and efficient network of communications and administration. The supra-village administrative and political authorities, in the persons of the DO and the 'people's representative', can have direct contact with the villagers. Also, through their programmes and promises, the national parties can appeal directly to the rural voters. The governing party, through the use of various government departments and officials, has the machinery to implement projects for which they can claim credit directly through the mass media—the radio, television, and broadcasts by information department vans and films. All these tend to reduce the power of the penghulu and party functionary as leaders and also as brokers who can negotiate or bargain for favours in the interest of their followers. Instead, they increasingly become channels for communicating decisions and directives from above, and also to serve only as a source of strength and support for the party at the local level. The most active party functionaries are often given small political appointments, or some land or small timber concessions in order to ensure that they will faithfully serve the party in power. Furthermore, the fact that the opposition is hamstrung and the ruling party is still able to win elections despite defections is a strong disincentive to 'leap-frogging'.

Most of the leader-brokers are people who enjoy high status and class positions in their own communities. They are separated from their poorer neighbours by differences in the way of life and standards of living. Although kinship ties still bind them with the poorer people, yet in many of the socio-economic activities they do not participate together or at the same level. It has already been shown that in the different institutions of co-operation like the derau and gotong-royong, the more wealthy persons do not participate (see pp. 93-4). While they are becoming separated from the poorer villagers, the leader-brokers are becoming more closely associated with groups of people outside, especially in the towns where they spend their time rather frequently. Though they are socially and economically inferior to the urban upper classes, they have much in common, in terms of social and economic positions, with the urban middle classes, and because of their political links they also have access to some of the members of the political elite at the state and even the national level. It is always an advantage to build this up into a more stable association for it can be useful as a means of improving one's status and also in obtaining favours for their own personal ends. Thus the need of the leader-brokers by the state or national political elite for mobilizing rural support, and the need of the latter by the former for furthering their social and economic positions, tend to place them together as individuals with common interests.

The leader-brokers are always in an advantageous position to benefit financially from investment and growth in their areas. Besides enjoying political rewards as described above, it is quite common for them to be given priority over others for small contract work or for alienated lands that are made available under the rural development schemes. It is the policy of the Government to create a class of wealthy Malays, and consequently in the rural areas there is a tendency for the leader-brokers to become more wealthy. Thus they have less time to articulate the needs and aspirations of the poorer peasants who are hard-pressed, especially with the present trend of falling prices for their agricultural produce and rising prices of food and clothing. When these deprived persons try to get the help of the local leader-brokers, they find that they have to wait for a very long time and on most occasions in vain. Furthermore, the leader-brokers and those in higher positions above them tend to recommend their friends and relatives to be considered for acquiring land or gaining employment, or they may insist on giving preference to party members or supporters. One consequence of this is that poor and landless peasants are forced to adopt illegal means of opening up land.

Among these poor peasants there have emerged new organizations which have given rise to a new type of leadership. For example, in place of the gotong-royong or derau co-operative groups, there are now work teams consisting of landless peasants who work for wages (see p. 93). Then there are the groups of landless peasants who organize themselves to open up land illegally. The underlying objective of these organizations is economic: to find work or land. They have their own leaders, but at present these organizations and leadership among the poor peasants lack the political basis that could make them become a strong political movement. The poor peasant sector in the rural communities is clearly 'a class in itself', but the peasants have not been able to act as 'a class for itself' in political matters. To do so requires not only consciousness, but a political organization that can stimulate class consciousness among the peasantry and mobilize it as an organized political force.

The changes in traditional society and the emergence of new social groups is a process that is accompanied by social tension, more particularly in societies undergoing accelerated modernization as in developing nations. In the situation under examination, two aspects can be seen. One is the transformation of the traditional leadership, and the other is the emergence of new social groups calling for new leaders. The penghulu and the imam lose many of their traditional functions by the same process whereby the kampung loses its influence in the face of the emerging government machinery. These village leaders also lose in status to the emerging landlord-party functionary-government official triad. Both categories have greater opportunities for financial rewards and improvement, and they introduce new social disparities into the village. Their leadership role becomes diminished and dispensable as the machinery of the government and the mass media move into the rural environment. They now assume a role that is predominantly one of brokers rather than that of leaders.

The majority of the villagers are socially and economically outdistanced by this new rural elite and are hence without leadership. Their relations with the new elite is strained by different standards and styles of living as well as by the latter's failure to participate in the traditional co-operative activities of the village. At the same time there emerges the class of rural poor who produce their own leaders from the work teams. The normal course of development under these circumstances would be for the rise of a new leadership which would articulate the demands of these social groups and classes. In a parliamentary system, this would involve the formation of

political parties with a consequent challenge to the established system.

In the situation under examination, the power to detain people for indefinite periods without trial, and the very strict control over publication and association, make opposition politics a hazardous and unproductive activity. For these reasons the newer social groups and classes fail to find political expression and representation, and this is the start of a process of tension and repression that will have far-reaching consequences. These tensions within the village are partly eased in the short run by racial ideologies and programmes of Malay advantage. Apart from other disruptive consequences of such tactics in a plural society, it is improbable that any such programme can satisfy the needs as well as the expectations of more than a minority in the village. Thus it will mainly accelerate the disruption of the traditional social structure of the Malay village.

The task of incorporating new social groups and classes of a modernizing society into its political structure would appear to be the Achilles' heel of the developing countries. The political movements representing these new classes will be challenging and disruptive to the existing social and political systems. The entrenched elite which is itself of recent origin finds that it has in the machinery of the state the means to repress the leaders representing the new classes. As the political system does not provide for adequate representation of sectional interests and for the diffusion of authority, it is possible for a small leadership acting in the interests of minor sections of the population forcibly to deny the new classes that are emerging in their society any place in the political structure.

Any further examination of this phenomenon is outside the scope of this book, but it seems to be the key to the chain of events that has led to the development of revolutionary situations in the developing countries.

Appendixes

APPENDIX I

I. THE following are examples of rites that belong distinctly to traditional beliefs and are not related to Islam. Nevertheless, they display some Islamic influences.

a. *Rites before clearing house-site*. This is carried out by a magician in order to pacify or drive away the spirits guarding the area so that they will not inflict any harm. On the day that the magician considers appropriate, he goes round the proposed site, collecting twigs of different types of plants found there. These are used for erecting a small structure about two by two feet, known as the 'ritual hut' (*rumah tetau*). He begins to burn some incense in it, over which he smokes small plates of 'roasted rice' (*bertih*). All the time while he is doing this, he recites incantations to drive away the evil spirits and tells them not to interfere with the people involved in the opening up of the land. These people are prohibited from causing any 'flow of blood' (*mendarah*), i.e. slaughtering of animals during the next forty days. It is only after this period that the new site can be worked on.

