The Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia

The Cultural Problems of Malaysia

MALAYSIAN SOCIETY OF ORIENTALISTS

Since the founding of Malaysia, it has become clear that the most urgent problem of multiracial and multicultural Malaysia, is the integration of its peoples and cultures in, or rather, into a modern nation. Formulated in these terms, the problem, however, is far from being only a Malaysian one. It is related to, or better, is only one aspect of the cultural problems of the whole of Southeast Asia, which through the centuries, has accepted so many cultural traits from the great cultural traditions of the world, and thus has become the greatest melting-pot of the most important cultural traditions in human history. The cultures of China, India, the Middle East and modern Europe as well as the indigenous Malay-Polynesian culture have here entered into a conflict and confluence as nowhere else in the world. And nowhere else in the whole of Southeast Asia are these conflicts and confluences represented in such an urgent and concrete form as in Malaysia.

This book is a collection of papers presented at the first conference of the Malaysian Society of Orientalists at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur. It can be considered as a first attempt at an assessment of the rich and multifarious cultural heritage of Malaysia as part of Southeast Asia and of the world at large, in its creativeness, its various concepts and ideas. The presentation of the structure, concepts and ideals of the great cultural traditions and their present day manifestations in Malaysia, may give not only an insight into the complex cultural forces and processes at work in Malaysia and Southeast Asia, but will also provide the social and cultural engineer with relevant material in his efforts to mould the growing Malaysian culture.

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The Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia

The Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the Context of Southeast Asia

Papers presented at the first conference of the Malaysian Society of Orientalists held in Kuala Lumpur from the 22nd until the 25th of October 1965.

Edited by
S. Takdir Alisjahbana
Xavier S. Thani Nayagam
Wang Gungwu

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Preface

SINCE THE FOUNDING OF MALAYSIA, it has become clear that the most urgent problem of multiracial and multicultural Malaysia, is the integration of its peoples and cultures in, or rather, into a modern nation. Formulated in these terms, the problem, however, is far from being only a Malaysian one. It is related to, or better, is only one aspect of the cultural problems of the whole of Southeast Asia, which through the centuries has accepted so many cultural traits from the great cultural traditions of the world, and thus has become the greatest melting-pot of the most important cultural traditions in human history. The cultures of China, India, the Middle East and modern Europe as well as the indigenous Malay-Polynesian culture have here entered into a conflict and confluence as nowhere else in the world. And nowhere else in the whole of Southeast Asia are these conflicts and confluences represented in such an urgent and concrete form as in Malaysia.

The purpose of the first conference of the Malaysian Society of Orientalists held from 22nd until 25th of October 1965 was, first and foremost, to arrive at an assessment of the rich and multifarious cultural heritage of Malaysia as part of Southeast Asia and of the world at large, in its creativeness, its various concepts and ideas. It is hoped that the conference was able to analyse the changes and mutual influences of the various cultural traits. The presentation of the structure, concepts and ideals of the great cultural traditions and their present day manifestations in Malaysia, may give not only an insight into the complex cultural forces and processes at work in Malaysia and Southeast Asia, but will also provide the social and cultural engineer with relevant material in his efforts to mould the growing Malaysian culture.

The Malaysian Society of Orientalists considers its first conference, organized within only three months, a considerable success. It wants to express its gratitude not only to the authors, who on short notice have prepared their papers, but also to the many participants, who have contributed to the importance and liveliness of the discussions in the various sessions. We regret very much that we have not been able to include a report on the various discussions in this publication.

It is, however, from the outset clear that the conference was able to cope only with a small part of the manifold aspects and problems of such a broad field of social and cultural processes. This first conference should therefore be considered as only a beginning for a number of research projects and discussions in the future, which through their more limited and specialized character should be able to deal with the various social and cultural problems of Malaysia more intensively.

It is with this in mind that we publish the papers of the first conference of the Malaysian Society of Orientalists on the cultural problems of Malaysia in the context of Southeast Asia.

The Malaysian Society of Orientalists wants also to express its gratitude to the Government, the Asia Foundation and Lee Foundation for their generous financial support for the conference and the University of Malaya, which put at the disposal of the conference its various facilities.

S. TAKDIR ALISJAHBANA
President, Malaysian Society of Orientalists

The International Congress of Orientalists and the Malaysian Society of Orientalists

THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF ORIENTALISTS is not a centralised organization, in the sense that it does not have a permanent secretary or committee. Its present statute, adopted at a plenary meeting in Paris, dates from 1897. According to its statute the committee of the country where the next congress will be held, functions as the committee of the Congress as a whole. The Congresses are held every three years. The last one held in January 1964 in New Delhi was the 25th Congress, the 24th Congress was held in 1960 in Moscow, the 23rd in 1954 in Cambridge, the 22nd in 1951 in Istanbul and the 21st in 1948 in Paris. The next Congress will be held in 1967 in Madison, Wisconsin, U.S.A.

The aim of the congresses is to create a meeting ground for Western and Eastern scholars interested in the culture of the East, to exchange the results of their studies and research as well as their views regarding the cultures of the East.

The Malaysian Society of Orientalists was inaugurated on 14th September 1963 and registered on 8th June 1964. The aims of the Society are to promote the study of the languages, cultures and societies of Asia in general, and Malaysia in particular. The activities of the Society include:

1. research,
2. the diffusion of knowledge related to the fields defined above by means of lectures, publications, seminars and such other media as the society may from time to time deem fit,
3. the establishment of connections with other bodies having similar aims.

Patrons of the Conference are:

The Honourable the Prime Minister, Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj.

The Honourable the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak

The present Council of the Malaysian Society of Orientalists is as follows:

President

Professor S. Takdir Alisjahbana

Hon. Secretary

Enche Yunus Maris

Hon. Treasurer

Mr. B. A. V. Peacock

Ordinary Members

Professor Wolfgang Franke
Professor Ho Peng Yoke
Mr. Tom Harrisson (Kuching)
Enche Lokman bin Musa
Tuan Haji A. Mubin Sheppard
Professor Xavier Z. Thani Nayagam
Professor K. G. Tregonning (Singapore)

Constitution of the Malaysian Society of Orientalists

I. *Name and Address*

The name of the Society shall be the Malaysian Society of Orientalists, hereinafter called the Society. The address of the Society shall be the address of the current Hon. Secretary. (Current address: c/o The Department of Malay Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur).

II. *Aims*

The aims of the Society shall be to promote the study of the languages, cultures and societies of Asia in general, and Malaysia in particular.

III. *Activities*

The activities of the Society shall include:

(*i*) research,

(*ii*) the diffusion of knowledge related to the fields defined above (Rule II) by means of lectures, publications, seminars and such other media as the Society may from time to time deem fit,

(*iii*) the establishment of connections with other bodies having similar aims.

IV. *Funds*

The funds of the Society shall be derived from the following sources:

(*i*) subscriptions,

(*ii*) grants and donations,

(*iii*) such other sources as the Council of the Society may from time to time deem fit.

V. *Membership*

Membership of the Society shall be open to all those interested in the aims of the Society, subject to the approval of the Council. Membership shall be of three categories:

(*i*) ordinary membership,
(*ii*) life membership,
(*iii*) honorary membership.

(*i*) *Ordinary membership*

(*a*) Applications for ordinary membership shall be made to the Hon. Secretary, proposed and seconded by members of the Society.

(*b*) Ordinary members shall be elected by the Council.

(*c*) The subscription for ordinary membership shall be $15.00 a year, payable to the Hon. Treasurer of the Society before June of the current year.

(*d*) Resignation from ordinary membership shall be made by letter to the Hon. Secretary, but subscriptions shall not be refunded.

(*e*) An ordinary member who fails to pay his subscription for two years shall be deemed to have resigned his membership. Such member shall be readmitted into the Society on payment of all his arrears.

(*f*) Ordinary members shall have voting rights at the General Meetings and shall be eligible to stand for the offices of the Society.

(*ii*) *Life membership*

(*a*) Applications for life membership shall be made to the Hon. Secretary, proposed and seconded by members of the Society.

(*b*) Life members shall be elected by the Council.

(*c*) Life membership shall be conferred on the applicant on payment of a lump sum of $200/- to the Hon. Treasurer of the Society.

(*d*) A life member can resign his membership, but his life subscription shall not be refunded unless approved by the Council.

(*e*) Life members shall have voting rights in the General Meeting and shall be eligible to stand for the offices of the Society.

(*iii*) *Honorary membership*

(*a*) Honorary membership shall be conferred by the Society on the recommendation of the Council on any person who has rendered a distinguished service to Oriental scholarship.

(*b*) Honorary members shall pay no subscriptions, but shall

enjoy all the privileges of ordinary members except voting rights and eligibility to stand for the offices of the Society.

VI. *Officers of the Society*

(*i*) The officers of the Society shall be elected for one year at the Annual General Meeting and shall hold office until their successors are elected.

(*ii*) The Officers of the Society shall comprise:

a President,
a Vice-President,
an Hon. Secretary,
an Hon. Treasurer, and
seven Councillors.

VII. *The Council*

(*i*) The Council shall be the governing body of the Society and shall be composed of the officers of the Society.

(*ii*) The Council shall meet at least twice a year.

(*iii*) The quorum of a Council meeting shall be six.

(*iv*) The Council shall have the power to co-opt any ordinary or life member to be an officer of the Society in place of an officer who vacates his office because of resignation or illness.

VIII. *Election of Officers*

(*i*) Nominations duly proposed and seconded by members and signed by the candidate must be received by the Secretary three weeks before the Annual General Meeting.

(*ii*) Election shall be by secret ballot by members present at the Annual General Meeting or by post. Postal votes shall reach the Secretary of the Society two days before the Annual General Meeting.

IX. *Annual General Meeting*

(*i*) The Annual General Meeting shall be held in the month of September of each year after at least two weeks' notice has been given to all ordinary and life members.

(*ii*) Fifteen ordinary or life members shall form a quorum at the Annual General Meeting.

(*iii*) The Annual General Meeting shall receive reports from the outgoing Council and elect a new Council for the coming year.

X. *Extraordinary General Meeting*

(*i*) The Council shall call for an Extraordinary General Meeting at any time on receipt by the Hon. Secretary of a written requisition signed by at least five ordinary or life members desiring to submit any specified resolution to such a meeting.

(*ii*) At least two weeks' notice shall be given to ordinary and life members before such a meeting is held.

(*iii*) The quorum for such a meeting shall be as in Clause IX (ii).

XI. *Amendment to the Constitution*

Amendments to this Constution must be proposed in writing to the Council, who shall submit them to an Extraordinary General Meeting called for that purpose, or to the next Annual General Meeting. The proposed amendments shall accompany notices sent to ordinary and life members under Clauses IX (i) and X (ii). Amendments shall be approved only if they are voted for by two-thirds of the members present at the Extraordinary or Annual General Meeting. If approved the Amendments shall come into force on the date resolved at the meeting. No amendment to the rules shall be operative without the prior sanction of the Registrar of Societies.

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Welcome Address by the President of the Malaysian Society of Orientalists

HONOURABLE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is with great pleasure that on behalf of the Malaysian Society of Orientalists, I welcome you at this opening ceremony of the Conference on the Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the context of Southeast Asia.

The Malaysian Society of Orientalists was inaugurated on the 14th of September 1963 and registered on the 18th of June 1964. The aims of the Society are to promote the study of the languages, cultures and societies of Asia in general, and Malaysia in particular. The activities of the Society include: 1. research, 2. the diffusion of knowledge related to the fields defined earlier, by means of lectures, publications, seminars and such other media as the Society may deem fit, and 3. the establishment of connections with other bodies pursuing similar aims.

The name of the Society indicates, that it was from the outset the intention to create an organization of scholars in Malaysia, who share the great interest in the cultures of the Orient, which since the last century has crystallised in the well-known International Congresses of Orientalists, which take place every three years. The last, the 25th International Congress of Orientalists, which was held in New Delhi in January 1964, was attended by several representatives from Malaysia. The 24th Congress was held in Moscow in 1960, the 23rd in Cambridge in 1954, the 22nd in Istanbul in 1951 and the 21st in Paris in 1948. The purpose of these international gatherings is to create a meeting-ground for Western and Eastern scholars, interested in the cultures of the East, to exchange the results of their studies and research as well as their views regarding the cultures of the East.

As a Malaysian organization, the Malaysian Society of Orientalists is, of course, first of all interested in the study of the cultures of Malaysia. In speaking about Malaysian cultures, however, we unavoidably speak of the basic cultural traditions of the whole of the Orient, since — without exaggeration — in no other part of the world have the cultures of Asia come to a confluence and confrontation as in Malaysia. All of the great cultural traditions of Asia, which were founded in the millennium before the Christian era by such philosophers and religion builders as Confucius, Moti, and Lao-tse in China, the thinkers of the Uppanishads, Buddha and Mahavira in India and the semitic prophets in the Arab Peninsula, have through the centuries reached Southeast Asia, reached Malaysia. Together with the native culture of the Malays, who about the same time as the emergence of these great cultural traditions, spread from the mainland of Asia over thousands of islands in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, these great cultural traditions are still until our days the most important determinants in the social and cultural life of Malaysia.

It is even more than that. During the last centuries also secular Western culture penetrated into Southeast Asia and Malaysia, a culture which developed from the philosophy of the Greeks, who about the same time as the great Asian thinkers courageously liberated themselves from mythological thought, and thus became the great pioneers of our modern secular culture.

Thus the name Oriental culture has, in fact, within not even a century already become outdated, since Western culture is already a vital part of modern Oriental cultures themselves, we can say has even become the yeast, which has started the great cultural fermentation in Asia, no less radical than the fermentation caused by Christianity, this Eastern religion which has changed European man and his culture in the past.

This, in a nutshell, shows us the complex problems and at the same time the fascinating challenge of the present cultural situation in Malaysia as part of Southeast Asia and the world. It is the same problems which this country is facing in its efforts at nation-building.

The Malaysian Society of Orientalists has chosen this unique social and cultural situation of Malaysia as the object of its first conference, in the hope to be able to contribute to the mutual understanding and cooperation between the various social and

cultural groups, and in this way to contribute to the integration of the people of Malaysia. The Society is fully aware of the complexity and comprehensiveness of the cultural problems, which Malaysia and Southeast Asia are facing in this decisive epoch of world history, and is conscious of the limitations of its own possibilities in the present phase of intellectual development in Malaysia. But somewhere a start has to be made to build up an atmosphere of calm and tolerant dialogue and deliberation, of open mindedness and honest endeavour for mutual understanding among the various cultures and social groups in Malaysia in the hope that a new creative zeal will arise out of such contacts and dialogues. History has taught us that societies and cultures are constantly changing and that contact and communication between societies and cultures has led to higher and more comprehensive social and cultural structures.

The intention of this first conference of the Malaysian Society of Orientalists is to make a general orientation of the basic elements, processes and problems of cultural life in Malaysia. The society hopes to be able to attract the interest of experts as well as laymen, so that out of this conference research and further discussions will follow. About twenty papers have been written on the Chinese, Indian, Islamic, Malay and Western cultures. The writers have attempted to give a characterization of the various great cultural traditions and a description of their present manifestations in Malaysia as a result of their mutual contacts and influences.

Since it is the first conference in Malaysia which deals with such a broad array of cultures, cultural traits, and cultural processes, it goes without saying that we had to overcome many difficulties and obstacles. In the present intellectual situation in Malaysia our choice of experts in the various cultural fields is rather limited. Many competent people are overburdened with work at the present stage of development in Malaysia and were not able to participate or contribute their thoughts to this conference; if nevertheless, many of them, out of a consciousness of social responsibility, made their contributions, they did so under pressure of time and work on relatively short notice. About twenty papers have been written on the various social and cultural items and problems in Malaysia; three came from Singapore. I want to use this opportunity to thank the authors warmly for their valuable contributions. After this conference the papers will be published in book form, the various

writers will be given sufficient time to change or improve their papers, taking advantage of the discussions during the conference.

To our great dismay we have not been able to collect enough papers for this conference from and on the Borneo territories. We are most grateful to the authorities of the Sarawak Museum, that Mr. Benedict Sandin from the Sarawak Museum is able to participate in the conference and will present to us films on the famous pre-historical excavation of Niah and on tribal life in Borneo. I am convinced that these films will be highly appreciated and will substantially help to increase our knowledge about the Eastern parts of Malaysia. We are most obliged to Filem Negara Malaysia for allowing us to show these films in its Studio in Jalan Utara, Petaling Jaya.

The Malaysian Society of Orientalists is most grateful for the encouragement and support it received from the government. It is a great honour for the society that the Honourable Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj and the Honourable Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak have accepted our invitation to function as patrons for this first conference.

The Malaysian Society of Orientalists expresses also its sincere gratitude to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports, to the Asia Foundation and the Lee Foundation for their generous financial support for this conference. And last but not least, the Society wants to thank the authorities of the University of Malaya, who did not only encourage the conference, but also put at its disposal the various facilities of the University. And it must be said, that to a great extent this conference is the result of a close cooperation between the Departments of Chinese, Indian, Malay and Islamic Studies and the Department of History of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Malaya. We hope that this conference will mark a new era of intensive cooperation between the various departments for the promotion of social and cultural understanding and scholarship in the University as well as outside the University.

Opening Address by Tun Abdul Razak bin Hussein Al Haj, the H'ble the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaysia

I AM VERY GLAD TO BE HERE TODAY and to be given the honour of opening your conference. I am sorry I am only here merely to declare open this conference. I wish that I had time to spend the next three days with you taking part in all your discussions.

The subject of your conference "the Cultural Problems of Malaysia in the context of South East Asia" is one, not only of tremendous interest to me personally but also of vital importance to the people of Malaysia and the future development of this country.

Malaysia, as most of you well know, is a multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-cultural country. It is a meeting place of the great cultures of the great countries of Asia — of India, China and the Malay-Polynesian region of Asia. Also in comparatively recent history, Malaysia has been the subject of cultural impacts and influences by countries of the Middle East and by European countries. Therefore Malaysia can truly be said to be the melting-pot of the cultures of the great world. You will therefore agree with me that cultural problems of Malaysia will make a very interesting study as Malaysia represents various cultures of Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

I must say this conference that you are now holding on the Cultural Problems of Malaysia is indeed timely. Since independence Malaysia has undergone rapid changes and development in various fields of activities. Our main problem and one uppermost in the Government's mind is the welding together of the various racial groups that have made this country their home and the object of their undivided loyalty. It has always been the policy of this government, the Alliance Government, to maintain and strengthen goodwill and understanding and friendship among our people of all races so that ultimately they will be able to regard themselves as

members of one nation, as one people. This process must necessarily take time but it must be the unshakeable determination of all of us to move ahead towards this ultimate goal so that we can build a happy, prosperous and united country. Therefore in our task of building a united nation, development of culture is a problem to which we must pay due attention.

As I have said, Malaysia is a melting-pot of the most important cultural traditions in human history. Here the cultures of China, India, the Middle East, Europe and the indigenous Malay-Polynesian culture have come together into one area as nowhere else in the world. Therefore the challenge that faces the leadership of this country today is the development, and harmonization of these various cultures, so that we can evolve a truly national culture. That is why ever since our achievement of independence, the development of our culture has been the subject of discussion and thought, not only by the government but by various voluntary bodies. I am indeed happy there has been established now a Malaysian Society of Orientalists which I have no doubt will play a great part in helping to promote the study of cultures and languages of our multi-racial society.

In the development of our society our policy must be not to change existing patterns of our culture in the sense that we impose a new pattern of culture on to our people but we should rather develop existing traditions and the way of life, evolve them into a way of life that is compatible with modern development and with the national aspiration of our people.

The various parts of Malaysia had been subject to colonial rule for over a century. Fortunately under the British colonial rule our traditional way of life, our customs were allowed to remain and in many cases undisturbed. Therefore with independence there came a general awakening among our people to evolve our own cultural identity as opposed to political and cultural domination by the colonial power.

Ever since we achieved independence, we have endeavoured to carry out development, to give our people greater opportunities in the various fields of activities and to give them a higher and better standard of living. Our development programme does not only include the development of our economy and the development of a higher standard of living but also the development of other things essential to the people of a happy nation; the

development of a free personality, free to smile, free to worship, free to talk, free to choose one's own way of life and free to advance by the application of one's own effort and ability. We have to carry out all these developments through democratic processes. We have a democratic Constitution which not only guarantees every one of our citizens a rightful place in our country but also protects his rights and priviliges. We believe in the ideals of freedom, justice and fair play and these ideals are embodied in our Constitution.

It has therefore been the cardinal policy of the Alliance Government within the structure of our democratic Constitution to direct all our efforts in all our National policies towards creating strong, united and loyal citizens from the various races in our country. Our National Education Policy is aimed at bringing our children of all races together, learning the same things in the same way and under the same roof so that they will feel they share the same ideals and the same destiny.

Ladies and gentlemen, we in the Government are most interested to know your views, your assessments, your findings of the various problems in cultural development of our country. We will be interested to know the cultural impact on nation building in a multiracial society such as ours. We will be interested to know the ways in which we can change the attitude of our people, their approach to life so that they will be imbued with a spirit of self-reliance and self-respect. Our policy is not only to build a united people but also to make them stand on their own feet particularly those in the rural areas so that they will have self-reliance and self-respect necessary for a civilized and progressive nation. The progress of a nation is the sum-total of the efforts of all its citizens and we must therefore be able to exhort every one of our citizens to do his or her best to make this country a happy place for our people and for our children in the years to come. Ladies and Gentlemen, having posed these various problems facing our country and our people, I have great pleasure in declaring your Conference open and wishing it all the success that it deserves.

Thank you.

Confluence and Conflict of Culture in Malaysia in World Perspective

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IT IS NOT POSSIBLE to speak about the cultural problems of present day Malaysia without referring to the most important cultural developments throughout the world, since Malaysia, because of its position in Southeast Asia, belongs to that part of the world where the great cultural traditions of the world have come to a confluence and confrontation as nowhere else. To the cultural historian this means that he has to face the tremendous task to analyse the interrelated and complex history of various cultures in the world during a period of thousands of years.

We know that in no field of research and reflection are the methods and objects as well as the concepts so varying and contradictory as in the field of culture. Even on the definition and classification of what we call culture does not exist agreement of opinion.

It is obvious that in our analysis, we will not be able to use the micro approach of anthropologists such as Kluckhohn who writes about the five American cultures, the Navahos, Zunis, Spanish Americans, Mormons, and Texans, although we can take advantage of his methods and way of thinking. For the description of the great cultural entities and traditions, his concepts are too detailed. For the analysis of the cultural development in the world during thousands of years we need more comprehensive generalizations. We enter then the field of cultural philosophy or cultural history in the widest sense of the word. Hegel for example discerns Oriental, Greek, Roman and Germanic-Christian cultures as the four stages of man's historical life: childhood, youth, manhood and old age. Spengler distinguishes Western, Greek, Magian, Indian,

Chinese, Egyptian, and Babylonian cultures. Toynbee arrives at twenty-one civilizations: Egyptiac, Sumeric, Babylonic, Hittite, Syriac, Minoan, Hellenic, Iranic, Arabic, Hindu, Indic, Sinic, Far Eastern, Andean, Yucatec, Mayan, Mexic, Orthodox Christian, and Western; if the abortive civilizations are included his list comes to twenty-nine.

These much larger classifications are not appropriate for our analysis either. The Hegelian classification bears too much the marks of the 19th century, when the European culture, and in this case the Germanic-Christian culture, was considered the highest and last phase of cultural progress. The classification of Spengler left too little space for mutual influences of cultures in his concept of cultures as organisms, each with its own life span and story. Toynbee is in his classification not really interested in the definition of cultural entities with their own structure, concepts and ideal; for him cultures or, as he calls them, civilizations are only objects of his historical description.

In facing the cultural development of the world as a unity, we cannot escape seeing the cultural history of the world as the manifestation of Man's great potentialities to create culture. Our most difficult problem is then to determine where and when to start with our analysis. Although so much has been revealed about the great mystery of the origin of man, it is by far not yet clear, when and where the humanization took place, when and where man started to have language and tools at his disposal. Are the few human artifacts in Africa, Indonesia and China, etc. milestones on the long road of humanization, so that we can speak of a polygenesis of the human species, or must we come to the conclusion that the present homo sapiens is the result of a single development from a certain time and in a certain area? There are no clear answers to this question, but on deeper analysis it is also not relevant for the cultural problems we are facing at this conference. Even the high cultures of Egypt, Babylonia, the Indus and Hoangho Valley from the fifth until the third millennium B.C. are not important for us, since there exists no direct relationship between these cultures and the present cultures of Malaysia. It was the time that cultures had a more isolated existence, resulting from the fact that contact and communication between the cultures were still very limited.

For the development of the cultures of Malaysia and the whole area of Southeast Asia the first millennium B.C. is more important

since it is the great cultural processes during that time which had the greatest influence not only on the cultural life of Southeast Asia, but we even can say on the present cultural situation in the whole world.

Various scholars on the cultural history of the world have been struck by the great cultural events which took place around the fifth century B.C., or more accurately between 800 and 200 B.C. It is as if out of the immense fluid ocean of cultural history in a relatively short time arose highest mountainous islands, which changed the total cultural landscape of the world until our time.

It is true that the study of pre-historical artifacts shows us that already very early some communications existed between the various cultures in prehistorical time. But real meaningful cultural communications, which still influence the cultural scenery of our planet, took place after the epoch when in a rather short span of time in China, India, the Arab Peninsula and Greece great thinkers and religious builders emerged: Confucius, Moti, Lao-tse in China, the thinkers of the Upanisads, Buddha and Mahavira in India, the Prophets in the Arab Peninsula, Parmenides, Heraclit and Plato in Greece.

This sudden synchronic outburst of human speculative and contemplative forces in places far and more or less isolated from each other, is the basis of the great cultural traditions of our time. Confucius' tenets are still the living belief of hundreds of millions of Chinese, Buddha's doctrine is not only the basis of the dominating religion in Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Ceylon but it plays also an important role among the Chinese and Japanese. From the semitic prophets of the Arab Peninsula derive the great religions of Christianity, which covers at present the whole of Europe, America, Australia and great parts of even Asia and Africa, and Islam which is the religion of hundreds of millions of people in Asia and Africa, while Greek philosophy is the very basis of our secular modern culture, which through its development during the Roman empire, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, had reached its highest scientific achievement in Europe and America.

What are the characteristics of these first high cultures, if we compare them with earlier cultures? It is undeniably clear, that with the rise of the various thinkers and religious builders around the fifth century B.C. the human species arrived at a new phase

in its spiritual and mental development. The thinkers, philosophers and religious builders arrived at a new consciousness of man and his life, of the world and the universe, transcending far above the magical-accidentalism of the magical and dynamical world and life view of the primitive, and even of the mythical methaphysics of Egyptian and Babylonic cultures of two or three thousand years earlier. It is as if man had discovered a new way of thinking, a new insight not only into himself and the world, but also into the forces around him and thus experienced a deep discontent with his existing culture. Through its most talented representatives mankind started to ask the most radical questions about life, the surrounding nature, and the mysterious powers, and thus arrived at new concepts, new ideals, which went together with a deepening of life experience and thought. It was in this time that the accidental, prelogical consciousness of magical powers and mythological relations gradually became transformed into more rational systems, manifesting a more systematic and logical thought process. Social and cultural life experienced a crisis. One of the most characteristic tendencies of this new systematical and radical thinking is the pursue of extreme abstraction. While the Greek philosophy of nature attempted to arrive at the ultimate substance or truth of the world around man, the Jewish prophets were wrestling with the concept of the unity of God as the base and the ruler of the universe. In India to the concept of Brahma, as the total and ultimate concept to which atma returns, is added the Buddhistic concept of Nirwana, the ultimate goal of all life, when the curtain of ignorance is removed. In China Confucius laid the foundations of the largest social-political structure in history based on the loyalty of children to the parents and of the citizen to the king and the state, on moderateness, on realism, and on a system of education for an efficient civil service, which until our time still influences the cultural life and thought of the Chinese.

It is clear that there was a great difference between the concepts and ideals of Confucius and Buddha, between those of Buddha and the prophets and those of the prophets and the Greek thinkers. But compared to those of an earlier time, these concepts and ideals had many traits in common, such as the radicality of their questions, the uncompromising seriousness of their search for solutions, and the comprehensiveness and logic of their concepts and ideas. It is as if they all experienced the universality and unity of man and his

destiny, and attempted not only to formulate this experience in a broad and severe rationality, but also attempted to live according to these experiences and concepts, regardless of their consequences. It was the time that Buddha left his princely life for the sake of ultimate truth, that philosophers and thinkers moved from one place to another as in China and Greece to teach, that hermits retreated from life out of an inner religious urge. Man discovered a new limitless spiritual order, out of which he could understand and judge the world and himself. Out of this extreme power of thought and understanding, a new comprehensive world and life view emerged replacing the old, which had been bound to the tribes, to the local magical and mythological beliefs and practices. A great social revolution took place. The warring small states in China made place for the great kingdom of Tsin Chi Huang Ti, and it was the Han dynasty which made Confucianism the official doctrine of the state. In India, the Maurya dynasty was established and united the many small states into the great Buddhistic kingdom of Asoka. It was also the great age of Augustus when the Greek-Roman culture was incorporated in a powerful kingdom, which commanded the whole area around the Mediterranean until Western Europe.