b. *Rites for village protection*. This is done in order to protect the villagers from serious illnesses or an epidemic. The decision to carry it out is normally arrived at in a meeting at the local mosque or prayer house at the suggestion of some elders or the headman. On the day agreed upon for the meeting, heads of households in the village or their representatives gather at the mosque or prayer house, bringing along with them three items as instructed by the performing magician, namely, roasted rice, incense and rattan cane. Then they are led by him to a spot quite far from the area of settlement; this spot is chosen by him according to the direction given in a dream. Here he erects a 'ritual hut' and then burns the incense, while uttering his prayers and incantations with both his eyes closed. After a while he takes the items brought by the people, and smokes them

one by one, over the burning incense. When all this is over, the people return to their homes with the instruction to scatter the roasted rice in the compound of their houses, burn the incense inside their homes at night so that the smoke will spread to every part of the house, and keep the cane in a safe place. The magician leaves the spot only after sufficient time has been given for everyone to arrive home.

c. *Rites during planting.* Before padi seeds are to be planted in the nursery beds, some of the peasants prepare different types of leaves such as those of the arecanut, *sepuluh* and *cemomor*, some powdered and yellow rice and a handful of padi seeds. These are taken to the local magician who blesses them. The arecanut leaves are believed to be able to protect the seedlings from plant diseases, the cemomor leaves to drive away pests, the sepuluh leaves to ensure that the padi plants are protected from all evil during the period of growth. The powdered and yellow rice have the power to drive away all evil spirits. All these leaves are buried in the nursery beds and while doing so, the following words are uttered: 'Blessing to you my father sky and my mother earth, pray look after and protect my precious jewels'. (*Assalamu-alaikum, hai langit bapaku dan bumi ibuku, tolong jaga tolong pelihara serigemalaku.*) After that the powdered and yellow rice are scattered everywhere. Finally the padi seeds are planted, followed by praises to the Prophet (*salawat*) which are invoked three times and a call to the earth and the trees around to look after the seeds and the seedlings well.

d. *Rites during harvesting.* This is done as soon as the padi begins to ripen in order to invite the 'vital aspect' (semangat) in the padi to remain and provide a bountiful harvest. At day-break, the farmer goes to his field and chooses seven stalks of rice that appear to be most healthy. Then, holding them tightly, he closes his eyes, invokes the praises to the Prophet three times and calls upon the pests to refrain from destroying his padi before the harvest. These seven ears of rice are then cut, put into a basket in which there are nutmeg and nails already blessed by a magician, covered with a piece of cloth and taken home. This basket is then set gently down in a place where the padi will be stored after the harvest. For the next three days, all members of the household are prohibited from taking rice and other food out of the house, and from going to the field. Harvesting begins only when this is over.

II. Below are examples of rites that combine both the Islamic and traditional forms:

a. *Hair-cutting*. This is essentially a simple customary ceremony whereby a lock of hair is cut from a baby when he is about a week old. This is not in any way related to Islam. On such an occasion, a tahlil is normally held and this is followed by a feast which ends with prayers for good health and a long life. Feast-holding is a common feature in Malay life. However the traditional hair-cutting and feasting have been combined with Islamic elements—the prayer and the tahlil which consists of repetitions of the name of God and the Prophet and praises to them.

b. *Marriage*. A marriage contract is recognized as legal in Islam when certain conditions are fulfilled, such as the consent of the girl, that of her father or the guardian and the solemnization of the marriage according to Islam, in the presence of witnesses. However, the Muslim requirements which are rather basic are inevitably combined with quite elaborate customary ceremonies. There is the marriage feast and the 'sitting in state' which are normally carried out in keeping with the treatment of the newly-weds as 'king and queen for a day'. Here, the demands of Islamic and traditional beliefs are met on the same day.

c. *Death*. Islam stipulates that before the dead are buried, the body has to be bathed and shrouded. Then a prayer for the deceased is performed. Certain traditional practices have also been combined with these to make up the total Malay funeral rite. There is the 'death feast', which is held usually on the first, seventh, fortieth and hundredth days after the death. These are held in the memory of and deference to the dead person. Sometimes the feast is repeated annually by some people, especially those who can afford it. The tahlil are often held before or after the feast.

APPENDIX II

The law of inheritance according to Islam is expressed in Sura 4, verses 11 and 12 in the Quran. Below is the translation of the verses, as given in Abdullah Yusof Ali (ed. and tr.), *The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary*, Lahore, Shaikh Mohd. Ashraf.

Verse 11

'God (thus) directs you
As regards your children's
(Inheritance): to the male
A portion equal to that
Of two females: if only
Daughters, two or more,
Their share is two-thirds
Of the inheritance;
If only one, her share
Is a half
For parents, a sixth share
Of the inheritance to each,
If the deceased left children;
If no children, and the parents
Are the (only) heirs, the mother
Has a third; if the deceased
Left brothers (or sisters)
The mother has a sixth,
(The distribution in all cases
Is) after the payment
Of legacies and debts.
You know not whether
Your parents or your children
Are nearest to you
In benefit. These are
Settled portions ordained
By God; and God is
All-knowing; all-wise.

Verse 12

In what your wives leave,
Your share is a half,
If they leave no child;
But if they leave a child,
Ye get a fourth; after payment
Of legacies and debts.
In what ye leave,
Their share is a fourth,
If ye leave no child;
But if ye leave a child,
They get an eighth, after payment
Of legacies and debts.
If the man or woman
Whose inheritance is in question,
Has left neither ascendants nor descendants,
But has left a brother
Or a sister, each one of the two
Gets a sixth; but if more
Than two, they share a third;
After payment of legacies
And debts; so that no loss
Is caused (to any one).
Thus it is ordained by God;
And God is all-knowing
Most Forbearing.'

APPENDIX III

In a letter of authority (*tauliah*) from the Sultan of Kedah, the late Sultan Abdul Hamid, to the penghulu of Hutan Kampung and Lepai, a person by the name of Ishak, there is a clause which reads:

'. . . the people in the *mukim* of Hutan Kampung and Lepai must follow all that *penghulu* Ishak bids or forbids them to do in matters concerning the administration of the state; and whosoever refuses to do so will be regarded as committing an act of 'rebellion' (*durhaka*) against His Highness the Ruler, and can be punished in accordance with the tradition.'

Note. There is no term in English that can fully express the meaning of durhaka, but 'act of rebellion' or 'act of resistance' come close to explaining the concept. Although commonly used today, a person may be considered as having committed durhaka if he rebels against his parents or government. In the context of Malay traditional culture, the word is used only to describe 'rebellion' or 'resistance' against a ruler. According to the degree of seriousness of the durhaka, different forms of punishment may be meted out. A person who commits durhaka, often referred to as *pendurhaka*, may either be banished or killed.

Glossary

Although many of the words listed below are translated in the text, those most frequently used and which require elaboration are arranged here alphabetically for the convenience of the reader.

Adat: Customs; embodies all the shared norms, values, beliefs, folkways and traditions that are held in a Malay society.

Amil: Collector of religious tithes, nowadays appointed by the religious department.