The breakthrough of this new attitude and courageous reflection was not only a breakthrough of individualism, which gave to the world new religions and philosophies, but also went together with an expansion of ethical responsibility far beyond the border of the clan or tribe: an ethical universalism came into being, which became not only the basis of the new large kingdoms, but which also made it possible that the new religions, philosophies and ethical systems spread through the whole world. Thus Buddhism moved to Southeast Asia, China and even Japan. Greek thinking spread through the area around the Mediterranean, to Western Europe. Chinese learning became accepted in Japan and the surrounding countries of Korea, and Indo-China. We know that a half millennium later Christianity emerged out of the tenets of the semitic prophets and conquered the whole of Europe, where it came to a unique synthesis with the continuation of Greek thought, which we call European culture and which has such a great impact on the culture of the modern world all around the globe. A half millennium later arose from the same semitic cultural atmosphere Islam, which spread in a short time through Asia and Africa.

Thus the extraordinary mental and spiritual upheaval around the fifth century B.C. has had the most far-reaching consequences for the whole world. It is the birth of these broad, universal beliefs, concepts, and ethics, setting free great expansive energy for the organizations of political entities such as the Han, Maurya and Roman empires that brought about a new, hitherto non-existent communication between the human race. The relationship between the Middle East and India increased further in the following centuries, but also China came out of its isolation through the opening of the silk road. At the beginning of the Christian era there existed a regular contact and exchange of goods, people and cultures between the greatest cultural centers of the world. In the following centuries searoads were opened, the Indian Ocean and the China Sea became the most important roads for the Malay, Indian, Persian and Arab ships, enabling a continuous contact and communication between these great cultural traditions.

The great importance of the last millennium B.C. has of course long attracted the attention of historians and philosophers. In the last decade it was Karl Jaspers[1], who especially emphasized this period by qualifying it as *die Achsenzeit*, the time of the axis of history, i.e. the most decisive epoch in the history of man, in which the great human potentialities broke through and a common framework of historical self-knowledge for all people of the world became manifest. That was the time from which all our present social and cultural life were derived. No peoples in the world have been able to escape its impact without being forgotten in primitivism.

It is clear that some speculations have been made about the cause of this more or less simultaneous, mysterious upsurge of human spiritual and mental life over a relatively small area of the world. Biological phenomena behind this change are not known, nor are other natural causes. Social phenomena such as the endless struggle and strife of small political units before and during this decisive epoch, could have been strong stimulating pressures for man to think and speculate, and to attempt to arrive at radical, more comprehensive solutions. Alfred Weber[2] made the bold

1. Karl Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, Frankfurt/M, 1956, p.14.
2. Alfred Weber, *Kulturgeschichte als Kultursociologie*, Muenchen, 1950, p.42.

assumption that it might be the use of the horse as a draft animal and steed which gave man not only a new feeling of self-confidence and power, but also a new perception of time and space, of life and the world. Another factor might have been that in this period the restless cattle-breeding nomads, with their dynamic patriarchal social organization conquered the more prosperous sedentary, well organized agricultural, matriarchal societies, and a fertile synthesis of logic, technique, social organization and religious concepts came into being, resulting in an unknown upsurge of social organization, science and technique as well as a systematization of religious belief.

During this time Southeast Asia was not yet on the cultural scenery of the world. Like Western Europe, Japan and many other parts of the world, it did not belong to the cradle of the high cultures of the axis of history; its high culture is of secondary character. The time of the great spiritual and mental upheaval in China, India, the Arab Peninsula and Greece was still the time of its prehistory when people came wave after wave from the mainland of Asia to inhabit the Southeastern coast of Asia, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines until Madagascar, and the islands of the Pacific until Easter Island. It is at present a more or less established fact, that the ancestors of the Malays[1] came from Central Asia, from the highland of Tibet and Yunan through the great rivers which stream southwards. Speculations have been made about the motives and aims of this southward movement of the Malays. Von Eickstedt classified them as belonging to the weaker groups in the struggle for life in the arid zone of central Asia, which escaped into the tropical jungle from the pressure of stronger groups; others brought them in relation to the restless struggle and strife during the centuries of the formation of the great Chinese kingdom, which made

1. There is still little certainty about the race(s) of Southeast Asia and many terms have been applied to indicate them. Since the Sarasins the term Malay has been widely used for the dominant race in Southeast Asia, but this word has many connotations. Continental writers have used the term Indonesian but this now is the name of the population of the republic of Indonesia. Eickstedt has classified the Malays as Palae-Mongoloid. It is clear that unlike the other races in the world the native population of Southeast Asia does not represent a pure race, but is the result of a mixture. To express this mixed character, terminologies as Austro-Asiatic, Indo-Mongoloid have been attempted. I use here the term Malays, since our concern is with the Malaysian culture. It is obvious that the term Malays is used here in the most comprehen sive sense.

life so unbearable for the Malay groups. I think it is very unlikely that only the high pressure of economic and political life drove the ancestors of the Mon-Kmer, the Thais, the Javanese, the Tagalog, etc., out of their homeland or that only the weakest groups of the races of Central Asia left the land of their cradles. It seems more acceptable that only the most adventurous, the most restless of them — were challenged to move to unknown parts of the globe. It is not possible that the Central Asian economic and political pressures on the Malays were so strong and continuous, that they had to leave even the rich and fertile soil of the Southern plains of the mainland of Southeast Asia, the rich tropical jungle of the Indonesian and Philippine Islands behind and moved as far eastwards as the Easter Islands and westwards as Madagascar. The irrepressible urge for adventure, for the far and unknown distance in these people accounts for the types of boats they invented, fit for the highest seas. They were in fact the first great open seafarers in human history. Rather than by physical fear it seems to me that their drive towards remote distances was prompted not only by a natural sense for adventure, but it might be also by a belief in a mythological paradise at the ends of the horizon, as some of their old myths suggest that did not allow them to rest and settle down in the newly conquered lands. It is obvious that in this endless moving over such a great area of land and especially sea they exhausted their energies and not enough strength remained for organizations of great power and solidarity structures, for philosophical and religious speculations and contemplations. There is something sympathetic in Toynbee's verdict of the cultures of the Polynesian as arrested cultures, which "after responding boldly and successfully to the challenge of the 'salt, estranging sea', by achieving the *tour de force* of a regular maritime traffic between island and island, that the pioneers won their footing on the specks of dry land which are scattered through the watery wilderness of the Pacific almost as aparsely as the stars are scattered through space"[1] received the penalty for their reckless boldness in the form of an "exact equilibrium with the Pacific — just able to cross its vast empty spaces, but never able to cross them with any margin of security or ease — until the intolerable tension found its own relief by going slack,.....losing their grip upon the ocean and resigning

1. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History* (abridgement of Vol. I - IV). New York, 1947, p.83.

themselves to being marooned, each in his own insular paradise."[1] This arrested culture of the Polynesians on Easter Island is only an example of many of the Malay Polynesian groups, which were scattered on an area as large as half the globe on isolated islands or in isolated settlements in a thick jungle, epitomized by the mysterious colossal stone images in Easter Island or the erratic megalith in the thick jungle of South Sumatra.

It is very likely that at the time which Karl Jaspers called the axis of history, from a demographic standpoint the whole of Southeast Asia, or even of the islands of the Indian and the Pacific Ocean, was still in a fluid situation, during which the various races such as Wedass, the Dravidas, the Negritos, Palae Mongoloids etc., struggled and mixed with each other, and at last settled down, forming the great Malay or *brown race,* which is typical for the whole of Southeast Asia until Madagascar today and which to a certain extent can be considered as a mixture of Mongoloid, Indian and Australoid traits. At the beginning of the Christian era, it can be said that this movement had come to a standstill, the population of the Southeast Asian continent as well as of the islands had already settled at its present habitat. There was energy and *élan* free for real cultural development after the centuries of restless wanderings.

Many descriptions have been made of the culture of the people of Southeast Asia, on the basis of pre-history, of language relationships, on economic conditions and various artifacts. Most important is the research which has been made on the adat law and the basic religious beliefs of the people of this area. In the most general sense it can be said that the pre-Hindu society in Southeast Asia consisted of small communities, mainly living in the plains, river valleys and hills, growing rice. The buffalo was already known and used. Women played an important role in community life. Society was democratic in the sense that the difference in status between the tribe or clan members was not very large and that the most important decisions in the life of the community were taken by a council of elders on the basis of *mupakat*, i.e. mutual agreement; the head was the *primus inter pares.* At all important social events as well as at events in the life circle of individuals, cooperation and mutual help existed between the members of the

1. *Op.cit.*, p.165.

community, regulated by the adat, i.e. rules of behavior, which derived from a mythical past. Therefore the adat was holy and unchangeable, thus giving stability and at the same time a static character to the whole life of the community.

Like all primitive people in history, the way of thinking was complex, all inclusive and highly intuitive. The belief in spirits and supernatural powers dominated all aspects of individual and communal life, so that the most fundamental concern was how to get the support of the good spirits and how to avoid the evil ones, or in the case of supernatural powers, how to strengthen oneself with this supernatural power, and even control or use it for individual or social interest. Worship of the ancestors was an important aspect of the belief in spirits. For the maintenance of good relations with the spirits and powers there were all kinds of offerings, rites, incantations, taboos, etc., all of which were regulated by the adat. It is very likely that the society and culture of Southeast Asia at that time was not so different from those of India before the arrival of the Aryans. Typical in the material culture were the houses on stilts, the skill of shipbuilding, and navigation which enabled the early Malays, etc. to roam over the seas and later to play an important role in trade; metals were already known. The close relationships of the various groups over this large area is testified by the many common words in the different languages besides common morphological characteristics.

It was also around the beginning of the Christian era, that the areas of the great cultures, especially India and China, consolidated themselves after the great spiritual and material change during the period of the "axis of history." As has been said, in China the Han dynasty was able to bring about a unified China, while the same was achieved in India during the Maurya dynasty.

The contact between Southeast Asia on one hand and China and India on the other hand undoubtedly dates from an earlier period, but of paramount historical and cultural importance were the contacts with these countries after they both had achieved the high cultures of the axis of history. It was through these contacts that Southeast Asia entered history, participated in high culture. From the two Asian high cultures, it was the Indian one which played an important role in the first millennium of the history of Southeast Asia.

Like Western Europe which came into the orbit of Hellenistic-

Roman culture and Semitic prophetic religion, and was able to mould both cultural traditions into a new Germanic-Roman culture of the Middle Ages, so in Southeast Asia the local cultures came to an exuburant blossoming under the influence of the high cultures of India. Large and powerful political units arose, a new vigorous culture developed, comparable to the highest peak of social and cultural achievement in any part of the world during the first one and a half millennia of the Christian Era. It was not only the time of the powerful kingdoms such as Funan, Sriwijaya, Cambodia, Majapahit, it was also the time that a strong organizational power and religious devotion and versatile artistic geniuses produced the Borobudur, Prambanan, Ankor Vat, which belong to the greatest monuments ever built.

It is not the task of this paper to give a description of that great historical epoch of Southeast Asia. My concern here is to analyse the versatile confluence of local Southeast Asian cultures with Indian high cultures, deriving from the period of the axis of history.

A lot has been written about this confluence. In the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century the common opinion was that the great kingdoms and their imposing monuments were the creations of Indian Ksatryas, who were expelled from India, or who left their country out of an urge for adventure. Others give the honour to merchants, who brought Indian culture to the countries with which they traded, and where some of them settled down. It was in any case Indians who played the active and creative role in this cultural contact; the people of Southeast Asia were considered to have been only the passive recipients. It was the great contribution of van Leur[1] that he brought to our attention the important role of the Malays in the past in navigation and trade in South Asia, emphasising the logical consequence that it was the Malay traders and sailors themselves who were important factors in the spread of Indian culture. He also points to the fact, that the quarters of the Indian traders and merchants were in the coastal areas, while the royal residence which was the focus of Hindu-Malay civilizations was usually located more inland. Bosch[2]

1. J. C. van Leur, *Indonesian Trade and Society*, The Hague, 1955.
2. F. D. K. Bosch, *The Problem of Hindu Civilization in Indonesia*, in Selected Studies in Archaeology, The Hague, 1961; *"Local Genius" en Oud-Javaansche Kunst*, Mededelingen der Koninklijk Nederlandsche Akademie von Wetenschappen, Afd. Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, Deel 15, No. 1.

elaborated further on this view and brought more arguments to support that it must have been the people of Southeast Asia, who played the active part in the acceptance of the influences of Indian high culture and in the transformation of their own society and culture from primitivity into high cultures. In the structure of the Hindu culture it was not possible that merchants should have been the spreaders of Indian high culture which was primarily of a religious and aristocratic character. Not less important is the argument, that it was first of all the people from Southeast Asia, and especially the Malays, who were the great navigators and traders of that time. Their trade with India and Ceylon was of great importance and it must have been in their contacts with India, that the people of Southeast Asia got acquainted with and became attracted to the high cultures of India. This high culture which influenced the cultures of Southeast Asia was of a very sophisticated religious character, so that it is justified to conclude that it derived from learned religious circles and the culture of the courts in India. The argument that Indian princes brought their culture to Southeast Asia must be rejected, since, if a triumphant Indian prince had undertaken a tour of conquest to such far away countries, he would certainly have mentioned this in his prasastis. It is very likely that Southeast Asian heads or princes, who had great power in trade and commerce, invited Indian Brahmans to come to their country to lend to their position grandeur and religious sacredness, which they had learnt to admire in their contacts with India. It is also very likely that religious people from Southeast Asia themselves went in great numbers to India to study Indian religion and culture. We know that in the eighth or ninth century a great number of Southeast Asian Buddhist pilgrims were in the Nalanda monastery in the old kingdom of Magadha. It was such people who brought back to Southeast Asia the essential knowledge of Indian culture, and created in their own country native centers of study. We must remember that in the time of Itsing, Sriwijaya was a great center of learning. It is only under the assumption of such independent Southeast Asian centers of study and learning, that Southeast Asia was able to develop its independent characteristic and achievement resulting from a synthesis of native cultural elements and creativity with ideas and the highly developed techniques of Indian culture. It is, for example, obvious that the builders of Borobudur, Prambanan or Angkor Vat were

acquainted with the theories of Indian architecture and sculpture, but it is also undeniable that in these creations the people of Southeast Asia have developed their own genius, so that the results are quite different from those in India itself. I think it is safe to make the comparison, that as the works of the Renaissance in Western Europe were not created by Italians, but by Germans, French, Dutch, the great cultural achievements of Southeast Asia during the first one and a half millennia of the Christian Era were achievements of the people of Southeast Asia, under the influence of Indian high culture.

We know, that, for example, the Indonesian chandi is not the same as the Indian temple, and that it was in a sense a continuation of the Malay place for ancestor worship. The Angkor Vat has been designed on the basis of the topography of the water-rich country and interesting also is the role of the snake, deriving from native mythology, in the sculpture of Buddha. We know that even in the wayang repertoire of Java, figures from old Indonesian cults of ancestor worship have been added to the heroes of the Mahabharatta.

It is not my intention to elaborate on the analysis of Indian and native elements in the culture of Southeast Asia during its golden age, My task is to speculate how this fertile "mixing", this "fusing", this "influence", or to use Bosch's terminology "fecundation"[1] was possible? It is clear that the confluence or synthesis of cultures is, first of all, an anthropological problem, and that by creating the terminology of fecundation nothing has become clearer. Bosch has only used a mysterious biological process as metaphor for a concrete anthropological process.

The most remarkable fact of this cultural contact is that the native societies easily accepted this high culture from India and what is even more surprising, they were able to utilize its elements in combination with their own cultural elements, to create an art which in many respects surpasses that of India. It means first of all that the natives of Southeast Asia were impressed by Indian religious culture and considered the acceptance of its elements as an advantage for their life and culture. No wonder, because, viewed from Southeast Asian cultural attitude, concepts and logic the Southeast Asian cultures are not so different from the high culture

1. F.D.K. Bosch, *The Problem of the Hindu Colonisation of Indonesia*, p. 20.

of India. Between both existed so many resemblances in attitude, concepts and logic. First of all both are heavily spiritual in the sense that the deepest essence of reality is spirit and that the material reality follows the spiritual logic, which is, in the term of Hans Leisegang[1], the logic of the circle, in which god, man and animal are interchangeable in a cyclical incarnation. Furthermore the relationship between religion and art is very close; art is a substantial part of religion, since it is in art (architecture, sculpture, dance, songs, beautiful language) that religion expresses itself.

It was in this spiritualism that the native Southeast Asian and Indian life and world view had a fundamental similarity and solidarity; in both there was not a sudden leap from the animal world to the human world and further to the world of the pure spirits, i.e. the gods. All were realizations of spirit, continuously on the move. In primitive animism the spirit or the soul moves from animal to man or vice versa. And the deceased forefathers were considered still roaming around, as powerful holy forces watching and guarding the community of man. The rationalization and individualization in the high culture of India transformed the erratic wandering spirits into rational systems. As great individuals such as kings, priests, and thinkers arose, the spirits acquired also individuality, and took the form of gods, hierarchically ordered, each with its own character and task in the universe.

Thus basically, animism and the tenet of Atma-Brahma (with the concept of incarnation) derived from the same world view. The second is only an elaboration of the first so that by the acceptance of the Hindu religion and culture the old native religion and culture did not suffer a breakdown, on the contrary experiencing a relief of growth.

This easy acceptance of the Indian life and world view led to the acceptance of so many Indian religious concepts. The Indian mythology such as the Ramayana and Mahabharatta easily found access to the Southeast Asian mind. We must remember that, as Rassers clearly revealed to us, even the Ramayana was not alien to the people of Southeast Asia; it fitted in to the structure of their mythology, as manifested in the prototypes of the Panji romans.

In a culture dominated by the religious value, such as the Indian and Southeast Asian cultures, the religious aspect was not isolated; on the contrary, it permeated and moulded the other aspects of the

1. Hans Leisegang, *Denkformen*, Berlin, 1951, p.61-142.

culture. The concepts, and with them the terminology of the Indian religious, political and artistic life became part of the cultures of Southeast Asia. A very important element for the development of the secondary high cultures in Southeast Asia was the introduction of the Indian script, which made possible the inclusion of the whole religious and secular literature of India into the new Southeast Asian cultures. On the basis of this script, the Southeast Asian cultures was able to start to build up their own religious, literary and intellectual life.

The centuries of the first one and a half millennia were the golden age of Southeast Asia. Great kingdoms arose with a developed system of communication, a large army and a hierarchical system of civil servants. The power of the kings, the concentrated organization of the state and of economic life, the comprehensive religious system as well as the artistic skill and dedication are manifested in the great achievements of Angkor Vat, the Borobudur, the Prambanan, etc. If we realise that the stones for the building of Angkor Vat, the city which was a system of canals and waterworks transformed into a blossoming garden,[1] had to be brought from a distance of a hundred miles, we can imagine how much of the energy and richness of this country of magnificent agricultural hydraulis, were invested in this huge creation.

In the long period of more than a millennium, it goes without saying that an independent cultural life came into being in these areas. Southeast Asia obtained the opportunity to develop its own cultural characteristics, after it had received a rational reinforcement from Indian culture, resulting in the organization of its political and religious life. But it is obvious that the creative force of Southeast Asian cultures did not lay in the rational field of speculation and contemplation, but more in the field of artistic creation. Southeast Asia did not make any substantial contribution to the development of new philosphical and religious speculation and contemplation, but it was able to develop an extreme aestheticism, which left even India behind.

It is interesting to note that the rational stratification of the Indian caste system was not accepted in Southeast Asia. Its strongest influence can be found in the stratification of the Javanese language which is only an aesthetic verbal substitute, compared to the rigid Indian caste system.

1. Bernard Groslier & Jacques Arthaud, *Angkor*, London, 1957, p.30.

The great cultural conflict took place with the arrival of Islam, which arose in the Arab Peninsula as one of the most vigorous offshoots of the semitic prophetic religion of the Arab Peninsula. As we know, Islam acknowledges as its own prophets all the prophets before Muhammad. Its characteristics as a semitic religion is its absolute monotheism, which even does not allow any artistic symbols of its entirely abstracted god. At the time that it arrived in Southeast Asia, however, it had behind it a history of nearly half a millennium, during which it had spread through the area of the Mediterranean until Spain, and the Donau Valley. In its fast expansion, especially in the direction of the West, it had been strongly influenced by Greek thinking, which was characterized by its secularity and rationality. The Greek philosophy and science, which at the decline of the Roman empire and during the Middle Ages receded more and more to the background in Europe, were absorbed and developed further by Arabic and Jewish scholars and philosophers. It was they who preserved the Greek tradition and later handed it over again to Europe at the end of the Middle Ages. On the other hand, a mystical branch of Islam also developed, under the influence of New Platonism and parallel to New-Platonism.

Through its expansion towards the East, Islam came into contact with Iran and India and to a certain extent under the impact of Indian pantheism. The Islam which arrived in Southeast Asia, and later on became gradually the dominating religion in a greater part of Indonesia, Malaya and some parts of the Philippines, had thus various potentialities. But in general it can be said, that in contrast to Indian culture, which came to these areas as a culture of the same attitudes, concepts and logic as the local culture, Islam as an absolute monotheistic religion brought a totally different attitude, systems of concepts and logic. It rejects the concept of the basic unity of animals, human beings and supernatural powers, and gives man a special position above the animal and vegetative world. By virtue of his separation from both Allah and the animal and vegetative world, man is given an opportunity to build his own world guided by his own intelligence. As has been said before, this tendency had been strengthened by the contact of Islam with Hellenism, during its expansion along the Mediterranean. In contrast to the logic of the circle of old Malay and Indian culture,

the logic of Islam is more that of the pyramid in which the highest position is attributed to God.

Another clear difference between Islamic and especially Indian Hindu culture is the democratic character of Islam with its doctrine that all men are equal before Allah. In this logic there is no place for the doctrine of incarnation and the Indian caste system.

Thus with the arrival of Islam, a strong conflict arose between the new and the established religion and culture. The belief in spirits, gods and supernatural powers was sheer superstition, as far as Islam was concerned. The caste system, which rested on the assumption that the celestial hierarchy was joined at its basis by a lower human social pyramid, had gradually to be adapted to the Islamic belief that Allah alone was all-powerful, and that beneath him all men were equal. Art, which had played such a vital role in indigenous and Indian cultures by expressing and symbolizing religious ideas and emotions, declined in the face of Islam's austere theological doctrine.

Islamic culture brought about great changes in the fields of economics, law and social organization, mainly because of its practical and rational attitude towards life and also because the fact that it was brought to Southeast Asia by merchants supports the assumption that Islam constituted an important factor in the active commerce in Southeast Asia at the close of the Hindu period and the beginning of Western influence.

The penetration of Islam was a gradual process promoted by merchants, since in Islam every believer is more or less a missionary for the belief. Later it penetrated into the courts and about the fourteenth and fifteenth century there existed already Islamic kingdoms in Sumatra, Malaya as well as Java. The struggle against the remaining Hindu kingdoms must have been bloody and devastating wars after which the last representatives of the Hindu-Malay culture escaped to Bali, where they have remained until our days.

In the continent of Southeast Asia however, Buddhism had a very strong foothold and has remained the dominating religion until our time.

Thus the 14th, 15th, 16th and 17th centuries witnessed powerful Islamic kingdoms in the Southern part of Southeast Asia, especially on both sides of the Straits of Malacca and in Java. It was the time that Samudra, Perlak, Pasai, Acheh, Malacca, Demak, etc. were

great international harbours and large centers of commerce, where the people from East and West as well as from Southeast Asia itself came into closer contact through commerce.

But as we know, Islamic society and culture in Southeast Asia were not able to maintain their expansion and growth. This decline was not only a phenomenon of Islam in Southeast Asia, but a general one in the whole Islamic world.

In Southeast Asia, however, this decline had its own characteristics. The victory of Islam over the old Malay and Hindu-Malay culture was in various cases only a superficial one, the native attitude and belief, reinforced by Indian religious attitude and beliefs, nearly everywhere remained strong and in many cases formed a decisive factor in thinking and behaviour. Everywhere the magical and mystical traits penetrated into Islam, and its rationalism and monotheism were diluted, running parallel to a weakening in thought and creative power. A rather superficial Islam based on mere reciting of the holy script in Arabic without true understanding became the general pattern. A certain syncreticism came into being, which paralyzed the expression of Islamic monotheism and secular rationalism. The stories of the walis in Java are clear evidence of this process.

Compared to the cultural influence of India and Islam on Southeast Asia, the influence of Chinese culture is indeed minimal, although more than ten million Chinese live at present in Southeast Asia. It is as if the Chinese high culture of the period of the axis of history did not have any expansive power in regard to Southeast Asia, with the exception of relatively small areas on the border of China, such as Annam and Tongkin. And indeed, viewed from this standpoint Confucius is a thoroughly Chinese social philosopher, whose greatest merit was the organization of the Chinese state. His doctrine was intended to be applied to the people of the Chinese kingdom and not to other people. It did not have a world mission, like Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. Quite different is the doctrine of Lao-tse, which indeed had universal appeal. But as we know the influence of Lao-tse on the real life of the Chinese was far less than that of Confucius. And if compared with Buddhism, with which it has some common traits, it is also a typical Chinese cultural manifestation, which even has accepted some elements from Buddhism.

As a rational and practical social philosophy, which built up a

system of Chinese cultural behaviour, Confucianism formulated the ideals of the virtuous man, and especially emphasized the obligations of the citizen, and of the members of the family. Loyalty to the king and the state and filial piety to the parent and the ancestors belong to its essential characteristics, besides an attitude of rational and practical compromise, i.e. the middle road, for the sake of social and individual peace. The systematic education and organization of a class of capable civil servants manifest further the rationality and practical attitude of Confucius' social philosophy. Thus Confucianism is more national, more soil-bound than Indian and Islamic culture. It gave to the Chinese for centuries the basic loyalty to his country and his national culture, and a feeling of self-sufficiency in the atmosphere of Chinese society and culture. To a certain extent this is one of the reasons that in the lively communication through the Straits of Malacca during the earlier centuries until the sixth century, the Chinese remained behind the Indians and Arabs. There was in the atmosphere of the culture a certain feeling that a person who left his country was lost, i.e., not only from the illustrious Chinese solidarity of the Middle kingdom, but especially from the holy land of the ancestors, to which every Chinese is deeply attached by the institution of ancestor worship. Moreover there were epochs in Chinese history such as the Ch'ings, during which the Chinese were punished for leaving China for Barbarian countries.

But we know that during the last millennium nevertheless, some Chinese have settled in Southeast Asia. On the island of Tumasek or old Singapore, for example, already in the 14th century there was a Chinese settlement.

But due to the special character of the Chinese cultural attitude, concepts and logic, Chinese religious and aesthetic influence, i.e., the expressive aspect of Chinese culture is very small in Southeast Asia especially if compared to that of India and Islam. Viewed from the Chinese vocabulary in the indigenous languages, its influence is greater in the practical aspects of life, i.e. concerning food and skills[1].

The greatest influence of the Chinese in Southeast Asia coincides

1. The Chinese have imported a lot of ceramics during the centuries. Some of them have attained a place in the religious belief of the people, as in Borneo. There is also some Chinese influence of Chinese motifs in Southeast Asian ornaments.

with the time of the cultural contacts of Southeast Asia with the West. And it was indeed in the nineteenth century that the Chinese government, under a certain pressure from Western power, recognized the right of its citizens to change their home and allegiance. It is known that the Chinese in the whole of Southeast Asia and especially in Malaysia have a crucial position in economic life. But with the economic aspect of culture, we are already in modern time, dominated by science, technology and economics, i.e. the progressive aspect of culture, which will be discussed in another paper.

Malaysian Prehistory: Some Current Problems

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I. INTRODUCTION

THE STUDY OF MALAYSIAN PREHISTORY began in the last decade of the nineteenth century, not long after the investigation of the remoter reaches of the human past became accepted as a serious academic pursuit in the West. We have behind us then nearly eighty years of field research. Over fifty separate sites have been excavated in Malaya alone and vast collections of the material remains of prehistoric cultures have been built up over the years in the museums of the region and in Europe.

The first recorded archaeological excavation of a Malayan site was by L. Wray Jr. at Gunong Cheroh near Ipoh in 1891. Wray's two rock shelters produced a few crude stone implements, a number of sherds of simple pottery and some crushed and broken human remains. Following these somewhat inauspicious beginnings, Wray's successors, notably I.H.N. Evans, H.D. Collings, M.W.F. Tweedie, and more recently P.D.R. Williams-Hunt, G.de G. Sieveking, and Tom Harrisson in Borneo have excavated many sites throughout the region. From this work there has emerged a picture, frequently hazy in detail and certainly far from complete, of a succession of cultures ranging from the primitive chipped pebble tools of the Palaeolithic industry at Kota Tampan, through the remains the Post-Pleistocene hunting and food-gathering peoples of Mesolithic aspect whose culture is known generally as the Hoabinhian, to a vague and shadowy Neolithic of primitive agriculturalists.

Much of the work in Malaysian prehistoric archaeology has been data gathering. That this approach was necessary at the outset is of course obvious, but the philatelic preoccupation with collecting

and recording is still very much the rule. Broad syntheses are rare, Tweedie's two pamphlets *The Stone Age in Malaya* and *Prehistoric Malaya* notwithstanding, and there have so far been few attempts to utilize the raw data of archaeology to write history.

After so long a period of development, this would seem a serious indictment. But to criticise Malaysian archaeology on these grounds would, I believe, be unjust. A great deal of our knowledge derives from excavations carried out between the Wars using techniques which, while adequate for their times, do not meet contemporary standards. Many ancillary aids to archaeology are of only very recent development and were not available to the earlier workers. Much potential information has therefore been irrevocably lost since it is in the nature of archaeological method that the context of a site is destroyed in the course of its investigation and data not observed and recorded at the time can rarely be retrieved.

The great voids, spatial, temporal as well as material, which exist in our understanding of Malaysian, not to say Southeast Asian, prehistory make the formulation of broad scale syntheses a difficult and hazardous task indeed. Though potentially rich in archaeological materials, Southeast Asia is far from being a paradise for archaeologists. The climate, flora and fauna combine with seeming maliciousness to destroy, and the lack of that essential archaeological ingredient, preservation, means that much of the archaeological record must for ever remain incomplete. It is not without significance that a large proportion of the archaeological discoveries that have been made in Southeast Asia have come from areas settled and developed in modern times. In fact such prosaic activities as road-building, drainage and irrigation, agriculture, mining and guano exploitation combined with natural agencies like river and marine erosion have been responsible for uncovering most of what has come down to us from antiquity. Purposeful archaeological exploration is still in its infancy, and the sad truth is that many new techniques of reconnaisance, such as air photography, phosphate and pollen analyses, that have shown spectacular results elsewhere, have not so far proved to be of great use here.

These factors and others have conspired to make the archaeological record in Southeast Asia patchy and discontinuous. One further obstacle to the successful interpretation of Southeast Asia or even Malaysia remains. The general lack of a chronological

framework has greatly hindered the task of tracing historical connections between prehistoric peoples and cultures. Without a time-scale it is not possible for us to judge the tempo with which prehistoric cultures developed in the ways in which archaeological research suggests they did. Sir Mortimer Wheeler has likened archaeology in this condition to a railway guide which lists the trains running on a certain line, but fails to indicate when they started and when they stopped. Archaeologists it is true have long been accustomed to working with cruder time categories than would satisfy conventional historians. For many areas and periods of prehistory, a relative chronology which says little more than whether one culture is older or younger than another is often all we have to show. But in Malaysia even relative chronologies have rarely been satisfactorily demonstrated owing at least in part to the nomadic nature of the prehistoric inhabitants and the resulting lack of sites with a stratified sequence of occupation deposits built up over a long period of time. The future, however, is perhaps brighter on the chronological front than on any other, for new methods of dating, foremost among them being radiocarbon analysis, hold out the hope of a series of absolute dates which may ultimately permit us to knit together the loose strands of Southeast Asian prehistory into a completer fabric, however loosely woven.

These opening remarks have inevitably created an image both bleak and discouraging. But it is perhaps better to approach our problems knowing the difficulties and limitations inherent in them, than with the sort of attitude which has led to the presentation of an over-simplified and falsely authoritative story which is found all too frequently in history text-books. Clearly it is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a survey of Malaysian prehistory. Furthermore, the writer cannot claim more than a superficial acquaintance with the material from Borneo whence the fruits of recent research by the Sarawak Museum under Mr. Tom Harrisson still await publication. Instead, it will I think be more useful to draw attention to some of the more outstanding problems and to discuss some of the more significant recent discoveries and studies, thus indicating the avenues along which future research may be expected to throw valuable new light.

II. THE PALAEOLITHIC

It is generally believed that the earliest traces of human activity in Malaysia are to be seen in a few quartz and quartzite pebbles roughly chipped to form crude implements which have been found in an old bed of the Sungai Perak at Kota Tampan. This Tampanian industry as it is called was first discovered and recorded by Mr. H. D. Collings in 1938. It is perhaps no accident that in that year great interest had been engendered in the remains of human cultures dating from the Pleistocene period by the Joint American Southeast Asiatic Expedition for Early Man. This expedition, of which Hellmut de Terra, Père Teilhard de Chardin and Hallam L. Movius were prominent members, resulted in the recognition of a new Lower Palaeolithic culture from sites in the Irrawaddy Valley in Burma which was given the named Anyathian. Studies were also made of Palaeolithic cultures in the Punjab, the Soan, in Java, the Patjitanian, and in China, the Choukoutienian.

Collings' discoveries at Kota Tampan, which, though not precisely dateable, it seemed reasonable to suppose were Pleistocene in date, compared closely on typological grounds with the other Palaeolithic industries from Southeast and Eastern Asia. Movius later proposed to call this whole group of industries which have many features in common, the Chopper-Chopping Tool Complex after two of their most typical artefact categories.

In 1954 Dr. Donald Walker and Mrs. Ann Sieveking carried out an intensive study of the Tampanian industry which has resulted both in a much clearer analysis of the tool categories involved and in the stratigraphy of the site and its relationship to the geomorphology of the Kinta and Perak Valleys.

Taken as a whole these earliest remains of human activity in Southeast Asia consist of pebbles, flakes and fragments of fossil wood which it is claimed have been shaped with a minimum of working into crude, irregular cutting edges. Mrs. Sieveking has described the material from Kota Tampan as offering "a distressingly uniform and natural appearance." Indeed one is entitled, I think, to a measure of scepticism and to doubt whether some at least of the collections are in reality more than naturally chipped stones. Elaborate typological schemes have been devised by Movius and others and when grouped together with others of similar form in the various categories it must be admitted that the stones do

begin to take on a more persuasively artificial appearance. Evidence of design and uniformity of purpose must in the last analysis be the criteria on which rest proof of human handiwork at its technologically crudest levels. But it must be remembered that the major Palaeolithic sites in Southeast Asia are ancient river beds made up of sheets of water-worn pebbles and naturally chipped stones. There is then surely a danger that the design lies in the mind of the collector to be imposed, perhaps subconsciously, on his selections from a vast array of randomly flaked stones.

While some degree of caution is desirable in dealing with collections of artefacts from open sites such as these, recent discoveries in Sarawak seem to offer strong support to the existence of an industry of crudely chipped pebble tools during at least the late Pleistocene. At Niah Great Cave, where excavations by the Sarawak Museum under Mr. Tom Harrisson have been in progress for over ten years, investigations in the lower levels of deposits in the cave mouth have brought to light a number of pebbles flaked in ways which conform closely to some of Movius' typological categories. These chipped stones come from levels which have produced carbon samples dated by radiocarbon analysis to 39,600 B.P. ± 1000 which, if the two phenomena can be shown to be stratigraphically related, would place them in the late Pleistocene. These stones are clearly erratic in the context of the cave deposits and it seems likely that they were brought there by human agency. If this was the case, then their rude cutting edges were at least utilised, if not actually manufactured, by Man.

The problem of the origins of the Tampanian industry and the related Palaeolithic industries from other localities in Southeast Asia and their status *vis-a-vis* the main stream of cultural development during the Pleistocene in other parts of the Old World has yet to be satisfactorily dealt with. Mrs. Sieveking in a recently published paper has drawn attention to typological affinities between the Tampanian and the Kafuan, a very early Lower Palaeolithic industry of Eastern, Southern and Equatorial Africa. Going still further, she suggests an actual historical connection between the Kafuan and the Tampanian and concludes that we have here evidence of a diffusion of stone industries and their early hominid makers from Africa to Southeast Asia.

As Movius has pointed out, in dealing with the relationships between stone industries at so low a level of technological deve-

lopment, typological criteria are at best of very limited value. The number of ways in which a cutting edge can be made on a pebble by simple flaking are obviously restricted. There is however a much more serious difficulty in Mrs. Sieveking's thesis, namely chronology.

By the end of the Lower Pleistocene and the onset of the Second European Glaciation the crude pebble tools of the Kafuan had given way to primitive bi-facially worked hand-axes in Africa. Movius' broad study, on the other hand, suggests that one of the strikingly uniform features of the Chopper-Chopping Tool industries is that nowhere do they occur earlier than the early Middle Pleistocene. The Patjitanian industry of Java is chronologically vague, but available evidence indicates a late Middle-early Upper Pleistocene age.

The chronological position of the Tampanian is likewise uncertain. Collings was able to support the Pleistocene age of his discoveries only by pointing to the fact that they were found in an ancient bed of the Sungai Perak, the 230 ft. terrace, and that the deposits which contained the artefacts were overlain by dunes of volcanic ash believed to have derived from the eruption which formed Lake Toba in Sumatra sometime during the late Pleistocene. Movius also called attention to a fossilized tooth of *Elephas namadicus*, a Pleistocene form, discovered in 1905 in similar tin-bearing gravels at Salak North in the Kota Tampan locality.

Mrs. Sieveking's interesting hypothesis makes the precise dating of the tool-bearing gravels at Kota Tampan one of the most important problems of Malaysian archaeology. She was fortunate, therefore, in being able to make use of the results of a pioneering geomorphological study of Quaternary deposits in Perak by Dr. Donald Walker as an aid towards placing the Tampanian more accurately within the main stages of the Pleistocene. Walker's hypothesis rests on a number of observed geomorphological features which he suggests could be linked with rising and falling sea-levels caused by cyclical changes in climate during the Pleistocene. The first stage of his sequence is marked by the cutting of the limestone floor of the Sungai Perak valley and the excavation of a buried channel in the mouth of the river which would have demanded a fall in sea-level to -400 ft. m.s.1. This was followed by a rise in sea-level to +250ft. m.s.1. when the river valley was inundated by the sea allowing a thick deposit of alluvium, Walker's Old Alluvium,

to be laid down in which the high 230 ft. terrace of the Sungai Perak was cut. Walker was careful to avoid too categorical a correlation of these features and the climate changes they represent with Pleistocene periods, but he does suggest that a high level (90 — 120 m. above m.s.1.) alluvial deposit observed by Smit-Sibinga in Java, Sumatra and Borneo and tentatively correlated with the First Interglacial may have its analogue in the Old Alluvium of the Perak Valley.

If Walker's hypothesis is proved correct, then the 230 ft. terrace at Kota Tampan with its contained artefacts must be dated to the First Interglacial or, at the latest, to the beginning of the Second Glaciation. This would make the Tampanian the oldest of the known Lower Palaeolithic industries of the Chopper-Chopping Tool Complex and lend strong support to Mrs. Sieveking's theory of cultural links with the Kafuan of Africa.

Unfortunately, there are still a number of difficulties in the way of a final solution to this problem. In the first place, it is generally accepted that the Second Glaciation was the most severe and had the longest duration of the four major glacial periods of the Pleistocene. It is reasonable to suppose that it brought about a greater fall in sea-levels throughout the world than the First, Third or Fourth Glaciations. It is likely, therefore, that the effects of the Second Glaciation would have obliterated some at least of the effects of its predecessor and it is possible that Walker's buried channels at -400 ft. m.s.l. may mark the fall in sea-level caused by the Second rather than the First Glaciation. This would necessitate the attribution of the Old Alluvium to the Second Interglacial and make the Tampanian industry contemporaneous with the other principal Southeast Asian Palaeolithic industries.

Furthermore, the writer discovered in 1957 a large collection of fossilized mammalian remains in a limestone fissure at Tambun near Ipoh. This assemblage has been dated by Dr. D.A. Hooijer to the Middle Pleistocene at the earliest. The circumstances of the discovery suggest that the animals whose fossilized remains found their way into the fissure, a natural trap, entered by way of a network of crevices leading down from the flat top of the limestone outcrop. It is most probable that this took place prior to the erosion of the Old Alluvium and the isolation of the limestone hills of the Kinta Valley in their present form. If this was so, then the dissection of the alluvial infilling of the Perak and Kinta Valleys is likely

to have occurred after the Second Glaciation, in itself constituting further evidence of a Middle Pleistocene age for the Tampanian.

III. LATER PREHISTORY

Whether the date of the Tampanian industry is finally established as late Lower or Middle Pleistocene, the archaeological record still shows a disconcertingly long break between the Palaeolithic and the next stage in the cultural succession over much of Malaysia. In Borneo, at Niah, there is evidence of an Upper Palaeolithic industry composed of implements made of small stone flakes. This has been dated by radiocarbon methods to between 25,000 and 10,000 B.C. In Malaya itself, however, it is not until much later that archaeology has been able to demonstrate further evidence of prehistoric cultures, this time from deposits of post-Pleistocene age mainly in caves and rock shelters, but also at one or two open sites like Sungai Lembing in Pahang.

The earliest remains are of simple hunting and food gathering peoples with a primitive technology and restricted material culture. Their principal tool was a small axe made usually from a river pebble and worked, often very crudely, either on one side or on both. There is some evidence that they utilised the sharp edges on the flakes, produced perhaps as a by-product of the manufacture of their axes, but there is no certain proof that they made flake tools by secondary working. Associated with these tools, stone grinding slabs and pounding stones are commonly found, often stained with a red pigment, presumably haematite. It is not clear whether these people developed the art of pottery making, but there is a possibility that at some stage in their history they used, even if they did not actually manufacture, crude earthenwares decorated with cord impressions. This list virtually exhausts the inventory of their material equipment and if they made other items, these must have been of perishable substances.

The caves and rock shelters occupied by these folk are frequently marked by extensive accumulations of shells and animal bones, impressive evidence of their dependence on hunting and food gathering for subsistence. The size of these middens suggests that in certain favourable localities a limited degree of permanence of occupation may have been achieved, but normally their way of life must have been nomadic. From the numerous human skeletal re-

mains relating to this phase, it appears that the preferred form of burial was in a crouched position with the knees flexed towards the chest across which the arms were sometimes folded. The body was normally interred on its side, but there does not seem to have been any regular practice of burying grave furniture with the body.

The culture, known as the Hoabinhian from a site in Indochina, has local manifestations in almost every part of Southeast Asia and South China. Throughout the region it betrays a striking homogeneity.

Subsequent developments witnessed the introduction of an increasingly sophisticated pottery tradition and a complex group of pottery styles, bewilderingly varied as to form and decoration, grew up. The technique of polishing as a means of making stone implements also made its appearance and a variety of stone axes and adzes, often rectangular in cross-section, have been excavated from Malaysian and Southeast Asian sites. The mortal remains of the people associated with these developments were commonly interred in a prone extended position, the body lying on its back and often accompanied by pottery vessels, stone tools, ornaments and evidence of ceremonial offerings of food. It is generally assumed that these people practiced a primitive form of agriculture, probably of the slash and burn type.

One of the recurrent problems of Malayan archaeology is that of the relationship of the Mesolithic Hoabinhian culture to the later cultures of the Neolithic. Early writers like Evans and Collings implied a belief that the Hoabinhian overlapped with the Neolithic and cite possible instances of the borrowing of cultural traits as proof of the coexistence of peoples at widely differing levels of development. Other, more recent workers, for example Tweedie and Sieveking, motivated perhaps by an understandable desire to create in the often confusing archaeological data from Malaya the kind of order imposed on European prehistory by the Three Age System, have tended to see the Neolithic as succeeding the Hoabinhian as a definite stage of cultural development. Arguing from the results of his 1954 excavation of the rock shelter Gua Cha in Ulu Kelantan, Sieveking maintains that the stratigraphy points to a sharp break in the cultural succession and the passage of a considerable period of time between the Hoabinhian occupation in the lower levels of the Gua Cha deposits and the Neolithic in the upper. Such a simple and clear-cut interpretation of the Gua Cha

excavation as published by Sieveking is not, however, easy to accept. Hoabinhian artefacts, for example, are shown in the sections at the same stratigraphical levels as Neolithic material. It must be admitted that since the deposits at this site were used extensively for both Hoabinhian and Neolithic burials, the stratigraphical relationships of objects may not be fully reliable. But it is hard, using this argument, to explain the presence of a Hoabinhian flexed burial near the top of the deposit in the second cutting. Sieveking clearly recognised this difficulty for he says, "The archaeological position of Hoabinhian Burial 14 in this sequence must be due to some local phenomenon..... It may have been buried in an artificially created earth mound on the edge of the rock wall, but the nature of the chocolate brown earth deposit in which it was found does not allow this interpretation to be verified."

A simpler, and perhaps more plausible, explanation of this, and other phenomena at Gua Cha and elsewhere is as evidence of the contemporaneity of the Hoabinhian and Neolithic cultures. Both primitive hunters and early agriculturalists were nomadic to a greater or less extent, and the hypothesis that both could have occupied the same sites alternately for varying periods of time would do no great violence to the evidence of modern ethnographical observations both in Malaya and other areas of Southeast Asia.

Further support for the contention that the Hoabinhian may have survived the arrival of the Neolithic was provided at a site not far from Gua Cha itself which was discovered by Dr. H. A. Lamb and the writer in 1963. At this site, Gua Chawan, situated at the confluence of the Sungai Jenera and the Sungai Nenggiri in Ulu Kelantan, we discovered a working floor at which Hoabinhian stone implements had been manufactured. The remains, consisting of finished and unfinished axes, quantities of river pebbles and stone flakes, showed no signs of disturbance. Most significantly they lay on the very surface of the deposit, quite uncovered by any soil accumulation. Certainly the situation of the discovery did not suggest great antiquity and may possibly point to the survival of this tool-making tradition into relatively recent historical times.

It has already been remarked that the appearance of pottery and polished stone implements is usually held to herald the arrival of agriculture as an economic system in Malaya. Other regions, however, have shown that pottery-making and the technique of polishing stone are not necessarily as closely linked to Neolithic agricul-

tural societies as once was thought and indeed it seems certain that both were introduced by non-agricultural Mesolithic peoples. Unhappily, the nature of the data makes it extremely difficult to demonstrate archaeologically the existence of agriculture at a particular site or level. Plant remains do not often survive, and although no studies have yet been completed, it already seems as though palinologists may experience great difficulty in distinguishing the pollen of cultivated plants from their wild, indigenous progenitors. Again, the first farming communities in Malaya certainly practiced shifting agriculture of the slash and burn or swidden type. As such they were only slightly less nomadic than their more primitive neighbours who had not yet adopted plant cultivation as a way of life. Under these conditions, thick deposits of occupation debris cannot be expected to form, and the archaeological remains of primitive farmers may differ from those of hunting and food gathering peoples only in the tool types present. Conceivably even these differences will be lacking, since primitive agriculture frequently demands a continued emphasis on hunting to supplement the diet.

A recently published study of the results of an excavation of a rock shelter near Raub in Pahang by Dr. F.L. Dunn using simple statistical techniques has put forward an interesting line of approach to this problem of the Neolithic. Dunn's excavation at Gua Kechil in 1962 was of limited extent, but very rich in terms of materials recovered. A numerical analysis of various categories of artefacts and other debris of occupation revealed that the amounts of shell and animal bone food refuse declined dramatically towards the upper levels of the deposit. At the same horizon fragments of polished stone implements appeared. While pottery had been found throughout the archaeological levels, albeit in decreasing amounts with depth, changes in pottery styles and the introduction of a strikingly different type of pottery with a highly burnished surface and a bright red slip could also be shown to coincide with the decline in quantity of animal food refuse. It is tempting to see these statistical trends as marking the beginnings of agriculture, correlated as they are with changes in the cultural remains. Other explanations for these observations are of course possible, but it is likely that more studies conducted along these lines would yield valuable new information.

The question of the origins of the later prehistoric cultures of

Malaysia has hardly been broached as yet. This is partly due no doubt to the noticeable lack of information about the prehistory of Thailand, Malaysia's link to the mainland of Asia and especially about those parts of Thailand geographically closed to Malaya. This deficiency is happily now in the process of being met, largely thanks to the efforts of the Thai-Danish Prehistoric Expedition, as a result of whose work strong affinities can now be shown between later prehistoric cultures in Malaya, South and Northwest Thailand and possibly even China.

In 1959 the writer recognised on the basis of pottery fragments from a cave in Bukit Kaplu in Kedah the existence of a type of vessel with tripod legs in the form of hollow cones. Similar fragments had been reported by Evans from a cave near Buang Bep in South Thailand in 1931, but he had failed to recognise their true significance. The reconstruction of the tripod vessel from Bukit Kaplu was at the time hypothetical, but received final justification when complete vessels of identical type were excavated in 1961 at the open Neolithic settlement site at Ban Kao in Kanchanaburi Province in Northwest Thailand. So similar are the tripods from the two sites that there can be no doubt as to the closeness of the cultural links between this part of Thailand and Malaya. These similarities are further borne out by comparison of other pottery vessels and artefacts excavated at Ban Kao and material from such Malayan sites as Bukit Tengku Lembu in Perlis and even Gua Cha in Ulu Kelantan.

Per Sorensen, one of the excavators of Ban Kao, has drawn attention to similarities between the pottery tripods from Thailand (he does not mention the Malayan examples) and three-legged vessels from the Chinese Neolithic, especially sites in Lung Shan. These similarities are indeed striking, but Sorensen overlooks one possibly important difference. The Neolithic Chinese tripods are designed in such a way that the hollow of the conical legs connects with the cavity of the bowl. The Southeast Asian specimens, on the other hand, are all made with the legs sealed off from the body. This would naturally have created a danger of bursting the legs when the vessels were fired owing to expansion of the enclosed air. The potters of Ban Kao and Malaya avoided this problem by perforating the legs with two diametrically opposed holes. This technical feature raises a point of fundamental difference between the Chinese tripods and those from Southeast Asia, and may indi-

cate that the relationship between the Chinese Lungshanoid Neolithic and the Neolithic of Southeast Asia is not as direct or as close as Sorensen suggests.

A number of studies of the human skeletal remains from Malayan prehistoric sites have been carried out. The most recent of these by Professor J.C. Trevor and Dr. D. R. Brothwell of the Duckworth Laboratory of Physical Anthropology, University of Cambridge, dealt with a series of Hoabinhian and Neolithic skeletons from Gua Cha. In the light of what has been said above regarding the relationship between these two cultures, it is interesting to note that an intensive biometrical examination of this skeletal material failed to produce evidence of any appreciable divergence in physical type between Hoabinhian and Neolithic individuals.

It might be expected that studies by physical anthropologists of the skeletons of the prehistoric inhabitants of Malaysia would shed a more direct and certain light on the question of their racial affinities and origins than is possible by purely archaeological means. It is more than somewhat disappointing, therefore, that the assessments currently available are couched in tentative terms. It may well be of the very greatest significance, however, especially with regard to commonly held views on the subject of the race of the bearers of Neolithic culture in Southeast Asia, that in the opinion of Trevor and Brothwell the Gua Cha people, as at present known, show the closest links with the physical type of the modern Oceanic Negroes, particularly the now extinct Tasmanians. Most significantly, they categorically discount all but the most tenuous links with the Negritos or Mongoliforms.

The chronological framework for the later prehistory of Malaysia is still far from satisfactory. Robert von Heine-Geldern's pioneering analysis of the archaeological material available in 1926 and his derivation by a devious chain of arguments of a chronological scheme has had profound effects on most later thinking. His hypothesis that full Neolithic culture could not have been introduced into Southeast Asia later than 2000 B.C. has been quoted so many times that it has by now achieved almost the status of tradition and is the original basis for many popularly held opinions on the antiquity of culture in Southeast Asia. It is possible that Heine-Geldern's dating may be proved correct by future work. But if this is so, it will be a case of the right answer being reached by the

wrong methods, since his reasoning is based on the still to be unravelled complexities of the affinities between Southeast Asian and Munda languages and, most unarchaeologically, on supposed relationships between language families and certain categories of prehistoric artefacts.

Sieveking arrived at a tentative chronology for the prehistoric occupation of Gua Cha on the basis of a series of assumptions regarding rates of accumulation of deposits, the duration of time indicated by the number of burials excavated and unexcavated, all linked to suppositions regarding the demography of the prehistoric inhabitants based on modern ethnographic observations of Malayan aborigines. Working back from a *terminus ante quem* of the beginning of the Christian era, he calculates along these lines that the Hoabinhian may well be at least 5000 years old, and observes that this dating "accords well with that originally suggested by Heine-Geldern for the migration of these peoples from continental Asia."

Only one radiocarbon date is so far available for prehistoric remains from Malaya. This date, of the middle of the second millennium B.C., resulted from analysis of material from an ancient hearth said to have been associated with Neolithic artefacts in the rock shelter Gua Harimau near Lenggong in Upper Perak. Further carbon samples from Dunn's excavations at Gua Kechil in Pahang are awaiting processing. Until these, and many more carbon samples have been analysed, little further progress on the question of the chronology of the later prehistory of Malaysia can be expected.

In Southeast Asia it is hard to decide where prehistory ends and history begins. Archaeology has already made great contributions to our understanding of the early historical period and there can be little doubt that further developments in the study of early Southeast Asian civilizations must depend more on archaeological methods than on epigraphical and literary sources. In recent months, great advances have been made in elucidating problems in the twilight zone between prehistory and the beginnings of civilization with the excavation at Kuala Langat and at Kuala Trengganu of two Dong-son sites. But the results of these discoveries lie outside the scope of this paper.

Future progress in Malaysian prehistory will depend on extensive surveys to assess the archaeological potential of the country,

and to ensure that sites are preserved for proper investigation, a pressing problem with the increasing tempo of industrial and rural development, Greater use should be made of the rapidly growing body of scientific techniques for the extraction of the maximum information from often intractable data. As our knowledge expands, it will be possible to move away from the rather haphazard approach which tends to characterize the initial stages in the investigation of the prehistory of any region and to concentrate resources on specific problems as these become more clearly defined. Finally, there is every reason to believe that closer cooperation between Malaysia and Thailand in the field of archaeology would lead to a solution to many of the problems which plague the prehistory of both countries.

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The Unity of Dayak Mythology

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IN SPITE OF the large place often devoted to their institutions in ethnological theory, to say nothing of their dubious popularity among travel-book writers and film-producers — our knowledge of the people of Borneo is still far from being satisfactory. In the vast specialised literature of the last hundred years, very few indeed are the sources in which can be found information both thoroughly reliable — and even this is by no means always the case — and, at the same time, sufficiently precise and complete to be taken into account for scientific purposes.

During the two last decades, however, while field-work became increasingly difficult to carry on in the former Dutch part of the island, a major progress in this respect was the comprehensive social-economic survey of Sarawak undertaken by the British Colonial Research Council. To this project, we are indebted for possessing now, in addition to Edmund Leach's general report — to this date, still the best introduction to the anthropology of the area — some good monographs on three of the most numerous tribes: W. R. Geddes' study of the Sadong River Land Dayaks, J.D. Freeman's vital contributions on Iban social morphology and land tenure, H. S. Morris' report on a sago producing Melanau community; Roy Needham's work on the Penan of the Tinjar basin, apart from a few seminal papers on the teknonymic-necreonymic system of this tribe, unfortunately remains still unpublished. Beside the results of this ambitious effort, various publications, such as the Sarawak Museum Journal or again the Swiss learned journal *Ethnologica* (which surveyed in its first volume the modes of burial to be found in Borneo), have seriously contributed to increase our knowledge in the realm of Bornean ethnography. Even if the situation seems by far less favourable with respect to linguistic research, during the same period have been published Cense and Uhlen-

beck's Linguistic Survey of Borneo — by the way, a rather distressing statement of our ignorance in that matter — and a new Sea Dayak dictionary by Scott; I understand that Southwell's long-expected Kayan dictionary is now well on the way, while various researches in the phonemics and morphology of local languages are currently carried on by Che Asmah Haji Omar and other scholars.

To be sure, in my opinion, all that is not enough; even very little compared with the immensity of the field which remains to be explored. But, at least, it is *something,* something substantial!

With such achievements, the virtually total absence of any work devoted to Dayak mythology makes a striking contrast. The only important novelty in this field has been the publication by the Borneo Literature Bureau of a few fascicules in the Iban language, among which Benedict Sandin's *Sengalang Burong* deserves special mention: actually, it is to my knowledge the best collection so far available of Dayak mythological texts. Though this little book obviously shows the correct way to further researches by meeting our most urgent need — the need for *reliable texts in the original language* — yet the lack of any systematic, analytical work in the field of Dayak mythology is nonetheless lamentable. This gap, of course, is only the regional reflection of a wider failure: the world over, in the domain of social sciences, religious anthropology is plainly lagging behind. With one exception, however; I shall come back in one moment to this aspect of our problem.

Whatever the reasons may be, this situation is especially unfortunate as far as Borneo is concerned. Few countries in the world afford such an abundance of complex, fully elaborated mythological systems, embodied in a variety of oral literatures of the highest philosophical interest and admirable poetic quality. Of these — the barrier of a relatively weakly spread language restricting the access to such outstanding Dutch works on other tribes as Elshout's *De Kenja-Dajaken van het Apo-Kajan Gebied* — the best-known is likely to be Iban folk-literature. Addressing this learned audience, undoubtedly familar with the basic features of the Iban culture, there is no need to insist on the proliferation among the Sea Dayaks of artistically wrought-out tales (*ensera*), on the amazing vitality of the mythic-epic cycles of Kling, his spouse Kumang and his brothers, on those love-songs (*pelandai*), the best of which sound so "modern" to any ear attuned to the subtleties of contemporary poetic diction, on the grandiose hermetism of the ritual

songs which used to accompany the great Iban religious feasts (*Gawai Kelingkang, Gawai Kenyalang, Gawai Antu,* etc.), on the stupendous metaphoric exuberance of the Iban so-called "secet" languages (*jako karong, jako tangkai*). But the Iban are by no means a unique case in Borneo for that matter. There would be no end to the enumeration — necessarily fastidious, as it is impossible here to exemplify every poetic item with the long quotations required — of the literary achievements attained by these apparently simple cultures: to give only one example, the Sakapan, Kajaman and Lahanan of the tiny Kajang group in the Upper Rajang-Balui possess, in addition to various well-represented literary genres (sukat or tales, patun or songs, nanyi or funeral threnodies, etc.) a kind of tribal epic made up of thousands of verses, the *laei begwa o'a* ("the thread of the core of songs"), which does in no wise yield in historical, ethnological or literary interest to the most famous similar texts known in Slavic, African and American languages; transmitted orally through generations in certain Kajang families, the *laei begwa o'a* can still be heard in Kajang longhouses, chanted by a choir (ma'a) according to an original polyphonic system based on the chord of the minor seventh, with a resulting effect of striking beauty.