Anak buah: Literally, children and relatives; but normally refers to the villagers who are under the jurisdiction of a particular headman of village or *mukim*.

Bendang: Padi field, referring especially to the low plain variety for growing wet padi.

Bersunat: Circumcision. Traditionally this is performed in the village and celebrated with a ceremony and a feast, but nowadays it may be performed in the hospital without them.

Bomoh: A category of magician, who often acts as a traditional healer, but may also perform as a divin-

er or even a sorcerer.

Datuk: Normally means grandfather, but with capital D refers to the title given to traditional chiefs, or as a title of honour awarded by the ruler. In the village today, the *penghulu* and police officer may also be referred to as *datuk*.

Derau: Co-operative group formed especially by padi farmers for the purpose of providing enough la-

bour needed during the planting and harvesting of padi. The group works by rotation on the farm of each of its members, and it is based on the principle of service being given in return for service.

Fatwa: Official religious injunction, interpretation, advice or view on particular Islamic problems, usually provided by the *mufti*.

Gotong-royong: A form of co-operation for mutual help in economic as well as social activities. Unlike the *derau* which is mainly for the benefit of its participants, gotong-royong may be performed for the benefit of the community as a whole, for example, in building a village mosque, repairing roads or even weeding graveyards.

Hadith: Traditions; collections of sayings and quotations from Muhammad.

Hantu: Ghosts, spirits; the term is often used to include the various types of spirits and ghosts traditionally believed in by Malay society.

Hutang budi: Literally, kindness debt; the sense of debt or obligation felt by a person after receiving favour or kindness from another. An effort is often made to repay the debt, otherwise it is 'taken to the grave'.

Ikhtiar: Attempt or effort. This concept explains that despite the belief in 'fate' or 'divine lot', there can still be an effort to determine the course of things or one's fate, although it may not necessarily succeed.

Imam: Prayer leader, also often acts as religious official in charge of the mosque or *surau*.

Jinn: Genii or spirits. Though it is inconsistent with Islam, the Malays believe that there are Muslim as well as non-Muslim jinns.

Jual janji: Promised sale, based on almost the same principle as pawning. Property, very often land, is given as security for loan or credit, and it is con-

sidered as having been sold to the creditor if the loan together with interest is not paid up during the specified period promised.

Kadzi (Kathi): Religious magistrate and administrator who is also the chief religious official at district level.

Kenduri: Feast. It is very common for feasts to be held in Malay society in connection with different types of ceremonies or rituals, e.g. those following births, circumcisions, marriages, deaths, etc. There may be a small feast (*kenduri kecil*) or a big feast (*kenduri besar*).

Kerjasama: Co-operation. This is an all-embracing term for various types of co-operative activities such as *derau* and *gotong-royong*.

Ketua: Head or leader; may refer to traditional heads or heads of modern associations.

Ketua kampung: Village headman. Very often he is head of one or a number of villages. He is not a member of the government bureaucracy, although he receives some token allowance from the government. In different states he may be known by other names, such as *tok empat* or *sidang*.

Lebai: Religious man. This is a loose and general term often used in the village for those who are considered more religious and knowledgeable about Islam.

Lompat-melompat: 'Leap-frogging'; in this particular context refers to the practice of jumping from one political party to another. This is a common practice in Malayan politics, particularly very near election time, or when there is an acute power struggle.

Masuk Islam: To embrace Islam. This is often carried out initially by a simple ceremony in front of a religious official by accepting the first pillar of Islam and repeating 'There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his Prophet'. Sometimes it is also referred to as 'becoming a Malay' (*masuk*

Melayu), because Islam is always identified with the Malay.

Merdeka: Independence. This was the slogan used to rally the people in their fight for independence from British rule. It also describes the status of independence.

Mukim: The smallest administrative unit into which a district is divided; it is made up of a number of villages and is headed by a *penghulu*.

Mufti: Chief religious official at state level. He is often responsible for giving out 'religious injunctions' or *fatwa*.

Padi kunca: A system whereby a farmer is obliged to sell his padi to a shop, mill or middleman from whom he has taken credit or loan; and more often than not he is forced to sell at a lower price.

Parit: Canal for irrigation. Extensively found in some parts of the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, it forms an important basis for the formation of linear settlements along the canal.

Pawang: A category of magician, who like the *bomoh* often performs as traditional healer, diviner or even sorcerer.

Penggawa: The term used in Kelantan for the head of a 'district' (*daerah*); but the Kelantanese 'district' is somewhat similar to the *mukim* of the other states, and the position of the *penggawa* is often regarded as equivalent to the *penghulu* as the term is commonly used in the rest of the country.

Penghulu: Head of the *mukim* who constitutes the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy. He is paid a salary and is regarded as a government servant, although at the same time he is supposed to symbolize leadership at the village level.

Pondok: Literally 'a hut', but in this book it refers to a religious educational institution based on a number of huts where students study and re-

side. This institution is often headed by a well-known local religious teacher, and has hitherto depended entirely on religious tithes and gifts to maintain itself.

Surau: Prayer house, but not used entirely for prayers; it also serves as a centre for religious instruction and also meetings in connection with village affairs. It is usually smaller than the mosque and is never used for Friday congregation.

Syarikat kerja: In this context refers to work teams formed very often by the villagers to do casual farm jobs, like weeding, digging canals, harvesting etc. for payment either on the basis of time or piece rate. All earnings are shared among members of the team.

Tahlil: A kind of mystical ritual involving a group of people chanting praises to God and the Prophet. It is often performed after feasts or after prayers, especially the evening prayer.

Ustaz: Religious man who often acts as a teacher also.

Wakil rakyat: People's representative; the term is commonly used to refer to a member of Parliament or the State Legislature.

Bibliography

Allen, G.C. & Donnithorne, A.G., *Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaysia*, London, George Alen & Unwin Ltd., 1962.

Bailey, F.G., *Stratagems and Spoils*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1970.

Boeke, J.H., *Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies*, Haarlem, H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon N.V., 1953.

Burridge, K.O.L., 'The Malay Composition of a Village in Johore', in *JMBRAS*, Vol. XXIX, Pt. 3, 1956, p. 60-77.

—— 'Managerial Influences in a Johore Village', *JMBRAS*, Vol. XXV, Pt. 1, 1957, p. 93-114.

—— 'Rural Administration in Johore', *Journal of African Administration*, Vol. IX, No. 1, 1957.

—— 'Race Relations in Johore', *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. II, No. 2, May 1957, p. 151-68.

Chander, R., *Field Count Summary, 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, Statistics Department, 1970.

—— *Socio-Economic Sample Survey of Households 1967-68: Employment and Unemployment in West Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur, Statistics Department, 1970.

De Jong, P.E. Josselin, *Minangkabau and Negeri Sembilan*, Djakarta, Bhratara, 1960.

Diaz, M.N. and Potter, J.M., 'The Social Life of Peasants' in J.M. Potter, M.N. Diaz, and G.M. Foster, (eds.), *Peasant Society: A Reader*, Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1967, p. 154-68.