Of all this, however, very little is known, and still less published: a few Iban texts in old issues of the *Journal of the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* and *Anthropos*, a few more in the pages of the *Sarawak Museum Journal*, some scattered translations of Dayak myths, generally in an abridged version, of dubious origin; no wonder that the study of mythology, here as in most other cases, lost itself in the sands of empty speculation.

Beyond their informational value for the ethnographer and the local historian, beyond the aesthetic appeal of the literary productions in which they find their most accurate and complete expression, there is still another feature of Dayak mythologies which deserves close attention. So far as mythical thought is concerned, though the matter has never been established with full scientific rigour, an impression of strong regional unity, sometimes difficult to specify, but nonetheless inescapable, forces itself upon the mind of any observer familiar with Dayak cultural life, a feeling too common among the best experts to be deemed "purely subjective", suggesting the possible integration of every individual Dayak group's particular mythology as a variant of a basic pattern within

a wider whole, coextensive with the totality of Dayak cultures.

The point may be of crucial importance, since this would provide us with an important clue when we came to assess the proper place of the autochthonous Bornean cultures in the total context of Malaysia and Southeast Asia. Clearly, no question could be more relevant to the central subject of this Conference.

This alleged unity of Dayak mythologies raises, however, almost immediately more problems than it is seen able to solve. In the first place, what is the exact nature of this unity of Bornean mythical thought, of this pattern basic to all Dayak mythologies? What is its meaning for anthropological theory? What is, still more important, its import on the Dayak people's daily life, on Dayak culture as a whole? It is not in this direction, this deserves to be remarked, that ethnological researches were ever orientated. What was looked for — several decades ago, when speculations about mythology were still fashionable among professional ethnologists — was the likely origin, the historical roots of this suspected unity: diversification of an originally homogeneous thematic stock, resulting from the process of division of an initially unique group into many separate tribes; diffusion and interplay of the mythical motives within a multitribal whole isolated by geographical factors, systematisation of local historical traditions? (historical records, orally transmitted — and, of course, still to be collected — exist indeed in many places and make short work of this 'ephemerist' hypothesis); unifying impact of an external influence, generally supposed to come from India. Ultimately, all these debates appeared for what they were, utterly futile and sterile. Approximately at the same moment, the time of decline and fall of Graebner, Father Schmidt and Thurnwald's *Kulturhistorische Schule*, the study of "primitive religions" began to face a stormy crisis of theoretical conscience, from which it has not yet so far recovered.

A list of the so-called "explanations" put forward from time to time in connection with Dayak rituals — for lack of available mythical texts ready for this kind of exercise — would supply a fairly complete exemplification of the many pitfalls which have progressively engulfed this unfortunate discipline. If we leave aside such flat ethnological hobby-horses as Frazer's "superstitious savage" or the once famous "totems", we find some explanatory value in this field: psychoanalysis and functionalism. With respect to the first of these, I know of an anthropologist, and not one of

the least in the profession, who is preparing a detailed analysis of the ideology of Iban head-hunting, showing in this an expression of the "Iban castration complex", and in *antu pala*, as it seems, symbolic substitutes for the male sexual organ! Arguments of common sense apart, the trouble with all that is that, after a half century of misunderstandings, we have recently learnt to read Freud with different eyes, to read his work in the intellectual, more specifically, philosophical perspective which ever was his own. I have really no time allowed to digress about this point from my present topic: I shall thus refer you to the works of Dr. Jacques Lacan on this subject. Be it enough to say here: no! Freud, one of the greatest minds of our century, never meant *that*! So much for the Iban castration complex and for their alleged capital penis-substitute: this has nothing to do with serious psychoanalysis.

Discussing the functionalist type of explanation is a more tricky business. It is, of course, beyond doubt that Malinowsky and Radcliffe Brown have introduced in social anthropology, with such concepts as functional whole, functional relation and social structure, exceedingly useful analytical devices, even if we reproach the first for his naive organicism, the second for his narrowly empiricist conception of "structure". It may be that these theoretical flaws, resulting from a contamination of sociology with biological images, have gone to the head of some followers: proceeding on this line, when they deal with rituals (to say nothing of myths), they simply miss the point. For instance, it is one thing to say that the lineal transmission of the *padi pun*, this sacred rice which every Iban *bilek* keeps alive through generations and which is never divided in case of partition of the familial properties or of marriage-out of family members, *corresponds* at the ritual level to the lineal unity and permanency through time of the *bilek* as a social unit; it is a quite different thing to ascribe to the institution of *padi pun* a *finality* by making of it a "tool for social control". After all, the Kajang have no transmissible sacred variety of rice and their *jo'o* (the Kajang equivalent of the Iban *bilek*), far from collapsing as a group, offers a much stronger resistance to partition than the Iban *bilek*.

With so narrowly utilitarian premises, modern social anthropology, for long under almost exclusive influence of the trends now considered, was not likely to pay much attention to mythology, excepting possibly those cases in which it can be assigned a role

of social control: as, for instance, when a myth of origin may be seen as giving supernatural support to the claim to power of a certain lineage or class. Where no such explanation is thought possible, the subject of mythology is prudently dropped as a whole. Actually, most professional anthropologists, at least in the English-speaking countries, feel that religion, myths and rituals are not a field likely to be fertile in theoretical discoveries, hardly indeed to lend itself to proper scientific investigation.

For this, there is, as they put it, no adequate approach, a complete lack of acceptable methodology.

In view of so many critical statements, you might expect from me a positive counterpart, at least a hint of some unheard-of theory concerning the origin of Dayak mythologies and the nature of their unity of formal pattern. Unfortunately, I have no such thing to offer; I shall add, in all humility, but categorically, that to that sort of general questions, at the present stage of Bornean studies, even a tentative answer cannot be given without falling a prey to self-delusion: it could never be too much repeated that what we need first is texts, many more facts, which, for our purpose, means *more texts*. I have thus nothing to oppose to the brilliant conclusions of my learned colleagues who can safely rest on the long tradition of sinology, indology. It must be confessed: the poor mythologist is not always able to repress a glance of respectful envy on his more fortunate colleagues.

The prospect in our own field is however not so bleak as it may appear at first sight: the collection of texts is only a matter a time — and money, of course. And, contrary to the opinion currently received in professional circles, an adequate approach to the study of myths has at last proved itself possible, a method which has been recently applied with full success in other places. I am referring to the structural analysis of myth, proposed by Cl. Levi-Strauss for the first time in an epoch-making paper of the *Journal of American Folklore*, and subsequently elaborated by the same author in his great work on Bororo mythology: *Le Cru et Le Cuit* (Paris, Plon, 1964).

Needless to say, it is beyond the scope of the present short note to summarize the theoretical foundations and technical procedures of Levi-Strauss' structural mythoanalysis. It will be enough to say here that it consists primarily in an extension to the analysis of myths of the approach characteristic of structural linguistics, more

specifically of the so-called Prague school (S. N. Troubetzkoy, R. Jakobson). In the light of this new approach, the past general theories of mythology appear to have fallen victim of a double error. On the one hand, they failed to take seriously the particular modes of thought of the so-called "primitive men", looking obstinately for external, mechanistic factors of explanation instead of considering it as purely and simply human thought — maybe human thought at its purest; we may think, in this respect of the way Tom Harrisson, in the introduction to *The People of Borneo* described with rare insight its manifestations as the means the Sarawak people have resorted to in order to *humanize their world*. On the other hand, they have also constantly forgotten that a myth is primarily a text, that is, some kind of linguistic material, focusing as they did their attention on the ancecdotal content or on subsidiary questions, such as the origin and migrations of themes and motives or the quest for a supposedly unique "true and original" version of the myth, from which other versions would have originated.

Exactly in the same way as the structural linguist now conceives the basic elements of language, not as isolated, substantial entities (sounds, words, etc.) but as abstract phonic images, defined with reference to relevant oppositions with other similar items (e.g. phonemes), Levi-Strauss isolates in the text of the myth various events and situations, defined by their significant oppositions, and considers these in their function of *signs*, in their architectonic role within the logical structure of the myth. Thus, the anecdotal interest of the elements making up the mythical story is purposely neglected, the attention of the analyst being entirely transferred to the problem of their place in the logical system underlying the myth: we might say, in Saussurian terms, that these elements are now seen as belonging primarily to *la langue* rather than to *la parole*, as syntactic functional units rather than incidents on the thread of the discourse.

Once again, in close similarity with the structural linguist's procedures aiming at the discovery of *an ordered system of signs* (e.g. the phonemic system of the language under investigation), the structural analysis of myths sees in the discovery of *the system of logical oppositions* organizing the mythical discourse the ultimate result of his analytical procedures, which thereafter give way

to a reconstruction, in terms of a less particularized experience, of the native vision of his world.

A first advantage of this new approach is that it clears the way of the sterile quest for an "original version" of every myth. It is, on the contrary, in the very nature of a structural analysis to call for *as many versions as possible*, the structural divergences between these versions leading to pointing out the mechanism of *inversion of signs* from which those variants originate *without altering the system of relevant oppositions;* a good instance of this mechanism is provided by a comparison of the Iban (Benedict Sandin, *Sengelang Burong*, Ch. I) and *Kajang* (B. de Martinoir's recording) of the myth of separation of the supernaturals from men (Iban: Apai Keling becomes invisible after eating snake flesh; Kajang: Ake Dyan becomes the Kajang aristocrat after having neglected to eat the snake flesh which made him invisible). A consequence of this is, once again, the urgent necessity of *MORE TEXTS*, the certitude of interpretation of a myth increasing, so to speak geometrically with the number of versions taken into account.

Another immediate advantage is that, without having yet proceeded to further analysis of the material, the structural method already permits one to pronounce objectively on the unity of Dayak mythology. Whatever the "meaning" (= the total vision of the world) underlying the inter-tribal mythical corpus, it is clear that the type of relevant oppositions between similar items and the categories of logical relations at work in the mythologies of the various Dayak tribes are, at least so far as Central Borneo is concerned, so strikingly identical that given the fact that we are dealing with people belonging geographically to a mountainous area, we have not even to wait for computer-processing before concluding the objective structural unity of the whole corpus (reservations being made for unexpected elements which the consideration of newly recorded versions may bring in — and it is indeed very unlikely that this would provoke a complete falsification of this conclusion).

The main objective, however, of structural mythoanalysis, the possibility of which makes this method a revolutionary step in the study of non-material culture, is of course the "translation of a particular experience" (i.e. the particular scheme of experiencing the world — in terms of Continental philosophy, we should say the "essential project", modes of perception and thought, scales of

values, "in terms of a general, or, more precisely, of a more general experience, making it accessible intellectually to people living in another historical period or in another culture" (Levi-Strauss) that this is now possible for the mythologist, with no less scientific objectivity than is required from the linguist or the historian, seems to me abundantly proved on the face of the results already obtained in the study of Pueblo, Sionan-Athabascan, Ge Tape Gurani and Borneo mythologies. I have a strong hope — I should say the conviction, if, being myself on the job, I did not feel an urgent necessity to make provision for my limited competence, that results as satisfactory as these in the field of Dayak mythology are possible.

Dayak culture in its so-called "primitive" aspects is now a matter of the past, and we must undoubtedly rejoice at the fast material progress which has already improved the standard of living of the *ulu* people. But the achievements of the Dayak past are part of the Malaysian, of the human cultural patrimony, and it would be lamentable to leave them vanish away carelessly into irremediable oblivion. To save Dayak "oral literatures" by collecting and editing as many texts as possible, to make the old Dayak culture intelligible to those foreigners who think, like myself, that, in the modern world more than ever, nothing human cannot be alien to man, this is for Malaysians a national duty, as well as an intelligent policy, so far as it helps both integrating the Dayaks into the Malaysian community and placing Malaysia on the intellectural map of the world. For the anthropologist who spent several years of his life in Dayak long-houses, it is not only exploration into a fascinating vision of the world, it is a fervent work of love, a modest way of paying his duty of gratitude to the Dayak people for the hospitality and friendship which he enjoyed among them and which remains to him a wonderful and unforgettable experience.

A Note on Malay Society and Culture

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I

ALTHOUGH THE MEANING OF CULTURE is varied and controversial to the extent of sometimes being vague and confusing, especially when taken in the abstract, it is definitely clearer to perceive in reference to a society. Culture and society are closely related because the former exists not *in vacuo* but in close connection with and as a product of the latter. It is quite common to look at a society either as an organised set of individuals with a given way of life or as an aggregate of social relations, and it is usual too to refer to culture as the way of life of these individuals or as the content of all their social relations. The way of life manifested in a society is mainly the product of its response to the challenge(s) of its environment, and this is determined both by the nature of the environment itself and also by the level of knowledge and experience the society is equipped with to respond to it. It follows that this way of life may be expressed through different types of economic, political, social and religious relations, devised and developed by and within the society as it proceeds from the earlier stage of adapting itself to the environment to the later stage of controlling or adapting the environment according to its own needs. Since the way of life of a society implies also the content of all its social relations, it suffices, therefore, to refer to the culture of a society generally as the sum-total of its way(s) of life. This broad definition does not restrict the meaning of culture only to Man's artistic expressions.

Speaking of Malay culture, we thus mean the sum-total of the way(s) of life of the Malays. Viewed from racial, cultural and linguistic origins, the term Malay includes a wide category of people not confined only within the boundaries of the Malay Peninsula,

but extending to a larger area often referred to as *Nusantara*. The peninsular Malays constitute but a minor portion of people from the same stock, and the culture they inherit form only part of a greater cultural heritage of the rest of the people in the area. What has set the Malays in this country quite apart from the rest socially and culturally has been the result of recent colonial history.

With the coming of the West, the fragmentation of *Nusantara* into separate politico-geographical units came to pass, and the frontiers that bound them became as much a reality — if not more — as the oneness in their socio-cultural background. Following this, Malaya as in the case of Indonesia and Fillipina too, began to develop according to its own charted path; strengthening its own political, economic and social relations, not much affected by and little affecting the other units. So, Malaya which was promoted at the beginning as a politico-geographical unit slowly developed in the direction of forming itself into a distinguishable socio-cultural entity. Perhaps the process in Malaya was somewhat slower than that of Indonesia and Fillipina. This may be due largely to the fact that while the Indonesians and the Fillipinos have always been almost a complete whole within their own respective societies, the Malayans are made up of at least three important component parts, with the Malays forming only a segment of the plural society.

The coming of the Chinese and Indians who preserved their own social and cultural identities within a new common environment has added complexity to the picture in Malaya. Whereas in Indonesia, for instance, common stock and common cultural heritage have provided strong bonds among their people, although they belong to different ethnic communities, the bonds that bind together the Malays, Chinese and Indians, who are of different stocks and culture, have not altogether been very strong. Within a common politico-geographical unit, the Malays as well as the non-Malays still maintain separate ways socially and culturally and have shown very little signs of integration. The sharing of common racial, cultural and linguistic origins with a wider group of people outside their own politico-geographical unit, and the maintaining of its own socio-cultural identity without sharing common links with the rest — and all this within a common politico-geographical unit — are interesting features as regards the position of Malay society and culture in this country.

Notwithstanding the above, it is still possible to look at

Malay society in the Peninsula as an independent social entity, though not a completely cohesive one, with a characteristic culture of its own. In other words, the discussion on Malay society and culture, not in the context of the more colourful *Nusantara* or multi-racial Malayan background but limited only in terms of what is found in this country, is not only possible but also justifiable. For the purpose of avoiding sweeping generalisations on the nature of peninsular Malay society and culture as a whole, two things need to be constantly borne in mind.

Firstly, Malay society is undergoing change, the speed and extent of which is not the same for the entire society. As a result, we see that within the same time perspective, different parts of the society show different levels of development. There are many examples of small and somewhat 'egalitarian' *kampung*, whose members are engaged in subsistence agriculture which is often carried out by means of simple techniques and technology. Here kinship may be regarded as the most important basis for all kinds of relations, and the types of institutions and organisations that have resulted from these relations amply reflect the stage of their development. But on the other hand, there are also to be found large, complex and stratified urban communities, cut off completely from the land but closely linked with industrialization or other large-scale economic undertakings. The values and attitudes of these people can be as diverse and complex as the roles and status of individuals and groups that make them up. The point to be stressed here is that although there are visible and invisible strands that bind Malay society, there are at the same time forces at work which make it quite unintegrated and heterogeneous.

Secondly, Malay culture now may be compared to a canvas depicting colours of different shades and combinations. In the past, Malay society and culture have been under several types of influences, either Eastern (Hindu and Muslim) or Western (European). Some aspects and traits from these influences have been assimilated by the Malays and have become a distinct though modified part of their culture today. The extent to which these influences can be traced in Malay society and culture reflects the degree of their penetration at different levels. Here again there is an element of diversity. For instance, a peasant group which has been exposed only to animism and belief in God, may manifest both or either of these influences to a high degree in its ritualistic activities or even

in its artistic expressions. But among another group, an urban middle class, for example, which has fully accepted the tradition of logic and science that came in the wake of modernism, there may be none, or little of the acceptance and practice of animism or religion, although there may be nominal recognition or tolerance on their existence as faiths. The difference, however, does not lie only between these two groups or more; even within them there may be different degrees of assimilation, and so in each the trace of one influence may be clearer than the other. What occurs in the belief system as illustrated here can easily be seen too in other spheres of Malay culture. Related to this is a further point which has to be remembered. The Malays in this country, although they all come from the same racial stock, consist of many immigrant groups from the surrounding area who actually belong to different ethnic backgrounds. These groups came bringing their own ways, customs and sometimes even languages which are peculiar to themselves. When they settled here they maintained some of these. A clear example would be the Minangkabaus who still practice *adat perpateh*. Although in many other respects they have always shared common cultural heritage with the Malays here, their cultural peculiarities which they brought with them further highlighted the multi-coloured nature of Malay culture today. Thus like Malay society too, Malay culture in this country is full of diversity and heterogeneity.

II

One way to facilitate the understanding of Malay society and culture is to view it as a society and culture in transition. The transition is from traditional to modern. What is considered traditional is the social and cultural heritage passed down and accumulated through time, and becoming the most important underlying factor in Malay society and culture, particularly before the process of modernisation wrought new changes. Modernisation came to Malaya through the West, and as a result it has come to be closely associated with the process of adopting Western ways, systems and techniques, particularly those that evolved in Europe after the 'two revolutions'. Although modern influences have had their impact felt for nearly a century, it cannot be said to have reached all levels of society or all aspects of culture to the same degree among the Malays in this country. The forces of tradi-

tionalism and modernism are still interacting with all their attendant conflicts; and changes in structure, organisations, institutions, values and attitudes are constantly going on in the direction of forming a new synthesis in Malay society and culture. Let us examine this more concretely.

The nature of Malay society and culture that was in existence up to the point when the full impact of British rule was felt beginning in the late 19th century, can be described as a feudal type. The economic basis was mainly fishing and agriculture for subsistence, but a fair amount of trade and mining also existed. Broadly, the society could be divided into two categories, the *rakyat* in the village sphere and the *bangsawan* in the supra-village sphere.

It would be misleading to picture the *rakyat* as constituting one close interlocking social group sharing a common group consciousness. The fact was that it was divided into small communities, settled along river banks or by the sea-side. This environment thus made fishing and padi planting their most important economic activities, and these were often on a small family scale at a low level of technology. Besides being just territorial units, each community seemed to show close kinship relationship within itself. The nature of the primary group together with close consanguinal and affinitive ties went a long way to create the sense of oneness and the need for cooperative living among members of the community. Cooperation within economic and social activities, as manifested in such institutions as *seraya, derau* and *gotong royong* was an important underlying feature in their life. This could be expected, because in the absence of hired labour, service could only be obtained in return for service through mutual cooperation. Such practices, based on territorial or kinship structure strengthened the solidarity within different community groups among the *rakyat* at village level.

Each village community, or sometimes a few communities together, had a head or leader, known either as a *ketua kampung, penghulu* or other local variations of those names. In almost all matters within the village the guidance, advice and leadership of this head were often sought after by his *anak buah*. But where a community was under the patronage or protection of an *orang besar*, who was regarded the virtual head of a bigger area, then the small community leader in addition to his other roles also acted as a mediator through which the *orang besar* channelled his influence dur-

ing the few occasions he needed to. The *orang besar* could either inherit his position or be appointed by the Sultan, who symbolised the apex of power. Within a political structure that is integrated, we may be able to represent it in the form of a large pyramid, where the apex is the sultan, the base the *rakyat* and in between the *orang besar*, who exercise control over their own areas besides being mediators between the ruler and the people through the small community heads. But where the system has disintegrated, as occured in Malaya during the 19th century, then a series of smaller pyramids could be seen, some having the ruler or different major or minor chiefs as the apex with bigger or smaller territorial groups as their bases. All these traditional leaders, be they *orang besar* or sultan, taken together constituted the *bangsawan* group. They did not represent a really coherent entity, because in Malaya at that time there in fact existed some acute relationships of disharmony among different groups in the supra-village spheres.

The relationship between the *rakyat* and the *bangsawan* was one between the ruled and the ruler, and in this relationship, within the limitation of each pyramid, influence and power were concentrated primarily in the hands of the few *bangsawan* at the supra-village sphere. The symbol of political power and social prestige among the *bangsawan* group was the size of following and grandeur of living. This depended on their economic resources, which came in two ways. Firstly, an *orang besar*, for example, could have some of his followers especially from among slaves, bondsmen and mercenaries to work on the land they owned. Secondly, and perhaps more important, he could forcibly collect taxes and dues from among the *rakyat* or from trade that went on within his area of jurisdiction, and this could be done either directly or through leaders subordinated to him. Besides this economic relationship, the *orang besar* could also conscript the services of the *rakyat* he has influence on, either for personal ends as in marriage, or for public safety as in preparing trenches and fortresses required for defence in times of war, through the institution of *kerah*. The ability of the *orang besar* to exercise this power depended largely on his power, and along with that the need among the *rakyat* for patronage and protection from the *orang besar* because the former would abide by the wishes of the latter only as long as this need could be fulfilled. In a feudal society such reciprocal interdependence,

one as a source for services and income, and the other, for protection and patronage, normally existed between the ruler and the ruled. This found no exception in Malay society.

III

When the Malay states came under British protection, the Malays were suddenly brought into contact with a new type of society and culture, which was completely different from their own; and this was because the British had already reached a stage of development strongly characterised by a highly capitalistic economy, intact politico-administrative system and advanced educational set-up. In actual fact, the acceptance of British protection marked the starting point of change in Malay society and culture itself.

In my opinion, there are three important factors that brought about this change: economic, politico-administrative and educational.

Economically, the British developed in Malaya large-scale capitalistic economy based on the production of rubber and tin, and expanded particularly Singapore and Penang as centres for entrepot trade. What the British began on a large scale, the Chinese also followed up but on a smaller scale. These economic enterprises did not attract any significant participation by the Malays, the large majority of whom still continued with their agricultural activities in the rural sector. But it would be wrong to imply that there was completely no effect at all of these changes on the Malays. First of all in the *kampung* a big number of them began to adopt the planting of cash crops — rubber mainly, and to some extent this introduced a little specialisation in production in some areas, and also emphasised the role of money. The stage had been set for the Malays in the *kampung* to become part of a wider economic network, and through the newly-introduced institutions such as the 'middlemen' and shops they were connected with the rest of the world both as producers and consumers of goods. More and more their economy became monetary. The process of accumulation was possible, and between the accumulators and those who lost their land through forced or voluntary transactions, the economic gap grew wider. So did their social differences. The presence of people with little or no land, and the possibility of hiring labour tended to break down the tradition of cooperation and mutual help. The tendency towards the more complex stratification into different

status groups also weakened the kinship or territorial ties.

With the superimposition of Western-styled politico-administrative systems and institutions, many direct and indirect changes occured upon the Malays. Firstly, government and administration became centralised, and the boundaries of the states and their small constituent administrative units were clearly demarcated. A ruler to symbolise power and unity for each state was constitutionally installed, though stripped of the economic and political powers enjoyed by his predecessors. His function became restricted but the area over which he symbolised authority widened. His position was well established and not easily challenged. The *orang besar* who could, and sometimes did manage to challenge the authority of a ruler in the past, had now been removed of the economic and political control and influence they had over their own territories.

A new phonemenon that arose out of this modern administration was bureaucracy, whose most important function was the execution of policies in civil, judicial or security matters. Instead of *orang besar* who partially acted as mediator between the ruler and ruled before, with this bureaucracy there came into being a new group of people who acted as the main channels between the government and the public. To head the district in civil administrative matters the district officer was instituted, and in conjunction with him there were other officers in charge of justice or security, each with their own array of subordinates. But at the lowest village level, the institution of *penghulu* managed to survive, only that his role was transformed from that of a village leader to the lowest member of the state machinery, responsible to the government. Besides the *penghulu* there also were other lower members of the administrative machinery represented in the village. The running of new government and administration through bureaucracy needed new structures, organisations and institutions, and naturally these also came in attendance of the change.

Of course, it has not only been in administration that all these changes took place. The adoption of parliamentary democracy as the underlying basis for politics and government, not only brought new institutions required for its operation, but also gave rise to new elements in personalities involved in the political and governmental structures. Leadership and power came through the process of election, and although the top order required only a small selected number, yet at the periphery there grew a large body of people,

who, although they do not seem to assume important functions in politics and government, nevertheless appear to be necessary appendages in the whole system. These are the parliamentarians and councillors, who together with the bureaucrats constitute the most important segment of the middle classes that have grown in Malay society as a new social feature after the coming of the West.

Education was important for serving some practical purposes. Trained manpower was needed to carry out technical aspects of the country's development, and educated personnel necessary for the running of the bureaucracy. Education was the answer. Within the village there also arose a small corps corp of people, who as a result of their education became teachers and minor officials, and so drifted away from traditional occupations. They added to the stratified nature of Malay society now, even in the *kampung*. But education, especially in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, has not only produced new structures in Malay society; it has also brought about new thoughts, ideas, values and attitudes among the people, which have had and certainly will continue to have an important role to play in the further transformation of Malay society and culture.

IV

What I have tried to show in the past few pages is that the Malays are transforming from feudal to capitalist society and from traditional to modern culture. Malay society and culture cannot be said to have been completely cast in the Western mould, but the synthesis of the West with the East is certainly perceptible. Nevertheless the rate at which the transformations have taken place naturally depends very much on the extent to which the influences have managed to seep into Malay life. What we have to bear in mind is that the most extensive of the economic, politico-administrative and educational changes did not take place within the *kampung* themselves. Most of the *kampung,* where the majority of Malays have always congregated, felt these influences only indirectly. To some the wind of change blew harder than to others; and so as a result we find that the stages of transformation arrived at in different parts vary. But even these are still in the process of change and transformation; and indeed Malay society and culture can be considered to be in a state of transition.

The transition to capitalism and modernism does not affect only the Malays, but also other segments of the Malayan community. The changes that occur in economic, political and social fields are those that seem to bring about closer links between the various segments within the same economic and politico-administrative frameworks. In other words, more and more, these changes will have the long term effect of bringing the various segments of Malayan society into a closer interlocking whole. Of course there still are many prejudices and conflicts in values and interests amongst them. Exploited, these prejudices and conflicts can certainly worsen. But certainly the sharing of common environment, common economic and political life, will go a long way in producing socializations and acculturations among the various segments of the plural society in this country.

Perhaps it may be right to end here with a note that besides transforming into a modern type of culture, the Malays will certainly change too in the direction of absorbing and assimilating more and more from the richness of the diverse cultures in this country. As much as they have assimilated from the Hindus and the Muslims, they will definitely be absorbing and assimilating into their own many of the Chinese cultural traits. These will occur much faster when the prejudices and conflicts have been reduced.

The Collections of Malay Artifacts: A Brief General Survey

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ENDOWED AS HE IS with more advanced brains than other animals, and with his ability to make tools, Man is able to satisfy the needs for food, shelter and for the well-being of his family by manufacturing material objects. These material objects (instrumental for the attainment of certain goals) such as tools, weapons, utensils, ornaments, clothing and houses as well as amulets and other objects for magico-religious purposes, are called the material culture of the people. The smaller objects of material culture, which may be carried or handled by an individual, are referred to as artifacts — to use the term in a restricted sense.

Artifacts may be classified either on the basis of the materials from which they are manufactured or according to their function. The latter method of classification is the most convenient one to adopt. We may thus broadly classify Malay artifacts into at least the following categories: -

1. Agricultural implements: of metal, stone and plant products.
2. Household articles: of metal, clay and stone, plant and animal products.
3. Weapons: of metal and plant and animal products.
4. Dress and personal ornaments: of metal and plant products.
5. Games and past-times: of metal and plant and animal products.
6. Transportation: of metal and plant products.
7. Magico-religious practices: of metal, clay and stone and plant and animal products.
8. Regalia: of metal, plant and animal products.