Downs, R.E., 'Rural Community in Kelantan, Malaya', in R.K. Sakai, (ed.), *Studies on Asia*, Lincoln, Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1960, p. 51-62.

—— 'A Kelantan Village of Malaya', in J.H. Steward, (ed.), *Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies*, Illinois, University of Ilinois Press, 1967, p. 107-86.

Firth, R., *Malay Fisherman*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966.

Freedman, M., 'The Growth of a Plural Society in Malaya', *Pacific Affairs*, 33, June 1961, p. 158-68.

Furnivall, J.S., *Colonial Policy and Practice*, New York, New York University Press, 1948.

Gerth, H., and Mills, C.W., *Character and Social Structure*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.

Gluckman, M., 'Inter-hierarchical roles: professional and party ethnics in tribal areas in South and Central Africa', in M.I. Swartz, (ed.), *Local Level Politics*, London, University of London Press, 1969.

Gouldner, A.W., *Studies in Leadership*, New York, 1965.

Groves, H.E., *The Constitution of Malaysia*, Singapore, Malaysia Publications Ltd., 1964.

Gullick, J.M., *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*, London, Athlone, 1965.

Hillery, G.A., 'Definition of Communities: Areas of Agreement', *Journal of Rural Sociology*, Vol. XX, 1956, p. 111-23.

Husin Ali, S., *Social Stratification in Kampung Bagan*, Singapore, Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1964.

——'A Note on Malay Society and Culture', in Alisjahbana, Nayagam and Wang Gung-wu (eds.), *The Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Society of Orientalists, 1966.

——'Patterns of Rural Leadership in Malaya', in *JMBRAS*, Vol. XLI, Pt. 1, 1968, p. 95-145.

——'Land Concentration and Poverty Among Rural Malays', in *Nusantara*, Vol. I, 1972, pp. 100-13.

Koentjaraningrat, *Some Social Anthropological Observations on Gotong Royong Practices in Two Villages of Central Java*: New York, Ithaca, 1960.

Kroeber, A., *Anthropology*, London, Harrap, 1923.

Marshall, T.H., 'The Nature of Class Conflict' in *Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays*, London, Heinemann, 1963, p. 171-80.

Mayer, A.C., 'The Significance of Quasi–Groups in the Study of Complex Societies', in M. Banton, (ed.), *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, London, Tavistock Publications, 1966, p. 97-122.

Mazidah Zakaria, 'Susunan Ekonomi dan Sosial Kampong Changkat Larang, Kawasan Simpanan Melayu, Perak', Kuala Lumpur, Universiti Malaya, 1967, (M.A. Thesis).

McFarland, A.S., *Power and Leadership in Pluralist System*, Stanford, 1969.

Meek, C.K., *Land Law and Custom in the Colonies*, London, Oxford

University Press, 1946.

Rashid Ahmad, 'Bureaucracy Negri Kelantan: Satu Kajian Perubahan dan Perkembangannya', Kuala Lumpur, Universiti Malaya, 1969, (M.A. Thesis).

Roff, W.R., *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*, Kuala Lumpur, University of Malaya Press, 1967.

Rokiah Talib, 'Komuniti Melayu Bandaran', Kuala Lumpur, Universiti Malaya, 1969, (M.A. Thesis).

Silcock, T.H. *and* Aziz, U.A., 'Malayan Nationalism', in W.L. Holland, (ed.), *Asian Nationalism and the West,* New York, Macmillan Co., 1953, p. 269-346.

Swift, M.G., *Malay Peasant Society in Jelebu*, London, Athlone Press, 1965.

Weber, M., *The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation*, translated by T. Parsons, and A.M. Henderson, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947.

Wilson, P.J., *A Malay Village and Malaysia*, New Haven, Hraf Press, 1967.

Wolf, E.R., 'Kinship, Friendship, and Patron Client Relations in Complex Societies', in M. Banton, (ed.), *The Social Anthropology of Complex Societies*, London, Tavistock Publications, 1968, p. 1-23.

Worsley, P., *The Third World*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Index

Aborigines (*orang asli*), 44.
Adat (customs), 71, 74, 75, 76, 92, 124; village elders and, 102-4, 106.
Agriculture, *see* Land; Peasants; Village.
Adat Perpatih, 71.
Administration, bureaucracy, government, 161-2; employment of headman and, 118-19, 127; Malays in, 25; of states, 18-19, 33-4, 66; political party leaders recruited from, 137-9; post-independence Malayanization of, 34; role of *penghulu* in, 119-24, 127, 128, 130-1, 147, 150, 152-3, 154, 160, 162; rural leadership and, 154-60, 162-70; status of occupation associated with, 76, 89-90; under British rule, 18-21, 28, 119; village, 65-6, 162.
Age, 167; as factor determining status, 73-4; leadership and, 13; *see also* Elders.
Alhadi, Syed Sheikh, 26, 27.
'Ali-Baba' partnership, 35.
Al-Imam, 27.
Allen, G.C. and Donnithorne, A.G., 16.
The Alliance Party, 29-30, 32, 33, 36, 38, 144, 145, 152, 157, 165.
Alms, giving/paying of (*zakat*), 75.
Alor Star, 3, 57, 107, 115.
Amil (collector of religious tithes), 110, 122.
Amulets (tangkal), 112.
Anak Buah (form of address), 126, 128.
API (*Angkatan Pemuda Insaf*: youth section of Malay Nationalist Party), 29, 134.
Assistant District Officer (ADO), 20, 118, 121.
Authority, relationship of leadership to, 8, 10.
AWAS (*Angkatan Wanita Sedar*: Women's Section of Malay Nationalist Party), 28, 134.

Bagan, 2, 5, 39, 42; elders in, 104, 107; headmen and *penghulu* in, 116, 118, 119-20, 122, 123, 124-5, 128, 129, 130, 131; political activities/leaders, 133, 134, 135, 137, 140, 141, 145-7, 150, 151, 152, 154, 156, 157; religious functionaries, 110-16 *passim*; social stratification, 72-101 *passim*; the village, 42-70 *passim*.
Bahaman, Orang Kaya, 20.
Bailey, F.G., 124, 150-1, 163-4, 165.
Batu Pahat, 5, 58, 59, 115, 116; 1946 communal clash in, 38n.
Bazaar, *see* Marketing; Village.
Behaviour, social status and, 73.
Bersanding (sitting in state of newly-married couple), 103, 104 &n.
Binjai Patah incident, 158, 159.
Births and deaths, registration of, 122.
Boeke, J.H., 41, 42.
Bomoh (traditional religious functionary), 108, 110-11, 113.
British: colonial administration, 15-22, 26, 76, 119, 161; growth of Malayan independence movement under, 26-32, 132; post-independence economic interests, 32 &n.
Bureaucracy, *see* Administration.
Burridge, K.O.L., 1, 38n, 41, 116.