It is pertinent to mention that the artifacts of any people are not all the products of the culture of that people. In the course of the history of any country, migrations (be they permanent or non-permanent in nature) and contacts through trade and missionaries have taken place. This has in most instances resulted in additional artifacts being adopted by the people of the different cultures involved in the contact. Some of these may be modified to suit the local taste and fashion and in some cases may be made from a different material to the original as materials must be obtained easily locally. A very interesting example of this is the Rehal (a Koran Rest) which is Arab in origin. Here we find that not only are the Rehals made of wood but the local inhabitants have ingeniously fashioned it out of two pieces of bamboo slotted into one another. In short, no single culture can boast that its artifacts are 100% original, uninfluenced even to a slightest degree by artifacts belonging to any other cultures.

Consequently, in the study of Malay artifacts one cannot neglect to compare those that are in question with the artifacts from its country of origin. A case in point is that of Negri Sembilan Malay silverware. Here though one may find some similarities with regard to shape to the Sumatran silverware there may be some differences between them in the arrangement of their floral designs.

Obviously the place where one can conveniently study artifacts is in the Museum. This is due to its functions, to mention but a few, as an institution for the collection, preservation and the study of the country's cultural heritage. There are five methods by which collections of Malay artifacts are made:

(1) *Purchase:* This is divided into two categories: *active* and *passive*. By *active* purchases is meant that the individual curator or his representatives make field trips in purchasing the materials. This method of collection is undoubtedly of great scientific value as relevant information can be obtained on the artifacts as to their place of origin, method of manufacture, uses and so forth. The bulk of the collection in the Perak Museum, Taiping, was acquired in this way and was principally made between 1880 and 1930 by L. Wray and I.H.N. Evans. On the other hand *passive* purchases in effect means individuals bring to the Museum objects which they consider the Museum is interested in acquiring, *Passive* purchase is in most instances, unsatisfac-

tory, for unlike *active* purchases the information regarding the age of the materials and of their place of origin may not be correct. However, mention may be made of individuals who are interested in the growth of the Museum's collection and may have the opportunity to purchase items which in their opinion would be of value to the Museum. They then sell these to the Museum at their purchase price.

(2) *Gift:* This method of acquisition forms only a very small percentage of the collection.

(3) *Bequest:* To my knowledge this has never happened here.

(4) *Exchange:* If the Museum possesses duplicates of any specimens in its collection and may wish to possess a specimen which it requires to fill the gap in the collection, reciprocal arrangement can be made to satisfy both parties.

(5) *Loan:* may be either for a fixed or an indefinite period. Such practice is useful as it fills the gaps in collections and facilitates research. In some instances after a lapse of a period of time the owner ultimately donates the objects to the Museum.

The history of the collection of Malay artifacts in the Museums in Malaya dates back to 1886 when the Taiping Museum, the first Museum built in the States of Malaya, was opened. Originally, it was to be a Museum of ethnography but in later years archaeological and zoological specimens were housed.

Prior to this date there had been individuals who made private collections but they were mainly collectors of such objects as weapons, silverware and silk sarongs. They were not interested in collecting items not of artistic or intrinsic value which were of daily use by the local peoples such as utensils of wood or coconut shells. The Museum realised this and the curator of the Museum, L. Wray, expressed this in his Annual Report for the Taiping State Museum in 1897: "Special attention has been directed to the collection of native articles, which are not as a rule considered to be objects of value by ordinary collectors, and which in consequence have not received the notice that they deserve." We certainly cannot blame those collectors, for after all they acquired only objects which they admired. But what is most distressing, though understandable from the lack of understanding as to the value of the objects, is that items collected in the majority of instances had no record as to their place of origin, method of manufacture and

other relevant information which would make them of great scientific value.

However, apart from the Taiping Museum, the Selangor Museum (opened in 1899), which was mainly a zoological Museum, did also collect Malay artifacts, particularly weapons, costumes and silverware. Unfortunately, some of the collections in both the Taiping and the Selangor Museums were lost during the Second World War.

After the Second World War other Museums in Malaya — the State Museums in Seremban, Negeri Sembilan (opened in 1953), in Malacca (opened in 1954), in Alor Star, Kedah (opened in 1956), and the National Museum, Kuala Lumpur (opened in August 1963 and replacing the former Selangor Museum which was destroyed by Allied bombing in 1945) and the Penang Museum (opened in 1965) played their part in collecting cultural materials of the country. The State Museums are concerned mainly with collecting materials from their particular States while the National Museum collects those from all the States in Malaya.

The other States in Malaya such as Trengganu, Kelantan, Johore, and Perlis hope to have their own Museums in the very near future and it is most encouraging to note that some of these States have begun collecting materials from their areas in the hope of housing them in their future Museums.

The Museums abroad, particularly in Europe have good collections of Malay artifacts, notably the British Museum and Victoria and Albert Museum (London), the Museum of Ethnology and Archaeology (Cambridge), the Musée de I'Homme (Paris) and the Nationalmuseet in Copenhagen. These collections were acquired either through expedition — the famous "University of Cambridge Expedition to the North-Eastern Malay States and Upper Perak" (1889-1900) — or specially collected by individuals here and sent abroad.

We are fortunate that due to the untiring efforts of the past curators anr directors of the Museums and the generosity of the few members of the public, this country now possesses quite an extensive collection of its artifacts. Gaps no doubt occur among the collections but where possible this could be filled. Now that the country is undergoing rapid changes in its rural development and the time may come when the artifacts of the peoples, living in formerly inaccessible areas, may be replaced by mass-produced articles. It is therefore a pressing need on the part of the Museum

staff and other interested individuals to collect (along with relevant information) Malay artifacts that may come their way. Particular attention should be given to wooden objects and other objects which quickly decay. I have had occation to come across such items that were discarded in villages on the East Coast because the owners had no further use for them.

In passing, it may be of interest to note that royal palaces in this country own quite magnificent collections of costumes, personal ornaments and other items. If negotiations can be made with owners for their acquisition they will provide remarkable material for the study of period costumes and personal ornaments of Malay Royal Families.

If one glances through the bibliography on the publications of Malay artifacts one finds that there is a dearth of material on this subject. Only a few writers such as L. Wray, I.H.N. Evans, C.A. Gibson-Hill, W. Linehan and A.H. Hill have taken great pains in doing research on this subject. This scarcity of interested research workers is most lamentable and it could have arisen from the fact that apart from a few scholars, the general public, particularly those from the University, is not aware of the existence of an extensive collection of Malay artifacts that can be found in the reserve collections in the Museum. Perhaps the Museum has played a passive role in this, and if that has been so the situation is now remedied.

Ideals and Values Common to South and Southeast Asian Cultures

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THIS PAPER confines itself to stereotypes concerning a few areas of Indian culture which seem relevant to Malaysia and Southeast Asia in their cultural exchange through history. These statements are not conclusions arrived at as a result of statistical or frequency analysis of texts and documents, nor are they based on any contemporary survey of cultural values prevalent among people of Indian and Ceylonese origin in Malaysia, but are merely impressions gained through reading and study. The paper is an attempt to rationalise and synthesise in order to make one's own impressions clearer and more defined. Such rationalisation and synthesis are not necessarily correct, but they do help in that dialectic whereby argument and counterargument make possible a more logical and coherent outline and interpretation of cultural history.

1. *RELIGION*

Ecumenism; Universalism; Syncretism

The body of speculation, belief and practices which Westerners termed as Hinduism, has been known to grow from the period of the Vedas, and Hinduism contains within it several streams of belief, traditions and practices. In the words of its most modern philosopher-exponent, "Hinduism is, not a definite dogmatic creed, but a vast, complex, but subtly unified mass of spiritual thought and realisation."[1] Hinduism considers itself historically dynamic, ever prepared to grow, to absorb, to speculate, to transmute, though the Vedanta may be said to be its principal or most noticeable foundation. It has considered religious experience as more important than dogma, and it is prepared to give within its spacious

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *Hindu View of Life*, Allen and Unwin, London, 1950, p.24.

halls qualified accommodation to all other religions. There is a prayer which expresses this syncretism.

> May Hari, the ruler of the three worlds worshipped by the Saivites as Siva, by the Vadantins as Brahman, by the Buddhists as Buddha, by the Naiyayikas as the chief agent, by the Jainas as the liberated, by the ritualists as the principle of law, may he grant our prayers.[2]

In the prayer halls of the Ramakrishna Mission may be seen pictures of the teachers of the great religions of the world, including Confucius and Christ. The terms "eclectic," "syncretic" and "tolerant" are used of Hinduism. These terms seem inadequate to express the positive benevolent Hindu attitude in its theory regarding other faiths. Perhaps the terms "universalism" or "ecumenism" express better the Hindu attitude of readiness to revere and absorb all spirituality, whatever the source.

In the practice of religion, the indigenous thought of India is against dogmatism, institutionalism, rigid organisation and cononical discipline. (The rigidity of observances, the faultless enunciation of the mantras, and the inflexibility of the *Grhyasutras* may be used to counter this argument, but not altogether.) The view that there is one and only one way to salvation has not real approval within Hinduism, and this view is equally disapproved by Buddhism as practiced in Ceylon, and by other faiths originating in India. There seems to be irony concerning theological debates and disputes between various religionists in the lines of the Tamil mystic Tayumaanavar, when he defines God as the "One about whom innumerable conflicting faiths claim 'My God' and 'Your God'."

Of this view of religion, more as ethical living than a set of definite dogmas, and of reverence for all creeds, the great emperor Asoka is the best known exponent of the Ancient Period. The code of ethics which Asoka made the content of his preaching within his dominions as seen in his several rock and pillar edicts, and for the preaching of which he sent embassies to neighbouring countries, in short his *dharma,* though Buddhist in inspiration, was more of an "agreed syllabus" of ethics taught by the various Indian religions of the time. His edicts show the preoccupation of a ruler, who, though devoted to his own beliefs and convictions, seeks the moral and spiritual well-being of all his multi-religious society. He tried to establish inter-religious harmony and ethical propriety under the sponsorship of the state by the common elements prevalent in the

2. S. Radhakrishnan, *op.cit.*, p.46-47.

ethics of the religions he knew. This attitude of universalism in religion has marked Indian religious practice. Hindu orthodox teachers with strong dogmatic and uncompromising strains may be cited, but the general tendency seems to be summed up in what the twentieth century philosopher has stated "Hinduism is not a sect, but a fellowship of all who accept the law of right and earnestly major cultural areas: [11]

In Southeast Asian kingdoms too, we observe a liberal policy of a plurality of faiths and flexibility and or syncretism of practice. In the monuments of the Khmers can be seen the alternating changes of worship in the palaces from Saivaism to Vaishnavism, and to Buddhism. Buddhist statues are found next to Hindu ones, and it is "difficult to determine what religion inspired any particular image or triad".

In A.D. 413, Fa-hien found in Yavadvipa (Sumatra-Java) so few Buddhists that "it is not worth while to mention them", but I-tsing in A.D. 671 writes:

> In the fortified city of Fo-che, Buddhist priests number more than one thousand, whose minds are bent on learning and good practices. They investigate and study all the subjects that exist just as in the Madhyadesa (India); the rules and ceremonies are not at all different. If a Chinese priest wishes to go to the west in order to hear (lectures) and read (the original Buddhist texts) he had better stay at Fo-che for one year or two years and practise the proper rules and then proceed to Central India.[4]

During 685 to 689 A.D. I-tsing brings four collaborators from Canton to copy Buddhist Sanskrit texts into Chinese which he sent in 692 to China before returning there in 695.

Before I-tsing, the Hinayana is very popular, but gradually the Mahayana gains popularity in the 7th Century itself. Srivijaya becomes in the 8th Century the home of both Buddhism and of Hinduism, and during the Sailendra period accepts an eclectic faith. The Bodhisattva Manjusri is identified in the Kelurak record (A.D. 782) also with the trimurti of Brahminism. Buddha and Siva came to be considered as only different names of the one Highest Being who ruled the Universe. Even charters commenced with praises to the Buddha and Siva in one breath.[5]

A liberal and humanist attitude to religion has characterised Indian philosophic religion during all periods — that different faiths are but different streams leading to the "One Ocean". The

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *op.cit.*, p.77.
4. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *History of Sri Vijaya*, Madras, 1949, p.30*ff*.
5. W. F. Stutterheim, *Indian Influences in Old Balinese Art*, p.83.

worship of other gods and devotion to the holy men of other religions is compatible with the general Hindu and Buddhist attitude in India and Ceylon. Hence active missionary movements purporting to convert people from one faith to another are not understood by Hindus and Buddhists and cause deep concern and misunderstanding of the motives of missionary endeavour. Among the similarities noted between the Chinese and the Hindus is that, neither has a church or a priesthood which exercises administrative control, and that neither group has "any compunction about going to different temples or appealing to diverse deities."[6]

2. *THE STATE*

Deification of Royalty

The ancient and mediaeval periods of Indian history, and even the modern period until the democratic revolution of the 20th mid-century, have been characterised by the State, the kingdom, or the clan, by ruler and ruled, as one closely knit group or society. Within these groups, there was, no doubt, a hierarchical structure of society, and this hierarchical structure underscored the permanent inclusion of persons into social classes without the opportunity of inter-class mobility. Caste, originally, and in some of its developments, was an inflexible social order which kept Indian social stratification static for several centuries. It was also part of the *Rta* (order) and the *Dharma* which ensured harmony in the world of rational beings. Though caste was an institution which enjoined privileges on the priestly class, it was king and kingship which ensured the permanency and working conditions within the state, and gave legal sanction to the state and made it, in a sense, viable. The priesthood, though it had surrounded itself with legalised safeguards, would have had no position of pre-eminence if the structure of society had not been hierarchical and had not been upheld by royalty. It was defined as the function of the king to preserve the *Dharma* by protecting the hierarchical fourfold varnasrama dharma, and the order of society for all classes and stages. In the ancient period, Brahminism flourished with monarchy and the divine right of kings; Buddhism in regions with a contractual republican theory. In Southeast Asian kingdoms, the rigidity of Brahminism and of caste was considerably relaxed, but the king continued to be the centre and foundation of the social structure, while the priesthood evolved into a ceremonial entourage.

6. F.L.K. Hsu, *Class, Caste, and Club*, p.247.

Kingship itself received religious dignity and sanction, since the king was conceived as a deva, as an incarnation of Vishnu and or of Siva. Manu attempts to find a plausible reason for the divinity of kings (Manu VII, 3-5, 8.)

When the world was without a king
and dispersed in fear in all directions,
the Lord created a king
for the protection of all.
He made him of eternal particles
Of Indra and the Wind,
Yama, the Sun and Fire,
Varuna, the Moon, and the Lord of Wealth.
And, because he has been formed
of fragments of all those gods,
the king surpasses
all other beings in splendour.
Even an infant king must not be despised,
as though a mere mortal,
for he is a great god
in human form."

The cult of kingship in Southeast Asia has affinities with kingship as evolved in India. At the same time, that cult exhibited elements and developments which divinised kingship much further than ordinarily manifested in India. The cult of the god-king, *Devaraja,* and his apotheosis on pyramidal structures (Phnom Batheng, Koh Ker, Phimeanakas) found in such abundance all over Southeast Asia are evidence of this development which incorporated original and local elements of kingship with what was adapted from Hindu and Buddhist scriptures, and Brahminic practices in Indian courts.

The temple-structures of Java are said to have been raised as part of this cult of royalty. Stutterheim says:

> That the above-sketched cult of kings was of extreme importance to a reigning dynasty is evident from many passages in the old literature of Java; as long as the chandi and its consecrated contents endured as a source of magic power for the dynasty, this power could, at most, be subjected for a time only; its capacity to rise again was, however, ensured. Therefore the devastations of chandis, of which the ruination of the pit and its contents was obviously the main purpose, should not be ascribed to the religious zeal of Muslims—by the nature of things this was never the case in Bali—but to victorious kings, who, having conquered a rival, desired to abolish for ever the possibility of restoration of the latter's dynastic power by ruining his holy chandis. For the chandis were, indeed, the vulnerable and hence carefully protected heart of the royal houses.[7]

Javarman II (*d.* 850) instituted the cult of the god-king which is said to have been the key feature of the Khmer civilization. The entire complex of buildings in Angkor is to be explained as in one way or another connected with the cult of royalty. The sculp-

7. W. F. Stutterheim, *op.cit.*, p.25.

tures of Vishnu and Siva and of the Bodhisattvas are but portraits of kings, princes, and high dignitaries, divinised into that celestial form they represented or into which they would be absorbed at the time of death.[8] Angkor Wat is a sanctuary not to the god Vishnu, but to King Suryavarman II, identified as Vishnu.[9] This cult saw a decline with the increase of Hinayana Buddhism from Ceylon. The divinity of the king in Cambodia was often referred to as "the inner self".

That the king was the life of the state is thus expressed in an ancient classical Tamil poem of about the first century A.D.:

> Not food (paid) not drink (water) confer life.
> The King is the life of this expansive world.
> Wherefore it becomes the duty of the Sovereign,
> powerful in his Army, to realise "I am the life
> (of the State)". (Puram. 186.)

3. *EDUCATION*

Guru-disciple relationship

Education, until the introduction of formal popular schools, was characterised by a certain close bond established between teacher and disciple. In India, the Guru-disciple relationship was much more formalised, and governed by traditions which necessitated the residence of the disciple in the house of the Guru, prescribed duties to be performed by the disciple, such as bringing firewood, tending the sacred fire, begging alms for his teacher and himself.

Chapters in the Jaina sutras, in the Vinaya, and in the Dharma-sutras are devoted to prescribing regulations for this relationship. The fact of being accredited to a good teacher or of descent from a lineage of reputed teachers was like credentials of authentic learning. When the Buddha went forth to preach his doctrine, Upaka, the Ajivikan asked of him. "In whose name, friend, have you retired from the world, who is your teacher? Whose doctrine do you profess?"

Ernest von Lasaulx, Viktor von Strauss, and Karl Iaspers would call an axial period of world history the millenium before Christ especially the 6th century B.C. Karl Jaspers thinks that it was during this period that Man and the ideas which govern the world came into being simultaneously in the West and in Asia.

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8. George Coedes, Angkor, O.U.P., 1963, p.29*ff*; *Les états hindouises d'Indocine et d'Indonesie*, Paris, 1964.
9. S. Chattopadhyaya, Traditional Values in Indian Life, Indian National Commission for Unesco, 1961.

"The three regions which, from the beginnings of the ancient civilizations onward, were possessed of a unique character, brought forth creations during the milienium before Christ upon which the entire history of the human spirit has rested ever since."[10]

Don Martindale has thus stated the pattern of mentality in four major cultural areas:

THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE CULTURAL MENTALITY IN THE FOUR MAJOR CULTURAL AREAS OF THE AXIAL PERIOD

Area	*General Character of the Mentality*
China	practical rationality and pragmatic traditionalism
India	metaphysical salvation consciousness, ascetic other-worldiness, ahistoricality.
Palestine	emissary prophetic orientation, revolutionary social Utopianism
Greece	methodological rationalism

The primary intellectual roles are again thus stated for this period.

PRIMARY INTELECTUAL ROLES OF THE MAJOR CULTURAL AREAS DURING THE AXIAL PERIOD

	Primary Intellectual Roles During the Axial Period	*Epitomized by*
China	official	learned official and wandering scholar
	(a) advisor and policy-maker	
	(b) clerk and scribe	
	founder of a private school and teacher	
India	house priest	ascetic
	teacher	
	founder of a school	
	official in the patrimonial state	
Palestine	Yahweh priest	prophet
	prophet	
Greece	official of the city-state	philosopher
	founder of a genteel sect	
	lawyer	
	teacher and public lecturer	
	physician	

The Guru is therefore a dominant type in certain areas of Indian culture. More than a teacher, he is a counsellor and the medium whereby spiritual lineage is transmitted. He holds a pre-eminent place even in modern Hindu life. I should like to point out the study by F.L.K. Hsu on *Clan, Caste, and Club* in which the modern Hindu view of the world is compared with the Chinese and the

10. Karl Jaspers, Origin and Goal of History, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1953, p.14.
11. Don Martindale, *Social Life and Culture Changes*, Van Nostrand. Princeton, 1962, pp.78, 83.

American. His conclusion is that the Guru constitutes a great difference between Chinese families and Hindu families.

> The institution of the guru is unthinkable to the ordinary Chinese. It simply has no Chinese counterpart. The teacher-disciple relationship has always been recognized in China but, except in the case of monks and priests, it has had no religious meaning and was designed only for the purpose of learning a specific skill or trade, and therefore it pertained to males only. But even then it neither approached the possible intimacy of the relationship between the Hindu guru and his disciples nor cut across the disciple's family relationship as it does in India. (p.34).

The Sacred thread was like a spiritual umbilical cord binding the student to the source of his spiritual and intellectual existence, his teacher, after discipleship ceremonies had conferred on him a ritualistic new birth.

The type of the Guru in South Indian legend and tradition is Agastya, whose identity is not easily established. He is the muni who according to legend compiled the first Tamil grammar, was the *fons et origo* of literature and science, and remains immortal on the Potiyil. He was also considered the Kulaguru of the Paandya line. The Agastya legends seem to multiply about the fifth century, and a cult develops in the South of India about this period. It is a little after this period that in Southeast Asia, (Sumatra, Java, Cambodia, Campa, Thailand) the cult of Agastya spreads, and he is even identified with Siva as the Bhatara Guru, as the Divine Teacher, and the intermediary through whom royalty is transmitted from heaven to earth. The numerous statues of Agastya found all over the archipelago, and his place in Southeast Asian epigraphy and literature are testimony to this characteristic feature of South Indian religion, popularised since the period of the devotional poet-saints of the Tamil country (7th—10th centuries) who frequently conceived Siva as the Great Teacher who initiated them into mystical lore. In South Indian iconography, Daksinamurti and Siva-Guru, are iconic representations of Lord Siva as teacher. It is not quite clear whether Agastya at one time was identified with Siva himself.

During the period of the Sailendras, the cult of Agastya become prominent. The name of the dynasty itself which means King of the Mountain, their choice of an emblem like the carp, the place-names prevalent during their epoch seem to be evidence of close religious and political connections between the Pandyan kingdom and Java and Sumatra.[12] The study of Poerbatjakara, *Agastya in*

12. Nilakanta Sastri, Agastya in TBG (1936) LXXVI, 458-545.

den Archipel, (Leiden, 1926) may be further amplified by a close study of Southeast Asian and South Asian sources.

In Hindu-Javanese iconography, Siva is quite often portrayed in his manifestation as Mahaguru. Various Javanese and Batak legends attribute the origin of rivers and lakes to a Guru type equipped with a staff (trident) and a pitcher. The Guru type is connected with the blessings and the fertility originating from water, and often it is not quite certain whether the Guru-type represented is Siva as Mahaguru, or a king or exalted personage in the guise of a Guru, or an Agastya-type of Guru himself. The great king Erlangga (flourished 1035) enjoyed the posthumous title of *paduka mpungku bhatara Guru*. Was this because his life was connected with the introduction of water works?[13] Agastya, an exalted figure of the Guru in iconography and in literature in both Southern India and in Southeast Asia is also connected with the river Kaveri, which originated according to the Buddhist poem *Manimekalai*, from water from the water-pot of Agastya, which was poured out as a request of the Chola King Kantaman. The river flowed eastwards to the sea, was welcomed by Campapati, who was doing penance under a jambu tree, and the city at its embouchure which earlier was termed Campapati came to be known by the name of the river itself (Kaveripattinam). Agastya is again connected in the poem with the origin of the Indra festival which was his suggestion so that the god of rain might be appeased, and prosperity might mark his city. Further, he is credited with having drunk the entire ocean.

What is the reason for the identification of the Guru type as the source of water fertility and as the source of wisdom, and why has this twofold symbolism persisted in iconography and literature? The answer must be obvious, that it is the Guru who releases the hidden springs of wisdom.[14]

4. *IN LITERATURE*

Ideal human types and their opposites

In Indian literature, if one is to find a common source of values and ideals, a source which would be relevant to all the languages and regions of India, and at the same time a source of values and

13. F.D.K. Bosch, "Guru, trident and spring," in Selected Studies in Indonesian Archaeology, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961, p.168.
14. *Op.cit.*

ideals in Southeast Asia, one must seek that source in the epics, the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*. The didactic content of the *Mahabharata*, and the ideals of human conduct presented in the *Ramayana* in the persons of Rama and Sita, of Hanuman, of Lakshmanan were powerful means of mass education and mass entertainment, a feature which has continued to remain in so popular a form as the *wayang kulit* and the dana of several regions of Southeast Asia. The significant traditions are contained in these itihasas. The *Mahabharata* contains the religious, social, ethical and political ideals of the ancient period, and continued to be like a codex providing the norms of behaviour in individual, social and political life. The *Ramayana* which is characterised by greater simplicity and unity as an epic poem, portrayed the highest ideals and personifications of character and inspired strength, courage, gentleness, purity, fidelity and self-sacrifice, and provided the examples of conjugal, filial, maternal and fraternal relationships. In its concept of kingship and the state, it provided the example of good government and the relationship which should exist between the ruler and the ruled.

Of the literature of India, it is the epics which captivated most the attention of Southeast Asia, connected as the episodes and events were with the notions and the rights and privileges of kingship, and the version of "Rama Rajya" or the "State of Rama". Further they provided abundant material for popular exposition of what was the dharma of the ruler and the ruled within a state. Hence, different versions were received from different parts of India, and synthetic versions made of these different versions. In Thailand, the Tamil version of the *Ramayana* seems to have been quite popular. In Cambodia, a version other than the Sanskrit version seems to have been the foundation of the bas-relief representations on the walls of Angkor Wat.

The popularity of the epics as the theme for sculptors and architects is seen on all important monuments in Southeast Asia.

Concluding Remark

This paper is a brief outline of four areas in which culture ideals and types may be found. There are other areas too in which comparisons between South and Southeast Asia may be made, e.g. the structure of the family, the hierarchical structure of society, ideals in literature, and ideals in art.

Some Characteristics of Indian Culture in Malayisa

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"FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS, a young businessman has been waging a lone crusade among the rural Malays that promises to transform their 'tida apa' attitude towards life into an agressive and dynamic stance" — so begins a story in the *Straits Times*.[1]

The story elaborates the aim of his crusade. Inche Hanafiah Hussain is reported to have said that since his election as president of the Associated Malay Chambers of Commerce, he has been going round the country meeting Malay businessmen and urging them to discard what he called their "lackadaisical attitude" to life.

He believes that Malays must be told that even in their sleep, they must dream business and worry about making money. His formula for their success is summarised in the words:

> Work — twenty four hours a day, if need be — and plenty of confidence, self-reliance and initiative.[2]

Apart from the question whether the Malays should follow his advice, and give up their sense of values, there is another question, and that is, how did they come to cherish what Inche Hanafiah refers to as their lackadaisical attitude to life.

It may seem strange if, in a paper devoted to a discussion of some characteristics of Indian culture in Malaysia, the writer starts by pointing to certain traits of character attributed to the Malays rather than to the Malaysian Indians. The fact is — if one may express it without being accused of undue exaggeration — that the kampong Malays represent Indian culture better than the successful Indian of the towns who has tended to play the sedulous ape to the westerner. The poor Indian labourer of the towns and even of the estates may be said to live in a halfway house. He cherishes certain Indian traditions, but if he had the means, he would follow in the footsteps of his successful brother who apes the westerner.

There is a small section of the Indian community, most members of which arrived in Malaysia in the inter-war years and later and who seem to be able to maintain a balance between their appreciation of Indian culture and its values and their evaluation of western-style gadgets and their usefulness. These form a very small minority and a large number of them consider themselves birds of passage. We will therefore devote our attention mainly to the Malays, the successful westernised Indians of the towns and their less successfull brothers in rural as well as urban surroundings.

Culture is a character ordinarily attributed to communities and people. It consists of those habits in individuals that have become customary, conventionalized, and accepted in the community.[3] The external aspect of a culture is seen in its arts, its ceremonials and its tools. Its real content consists in memories, in a fund of tradition. It is this content rather than the form that this paper will mainly deal with.

It has already been pointed out that in the Malay folkways Indian cultural traits are more evident than in the disparate ways of the present day Malaysian Indian. It is the Indian character in their way of life that may have led a historian to state:

> People from India and further north came down in search of trade and adventure and settled down. The settlers and the aborigines intermarried and this mixing produced a new race which today is called the Malay race.

He does not specify what he means by "further north". It may be truer to say that

> The modern Malay is a mixture of several different races and cultures. He may have Indian, Chinese and Arab blood in his veins; and he may also have the blood of some of the earliest of Malaya's primitive peoples.[4]

In this mixture of cultures the contribution from India appears to be the most dominant. It is not unreasonable to assume that the indigenous culture borrowed heavily from the invading Indian culture, which in the eyes of the indigenous people, assumed an aura of enchantment. It came from a distance, loaded with flashy things, and as days passed, with the glitter and might of a large well-organised army. The life of ease enjoyed by the higher classes of the settlers may also have had its appeal to the indigenous people who lived in less comfortable conditions. When cultural traits are transmitted, they are diffused rather than distributed. They interact and modify one another. The result is that in the process of diffusion, they are transformed, recreated.[5] This transformation

we can notice in a number of instances of borrowing from Indian culture.