Cabinet system, 33.
Capital investment, 32 &n.
Cash crops, 77, 78.
Casual labourers, 89.
Chander, R., 15.
Chettiar community, 100.
Chiefs, *see* Traditional leaders.
Chinese, 3, 4, 5, 16, 107, 135; 'Ali-

Baba' partnership with Malays, 35; businessmen, middlemen, 17, 25-6, 27, 35, 58, 100, 125, 135; class conflicts and, 100-1; communal conflicts with Malays, 35-8, 116; education, 22, 23-4; employment, 23, 24; immigrants, 17, 22; in villages, 41, 47, 58; political activities of, 29-30, 135; population (%), 14, 23; post-independence opportunities for, 32; socio-economic organization, 23-4, 25.
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 135.
Circumcision (*bersunat*), 52.
Classes: class conflicts, 96-101, 139; class inequalities, 77-83; manifestations of differences between, 92-6; peasants' lack of class-consciousness, 169; structure of, 83-92.
Clearing house-site, rites before, 171.
Cleverness (*pandai*), 74-5.
Coconuts, 2, 5, 57, 58, 77, 83.
Commerce and trade, 14-15; non-Malay predominance in, 25-6, 27.
Communications, 17; control by local leaders of, 139-40, 162; *see also* Railways; River transport; Roads.
Community, concept of, 39-40.
Community centres, 32, 37.
Consultations (*perundingan*: over election of headmen), 117.
Co-operation, co-operative groups, 12, 51, 53-7, 67, 93, 94, 167, 168, 169; *see also* Work-teams.
Co-operative Societies, 140, 141.
Corvée (*kerah*) system of labour, 118.
Credit, loans, 80, 81-2.
Crime, 122.
Customs, *see Adat*.

Datuk (form of address), 126 &n, 128.
Death, 65; registration of, 122; rite of, 173; sale of land as result of, 80-1.
Debts, indebtedness, 80, 81-2, 97.
De Jong, P.E., 71.
Democratic Action Party (DAP), 36.
Derau (*co-operation*), 12, 53-4, 93, 94, 168, 169; *see also* Co-operation.
Diaz, M.N. and Potter, J.M., 70.
District Land Offices, 3, 39, 78.
District Office, 3, 39, 120.
District Officer (DO), 20, 66, 117-18, 119, 126, 127, 147, 150, 153, 154-5, 156, 158, 167.
Districts (*daerah* or *jajahan*), British administration of, 19-20.
Divination, 111, 112.
Divorce, 102, 103, 110.
Downs, R.E., 1-2.
Drainage and irrigation: government projects, 122, 167; village co-operation in clearing of, 53, 55.
Dulang ('tray') washers, 16; *see also* Tin mining.

East Malaysia, *see* Sabah; Sarawak.
Economic development, resources: class inequalities and, 77-83; class structure and, 83-92; ethnic groups and, 24; magic rituals and, 63-4, 114; post-independence, 32 &n, 35; under British colonial rule, 16-17, 76; village, 57-9, 68, 162.
Education: Malayan independence movement and, 27, 30, 31; of different ethnic groups, 23-4; *pondok* ('hut') schools, 22, 30, 110, 115, 133; religious, 20, 110, 112, 115-16, 133, 134; school committees, 141, 147; social stratification and, 74, 76, 89-90, 91, 99; teachers' involvement in political parties, 133, 134, 137-8, 140, 141, 142, 144-5, 146, 147-50, 151, 152, 154, 165; traditional magic and, 114; under British rule, 20-2, 76; village elders and, 105-6.
Elders, village (*orang tua kampung*), 102-8, 115, 117, 126, 133, 146, 162, 163, 166; *see also* Age.
Elections, 136, 139, 154, 156, 167; 1955: 30, 31-2; 1959: 31, 33, 157; 1964: 31, 33, 125, 144, 149, 157; 1969: 31, 33, 38; of headmen, 117-18; of *penghulu*, 120; of political party leadership, 137.
Emergency, 1948 state of, 29, 132, 158.
Employment, 14-15, 17, 37; by socio-economic group and race, 23-6.
Executive Council, 33.
Ex-government officials, recruitment of party leaders from, 138-9, 140, 142, 165; *see also* Administration.
Expenses, marriage (*hantaran*), 95-6, 104.
Extended family, *see* Family.

Family: extended, 46; Islamic collec-

tive prayers by, 60-1; nuclear, 45-6; *see also* Kinship.
Fasting, *see* Ramadhan.
Feasts (*kenduri*), 51-3, 67, 92-3, 104, 129, 173.
Federal Legislative Council, 31, 33.
Federated Malay States (FMS), 16.
Federation of Malaya, *see* West Malaysia.
First Malaysia Plan (1966-1971), 32.
Firth, R., 1, 2, 41, 111.
Fish, fishing, 2, 3, 5, 57, 58, 81, 83, 111, 113.
Five-Year Development Plans, 32.
Freedman, M., 22.
Furnival, J.S., 22.

Gerth, H. & Mills, C.W., 10, 11.
Ghosts and spirits, 63; *see also* Traditional beliefs.
Gifts, 95-6, 143, 144.
Gluckman, M., 130.
Gotong-royong (co-operation), 12, 53-4, 168, 169.
Gouldner, A.W., 7, 8.
Groves, H.E., 33.
Gullick, J.M., 118.
Guntung, 43, 45, 47, 51, 56, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68-9, 144.

Hair-cutting (*potong jambul*), 52, 65, 173.
Hari Raya Puasa (religious festival), 49.
Harvesting, rites during, 172.
Headmen (*ketua kampung*), 2, 3, 11, 12, 47, 62, 69, 91-2, 120, 122, 123, 146, 163, 166; change from hereditary to elective method of election, 117-19; different terms applied to, 116-17; *penghulu* and, 66, 124-6; political involvement of, 133, 137, 142, 144, 145, 149, 150, 151, 155; role and influence of, 126-8; *see also* Village.
Healing, magic power of, 111, 112, 114; *see also* Illness.
Hillery, G.A., 39.
Homesteads, 46-7; *see also* Kinship.
Honesty (*amanah*), 74-5.
Households, *see* Kinship.
Huma Luas, 43, 45, 47-8, 51, 56, 62, 65, 66, 67.
Illness, 143, 171-2; village elders and, 102-3, 107.
Imams (Muslim prayer leaders), 22, 61, 107, 108, 109-10, 112, 126, 128, 133, 141-2, 143-5, 146, 147, 150, 162, 163, 169.
Immigrants, immigrant workers, 17, 22, 25, 77, 78.
Income distribution, 87-90.
Independence of Malaya (1957), 32, 136.
Indians, 4, 27; class conflicts and, 100-1; education, 23-4; employment by socio-economic groups, 23, 24; immigrants, 17, 22; in villages, 47, 58; middlemen, 17, 58, 100; money-lenders, 100; political organization, 29-30; population (%), 14.
Indonesia, 28, 123.
Inheritance, Muslim law of (*faraid*), 98-9.
Intermarriage, 25; *see also* Marriage.
Islam, *see* Muslim religion.

Jaafar, Dato Onn bin, 30.
Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 28.
Java, Javanese communities, 41, 45, 48, 53, 70, 111, 116.
Jerantut, 58, 59.
Johore, 1, 2, 15, 16, 22, 30, 44, 115, 120, 131.
Jual janji (promised sale of land), 82, 97.

Kadzi (Muslim magistrate), 22.
Kampung, see Village.
Kampung Baru, 40.
Kangkong, 1, 2, 3, 39; elders in, 102-3, 106-7; headmen and *penghulu* in, 116, 118, 119-20, 122, 123, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131; political activities/leadership in, 133, 135, 137, 140, 141, 147-50, 151, 152, 154, 156-7, 167; religious functionaries in, 110, 111, 112, 113-14, 115; social stratification in, 72-101 *passim*; villages in, 42-70 *passim*.
Kaum Ibu (women's section of UMNO), 29.
Kedah, 3, 15, 16, 30, 120, 124, 131.
Kelantan, 2, 15, 16, 30, 31, 34, 41, 111, 115, 117, 119, 167.
Kelibang, 43, 44-5, 47, 51, 56, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68-9, 144.

Kenduri, see Feasts.
Kerdau, 1, 2, 4-5, 39, 42; elders in, 107; headmen and *penghulu* in, 116, 118, 119-20, 122, 123, 125, 128, 129, 130, 131; political activities/leadership in, 133-5, 140, 141, 142, 143-5, 150, 151, 152-4, 156, 157; religious functionaries in, 110-16 *passim*; social stratification in, 72-101 *passim*; villages in, 42-70 *passim*.
Kerjasama, see Co-operation.
Ketam, 62, 153.
Ketapi, 66, 67.
Ketua (leader), meaning of, 11, 12-13, 116.
Ketua Kampung, see Headman.
Kindness (*baik hati*), 74-5.
'Kindness debts' (*hutang budi*), 140 &n.
Kinship, 99, 162, 163, 164, 166, 168; in mukims, 39-40; institutions based on, 51-7, 67; political parties and, 134, 139; village, 4k-2, 44-51, 67, 68, 69, 70; *see also* Elders; Headman; Marriage.
KMM (*Kesatuan Melayu Muda*), *see* Young Malays Association.
Koentjaraningrat, 53.
Kroeber, A., 164.
Kuala Kangkong, 42-3, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 56, 57, 62, 66, 67, 68, 106-7, 133, 151.
Kuala Kerdau, 43, 45, 51, 56, 62, 65, 66, 67.
Kuala Lumpur, 40; 1969 communal clash in, 38.

Labourers: farm, 93, 134-5, 138, 139; non-agricultural, 90; *see also* Peasants.
Labour Party of Malaya (LPM), 31, 38, 134, 135; *see also* SF.
Land, Landownership, 3, 26, 28, 90, 156; accumulation of, 77-80; class conflict and, 97-100; dispossession of, 80-3; distribution of, 83-7; illegal land-opening movements by villagers, 157-60, 168; income distribution and, 87-92; Muslim law of inheritance, 98-9; *penghulu's* duties connected with administration of, 121; political activities of landlords, 134, 138, 139, 141, 142, 165; raising of loans on, 82; settlement schemes, 32, 37; Torrens system of registration of, 78; *see also* Co-operation.
Leader, leadership, concepts of, 5-13.
'Leap-frogging' (*lompat-melompat*), 156, 166, 167.
Lebai (Islamic functionary), 108, 110.
Lela, Maharajah, 20.
Lost or stolen property, tracing of, 111.

Macang Manis, 43, 51, 56, 62, 65, 67.
McFarland, A.S., 10, 11.
Magic, magicians, 63-5, 111-15, 116, 143, 171-2.
Malay Administrative Service (MAS), 21, 34.
Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 135; *see also* Alliance.
Malayan Civil Service (MCS), 21, 34.
Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 28, 38.
Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), 29, 33; *see also* Alliance.
Malay College, Kuala Kangsar (MCKK), 21.
Malay Nationalist Party (PKMM), 28, 134.
Malay Reservation areas, 80.
Marketing: class conflict in, 97; of land, 80; *padi kunca* system of, 82; village, 57-9.
Marriage, 68, 109, 162; class differences and, 92-3, 94-6; elders and, 103-4, 106, 108; feasts celebrating, 52-3; religious functionaries at, 109, 110; rites, 65, 173; village co-operation and, 55; village kinship relations and, 48-51.
Marshall, T.H., 98.
Mass media, 167, 169.
Matrilineal society of Negri Sembilan, 2, 71.
Mayer, A.C., 163, 164, 165.
May Thirteenth Incident, 114, 116, 158.
Mazidah Zakaria, 41, 42.
Mecca, pilgrimages to, 75-6, 109, 144.
Medicine, 58, 114; *see also* Healing; Illness.
Meek, C.K., 78.
Melaka, 15, 20, 27, 45, 60, 70.

Membela kampung (village-protection rite), 65.
Meminang (asking for a girl's hand), 95-6, 103.
Mentakab, 4, 59, 115.
Merdeka (Independence), 29.
Merisik (sounding out stage in marriage), 95, 103, 104.
Middle classes, 25-6, 35, 37, 92, 99.
Middlemen, 17, 57, 78, 90, 97, 100; politico-administrative ('leader-brokers'), 154-7, 163-6, 167-8.
Mobility, *see* Social organization.
Modernization, 113-15, 161, 169; *see also* 'New' leaders.
Money economy, emergence at village level of, 57, 77, 78, 115, 167.
Money-lenders (*ceti*), 100.
Mosques, 32, 37, 40, 61-3, 67, 69, 70, 109-10, 116, 141-2, 156, 171; village co-operation in building/repairing of, 53, 55, 56-7, 153.
Muar, 5, 115.
Muhamad Abduh, 26.
Mukim, 42, 47, 49, 66, 107, 119, 134, 144, 163; definition of, 39-40; *see also* Penghulu.
Mukim Development Committee, 122.
Mukim Register, 39, 78.
Muslim religion, Islam, 16, 18, 171; assimilation of ethnic groups and, 25; Five Pillars of, 75-6, 108; functionaries, 108-10, 112-16, 167; in village, 59-65; law of inheritance (*faraid*), 98-9, 174-5; Malayan independence movement and, 26-7, 30; marriage ceremony, 103-4n; rites, 173; schools, 21-2, 27; village elders and, 104-5.
Mutual help (*tolong-menolong*), 51, 53-7.

National Association of Malay Teachers, 31.
Nationalism, growth of, 26-32, 132; *see also* Political development.
Negri Sembilan, 2, 15, 16, 33, 71.
'New' leaders, 161, 169; political parties, 132-6; party leaders, 136-43; examination and observation of 3 cases, 143-54; position in national context of, 154-60.
Nikah (solemnizing of marriage), 103 &n, 104.
Nuclear family, *see* Family.