It has been said that because the Malays value their freedom and enjoy peace and quiet, they have sometimes been accused of being lazy.[6] There is no gainsaying the fact that when compared with the Chinese, they tend to be less industrious. The reason for this is probably not in their aversion to physical labour, but in their philosophy of life, which was borrowed from India, but which had undergone a sea change in the process. One finds in *Manu Smrti* the following:

> Some say that dharma (virtue) and material gain are good, and still others that dharma alone or pleasure alone is good, but the correct position is that the three should coexist without harming one another (2.224).

Yajnavalkya Smrti states:

> The science of dharma is of greater authority than the science of material gain. (2.2.21).

Even Vatsyayana in his *Aphorisms on Love* has emphasised:

> Man, who could live up to a hundred years, must apportion his time and take to virtue, material gain and pleasure in such a way that these are mutually integrated and do not harm each other. As a boy he must attend to accomplishments like learning; in youth he should enjoy himself; in later life he should pursue the ideals of virtue and spiritual liberation. (1.2.1.).
>
> When there are all three, virtue, material gain, and pleasure, their superiority is in the order of their precedence (1.2.24).

Though these were the values the settlers cherished, it was certain external aspects of their daily life that the indigenous people observed and tried to emulate. The daily routine of a man of taste and culture, according to Vatsyayana included such comforts as the following:

> After eating (in the forenoon) comes playing with parrots and myna birds and making them talk; and indulging in cock and ram fights and in other artistic activities; also attending to the work he has with his friends and companions. Then a little nap. In the forenoon still, he dresses and goes out for social calls and for enjoyment of the company of others. In the evening he enjoys music and dance. At the end of it, in his own apartments, decorated and fragrant with smoke, he awaits, along with his companions, his beloved who has given him an appointment, or else sends her a message and himself goes out to meet her. Such is the daily routine (*Kama Sutra,* 1.4).

The appeal of such a daily life need not be stressed. If the chieftains' families with whom the Indian immigrant had established financial and marital relations, as well as the common people imitated his way of life, at least in its externals, he must have been happy about it. He did not probably choose to spoil the pleasures of his hosts by preaching to them all about the four ends of man.

This love of pleasure, which is not an uncommon human trait, was probably coloured by a concept of fatalism. It is common knowledge that though most teachers disapproved of it, there appeared a fatalist strain in Hindu thought.[7] The Dravidian Ajivikas believed that nothing that a man could do would in any way influence his future lot because his lot was predestined. In their hands the doctrine "evolved into a Parmenidean view that all change and movement were illusory, and that the world was in reality eternally and immovably at rest."[8] As the early Indian immigrants were mostly from the Dravidian region, it is not unlikely that quite a few of them were Ajivikas. It is again probable that like most converts who are more zealous than the persons from whom they accepted the doctrine, the indigenous inhabitant tended to take the doctrine more seriously, especially because it appealed to a weakness to which flesh is heir. In his own ancient patterns of a pantun, he must have expressed thoughts like the following:

> All things have rest; why should we toil alone,
> We only toil, who are the first of things
> Death is the end of life; ah, why
> Should life all labour be?9

It has been said that if the Indian climate had any effect on the people of India, it was to develop in them a love of ease and comfort, an addiction to the simple pleasures and luxuries freely given by a bounteous Nature — a tendency to which the impulse to self-denial and asceticism on the one hand, and occasional strenuous effort on the other, were natural reactions.[10] If the Indian climate is to blame, the Malaysian climate, which exudes more humidity, is probably more to blame for moulding the character of the inhabitants. But it would seem that without inspiration from India, this love of ease and comfort which has developed into a belief in fatalism and quietism, would not have been elevated to the position of an act of faith. As has been already remarked, the strenuous activities of the Chinese, the Europeans and the latter day Indian immigrants themselves tend to belie the exaggerated responsibility attributed to the climate.

It is remarked about the Malays that insult and injustice they will "resent deeply, but not with open or violent protest unless the provocation is excessive."[11] Deep resentment of injustice and insult the Malays seem to share with many other communities, but in their silent protest there appears to be a faint link with the passive resistance which India developed as a useful political device, if not

a doctrine of political philosophy. This may have been a philosophy developed out of sheer necessity. The Dravidians found that when the might of their arms failed against the Aryan invaders, their loud protests too were of no avail. It was probably this tendency to yield to superior might while resenting the injustice involved in the situation that the Dravidian immigrants helped impart to the indigenous people.

The Malay thinks 'hustle' bad form, [12] which probably it is. To the ancient Indian poet, one of the important elements of a woman's beauty was her gait, which he compared to that of an elephant. It was this slow graceful movement that was designed to be promoted by *sari* and *sarong*. The modern Malaysian Indian girl who complains of deprivation of her 'freedom of movement' when confined in a *sari* has probably progressed far — far from the Indian and general concept of gracefulness.

Love of country life is not a special attribute of the Malays or the Indians. But the Malay's longing for trees outside his kampong and running water in the vicinity is parallelled by an identical desire cherished by the Dravidians, especially the Malayalis. Like Malayali, even when a Malay is poor, he likes to have his own garden plot. The Malay houses raised high on piles, with their roofs thatched with palm tree fronds and their floors and walls made of bamboo, sheltered by coconut and areca palm trees with clusters of banana plants close by, [13] remind one of similar sights in rural Malabar. In all these as well as in the presence of sleeping mats which can be rolled up and put away during the day, and in the use of the metal goblet called *kendi*, one can notice typical Dravidian folkways, if not in their pristine purity, at least with no substantial modification.

From these remarks on traits of character, one may pass on to a consideration of a few Malay social institutions. One that claims pride of place as indicating Indian elements is the institution of matriliny in *adat perpateh* society.[14] Even if one agrees with Coedes that matriliny was an *indigenous institution* in Malaysia, a comparative study of the details of the institution in Malabar and Malaysia would, no doubt, reveal the impact of the Dravidian way of life on Malaysian culture. It is not improbable that the Malaysian institution was either borrowed or adopted from Malabar. It is remarkable that this institution in Malaysia has not only stood the test of time, but also withstood the direct onslaught made on it

by Islamic law and western concepts of family life and inheritance. The following sayings which attempt to harmonise the *adat* with religious law are worthy of a Minangkabau Sankara.

> Customary law hinges on religious law,
> Religious law on the word of God.
> If custom is strong, religion is not upset;
> If religion is strong, custom is not upset.[15]
> Our customary law bids us
> Remove what is evil
> And give prominence to what is good;
> Bids us do good
> And forbids our doing evil.[16]

When the British administered Islamic law to the Malays, what they did was to administer that law as varied by local custom, with the result that the customary laws of inheritance envisaged in *adat perpateh* have been, in the main, left intact. It is worthy of note that when the Republic of India abolished by statute all the incidents of matrilineal inheritance among the Hindus, its transplanted scion appears to hold its own ground against attacks made on it, among Muslims generally considered to be wedded to a different system of inheritance. In this one instance at least, the present day Malay seems to have maintained and cherished his Indian heritage.[17]

If an institution like matriliny was transplanted in the Sumatran and Malayan soil centuries ago, it was in the last century that a number of Indian people were deported to Malaysia as they were sentenced to deportation for life. All these deportees were not found guilty of serious crimes, nor were all of them from the lower castes or classes in India. Misfortune is an excellent leveller and as deportees they were treated alike; and they tended to treat themselves equal to one another. Here was a situation where, with no women of their own castes among them and no matrimonial relations to contemplate, they inclined to accept a fellow-Indian as a fellow-sufferer regardless of his caste. By the time they were able to acquire their own plot of land or set up in business after years of toil for the government and were in a position to bring their wives, or would-be brides and relatives to Malaysia, they had lost touch with the rigorous caste system prevalent in India. Later on when the indentured labourers from South India arrived in Malaya and Singapore, what they found was an Indian community, devoid of the rigours of the caste system, though not entirely oblivious of the institution. Although intercaste marriages among

Malaysian Indians are not of common occurrence, incidence of untouchability is unheard of.

Deportees and indentured labourers who, by force of circumstances, had to leave their womenfolk behind, were probably not the best purveyors of Indian culture. It was some years before they could set up families of their own. During these years of their single lives, when they practically lost their Indian cultural moorings, they began to appreciate the ways of life of their European supervisor or assistant manager. They desired that when they could, they should train their children in the ways of the west, which in their eyes, seemed to guarantee a privileged position like that of the supervisor or the assistant manager. Trained in these circumstances, the children were inclined to despise everything Indian. Many of them never visited India; when some of them did, they found India 'lousy' (to quote their own favourite expression) because they missed there some of the gadgets with which they were familiar in Malaysia. In their love of the west, some of them anglicised their names, while a few went to the extent of adopting a western name and calling themselves Eurasians! Their children —Malaysian Indians of a third generation, who were all 'local-born" — went to English schools, spoke English at home as well as outside, said that they "wouldn't know" any Indian language and assumed an air of importance. When they held parties, English or Scotch drinks were invariably served. Their daughters learnt western music and ballroom dancing. But all these accomplishments did not bring them the desired supervisorship or assistant managership. Even when they did in a few rare instances, the newly-acquired position did not assure the holders of ready acceptance in the local European society. This opened their eyes. They felt less inclined to despise things Indian; though they could not bring themselves to appreciate Indian ways, they felt that a complete break with Indian life would be to their disadvantage. Though they never considered themselves bound by Indian tradition, they thought that it was imprudent to ignore it altogether. This was occasioned by the arrival in the second quarter of this century of a large number of fortune seekers from India. A considerable number of these new arrivals had at least secondary school education. Many had some professional qualification or other. Some of them were graduates of Indian universities. A large number of the newcomers were unskilled labourers. The educated ones managed to

secure white-collar jobs while the unskilled ones too were employed in some capacity or other mostly in factories and estates. It was these new immigrants who were prone to revive Indian culture in Malaysia. The 'local-born' Indians had to come to terms with them, not because they liked the new arrivals or their ways, but because they learnt, to their chagrin, that ignoring them meant living in isolation in snobbery-built ivory towers and only meeting a kindred spirit once in a blue moon, after having made all formal arrangements for such a get-together.

The new arrivals naturally considered themselves Indian; many of them did not even plan to settle down in Malaysia. They wanted their children to acquire what is locally known as 'English education' because it was advantageous to acquire it from the point of view of prospects in life, but they wanted the children to learn their mother tongue too, the language of the Indian region from where they came. Some of them sent their children to schools and universities in India. They taught their daughters Indian dancing and music. They even organised classes where lessons in *hata yoga* were given. This was not to derive any spiritual benefit, but to maintain physical health and save themselves from an early death due to some heart disease or other induced by the high tension of a money-grabbing modern life in the cities and towns.

It is often said that power corrupts. Money appears to be equally potent in its corruptive influences. The Indians who came to Malaysia as adventurers and fortune-hunters appeared to make the pursuit of wealth their main aim in life. Many of them in spite of the money they made, did not even enjoy themselves. In their vision, share certificates and bankers' pass books appeared more fascinating than a concert. They felt less inclined to be bound by family ties which, according to the Indian way of thinking, necessitated the expenditure of considerable sums of money on close relatives. This materialistic attitude to life in which they surpass the materialistic westerner seems to be their main contribution to the present day Indian way of life in Malaysia. The average westerner has certain pretensions to high culture, in spite of his hectic pursuit of wealth and physical comforts. The typical Indian in Malaysia seems to acquire wealth for its own sake; and when he acquires gadgets which help promote physical comforts, it would appear to be more for prestige than for actual comfort in daily life. By the time he acquires considerable wealth and owns two or more cars,

he inclines to be snobbish too, but with one difference from the 'local born' Indian who had evolved a generation ago. The latter's appreciation of western ways the former does not share; when the new successful adventurer acquires western gadgets, it is mainly for prestige and partly for comfort. It appears he has not lost his spiritual values; on festival days he visits places of worship, either as a matter of habit or induced by a compulsion of the spirit. But in his daily life in his obsession with the things of the earth, he is apt to forget matters of the spirit.

The unskilled labourer who sticks to Indian ways probably because he cannot afford the luxuries of a different style of life indulged in by his successful brother from India is instrumental in exerting a steadying, restraining influence on the neophytes of Mammon. In the teashops and accasionally in the reading rooms,[18] he discusses with his fellows their successful brethren, who cannot afford to ignore the comment and gossip emanating from these places of public resort. These labourers who may be from the same place as the successful adventurer, will visit India once every few years, and the news they spread in their home town or village about the latter will have its inevitable repercussions on his success in general, and in certain social matters in particular, such as finding a suitable husband for his daughter. The unskilled labourer, therefore, helps to maintain Indian culture in Malaysia in two ways, first, by clinging to the culture himself and second, by restraining any flagrant violation of the *mores* by some one who may be inclined to do so.

A discussion of Indian culture in Malaysia will be incomplete if no mention is made of the contribution of the Indian mercantile community. The merchant princes from the north of India appear to the general Malaysian public as symbols of Indian aristocracy. They live in small colonies of their own, meeting others for purposes of business, and once in a while, on formal social occasions. In their own little colonies, they preserve infact all their cherished *mores*. The small trader from the south, who is almost invariably a Muslim either from the Coromandel coast or from Malabar has in recent decades played a considerable role in diffusing Indian culture. He comes to Malaysia leaving his wife in India and is not an unwelcome guest in Malay families; nor is he averse to finding a new wife in the place where he carries on his trade. The common religious affiliation compelled with the marital relationship he has

taken up, gives him a unique position in helping to mould a Malay way of life in tune with that of the Muslims of South India. Accustomed as he is to matriliny in his own community, the Mapilla from Malabar is not scandalized by this un-Islamic system of inheritance. As he considers himself a bird of passage, he might even prefer matriliny in regard to his own family relationship in Malaysia. If he has to leave Malaysia, he does not have to worry about his children born in a matrilineal family.

The link forged by the Indian Muslims with Malays in recent years is probably the most potent factor in the diffusion of Indian culture in Malaysia in the present century. As the Indian Muslims who have been in Malaysia for some years and especially their children, are inclined to adopt Malay customs in certain matters such as marriage ceremonies, a fusion of the two cultures is also being effected to a limited extent. But the real meeting place appears to be in the western way of life, which many recommend in the familiar euphemistic expression, modernisation. Whatever may have been the attitude of their forefathers in India, the Indians in Malaysia are not immune to the attractions of material comforts, which when engaged in their hot pursuit of wealth, they hope to enjoy in later years. The Chinese are appreciative of western ways and are willing to adopt them, as long as their own traditional ways are occasionally followed, mainly for the sake of glorious memories of the past. The Eurasians are generally west-oriented. The social reformers among the Malays preach to their village folk the attractions of a way of life which accentuates the sense of values of the west. If spiritual values and religious institutions are not directly challenged in the process, even the *ulemas* and the *purohits* may elect to be passive witnesses to modernisation. But a modernisation which involves, for instance, *bharata natyam* danced to jazz music would be inconveivable. Synthesis may be attempted where it is possible. Speaking of legislation Macaulay said, "Our principle is simply this — uniformity where you can have it — diversity where you must have it"[19]. Could not the same principle be applied when desiring or attempting synthesis of cultures?

FOOTNOTES

1. *The Straits Times,* Oct. 15, 1965, p.11.
2. *Ibid.*
3. R. E. Park, *Race and Culture,* Illinois, 1950, p.1.
4. G. M. Khan, *History of Kedah,* Mor Star, 1939, p.6.
5. R. E. Park, *op.cit.,* p.7.
6. Josephine Kamm, *Malaya and Singapore,* London, 1963, p.23.
7. A. L. Basham, *The Wonder that was India,* London, 1954, p.322.
8. *Ibid.,* pp.295-296.
9. Tennyson, *The Lotos-eaters.*
10. A. L. Basham, *op.cit.,* p.4.
11. Ashley Gibson, *The Malay Peninsula and Archipelago,* London, 1928, p.25.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Josephine Kamm, *op.cit.,* p.23.
14. See J. Minattur, "Indian Influence on Malay Customary Law". *Journal of Indian History,* XLII, iii, (1964), p.784.
15. Adat bersendi hukum
    Hukum bersendi kitabullah
    Kuat adat, ta' gadoh hukum,
    Kuat hukum, ta' gadoh adat.
16. Pada adat menghilangkan yang burok,
    Menimbulkan yang baik;
    Pada shara' menyuroh berbuat baik,
    Meninggalkan berbuat jahat.
17. See J. Minattur, "Indian Influence on Malay Customary Law", *op.cit.*
18. The number of newspapers in Indian languages published from Malaysia as well as the many libraries and reading rooms which provide books in Indian languages testify to the fact that most literate Indians are voracious readers.
19. Speech in the East India Company debate, July 10, 1833.

Aspects of Society and Cultural Life of Indians in Malaysia

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IN THE CONTEXT of Malaysia's multi-racial society, the Indians are regarded as constituting one racial group. This is a matter of great political and administrative convenience. For the purpose of social and cultural analysis, however, it could be misleading. As one looks closer at this Indian community, one hardly sees it as a homogeneous, well-knit social group but as one consisting of several separate and inter-locking groups organised on the basis of a host of divided loyalties. However, on account of some coincidental circumstances the divisions within the community are not as intense as they might otherwise have been. The fact that the Indian element in the Malaysian population arose primarily from the need for plantation labour and that this labour was looked for and was forthcoming from one particular region of India to the exclusion of others has lent some homogeneity to the Malaysian Indians. It has resulted in the present position that about 80% of Indians in Malaysia are Tamil-speakers, another 10% being Malayalees and Telugus from closely related language-culture groups. The remaining 10% are northern Indians among whom Punjabis predominate. Despite this preponderance of one linguistic group, the Indian community taken as a whole is split up into innumerable sub-groups organised on the basis of one loyalty or the other. Some of these sectional loyalties are dwindling, others are as strong as ever.

One of the obvious factors that divides the Indians into separate sub-groups is language. The Tamils have many associations spread over the entire country, some of them strong and active, others but nominal, to foster the Tamil language and aspects of culture connected with this language. The Malayalees have similar associations in the larger urban centres where they are congregated serving the same purposes. Similarly the Telugus are organised in language

societies in places where they are concentrated. The Punjabi speakers have their own organisation and their own activities. Those who speak Hindi and who feel strongly about it as India's official language have also organised themselves for the propagation of Hindi. In India after independence linguistic nationalism arose as an important political force. It is but natural that it should have a similar, though less marked, effect among Malaysian Indians. Here language operates as a divisive as well as a unifying factor. While it divides the Indian community vertically into segments, within a linguistic group it overides other divisions of religion, class or caste and thus prevents further fragmentation of society.

Language is only one, even if the most important, factor that divides the Indian community. There are other factors that produce other loyalties cutting across each other. Religion is one of those. A vaste majority of Indians are Hindus and this is another factor lending some homogeneity to the community. But there are also influential Sikh, Muslim and Christian minorities. The two last groups, though belonging to religions that are international, retain their separate associations. Indian Muslims have their separate organisation. Indian Catholic groups have their own welfare associations. The Methodist Church has found it advisable to organise separate Tamil congregations in many parts of the country. The Syrian Christians of Malabar have their own organisation.

Caste is another divisive factor. Caste associations were very popular in the early stages of Indian immigration into this country. They were in fact the only forms of organisation permitted and conceived of. The Natukottai Chetties, a powerful commercial caste among Tamils, have one of the oldest and strongest of such organisations. Other castes that had separate organisations were Vanniyar, Thevar, Nadar, Yadhavar and Adhi Dravidar (the reformed term for depressed castes). Most of these are now defunct or dormant but could be revived when caste issues are at stake. At one time there was also the practice of forming associations based on the region from which the original immigrants came. Thus districts such as Ramnad, Arcot, Salem and Tanjore in the Madras state which have provided large quotas of immigrants have had or still have associations restricted to persons who came from these areas.

As about 35% of the Indian population has moved into the larger urban centres, the social and cultural life of the Indian community has undergone substantial changes. A fair proportion of

these are constituted of professional men and white-collar employees of various grades. Owing to an intensive utilisation of educational opportunities there is a steady movement into the middle and lower middle class categories from the various proletarian sectors. Among plantation labour, the one pervading ambition is to get the sons away from the estates and procure employment for them in the towns, if possible of a white-collar character. The Indian of the urban middle class and to a less extent the working class is brought into contact with all other communities of this country in various spheres of his life. He finds it necessary to develop loyalties other than what he has been traditionally fostering. He cannot, and after some time does not want to, use his vernacular extensively in daily life. He finds it difficull to adhere to the customs and taboos of his caste and even to remain within its narrow confines. In the context of the democratic state he must develop ideological ties which transcend his traditional loyalties. He makes a brave effort to come to terms with his urban multi-communal environment. In the process much of the traditional elements of his culture are lost. In this, however, his position is but marginally different from that of his counterparts in India and Ceylon who too are grappling with the problem of reconciling tradition and modernity in the great urban centres in both these countries.

Despite this submergence of urban Indian communities, they are in some respects the most vocal preservers of various aspects of the classical Indian culture. Classical Indian music and dancing find ardent patrons among them. Societies such as the Sangitha Apiviruthi Sabha (Society for the Promotion of Music) are active in maintaining and cultivating an interest in the Carnatic school of Indian Classical Music and the Bharatha Natyam style of dancing. In the larger towns there are private schools as well as individual teachers offering instruction in these arts. They are patronised generally by the children of the professional and commercial middle class. The specialist instructors are usually people who would have learnt in one of the many music scools in the Madras State. Quite frequently visits are entertained from well known Indian artistes who never fail to draw large crowds to their public performances. It is the quite lavish support of the urban community that has made all this activity economically feasible.

Efforts to foster Indian drama and lighter forms of music are more popular and widespread throughout the Indian community.

Wherever some few Indians are thrown together, there sprouts a drama club. Staging of dramas was one of the first recreational activities that made its appearance among plantation labour and was noted by the Commissioners of Labour of that time. Some years back the themes were solely religious and mythological but now there is a growing tendency to produce plays highlighting contemporary society and its problems. Here the influence of the Tamil cinema is noteworthy. Another recent trend is the appearance of Indian orchestras all over with a westernised presentation of popular Indian music.

Nowhere is the continuity of the Indian tradition more marked than in the preservation of the Hindu religion. In spite of the difficulties inherent in the practice of the rituals and ceremonies of Hindu worship in an environment outside the country of its natural growth, every effort is made to adhere as closely as possible to these time-honoured practices. One of the first social amenities provided the estate labourer was a temple constructed in the vicinity of his residence. Soon the entire plantation country was littered with modest little shrines dedicated to one or the other deity of the Hindu pantheon. The growing urbanisation of the community brought Hinduism to the towns. Here more lavish and better conceived temples arose. The commercial and professional class of Indians became patrons of Hinduism and under this patronage Hindu activities in the larger cities were intensified. Especially noteworthy is the contribution of the Natukottai Chettiar who are prominent in banking and agency business in this country. They have pioneered the construction of Hindu temples in many towns in the country and are active in the maintenance and management of these institutions.

A great majority of the Hindus of Malaysia belong to the Saivite sect. Most of the temples in the country are Saivite temples. The most popular deities to which these temples are dedicated are Siva, Subramanya and Ganesh. In them the ceremonies and ritual are performed according to the Saiva Agamas by Brahamin priests. There are very few immigrant Brahmins in the Indian community and these now perform secular occupations. The specialists in ritual have therefore to be specifically brought from India and maintained here by the community which they serve. Besides officiating in temples, these priests also perform the domestic ritual of such Hindus as require their services. The most important are

the rites concerning marriage which are scrupulously performed at least in the urban areas. In temples the festive occasions of the Hindu calendar are celebrated with appropriate ceremonies. Particular temples specialise in the elaborate celebration of particular festivals, thus putting the limited resources of the community to the best use. As many of the north Indians are Vaishnavites there are a few Vaishnavite temples for their worship. These temples are dedicated to Vishnu and his incarnations and Vaishnavite festivals are celebrated here. The division between these sects is, however, not rigid and they are not mutually exclusive. Hindus would worship freely in both shrines. Saivism has traditionally been more closely associated with Tamil, uses more of this language in its worship and has a substantial body of religious literature in this language.

This form of Hindu worship is scriptural and is universal to Indians. There is yet another aspect of religious practice followed by sections of the Indian community. Here worship is centred round deities that are of a more particularist and regional character. The deities mentioned above are of a transcendental character and worshipped by all Hindus. They are the 'higher Gods' of Hinduism who are approached for ultimate and fundamental ends. There is a range of 'lesser Gods' who are worshipped for immediate and particular favours. These are considered the daily protectors of the village or the community, keeping epidemics away from that area, making crops grow, trees bear and animals produce. The *poojas* (rituals of worship) in their shrines could be performed by members of castes other than Brahmins. This aspect of Hinduism was brought to Malaya by the rural immigrant communities. The temples of the estates are generally dedicated to this category of deities such as Muniandy, Aiyanar, Vairavar, Mathurai Veeran and Mariamman. There are very few Brahmin priests on the estates. A member of one of the other castes functions as officiating priest. To these deities blood sacrifice could be offered. At one time the sacrifice of goats and cockerel was widespread in festivals but now, under the influence of a religious reform movement that started in India, this practice has almost completely been given up.

Both on the estates and in urban areas, the practice of self-immolation in worship is continued in various forms. The most widespread of these is carrying the Kavadi. This is a form of penance undertaken for Lord Subramanya in which the devotee carries a

decorated wooden arch from a fixed point to the shrine of the deity. In the course of this journey the devotee inflicts on himself various forms of pain by sticking pins or needles through his skin or sharp skewers through his tongue or lips. He is generally in such a state of religious ecstasy that he is able to bear the pain that is thus being inflicted on him. Another such act is that of fire-walking. A fire-walking ceremony forms a part of some important festive occasions. It is a major ritual in most estate temples. A rectangular pit is prepared and a fire is kindled. When the fire has been reduced to red hot embers devotees walk through it in an attitude of worship. For these acts of self-mortification the participant must prepare himself, spiritually and physically, over a period prior to the performance by a life of abstention, austerity and prayer. Such acts are highly valued in the community and a degree of prestige attaches to the performer.

The humanistic, non-sectarian reformist movement reflected in the Ramakrishna missions in India has left its mark in Malaysia as well. With this inspiration was seen the formation of the Pure Life Society and the various activities it engages in. In one aspect of its activities it pursues the ideal of renunciation and dedication to the pursuit of true knowledge through asceticism and speculation. Its Ashram is a centre for meditation and it represents the Vedantic school of Hindu philosophy. Apart from its being broadly Vedantic in its approach, this movement is by no means sectarian. At the highest stage of spiritual realisation, the Hindu makes no distinction of caste, creed or race. He believes that the end of all spiritual paths, indeed of all human activity, is the realisation of the ultimate Truth which is but one and all-embracing. These assumptions and attitudes make the Pure Life Society and all associations connected with it a good medium for contact between Hindus and adherents of other faiths. Whereas popular Hinduism with its rituals and taboos isolates itself from others, philosophic Hinduism draws itself closer to other religions and makes cooperation possible. The Pure Life Society offers itself as a forum for such interreligious cooperation. Its members are active on bodies with similar aims. It tries in every way to emphasise the basic unity of all religions. The humanistic side of this movement is seen in its activities towards social welfare. It runs schools in the neglected sector of Tamil education among backward classess of the community. It runs an orphanage near the capital city and supports several

other welfare causes.

Bonds of religion and language bind the Sikhs closely and demarcate them from the Hindu community. These bonds tend to be closer in Malaysia where they are a minority within a minority, differing markedly in appearance and habits from the rest of the Indian community. Here they are mainly an urban community, occupied in functions of a commercial, professional and proletarian character. The maintenance of the beliefs and practices of Sikhism is a focal point for the unity of this community. Because of its compact and concise character, religion tends to be a greater unifying force among Sikhs than it is among Hindus. Sikhism specifically repudiates caste distinctions in society and does not tolerate these divisions in any way in its religions observances. This has not, however, succeeded in eradicating fully caste and other divisions among them which pre-dated the origin of Sikhism. These divisions were traditional to Punjab society and have continued among them into modern times. There are regional divisions distinguishing groups that emigrated from one part of the Punjab from another. At one time these divisions were quite rigid. These groups would not inter-marry. Now in Malaysia these regional groups are breaking down. A deeper division is the jatis or castes. These castes are endogamous in the same way as the Hindu castes. Rigidity in this respect is still found in Sikh society. Inter-caste marriages among Sikhs are about as rare as they are among Hindus. In this respect the Sikhs resemble Indian Christians. The conversion from Hinduism to religions that specifically deny the existence of hereditary social differences has not prevented some compromise in practice with the older social institutions. These may be weaker in their incidence, though they are certainly prevalent in some form or other. However, towards the preservation of the religion and the language the whole community works in a united way. Every big city has a Sikh temple and school attached to it which gives religious instruction and teaches the Punjabi language and script.

This brief survey is intended to bring out some of the major strands in the social and cultural life of Malaysian Indians. The picture one gets is one of cultural diversity and absence of social cohesion. This is the reason why the Indian community, though it has by and large united itself politically behind one representative body, has not been able to do so in the social and cultural spheres.