Occupation, social status and, 74, 76, 91; *see also* Employment.
Orang kampung (rural people), 40.
Orang kerajaan ('government man': *penghulu*), 128, 130.
Orang kita, 130.
Orang kuat ('strong man'), 13, 150-1, 156.
Orang lama ('old hands' of PRM), 134.
Orang raja ('ruler's man': *penghulu*), 128.
Orang tua kampung, see Elders.

Padi production, *padi kunca* marketing system, *see* Rice.
Pahang river, 4, 43.
Pahang, 4-5, 15, 16, 116, 120, 160; anti-British uprising in (1880), 20; Sultan of, 33.
Pakistanis, 25.
Pangkor Treaty (1874), 15, 17.
Panglima (assistant *penghulu*), 120.
Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PAS), 30-2, 36, 66-7, 113, 125, 131, 133-5, 139, 144, 148-50, 151, 152, 157, 167.
Paramount Ruler (*Yang Dipertuan Agung*), election of, 32-3.
Parit, 43, 50, 62, 66, 69.
Parit Bengkok, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 58, 59, 62, 67, 68, 104, 134, 146.
Parit Besar, 43, 45, 48, 49, 51, 56, 59, 62, 67, 68, 70, 104, 146.
Parliament, 33-4, 154, 156.
Parti Islam Semalaya (PAS), *see* Pan Malayan Islamic Party.
Parti Negara (PN), 30, 32, 134, 146.
Parti Rakyat (PRM), *see* People's Party.
Pawang (traditional religion functionary), 108, 110-11, 113, 141, 143, 144.
Peasants: class conflicts and, 97-100; class differences among, 87-9, 91, 92-6; contrast between town dwellers and, 164; illegal land-opening movements of, 157-60, 169; lack of solidarity between working class and, 25; leader-brokers and, 168-9; racial conflicts and, 37-8; support for political parties by, 30, 133, 138, 139, 140, 141; *see also* Land; Village.
Pekan Kerdau, 43, 47, 62.

Pemimpin (leader), meaning of, 11-12, 13.
Penang, 15, 20, 27, 115; development of port, 17; 1958 communal clash in, 38n.
Penggawa (head of mukim in Kelantan), 119.
Penghulu (*mukim* head, official), 40, 48, 49, 62, 68, 89, 107, 117, 118, 127, 144, 157, 160, 162, 163; administrative and leadership role of, 119-26, 128-31, 165, 166, 167, 169; Bagan, 145-7, 150, 151, 152, 154; headman and, 66, 124-6; illegal land squatters and, 158, 159; 'middleman' role of, 124, 154-6, 163, 165, 167; political activities of, 133, 137-8, 141, 149, 152-4.
People's Party (PRM), 31, 38, 134, 135; *see also* SF.
People's Progressive Party (PPP), 36.
People's representatives, *see Wakil rakyat.*
Peragap, 43, 45, 48, 50, 51, 56, 62, 66, 67, 69.
Perak, 15-16, 41, 119, 120, 158; anti-British uprising in (1876), 20.
Perbilangan (sayings), 71.
Pergerakan Pemuda UMNO (Youth section of UMNO), 29.
Perlis, 15, 16, 30, 115, 119, 120.
Permatang Kangkong, 42-3, 44, 45, 47, 49, 51, 56, 57, 62, 66, 68, 106-7.
Peserai (mukim), 119.
Piety (*warak*), 74-5; *see also* Religion.
Pilgrimages, 64, 75, 78, 109, 144.
PKMM (*Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya*), *see* Malay Nationalist Party.
Planting, rites during, 172.
Political development, organization: class conflict and, 100-1; growth of Malayan independence movement, 26-32, 132; involvement of headmen and *penghulu* in party politics, 125, 126, 127-8, 131; post-independence, 32-8; under British colonial rule, 15-16, 76; village, 66-7, 68, 162, 167.
Political parties, 15, 28-32, 132-6; leaders of, 136-43, 165-6; the 'new' rural leadership and, 143-57 *passim*, 162-70.
Polytheism (*syirik*), 63.
Pondok ('hut') schools, *see* Education.
Population, 14; increase in village, 77; multi-ethnic distribution, 22-3; urban/rural distribution, 18, 23.
Prayer houses (*surau*), 53, 55, 56-7, 61-3, 67, 70, 109-10, 116, 126, 141, 171; *see also* Mosques.
Professional classes, non-Malays' predominance in, 25, 34.
'Promised sale' (*jual janji*, of land), 82.
Prophet Muhammad, 75; feasts celebrating birthday of, 52.
Proverbs, 71-2.
Public Works Projects, 122.
Puja pantai (fishermen's ceremony), 113.
Pulau Pangkor, 1959 communal clash in 38n.
Purun, 67.
Puthucheary, J., 32n.

Quarrels, 102, 103, 129.
Quran, 27, 63, 107, 110, 112, 113; Islamic law of inheritance according to, 174-5; reading of (*khatam Quran*), 52, 61.

Racial conflicts, 2, 25, 35-8, 100-1, 116.
Railways, 4, 17.
Ramadhan, fasting during, 60, 61, 64, 75, 108-9.
Rashid Ahmad, 34.
Red Books (on Rural Development Programme), 121.
Religion: elders and, 104-5; ethnic assimilation and, 25; feasts, 52; functionaries, 108-16, 117, 143-5, 162, 163, 166, 167; in village, 59-65, 68, 70, 164; *penghulu* and, 122; post-Independence, 33, 37; social stratification and, 74, 75-6, 91; traditional rites, 171-3; *see also* Muslim religion; PAS.
Rice cultivation (*padi*), 2, 3, 4-5, 47, 77, 81, 83, 115; co-operation or mutual help in, 54, 55; *padi kunca* marketing system, 82, 97; traditional magic and, 114, 172; village marketing of, 57, 58.
Rituals, rites, village, 64-5, 171-3.
River transport, 4.

Roads, road-building, 3, 4, 17, 32, 37, 115, 156; village co-operation and, 53, 55, 56, 146, 167.
Rokiah Talib, 41, 42.
Role-playing, leadership and, 8, 10-11.
Rubber production, 2, 4-5, 15, 16-17, 25, 47, 48, 77, 81, 83, 94, 115, 123, 134-5; post-Independence, 32n; slaughter-tapping in, 97-8; traditional magic and, 114; village co-operation in, 55, 167; village marketing of, 57, 58-9.
Rural Development Plan, Programme, 32, 36, 125-6, 168; *penghulu's* duties in, 121-2.
Rural Industrial Development Authority (RIDA), 146.

Sala village, 49.
Salt, earlier tasting by elders of, 102, 105.
Second Malaysia Plan (1971-1975), 32n.
Selangor, 15, 16, 41, 117; illegal land-opening movement in, 157-60.
Sharecroppers, 89, 93, 97.
Shopkeepers, 78, 79, 87, 90, 97, 125, 135.
Sidang, 117; *see also* Headman.
Sikh community, 100; *see also* Indians.
Singapore, 1n, 15, 17, 58.
Slaughter-tapping (of rubber trees), 97-8.
Socialist Front (SF), 31, 38 &n, 67, 134-5, 139.
Social organization: post-Independence mobility and conflict, 32-8; under British administration, 22-6; village, 41-2, 44-57, 67-70.
Social stratification, 71-101, 164; proverbs illustrating, 71-2; forms of address, 72-3; behaviour, 73; factors determining status, 73-7; basis of economic inequality, 77-83; structure of economic classes, 83-92; manifestation of class differences, 92-6; class conflicts, 96-101.
Society's Ordinance, 137.
Sorcery, 111; *see also* Magic.
State Civil Service, 34.
State Councils (*Majlis Negri*), 20, 33.
State Legislative Council, 33-4, 154, 156.
Status, 7, 8, 24, 162-3, 166, 167, 169; factors determining, 73-7; forms of address and, 72-3; in marriage, 94-6; land accumulation and, 78; of 'leader-brokers', 168; of political party leaders, 137, 138, 139, 146, 147, 150; relationship of classes to, 91-2.
Sultan, 16, 27, 119, 124; loss of powers under British rule of, 18-19, 20; post-Independence role of, 33; *see also* Traditional leaders.
Sumatra, 45, 79, 144.
Sungai Sireh, 158.
Surat Tauliah (letter of authority), 117.
Surau, *see* Prayer houses.
'Swamp padi' (*padi paya*), 4-5, 77, 94; *see also* Rice cultivation.
Swift, M.G., 1, 2, 71, 82.
Syarikat kerja, *see* Work teams.

Tahlil (Islamic ritual), 61, 105, 110.
Tamil vernacular education, 22.
Tapioca, 58.
Tarawih (Ramadhan prayer), 61.
Taukih (rich businessman), 100.
Tax, revenue collection, 18, 19, 118, 155; land, 78, 120, 130.
Teachers, *see* Education.
Teachers' Association, 147-8.
Teachers' Co-operative, 147, 149.
Teluk Batu, 43, 50, 51, 56, 62, 66, 67, 69.
Teluk Gong area, land squatters in, 158, 159.
Temerloh, 4, 58, 59, 115.
Tenant farmers, 89, 93, 97, 139.
Territory: institutions based on, 51-7; village, 42-4, 164.
Timber industry, 4, 32.
Tin mining, 15, 16, 17, 25, 32n.
Tithes, religious (*fitrah*), 108, 110, 122, 143.
Tok Empat, 116-17; *see also* Headman.
Tok Gajah, 20.
Tolong-menolong, *see* Mutual help.
Torrens System, 78.
Towns, *see* Urban development.
Trade, *see* Commerce.
Traditional leaders, aristocracy, 161,

162, 166-7, 169; political party leadership and, 142-3; *penghulu* and headman, 116-31; religious functionaries, 108-16; under British administration, 19-20, 26; village elders, 102-8.
Traditional beliefs, spirits, 63-5, 75; functionaries in practices of, 108, 110-15, 116; rites, 171-3.
Trengganu, 15, 16, 30, 31.
Tuk, see Datuk.

United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 29, 30-1, 33, 36, 66-7, 125, 128, 129, 131, 132-5, 144-5, 147-8, 149, 153, 156-7; leadership of, 137, 139, 142, 145-6, 151, 159, 165.
Upper classes, 26, 34-5, 38.
Urban development, communities, 17-18, 25, 41, 100, 161, 164, 168.
Ustaz (Islamic functionary), 108, 110.
Utusan Melayu (newspaper), 113.

Vigilante corps, 123.
Village (*kampung*), 39-70, 163, 169-70; definitions of, 40-2; economic basis, 57-9; elders, 102-8; fission and fusion of, 67-70; headman, 116-19, 126-8; institutions based on territory and kinship, 51-7; kinship basis, 44-51; liaison between national leadership and, 154-60, 167; Malay concept or, 40; political parties/leadership and, 133, 134, 137-54; politico-administrative basis, 65-7; relationship between headman and penghulu, 124-6, 127; religious basis, 59-65; religious functionaries, 108-16; rites for protection of, 171-2; role of penghulu in, 122-4, 128-31; territorial basis, 42-4; *see also* Peasants; Social stratification.

Wakil rakyat (people's representatives), 33-4, 154, 155, 162, 165, 167.
Wealth, 108, 142; as factor determining status, 74, 76-7, 91, 138, 168; from land accumulation, 78-80; of 'lender-brokers', 168.
Weber, M., 8, 10.
Welfare Societies, 140, 141.
West Malaysia, 1n.
Wilson, P.J., 41.
Witchcraft, 63, 103; *see also* Magic.
Women, *padi* co-operative groups of, 55.
Working-class: lack of solidarity between peasants and, 25; racial conflicts and, 37, 38; rural, non-agricultural, 90, 91; support for political parties by, 135; *see also* Peasants.
Work teams (*syarikat kerja*), 55, 93-4, 146, 169; *see also* Co-operation.
Worsley, P., 28.

Young Malays Association (*Kesatuan Melayu Muda*: KMM), 28.
Young people: attitude to village elders of, 104-6; and to religion, 116; support for political parties by, 133.
Youth clubs, 140, 141, 147.
Yusuf, Raja, 20.

Sociological studies of present-day Malay society are rather rare. While studies of economic aspects of that society and of social change generally have been made, little attention has been given to rural leadership. The main objectives of this study are to examine the nature of rural Malay society, to identify the various types of leaders existing in the different communities, to trace their functions in the context of the environment and to assess their effectiveness.

Since independence, the structure of Malay society has been radically changed. Though these changes have affected the cities and towns far more than the rural areas, even here changes in leadership have occurred. It is found that although the elders and religious leaders still retain limited functions, a new type of leadership without traditional roots—that of the landlord, the government and party official—has developed with the penetration of new political and administrative institutions. For the purpose of this study, detailed first-hand research has been carried out in three rural communities, each with differing predominant economic occupation—fishing, rice-growing and rubber tapping—in different parts of West Malaysia.

This is very much a pioneering work which deserves to be widely read by those concerned with social change as it infringes on peasant life not only in Malaysia but also further afield.

Other books in the series

DAVID LIM
Economic Growth and Development
in West Malaysia 1947–1970

LEE SOO ANN
Economic Growth and the Public Sector
in Malaya and Singapore 1948–1960

JOE ENGLAND and JOHN REAR
Chinese Labour under British Rule
A Critical Study of Labour Relations and Law in Hong Kong

N.J. MINERS
The Government and Politics of Hong Kong

LOH FOOK SENG
Seeds of Discord
British Politics and Educational Policy in the Federated Malay States 1874–1940

east asian social science monographs

Price $17.50 (in Malaysia only)

ISBN 0 19 580306 X