The Islamic Conception of Religion and Social Ideal

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Mohammed and the birth of Islam

Mohammed the Prophet of Islam was born about 570-571 A.D., in Mecca, from the marriage of Aminah and Abdullah, son of Abdol Muttalib, guardian of the Ka'aba. His father Abdullah died before he was born and his mother Aminah followed suit when Mohammed was 6 years of age. The orphan Mohammed was then taken care of by his grandfather Abdol Muttalib. Upon Abdol Muttalib's death the duty to take care of Mohammed devolved upon his uncle Abu Talib, son of Abdol Muttalib.

At the age of 25, he married Khadijah, a rich widow engaged in the caravan trade to Syria, who was 15 years his senior. Mohammed was employed by Khadijah to take charge of her caravan as his honesty and experience had come to her attention. Following his service with Khadijah, he was offered her hand in marriage by none other than the person herself. His marriage to Khadijah strengthened his influence among the Quraish of Mecca, and provided him that rest and exemption from daily toil which was needed to enable him to ponder about other problems than that of acquiring regular income.

Already at an early period Mohammed concerned himself with the introduction of justice and security in the town. With a few others he established an association to protect the weak against the tyranny of the strong, in the economic field as well as in the sphere of personal liberty. This instance was in keeping with the tradition of pre-Islamic Arabs forming confederations or alliances to resist those menacing the rights of the weaker ones. During his youth Mohammed's clan was the leader of such a confederation called the 'Hilf al-Fuzul'.[1]

Since the death of Abdol Muttalib, authority in Mecca had become more or less divided such that any curbing influence to the violation of justice diminished in strength. 'The ties of blood and family *esprit de corps* afforded some degree of protection to every citizen against injustice and spoliation, but strangers were exposed to all kinds of oppression. They would often find themselves robbed, not only of their goods and chattels, but also of their wives and daughters.'[2]

Before Mohammed was conscious of his prophetic mission we find him as a young man, esteemed by his people for his truthfulness and moral integrity. Already in this period Mohammed had gathered around him a group of young people belonging to the less wealthy amongst the Quraish. He was apparently dissatisfied with the prevailing situation as evidenced by the fact that once a year for a month, he would retreat to the cave al-Hira situated on a hill outside Mecca. Here he would pray and meditate in seclusion and give food to the poor that came to him.[3]

In one of these nights of noctural meditation, Mohammed had a vision of the angel Gabriel urging him to read some passage which he at first did not understand. After repeated insistence Mohammed finally uttered the following sentences:

> Read in the name of thy Lord who created,
> Who created man of blood coagulated.
> Read! Thy Lord is the most benificent,
> Who taught by the pen,
> Taught that which they knew not unto man.[4]

This vision made an impact of such a nature on Mohammed that it elicited an inner turmoil accompanied by doubt and the idea to inflict self punishment by throwing himself over a cliff. None was to him more hateful than an ecstatic poet or a man possessed. He was afraid of being either one of them. On his way to the cliff,

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1. W. M. Watt, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, Routledge-K. Paul, London, 1961. The role of the Confederation of Fuzul in the spread of Islam is here discussed. See also W. M. Watt. *Muhammed at Mecca*, Oxford, 1953.
2. Syed Amir Ali, *The Spirit of Islam*, Macmillan, London, 1927, p.13.
3. Muhammad Ibn Ishaq, *Life of Muhammad*, tr. with intro. and notes by A. Guillaume, Oxford University Press, London, 1955. The work of Ibn Ishaq is the oldest extant biography of Mohammed. He was born about 70 years after the death of Mohammed and died in Bagdad about 767 A.D.
4. *Ibid.*, p.106. From *Qur'an* Sura 96: 1-5.

Mohammed sensed another vision which assured him that he was neither an ecstatic poet nor a man possessed but a messenger chosen by God to deliver the truth to humanity.

In this state of turmoil he returned home to his wife Khadijah who consoled him by saying that God would not treat him as a poet or a man possessed considering his truthfulness, his great trustworthiness, his fine character, and his kindness. This event took place in the year 610 A.D. Henceforth Mohammed commenced his life as the prophet of Islam.

His first group of converts were his wife Khadijah, his cousin Ali son of Abu Talib who was then a youth in his teens, his freedman and adopted son Zaid bin Marith, Abu Bakar, a rich and honourable merchant, to be followed by many others whose names later went down in the history of the world.

From the list of early converts in Mecca, preserved by Muslim historians, which amount to a few hundred persons, some factors of sociological interest can be noticed. The great majority of these early Muslims were men well under the age of 40. They were recruited from both the powerful and the weaker clans, numbering not less than 14. Many of them belonged to the middle class. Some of them were men of influence within their respective clans.[5]

To the above groups may be added individuals whose clan affiliation was weak, not to mention the slaves who accepted the message of the Prophet, and joined the group of the early converts.

For the first three years Mohammed preached the new religion secretly. In the beginning his preaching was not taken seriously by the Quraish of Mecca. Later, however, when they discovered that the movement was gaining strength, the Quraish resorted to force and started persecuting the Muslims. As a result of this persecution and other considerations, Mohammed left Mecca together with his followers and migrated to Medina. This occured in July 622 A.D., and marked the beginning of the Islamic calendar, called the year of the Hijrah.

The nature of inquiry permits us to pass over the details of what happened during Mohammed's period of preaching which culminated in his victory over his opponents at Mecca. During this period which lasted for approximately 22 years Mohammed had

5. W. M. Watt, *Muhammed at Mecca*, p.96.

organized several expeditions, led his followers in several battles, engaged himself in intertribal diplomacy, made attempts to consolidate the strength of his community, reformed its social life by a gradual introduction of new principles, one by one, or a few at a time, laid the foundation of government and state-craft, and performed his role as father and husband.

Personality and character of Mohammed

From the accounts left to us by Muslim historians we get quite a number of facts regarding the personal life of Mohammed which shed light on his character. We also have a pen picture of the man.

According to these accounts Mohammed was a man of sturdy build of average height. His arms and forearms were long and his hands and feet were rough. His forehead was large and prominent. He had a hooked nose and large black eyes with a touch of brown, his hair long and thick, straight or slightly curled. So was his beard. His cheeks were spare and his mouth was large with which he made his pleasant smile. His complexion was fair.

'He was given to sadness, and there were long periods of silence when he was deep in thought; yet he never rested but was always busy with something. He never spoke unnecessarily. What he said was always to the point and sufficient to make his meaning clear, but there was no padding. From first to last he spoke rapidly. Over his feelings he had a firm control. When he was annoyed he would turn aside; when he was pleased, he lowered his eyes. His time was carefully apportioned according to the various demands on him. In his dealings with people he was above all tactful. He could be severe at times, but in the main he was not rough, but gentle. His laugh was almost a smile.'[6]

The seriousness of his prophethood did not prevent him from expressing his desire for amusement and recreation. On one occasion he ran races with his wife Ayesha, winning one and losing another. Once he held her up in his arms to enable her to watch the performances of some entertainers.[7]

He was also very fond of children and apparently could get on very well with them.

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6. W. M. Watt, *Muhammad at Medina,* Oxford University Press, 1956, p.321.
7. Al-Ghazzali, *The Alchemy of Happiness,* tr. C. Field, Ashraf, Lahore, p.III.

His kindness extended itself towards animals, something remarkable in his time and part of the world. While his men were marching towards Mecca just before the conquest, they passed a bitch with some puppies. Not only did Mohammed give orders for them not to be disturbed, but he also posted a man to see that his orders were carried out. In conformity to the prevailing custom of his time, and also for political reasons, Mohammed was married several times and at the time of his death he had, for certain, nine wives. In his days marriage was one of the most effective means to secure the alliance of a tribe to his cause.

Regarding his own conception of himself as one ordained by God to establish the true faith, he never claimed for himself more than being a messenger with all the human attributes residing in man. He was always conscious of his own shortcomings as a human being. 'It is a likeable characteristic of Mohammed,' writes his European biographer Tor Andrae, 'that he never claimed perfection or infallibility, but always admitted frankly that he was guilty of shortcomings and mistakes like other men.'[8] Not once in his career did he consider himself invulnerable to errors and mistakes.

Contrary to the expectation of his people, Mohammed never solicited the assistance of miracles to establish the truth of his religion. 'Many inspired men have succeeded in performing signs and wonders which have confirmed their claim of a call. The legend of the miracles of holy men are not always fables created in a vacuum; they may often describe actual experiences, although these have undergone a peculiar reconstruction. Of course, such miracles are often produced in a subjective honesty, but we can readily understand how deception might be employed, either consciously or unconsciously. Mohammed rejected every request to pose as a wonder-worker, and emphatically denied all supersitions in regard to his own person. He is only a man like other men; he has no recourse to heavenly resources; he is not even the master of his own fate, to say nothing of the fate of others.'[9]

As regards his self-restraint and inner discipline which enabled him to elevate his action above personal feelings, nothing is perhaps more illustrative than the way he treated his bitter opponents after the fall of Mecca. It is noted that only 10 persons were excluded from the general amnesty which Mohammed granted to the Mec-

8. Tor Andrae, *Mohammed, the Man and His Faith*, U.S. 1960, p.179.
9. *Ibid.*, p.178.

cans. Out of these, 6 were pardoned and 4 were executed for specific criminal offences, apart from opposition towards Mohammed. Of these 10 persons only one came from the group of prominent leaders opposing Mohammed and he was subsequently pardoned. As Andrae says, 'It is rarely that a victor has exploited his victory with greater self-restraint and forbearance than did Mohammed. Only ten persons were placed upon the list of the proscribed.'[10]

Mohammed and the Teachings of Islam

Before describing the teachings of Islam, it is certainly commendable to bear in mind certain points listed below as they enable us to understand properly the teachings of any religion or social philosophy.

(1) All the great religions, as Weber has pointed out, are historical individualities of a highly complex nature. This implies that we must not create a kind of fictitious identity between two different religions. Both the common and differentiating factors ought to be considered not only with regard to the structure of their respective teaching but also to their respective historical experience.

(2) The concepts used in the study of Islam must be properly adjusted in its semantic connotation. For instance the concepts 'orthodox' and 'liberal' when used to clarify groups between Muslims should not be viewed in the same light as when they were applied to Western Christian history. In Islamic history, Muslim orthodoxy is characterised by a broader and more tolerent view than its rival the Mu'tazila who gave a semblance of liberality by its insistance on rational explanation of religion.[11] In European history, tolerance and liberal thought were initiated by those opposed to orthodoxy and the churches, without excluding exceptional cases. [12]

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10. Tor Andrae, *op.cit.*, p.179.
11. On the dissension between the Mu'tazila and the orthodox party, Gibb says, amongst others, the following: 'In the daily practice of religion they had shown themselves harshly dogmatic, lacking the human charity, tolerance, and broadmindedness of the simple Muslim faith, even to the extent of persecuting their opponents in the day of their power. In their theology they had produced a vacuum and — far worse — had accorded to the products of human reason an absolute value above the Word of God. The orthodox rightly rejected these pretensions, for in religion anthroposophy is a more insidious solvent than anthropomorphism. The right wing of the Mu'tazilite, who in their search for some synthesis of philosophy with orthodox doctrine had been gradually drawing apart from the rationalist left wing, threw in their lot with the defenders of the Sunna. Applying the methods

Another concept which has different meanings in Islam and Christianity is the concept of religion itself. In Christianity religion is primarily the personal relationship between man and God in the capacity of his life as an individual. The Christian religion does not include a social system as part of its permanent structure. It has no system of taxation, no system of government, no system of inheritance, etc., which are supposed to abide with the community as requisites of the Christian character of life. In Islam it is not the case. Islam is a religion in the sense of personal relationship between man and God, and it is also a social order. This distinction is important to avoid confusion in the understanding of Islam and the reading of its history.

(3) From the religion and its history we have thus several meanings of the word 'Islam' as developed by common usage.

a. Islam as the teaching of Mohammed preserved in the form of a book called the Quran.

b. Islam as developed by its followers which includes systems of philosophy, jurisprudence, mysticism, political theories, histories, theological exegeses, art, music, architecture, etc. etc.

c. Islam as the empirical actuality of the above, that is Islam as the actual civilisation.

d. Islam as a political might, a world empire.

e. Islam as a political movement like the pan-Islamic movement in the 19th century.

At this juncture we are exclusively interested in Islam in the sense of a religion and social order founded by Mohammed.

(4) In the study of Mohammed and his teachings, as with any other socio-cultural phenomenon expressing man's belief and

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of Greek dialectic to the support of the Koran and the Hadith, they evolved a new orthodox scholasticism and defeated the Mu'tazilites on their own ground.' H.A.R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism,* Mentor Books, 1958, p.91. My point in mentioning this dissension is only to stress the need to be careful in using the terms like orthodox and liberal so as not to confuse their meanings in the different parts of the world and in different times. In Buddhism it may probably have a different meaning as the term orthodoxy is not applicable to the overwhelming majority of Buddhists if by that is meant the teaching nearest to the founder and shared by the majority, for Buddha himself is believed to be an agnostic while his millions of followers have been and still are theistic if not polytheistic.

12. J. B. Bury, *History of the Freedom of Thought,* Home University Library, Oxford, 1952.

aspiration, it must be stressed that it is absolutely rejectable to isolate an event from the socio-historical unit of which it forms a part. It has now been recognised as a platitude amongst social scientists and modern historians that every event, particularly phenomenon like the rise of a new social movement, stands in organic relation to the society and prevailing situation as a whole.

(5) From the very beginning Mohammed made a distinction between what he believed as revelations coming from a supernatural source and ideas which were the products of his own mind.[13] Thus not every thing the Prophet did or uttered should be taken as belonging to the permanent parts of the Islamic faith. The distinction is maintained between the revealed truths of Islam and the personal life of the founder. The revealed truths stand above the life of the founder as the imperatives of the Islamic religion. Mohammed is regarded as the best example for his followers but not as a divinity.

(6) In the course of centuries, and even from the very beginning the teaching of Islam, as it is with any other faith, became mingled with non-Islamic elements brought by those who adopted the religion. Thus the belief in the segregation of women and the use of the veil amongst some Muslims was given an Islamic colouring although this had been introduced into the Muslim civilisation by converts who jointed the faith and brought with them some of their former heritage. Amongst the Muslims of Malaya and Indonesia, for instance, there has neither been the segregation of women nor the use of the veil, despite the fact that they represent one of the most religious-minded peoples of Islam.

Apart from the above there have been also practices of which the Muslims consciously avoid giving a religious stamp. One of them was the barbarous practice of castrating male slaves to make them safe for the protection of the harem. This practice was taken over from the Byzantines despite its strict prohibition by Islam, and the first Muslim sovereign who apparently surrounded himself with eunuchs was the Caliph Amin, son of Harun al-Rashid. He called the fair ones grasshoppers and the dark ones ravens.[14] According to Tabari, he collected them round himself day and night, at meals and drinking bouts, even at business hours. He would

13. W. M. Watt, *Muhammad at Mecca,* pp.52-58.
14. For an interesting account derived from Muslim sources, see A. Mez, *The Renaissance of Islam*, tr. S. K. Buksh, D. S. Margoliuth, Luzac, London, 1937.

have nothing to do with women, slaves or otherwise.

The Islamic conception of religion

According to the Quran, religion is an existential need rooted in the very nature of man. The aim of religion is to awaken in man the belief in a Creator and the sense of fellowship with Him. In order to assist man in his quest, it was made possible that the truth was revealed to some individuals who were then supposed to communicate it to others. This revelation is given the term 'wahy', prophetic revelation. This prophetic revelation did not begin but culminated in its supreme form with the Prophet Mohammed. There were prophets before Mohammed in various places and times who came to deliver the divine messages. These prophets were all Muslims, both those mentioned by names in the Quran like Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and those whose names are not stated. Their faith was Islam, considered by the Quran as the universal religion corresponding to the ideal nature of humanity in which God had created all living beings. Thus all these prophets preached the same religion with the only difference that time and circumstances conditioned the nature of its externalization in the forms of rituals and prescriptions. According to the Quran, religion underwent a dynamic development until it reached its perfect crystallization in the form externalized by the Prophet Mohammed with the year 610 A.D. as its starting point. The Sufis, or Muslim mystics, called this the 'nuqta', the point towards which the whole meansing of existence and the forms of religious life converged.

The word Islam is derived from the recurrent use of the verb 'aslama', that is, to submit oneself to the will of God. The believer is called a Muslim, that is, he who submits. In this sense also the other objects of creation such as animals, plants, and inanimate nature are also called Muslims because they all submit to the laws making their duration possible in their respective levels of existence.

The fundamental doctrines of Islam

(*a*) The most important principle of Islam is *the belief in one God*. The belief in the oneness of God and the unity of existence as emanating from the Divine Being is given the name 'Tauhid'. The mystic who has attained unity with God, leaving aside what this actually means, is called a 'muwahid'.

According to Islam, God is a Being whose essence is beyond human comprehension. We are not in the position to know what He is but only what He is not. In the interest of assisting our comprehension a description is given by the Quran with the means of expressions familiar to men. Thus the Quran uses human terms to describe the attributes of God although it also expressly states that the two are not identical. [15] There are 99 metaphors used to describe the Being of God called *al-asma al-husna* the most beautiful names. Underlying each name resides the attribute (*sifat*). God is the necessarily Self-Subsisting Being. He is the only Reality (*al-hao*) not subject to any other, being the originator of everything else. He is the First and the Last, the Living and the Self-sufficing, the Exalted and Comprehensive. Allah (the Arabic term for God) is the Absolute Creator, Sustainer, Ruler, Destroyer, Restorer, Recorder.

His relation to man admits also of metaphorical analogy with that between man and man. Thus Allah answers prayers, heeds the supplication of his creatures, provides them sustenance, takes cognizance of everything that happens not excluding the falling of a single leaf from the most unknown tree. Every created being, from a stone to man, receives the attention of Allah (*Quran* Sura 6: 59).

The relation between man and God is as varied as there are types of men, ranging from fear to love. Whether it is fear or love it shares the common state of dependence. Man is dependent on God. His highest devotion and reverence should be directed to God.

God's relation to man and the universe is both transcendent and immanent. He is transcendent in the sense that His Being is not identical with His creation. He is immanent in the sense that His creation emanates from Him and that He concerns himself with everything that occurs, participating in the life of the universe. As the Quran puts it, He is nearer to man than his own neck vein.

The Islamic conception of God is monotheistic in the absolute sense of the word. It admits of no other reality independent of God. It has maintained rational consistency in its conception of God in its effort to avoid anything which may smack of dualism. It rejects any concretization of the Deity in human form, be it partially or wholly. The conception of the god-man has no place in Islam. It is ranked as the greatest blasphemy.

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15. D. B. Macdonald, art. Allah, *Shorter Ency. of Islam*, Brill, Leiden, 1953.

(*b*) Next in importance is *the belief in the prophethood of Mohammed* and the finality of his revelations. The Quran makes a distinction between two types of revelation one of which is believed to be finalised in the prophethood of Mohammed. This is the one called 'wahy'. The other is called 'ilham'. This type of revelation continues indefinitely until the termination of existence, as the Muslims believe. It differs from prophetic revelation in the sense that its validity is restricted to the recipient and does not involve the establishment of new laws or principles of faith. Those who do not believe in that particular instance are not bound to accept it. The saints are supposed to be illuminated by this type of revelation.

Economic reforms

In the economic sphere the reforms of Mohammed went right against the established principles of pre-Islamic ethics. Usury, hoarding, wasting of wealth are forbidden. So is the oppression of slaves and labourers and also of animals. An institution was introduced to collect the poor-tax (zakat) which amounts to one fortieth of the total property. The aim of working for one's own living is encouraged to avoid parasite dependence. Upon the death of each Muslim his property, if he has any, has to be divided amongst his heirs, the portion of which is fixed by law. The right of the woman to dispose of her own property is not affected by marriage.

The locus of values

As opposed to the tribal humanism of Arabian paganism, Islam advanced the idea of religious humanism based on the belief in God who is conceived as a Being commanding brotherly love, mutual trust, faithfulness, honesty, peace, avoidance of blood-shed, just dealings, etc. The worth of the individual is not considered as dependent on the membership of the tribe, but the community of believers. Solidarity is not to be based on ties of blood but the bonds of faith and righteousness. The individual is regarded as a being worthy of respect in his own right. Basic moral principles like the condemnation of murder, looting, abduction, etc., are valid for everyone. Such violations of moral principles are equally condemned whether they are perpetrated against another group or within one's own group.

Conception of leadership

With the advent of Islam, Arabian society witnessed the introduction of a new principle of leadership in the equality of all believers irrespective of age, clans, tribes, class, race, or nation. To the Arabian society of his days Mohammed's reforms were truly revolutionary. For a man to be a member of the Muslim elite it is not necessary to have wealth or belong to a particular tribe. It is required that he orders his life according to the ideals of Islam. The rulers are regarded as vicegerents of God to whom belongs the highest sovereignty.

From the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet, the following principles of leadership have been laid down:

a. That sovereignty belongs to God and not to the state or the rulers. (*Quran* Sura 7: 54).

b. Those in authority are to be selected from among the members of the community, on the ground that they are capable and trustworthy. (*Quran* Sura 4: 58).

c. They should enjoin the good and forbid evil. (*Quran* Sura 22: 41, 3: 110).

d. The noblest amongst them is the most righteous and pious. (*Quran* Sura 49: 13, 98: 7).

e. The best leaders are those who love the people and are in turn loved by them (Related by Muslim).

f. The affairs of government are not to be assigned to those who are out for positions moved by their greed for them. (Related by Bukhari and Muslim).

g. Obedience to the rulers is obligatory as long as it does not entail violation of the Islamic commandments. There is no obedience in sin but only in virtue. (Related by Bukhari and Muslim).

h. Anyone in authority, even if he is a slave, must be obeyed as long as he enjoins good and forbids evil.

i. The rulers must not legislate against what is already laid down in the Quran and the tradition of the Prophet which belongs to the eternal principles of Islam, like the laws of inheritance, the zakat (poor tax), the prohibition against pork, alcoholic drinks, gambling, adultery, fornication, murder, theft, cheating, slander, etc. (*Quran* Sura 33: 36).

j. The rulers should defend and honour the property, the

life, and the dignity of all their subjects irrespective of class or creed.[16]

k. Every one in authority including the Caliph is not above the law. If the Caliph commits a transgression he is to be judged by law, to which even the Prophet himself was subordinated.

The position of women

In this sphere Mohammed introduced several reforms also. Apart from the condemnation against killing female offsprings, it was also prohibited to force a woman into marriage against her will, or if she was married to allow her step-sons to inherit her on the death of the husband. Polygamous union was restricted to 4 and the husband was obliged to treat the wives equally. Cruelty against wives was condemned.

When circumstances compelled a divorce they were not to be thrown out of the house without a proper place to go to. Respect for the mother was urged to the point of a religious duty. It is generally admitted that the reforms of Mohammed raised the status of women from the position in which he found them.[17] The right of inheritance, although half of the male heir, was alloted to the female heiress. While before mothers and daughters did not possess the right of inheritance, in Islam this was made into an inviolable principle.

Slavery

In this field Islam also instituted several reforms. The first to note is the restriction of conditions whereby a person can become a slave. In pre-Islamic times a person could become a slave by the

16. For further reference Maulana Syed Abul A'la Maududi, *Islamic Law and Constitution*, ed. tr. Khurshid Ahmad, Islamic Publications Ltd. Lahore, 1960.

17. H. A. R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism*, pp.33-34. The section on fundamental constitution and rights of non-Muslims in an Islamic state contains a more extensive presentation than those cited in this book. I have only mentioned those that are strictly derived from the Quran and the complementary traditions of the Prophet, excluding later thoughts developed on the subject. The question of whether the Caliph should belong to the Quraish tribe or not is a disputable subject which had engaged the attention of Muslims as early as the Caliphate of Ali. The Kharijites opposed the principle of Qarshiyat (the qualification of being a Quraish) as necessary to be elected as Caliph. Mualana Maududi, Mr. Mohammed Natsir from Indonesia, and with them many other Muslim thinkers of today, do not subscribe to the principle of Quarshiyat.

following means. (1) carried away by force, (2) enslaved as a result of not being able to pay debt, (3) sold by the parents, (4) captured in a battle as prisoners, (5) offsprings of slaves. Mohammed allowed only offsprings of existing slaves as slaves, and those captured in war. The Quran is very clear on this. (See Sura 47: 4). Enslavement by debt, by brigandage, by parental offer of sale is forbidden. So is the enslavement of one believer by another except when he is already a slave. In subsequent periods, after the death of Mohammed and the Righteous Caliphs, slaves were imported from outside the Muslim world, and were also increased by means of raids into the territories of those regarded to be at war with Islam. The non-Muslim subjects of the Islamic state could not however be turned into slaves unless they were already such.

We have noted already the restriction of conditions in terms of recruitment. On the positive side Islam adopted certain measures which facilitated the liberation of slaves and restrained the self-perpetuating tendency of the system. In pre-Islamic time, it was the habit of the Arab to enter into concubinage with his slaves. The children of such a union remained as slaves, so did the mother. Mohammed accepted this practice but introduced far-reaching modifications. The children of the union become free and legally enjoying the full rights like any other. The mother automatically received a different status. Her freedom was guaranteed at the death of her husband-master, and before this occured, she was not liable for sale to any other person. Thus the institution of concubinage as practised in early Islam served as a great liberating agent for those who fell into slavery.

Furthermore, kind treatment towards slaves and granting them their liberty were strongly recommended by Mohammed and the Quran (Sura 24: 33), "The founder of Islam," say Mez, "not only insisted upon the humane treatment of slaves, but also that it should be made possible for them to secure their freedom, when they have shown themselves worthy of it by their conduct. Accordingly the emancipation of slaves among the Muhammadans must be regarded as a meritorious act.[18]

Belonging to the injunctions laid down by Islam are the prohibition to force slave girls into prostitution, to separate a child from its parents, in short to compel a slave to commit an action which is forbidden by Islam, or to behave cruelly towards them.

18. A. Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*. p.168.

In the year before his death, Mohammed, during a farewell at Mina delivered an address to his followers wherein was included a reminder to deal justly with their slaves. They were to be fed by the same food which they themselves ate, to be clothed with the same clothes as the masters. If the slave committed a fault which the owner was not inclined to forgive, he was advised to sell and not to torment him.

One of Mohammed's trusted companions, much respected by the Muslims up to the present day, was Bilal, an Abyssinian slave who was one of the first to embrace Islam. To him belonged the honour of being the first person, appointed by Mohammed himself, to assume the duty of calling the faithful to prayer.

The institution of slavery is not considered by Islam as a necessary and abiding feature of social life. It may be abolished any time in history and anywhere, if the social and historical context made it feasible.

Amusement and pastime

The Islamic religion forbids many practices that were approved by pre-Islamic society. Gambling, prostitution, drinking liquor, and things which are injurious to health like narcotics are forbidden. So is homosexuality, and indulging in evil gossip. The law prescribes corporal punishment for drinking, adultery, and fornication.

These are then some of the main changes introduced by Mohammed. The aim of this paper is limited to a concise presentation of some basic elements in the doctrinal structure of Islam. Numerous significant items have been omitted, one of which is the Islamic conception of change and permanence, of relativism and absolutism in the spheres of laws and moral values. The Islamic philosophy of man, of mysticism, of science and the universe have likewise been omitted. The all-embracing nature of Islam makes the task of analysis and presentation difficult not only in terms of space but also in terms of a coherent systematic framework of analysis and presentation. This has always been the case with great religions like Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Hinduism.

Islamic culture in Malaysia

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THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIC CULTURE in Malaysia can be fully understood only when it is viewed in the context of the Malaysian Archipelago comprising those lands that generally fall within the area of Maphilindo. My general survey would cover areas in what is now known as Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula only, since these are the areas in Southeast Asia that have more fully undergone — and are still undergoing — the islamization process. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to this area as Nusantara.

In this general survey, my purpose will be merely to draw pertinent conclusions derived from historical facts and theoretical analysis outlining the major changes in the world view of the people of Nusantara which were brought about by the coming of Islam. In fact, I would go so far as to assert that the coming of Islam, seen from the perspective of modern times, was the most momentous event in the history of Nusantara.

The nature and scope of the subject make it impossible to give details here. It is more in line with the spirit of this Conference that the conclusions entertained be given in summarized form.

(*a*) Hinduism, as the people of Nusantara practised it, was a superstructure maintained by the ruling group above an indifferent community. The community's participation in Hinduism was a necessary influence from above; the religion was imposed on the community by the authority of the ruling group. The Nusantara society was therefore not a Hinduized society; rather the Nusantara dynasties were, to use the expression of Van Leur, "legitimized sacrally by an Indian hierocracy." The philosophical influence of Hinduism upon the Nusantara world view has been unduly magnified. The people of Nusantara were more aesthetic than philosophical by nature; they either did not fully grasp the subtleties of

Hindu metaphysics, or they ignored it in favour of that which was less complicated and more readily acceptable to their own world view. Philosophy was transformed into art at the expense of the rational and intellectual elements. Intellectual speculation with its emphasis on logic and systematic reasoning does not seem to have been popular. No doubt the doctrine of the Atman as propounded in the Bhagavad Gita was known and made to run through the veins of Hindu-Malay literature to give to it some life-giving spark of the divine. But we must not be misled into thinking that there was anything really deep in the sense in which it is propounded in the Hindu doctrines. The doctrine of the Atman interpreted as the Brahman "lodged within" the individual being was congenial to the autochthonous world view of the Hindu-Malay which was still steeped in animism.

In Hindu-Malay translations of Hindu-Indian religious literature such as the Mahabharata, the Bhagavad Gita depicting the life of Arjuna and the Bharatayuddha, it is significant to note that the philosophical expositions so important in the original suffered great neglect. The epic, romantic and mythological aspects of Hindu literature were emphasized since these aspects were in great demand in the courts of the ruling group. Indeed, we find more copies of epic, romantic and fantastic literature in existence than those which were philosophical. The number of copies of Hindu-Malay literature was determined by its popularity in court. Prapanca's works, for example, which were mostly of erudition rather than effusions of a poetical spirit, were criticized by the female critics at court so that one of his most famous works, the Nagara Kertagama, has come down to posterity only in one manuscript. It can be seen that literary works were meant for the court and that the court determined their worth. Although it may be conceded that Old Javanese literature embodied much that was philosophical such as, to mention one example, the Arjuna Wiwaha of Mpu Kanwa written over three centuries before the Nagara Kertagama, yet most were in poetic form, lacking exposition and commentary so that it was not meant for the profane ears of the masses. For this latter group, the philosophical world view envisioned by the poets of Old Javanese literature was glimpsed in the *wayangs*, filtered, as it were, through the medium of art.

(*b*) The same could also be said of Buddhism in the Nusantara. For many centuries, from the 6th to the 11th centuries, Sumatra

seemed to have been a great centre of Buddhism and Buddhist philosophy. Yet the influence of the Buddhist clergy in Sumatra did not seem to make itself felt in the realm of philosophy, but again in that of art. It is further significant that this artistic manifestation occured in Java in the form of the great Borobudur. We are told in the late 6th century of the existence of one thousand monks in Sumatra where Buddhist theology and philosophy flourished; of the venerable Atisha, the great reformer of Buddhism in Tibet who had sat at the feet of Dharmakirti, high priest of the Buddhist clergy in Sumatra in the early 11th century. Considering the powerful influence of the Sumatran Buddhist clergy in producing reformers in distant lands, it is strange and surprising that Buddhist philosophy did not flourish as well in Sumatra itself. It is possible that Buddhism, not being a missionary religion charged with an expansive movement, was not interested in imparting a new world view to the people of Nusantara. It may also be possible that the Buddhist clergy was mainly composed not of indigenous people, but of people from south India who came there to find seclusion and peace for the purpose of contemplation; who, perhaps much in the same attitude adopted by Albert Schweitzer with regard to Lambarene, shut themselves up in their monasteries oblivious of the outside world. Neither the Hindu-Malays nor Buddhist-Malays, as far as we know, have produced any thinker or philosopher of note.

The reputation spread abroad of the people of Nusantara as being refiners of great cultures, who excelled in syncretizing the great pre-islamic religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, in the sense of fusing or blending them, has no firm basis. If Kertanagara practised the Siva-Buddha cult and finally assumed divinity as a Buddha-Bhairava in 1275, this does not necessarily reveal the possibility of fusion between Sivaite Hinduism and Mahayana Buddhism. It would simply reveal that the king, being ruler of both Hindus and Buddhists, would logically unite within himself the divinity worshipped by both religious groups in order to enhance his charismatic sway over the people. As Rassers and Pigeaud have pointed out, the term 'syncretism' must be regarded with some degree of caution in this respect; perhaps parallelism would better describe the fact, and this is clearly brought forth in the significance of the story of Gagang Aking and Bubukshah.

(*c*) Serious theories of the spread of Islam put forward by

Schrieke and Van Leur, and the manner in which it was compared with the spread of Hinduism by Schrieke, cannot be regarded as tenable. The views of Schrieke in drawing identical conclusions about the spread of Islam and Hinduism have been refuted in several places by Van Leur. Van Leur's theory in itself, however, is also full of inadequacies and contradictions of a very glaring nature. The final judgment with regard to Islam pronounced by Van Leur is that Islam did not bring a higher civilization. Nowhere in his book did Van Leur provide enlightenment as to his criterion for the measuring of high and low culture, nor what he meant by civilization. But one may safely surmise, from his many conclusions, that he regarded the evidence of the artistic forms such as monuments, sculpture and the shadow play as manifest indications of a high civilization. While we may not dispute the great value of those artistic forms in determining the nature of a civilization as high, we cannot agree that this criterion is reliable. May we not then fallaciously conclude, by faithfully accepting Van Leur's criterion for measuring the degree of cultural achievement of a civilization, that early Christianity did not bring a higher civilization to supplant the Roman civilization because it was the product of an alien culture, a slave religion, furtively moving within the elaborate and splendid framework of the high civilization of the Romans?

Islam came to the Nusantara couched in Sufi metaphysics. It was through Sufism that the highly intellectual and rationalistic religious spirit entered the receptive minds of the people, effecting a rise of rationalism and intellectualism not manifested in pre-islamic times. This emergence of rationalism and intellectualism can be viewed as the powerful spirit that set in motion the process of revolutionizing the Nusantara world view, turning it away from a crumbling world of mythology, which can be compared with the Greek world in the Olympian era, to the world of intelligence, reason and order. It prepared the Nusantara for the modern world to come. The disseminators of Islam propagated the belief in a God Whose Power is governed by His Wisdom; Whose Creative Will acts in accordance with Reason. Man is conceived as the epitome of Creation; that in the ring of universal life Man is the superscription and the seal. The essence of Man is that he is rational, and rationality is the connection between him and Reality. It is these concepts that, to use the expression of Hurgronje, "gave the small man a sense

of his individual worth as a member of the Islamic Community" — a sense of worth and nobility denied him in pre-islamic times.

Spiritual refinement and knowledge was shared with the people; Islam brought the intellectual and rational impetus not only to the courts but also to the people in general so evidenced by the fact that not all philosophical treatises were written solely for the pleasure of kings. On the contrary, very few such treatises were written for the courts. The existence of numerous copies of treatises on metaphysical topics expounding a cosmology and ontology that can be traced back to the well known 'classical' Sufis, Mutakallimun (Loquentes), Logicians and Philosophers of Islam, and further back to Plato, Plotinus and Aristotle, demonstrate that Islamic-Malay literature was neither the preserve of the courts nor determined by their values, but was more democratic than the past in the selection of its audience and readers. As late as the 19th century, works by famous Muslim mystics were still being copied in the Malay language.

One of the most important single cultural phenomena directly caused by the influence of Islamic culture was the spread of the Malay language as a vehicle not only for epic and romantic literature, but even more so for philosophical discourse. The use of Malay as the language of Islamic philosophical literature in the Nusantara enriched its vocabulary and technical terminology considerably and was one of the paramount factors that displaced the hegemony of Javanese. It is important to note that the stories in the Mahabharata epic were translated into Malay from the Javanese, but almost all Islamic philosophical writings found in the Javanese were translations from the Malay. Connected closely with this cultural phenomenon, another conclusion may be drawn in that with the coming of Islam it was the Malay kingdoms as opposed to Javanese (i.e. Sumatra represented by Pasai and Acheh, and the Malay Peninsula represented by Malacca) that played the dominant role in the spread of Islam and Islamic theology and philosophy in the whole of Nusantara.

In the beginning of this paper, I spoke of the coming of Islam as the most momentous event in the history of Nusantara, particularly when seen from the perspective of modern times. The analogy that I have in mind to illustrate this assertion is the similarities that exist between the dominant role of Islam in influencing the beginnings of the European Middle Ages as Pirenne pointed

out, and the role of Islam in transforming, so to speak, both the soul and the body of the Nusantara society. Many scholars who spoke of Islam as merely a veneer over the structure of Nusantara society are mistaken, and they based their theory on superficial observation. So far none of them has made any serious semantic study of the Malay language to support their theory. It is only through the study of key cultural terms in the language that a more satisfactory perspective of the society can be brought to view, and not merely through the study of *adat* law. The result of a preliminary semantic study of the key cultural terms connected with concepts of God, being, existence, time, religion, man, the self and will reveal the great changes that have occured in the Nusantara world view caused by Islamic elements. The animistic elements in the old world view coupled with its logical notion of a block universe with all its implications have been supplanted by rationalistic elements involving an atomistic, dynamic universe. The concept of the self is now highly abstract. The self does not belong to the spatio-temporal order, and this in turn influenced the concept of will and its relation to freedom and morality. The connotations in the old feudal concepts were replaced by new and different ones. New culture values replaced the old.

In the political field, Islam became the unifying force throughout Nusantara. Together with the historical factor, the religious and language factors began setting in motion the process towards a national consciousness. It is the logical conclusion of this process that created the evolution of the greater part of Nusantara into the modern Indonesian nation with Malay as its national language. It may be argued that alien historical forces have created disharmony in the logical process diverting the evolution of the rest of Nusantara to follow a more adventurous, highly ambitious course whose destiny eludes our vision still.

At the encroachments of Western imperialistic expansion, it was Islam that provided the spirit demanding revolutionary action; it was the underlying ideology through which the resistance movements conceived a *jihád* (holy war) against the imperialistic non-believing colonialists. Indeed, as Wertheim pointed out, Islam can be regarded as the fermenting agent for the revolutionary process that has taken place in 20th century Nusantara.

In modern Nusantara, we have seen everywhere what appears to be the declining influence of Islamic culture. For a thousand

years since the 7th century, Islamic culture nurtured empires (Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Mamluk, Ottoman, Shiite, Moghul) and experimented with more forms of government that any other culture; its political and administrative machinery encompassed more peoples in the world than any other. Islam proved itself adaptable to the vicissitudes of fortune and yet remains resilient. It enriches itself with the assimilations from other cultures without ceasing to retain its Islamic character and essence. It has the remarkable capacity to save itself as demonstrated in the case of the Mongols. Yet must it need the Muslims. It is too early to judge whether or not Islamic culture is declining, but it is certain that the Muslims have been. In the Nusantara, the coming as well as the imposition of Western culture and imperialism beginning in the 16th century certainly interrupted and slowed down the process of islamization. Before this period there were other forces operating in the Islamic world as a whole such as internal political dissensions and the decline of political and economic power. Furthermore, advancement in the field of science in Europe coupled with lack of such advancement in the Islamic world weakened the latter considerably. These disastrous events occuring in the Islamic world caused repercussions in the Nusantara. But the appearance of the Europeans on the Nusantara scene and their control over the area beginning from the 17th century to the present century left their effects upon the Muslims. In certain parts of the Nusantara, Western influence has resurrected the preislamic feudal order; in modern times we witness the revivification of feudal tendencies old customs devoid of coherent culture values, old titles, court traditions, etc. Western scholarship engaged in Nusantara history has neglected and minimized the importance of the study of Islam here. Prejudice against and fear of Islam have influenced Western imperialism in attempting a consistent policy of separating Muslims from their religion, as has been the case with the Dutch and British powers in Nusantara. This was generally effected by the control of religious administration, and thereby the religion itself, through the local ruling groups. Within this framework, reforms would be difficult tasks to accomplish. It is a significant coincidence that the British notion of the ruler being head of religion has been duplicated in those areas of Nusantara that have come under British domination. In comparison with, say, 17th century Acheh, whose ruler wielded far more power than

any modern ruler in the Nusantara, we find that he never assumed the prerogative of being head of religion. It was the *Shayku'l-Islám* who administered the religion, and the ruler put himself under the jurisdiction of the former. On the other hand, however, the coming of the West, seen solely from the perspective of a cultural phenomenon and not an imperialistic one, can be considered as a continuation of the islamization process; it can be considered to have perpetuated the rationalistic spirit, the philosophical foundations of which have already been laid by Islam before that. It is when seen in this perspective that, to use a pregnant remark, Islam had prepared the Nusantara, in a sense, for the modern world to come.*

* This paper is to be considered merely as a preliminary remark on a theory of the islamization process and on the cultural influence of Islam in the Nusantara, particularly as seen through the changing concepts of key terms in the Malay language in the 16th and 17th centuries. As a preliminary remark and nothing more, I have found it not necessary in this paper to demonstrate the validity of some very important assertions by adducing detailed supporting materials, since that will be done in my formulation of the above-mentioned theory, which is now in preparation.

S.N.A.

An Islamic Constitutional Document in Malaya

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THIS PAPER is only a modest attempt to draw attention to the contents of a document which — to judge by its association with certain basic postulates of Islamic constitutional theory — presents a phenomenon of great interest both to students of Islamic institutional development in Malaya and to scholars concerned with Malayan legal history. The document concerned is a Statute promulgated on the 22nd of November, 1911, by Sultan Zain al-Abidin 111 (d. 1918) of Trengganu and embodies the first constitution of the modern State of Trengganu which two years earlier had ceased to be part of the Siamese sphere of influence and in 1910 had entered into an Agreement with Great Britain which among other things provided for the appointment of a British Officer to reside in Trengganu and to an Agent with functions similar to a consular officer. This Constitution bears an Arabic name *itqán al-muluk bi ta'dil al-suluk* and contains fifty-three sections excluding the Preamble and the Conclusion. Lt was indeed this instructive title which caught the writer's attention in the course of his survey of the early legal documents of Malaya housed in the Commonwealth Relations Office in London. The version available in London is only an English translation of the original which I have not yet been able to reach though some investigation was made in the repositories of Kuala Lumpur. While not abandoning further hopes of tracing the original it must be recorded that my observations here would be general and tentative and hence need not be seriously affected by the lack of the original. Since translated materials of this type suffer certain inherent limitations when it is a question of transposing conceptual terms, a detailed analysis of the subject would have to await a later period.

My somewhat cursory references so far have not brought to light any distinct existing study of this document. Haji Mubin Sheppard, the author of an article on the history of Trengganu perhaps referred to this Constitution when he mentioned that Sultan Zain al-Abidin introduced, on November 2, 1911, "*the Undang-Undang Tuboh Negri* which is a document containing fifty three clauses" intended as a written constitution for the State. He makes no allusion to the contents of the document. The date of the document at the writer's disposal is 22nd November, 1911, whereas Haji Mubin Sheppard dates it 2nd November, 1911; the possibility of a misprint somewhere is not ruled out.

Before outlining the contents of the Trengganu constitution let me state briefly the principal landmarks in the evolution of the classical constitutional theory in Islam. The rise of the main current of Muslim political theory was largely bound up with the birth of an Islamic political State in Medina in the seventh century A.D., a polity united in their allegiance to their head, Muhammad, not solely by the acceptance of a common religious creed but also by their willingness to respect the terms of the 'Constitution of Medina' which placed the country on new constitutional and social foundations. The pattern and the structure of the constitutional theory that ensued in the later centuries in all its diverse vicissitudes, was in fact a ratification of actual historical process. Its basic features were the rise of the concept of a headship for the State in the person of an *imam* (lit. leader) and that of an Islamic Community in the *jamá'ah* (lit. group, congregation). The ultimate authority for the maintenance of this political system lay on the one hand in some form of religious obligation and on the other in the will of the Community to acquiesce in the system by resort to the instrument of *bai'ah* which signified allegiance. Ranging between these twin concepts of the *imam* and *jamá'ah* there arose a number of other political organs and functionaries by different names and at different times in the history of Islam determined by factors which demanded some type of political organization.

The concept, definition, constitution and the manner of implementation of the State, a State in which the individual would find the widest scope for the ethical development of his personality, in which he could afford to live and attain to the "good life" the *hasanah* in the world, was again determined by the massive shifts in the political power and the type of internal expansion they en-

gendered. The early Muslim theorists formulated a master-plan, the *shari'ah* or the 'Highway' which set out the norms of human conduct and life both in its relation to God and to fellow beings. The substance of this master-plan was itself a result of gradual historical development, the product of human endeavour to translate basic eternal values, as conceived by Islam, to historical experience. The so-called immutability of this scheme was more in the nature of a self-imposition that followed the political breakdown of the Muslim Empire rather than a self-evident truth. The extent to which the *shari'ah* subsumed the Islamic State and the degree to which the latter was committed to the implementation of the former were again — to judge by empirical standards, if not by theory alone — closely related to the political history of Islam.

The Caliph, the *malik* (king), the Caliph and the Sultan, illustrate the historical sequence in which the constitutional theory of Islam was evolved parallel with the external and internal expansion of Islam. At the root of this development lay the crucial issue of the indivisible authority of the *imam* as head of the Islamic State irrespective of geographical boundaries. In an Empire of far-flung territories the problem which this inexorable doctrine posed was overcome to some extent by introducing the formulae of delegated authority, the *wilayah* as expounded by the jurists. The acceptance of this formula was destined to lead to a division of functions and eventually of authority; the function of the Caliph the supreme Ruler gradually crystallising into a normal office whose main responsibility was to guarantee, in theory if not in practice, the ideal Muslim State, while the delegated representative of the Caliph, the various commanders and provincial governors, cultivating on a large scale the extra-Caliphal duties which in the end gave it a distinctive temporal significance. The clear rift occurred with the emergence of the Sultan, who originally functioned only on authority extended from the Caliph, as the sole temporal power whose position reinforced by military strength; he maintained his contact with the ideal State by associating himself with the *Shari'ah*.

The role of the legislative process in Islamic constitutional theory might seem to be pertinent to our discussion. The major problem which confronted the early State authorities and the legal circles in Islam was the task of finding a mean between the machineries of privately evolved *Shari'ah* Law and the State legislation. Instan-

ces in the early history of Islam provide evidences that the seeds of the functioning of State legislative organs appeared in the rise of the *shura* or the consultive body which debated the election of the third Caliph of Islam although this failed to develop as an effective organ of government in Islam. The sphere of State legislation was maintained by a series of administrative rulings; the concordat that existed between the State-made Law and the *Shari'ah* Law was indeed as tenous as it was subtle. The outstanding fact remains that despite the failure or perhaps refusal of the one to assimilate or be assimilated by the other, they existed side by side for centuries without any serious open conflict in keeping with the catholic spirit of Islam to accommodate the multifarious divergences inherent in human attitudes and to extend the area of tolerance to the utmost.

It has become common to assert that inasmuch as the Mongol destruction brought the end of the historic Caliphate, so did the overthrow of the Ottoman Sultanate in 1922 followed by the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 in Turkey seal the fate of this institution and that there was no fresh endeavour anywhere else in the Muslim world to resuscitate, re-interpret and re-formulate the political theory of the Muslim State in the light of the enormously changed conditions of the present-day world. It is in this respect that I consider this constitutional document of Trengganu, for whatever it is worth, as a bold contemporary effort of far-reaching implications to the Muslim world. The State, though committed in a way to live under the shadow of a foreign power, refused to be crushed out of its natural existence; it proclaimed a form of monarchical government, a political system which was yet another experiment in political thinking.

SUMMARY OF CONTENTS OF THE TRENGGANU CONSTITUTION

The constitutional organization envisaged is that of a Sultanate, a political system of which the principal constituents are: the Ruler, the State, and the Consultive Assembly *mashwarah* as a governmental organ.

GENERAL

The Constitution clearly states that the "Government of Trengganu" is an Islamic power, and Islam the State Religion even should adherents of other faiths outnumber the Muslims. The Con-

stitution is intended to serve as a guide in State matters and may *not* be "altered, amended, changed, broken or destroyed". Refusal to obey the Constitution shall be tantamount to rebellion. The constitution was proclaimed with the consent and approval of the Ministers and the *mashwarah*, chiefs and heads of departments after full and mature consideration. It should be made known to all the people of the country.

RULER

The Sultan shall be the Supreme Ruler of Trengganu and in him is the servant of the law and imposes on himself the observance of the Government. For all intents and purposes the Ruler himself is the servant of the Law and imposes on himself the observance of its provisions. The office of the Sultan would appear to be based on a somewhat eclectic principle; on the one hand the sultanate rested on legitimate hereditary rights in the Ruling House and on the other, the right of election of a Ruler passed to the *mashwarah* under certain circumstances. The document deals at length with the doctrine of the office of the Sultan, the chief aspects of which are:

Although the powers of the government and the State are vested in the Ruler yet it is "usual and important" for him to "confer with the Ministers in all matters of State and in all matters relating to laws and regulations.

The action taken by the ruler may under certain circumstances be over-ruled by the *mashwarah*.

It would be unlawful for him to surrender either the State or Government or any of the powers and privileges of the Government to any Government or Power of Europe or others.

There shall be no obedience to him in case he commits breach of trust.

CONSULTIVE ASSEMBLY

A consultive assembly is contemplated in the institution of a *mashwarah* which shall be a body of general advisers to the Ruler. Their object is to assist him and the ministers in the administration of the country in framing, amending and adding to the laws and regulations.

The State Council shall comprise the following:

(a) Ministers, who are members of the *mashwarah* who hold senior ranks and offices to which they are appointed by the Ruler.

(b) Heads, these include the *ulama'*, wealthy men, chief penghulus but exclude members of the *mashwarah* who form the cabinet of ministers.

(c) Pillars of the State, these are members of the cabinet of ministers and heads who are entitled to have any say in the election of the Ruler and in other important affairs.

Decision of the *mashwarah* shall be by majority vote and all members while in conference have equal rights to express their views. Members may be proposed for election and approved by the Ruler from time to time.

All laws of the country shall be exercised with justice to the people of the country and foreigners alike.

The Ruler and the Government of Trengganu shall always exert themselves in maintaining good and cordial relations with foreign governments more especially with the British Government in order that such relations may be permanently established.

The Ruler reserves to himself the right to add or enlarge, with the approval of the *mashwarah*, this Statute from time to time provided that such addition or enlargement does not destroy its primary objects and principles. He also has the right to define and interpret any of its sections.

ISLAMIC INVOLVEMENT

The Ruler shall be a Muslim and of the Malay race.

He should be free from those qualities which the *Shari'ah* law does not approve of.

All ministers shall be persons professing the Islamic religion. Members of the *mashwarah* shall not necessarily be of the Islamic religion or belonging to the Malay race.

If the ministers or other officers act in a manner contrary to the *Shari'ah* law their punishment shall be considered by the Ruler.

CONCLUSION

Each of the points referred to in the preceding summary represents a theme of substantial matter for discussion. The intrinsic value of the document lies in that it opens out avenues for exploration with a view to establishing the sources, whether of persons or records, that furnished the materials for its formulation. The findings listed above have to remain at this stage, rather inconclusive for reasons mentioned earlier. It might, however, seem

legitimate to attempt, if at all, a general interpretation based on the broad facts revealed by the contents of the documents.

If there were to be any field in which Islam maintained the doctrine of viability throughout the ages, in times of war and peace of stability and unheavals, it was in the field of constitutional theory. In the course of its evolution Islamic political theory acquired an astonishingly wide degree of flexibility to adjust itself to the needs of a changing social and political order. Each institution was born to stabilise an existing situation and having done its work, paved the way for other experiments. The contributions of the great political theorists of Islam — the Ash'arite doctrine with its insistence on the need for a single head in a unitary Islamic empire, the postulates of the Mawardian theory which rationalised the formula of delegated authority in government and administration, the arguments of al-Ghazali which made the public weal the master-criterion, the celebrated thesis of the original thinker of Islam, Ibn Khaldun, which elaborated on the method of a rational statecraft, the theory of Ibn Taimiyyah which rejected the idea of a unitary Islamic State and saw the basis of authority in the mutual contract with the community, the treatise of al-Farabi which sought to incorporate the Platonic concept of a philosopher-king into Islamic constitutional theory, all these had the same ultimate objective, to ensure that sovereignty, in whatever form it exists, is not abused and to see that social peace and the rights of the individual won the highest respect in human society. Inasmuch as sovereignty belongs to God at the philosophical plane, it also belongs to mankind at the human level, a divine gift which must be preserved at any cost.

It ought to be clear to any student of Islamic political theory that the general features presented by the Trengganu constitution rest not on improvised roots but on foundations of constitutional theory evolved through a period of some 1300 years of history. Some of its provisions, such as the provision regarding the State religion, do in fact savour of an Islamic ideal. The idea of a State religion would appear to be somewhat inconsistent with the historical development of the Islamic State. The first constitution of an Islamic State, that of Medina, far from providing for a State religion, incorporated the inalienable right of religious freedom.

By giving the religious law a semblance of immutability it provided for stability in religious values for its adherents. This meant,

of necessity, the divorce of the Religious Law from the usual legislative process. This situation did not apply to constitutional law or public law.

One further point that emerges from the evidence of the Trengganu constitution is that Islam, far from being superficial in this part of the world, had at some time attained a stage when its impact was fully absorbed in society, for otherwise one fails to appreciate the theoretical groundwork that remains at the basis of this constitution. The failure of this maturity to develop and to manifest itself into new modes of expression is not, as it is sometimes claimed, due to the nature of the Islamic doctrine but to factors attendant in the political history of the country and perhaps to the accidental political determinism of the nerve-centres of world power.

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Since this paper went to the press, I have been successful in reaching the original version in Jawi-Arabic of the Constitution; my fears that the English translation — available in the Commonwealth Relations Office, London — on which I based my initial observations contained in this paper, might be an imperfect version of the original have been more than justified, especially so when the existing English translation fails to project the true image of the conceptual terms and phrases found in Arabic in the original. Of course, there is some evidence of British participation and advice in the drawing up of the document, but what is particularly significant is the native conceptual norms in which the clauses were worded. However, I proposed to expand this paper in a separate study incorporating the new material at my disposal, at a later date.

Some Investigation in the Structure, Concepts and Ideals of Chinese Culture

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THE PRESENT WRITER, being mainly concerned with Chinese history from the 14th century to the contemporary period, is not specialized in Chinese cultural history, and feels himself not quite competent to deal with a subject such as the structure, concepts and ideals of Chinese culture. In the course of looking for relevant information it became evident that other scholars have written already on several aspects of this subject in a much more competent way than the present writer would be able to do within a short period. Therefore it may be justified, if in the following paper mainly the writings of other scholars are quoted in order to present to the participants of the Conference an introduction into the structure, concepts and ideals of Chinese culture. Chinese culture, however, is such a complex matter as to its various political, social, religious, philosophical, literary and artistic aspects as well as to the long period of almost 3000 years it covers — the prehistoric period left out of consideration — that it is impossible to include its entire scope in the framework of a short paper. The reader may be aware that only a few strictly limited aspects of Chinese culture are presented to him. Entirely different approaches to the subject could be taken.

The first part of this paper is a kind of introduction concerning certain aspects of the Chinese world conception and of the ideas of the Taoist and Confucian schools. The second part will deal with the social ideal of life: the position of the scholar-officials and the ethos of this elite group. The third part deals with the patterns of family and clan organization, in particular with the clan rules which exemplify in a very illuminating way the ideal patterns of Confucianism in action.

In the Chinese cosmological world-conception, the earth and the universe are closely related. Life on earth should be in harmony with the universe. In the same way as night and day and the four seasons alternate, and as the celestial bodies follow their regular course, *tao*, life on earth has to conform to *tao*. The effect of *tao*, or the quality of being conform with *tao*, is called *te*. Conformity with *tao* can be effected only if the two basic forces or moving principles of cosmic action, *yang* and *yin*, are well balanced. *Yang* is the principle of action, of giving, corresponding to heaven, to the sun, to the light, to the male, in opposition to *yin*, the principle of repose, of receiving, corresponding to the earth, to the moon, to the dark, to the female, *Yang* and *yin* together, producing all life on earth have to be in permanent harmony. If one should outweigh the other, there would be disharmony resulting in natural calamities and disorder among mankind; *tao* would be disturbed.

The social order on earth should correspond to the cosmic order. As the polar star is supposed to be in the center of heaven and all other stars moving around it, the emperor should be the center on earth, all human beings surrounding him within an appropriate nearer or further distance. Certain officials were supposed to correspond to certain stars. The emperor and the officials assisting him in government should also rule in accordance with *tao*. Extraordinary cosmic phenomena, such as eclipses of the sun or the moon, the appearance of a comet, but also unusual floods and droughts, the appearance of human or animal monsters, and other abnormalities in the *tao* of nature were supposed to indicate abnormalities in human life or in the actions of the government not corresponding to the human *tao*. *Yang* and *yin* were somehow out of balance. Thus this balance had to be restored by correcting mistakes and deficiencies in government policies or in the actions of its officials in order to avoid greater evil. Except from these basic religious elements Chinese thinking was primarily concerned with matters of this world. In the Chinese view the purposes of life could be achieved only on earth and not in the other world. The educated Chinese was usually agnostic and he looked down with contempt upon the religious superstitions of the uneducated masses.

In accordance with this cosmological world conception it was since most ancient times the common view, that the life of all human beings should conform to *tao*. Opinions, however, greatly varied on the exact nature of *tao* and on the best way to harmonize

with *tao*. The Taoist school — the School of *tao* — considered *tao* merely as the amoral cosmic order — the *tao* of nature. The Taoists stressed the importance of the *yin* principle advocating an intuitive knowledge of a receptive, feminine kind. The Taoists were against all political and social activity, and they advocated a passive and yielding attitude concentrating on the observation of and on the devotion to the *tao* of nature often leading into eremitism. In this way taoism often coincided with the negation of the existing political and social structure with its different classes and of the highly differentiated life which characterized Chinese society as early as during the second part of the first millennium B.C. In opposition to this development towards differentiation the Taoists advocated the return to the earlier social conditions of an idealized primitive community without private property and without class differentiation. This concept is reflected in a very famous passage of the section *Li-yun* in the *Book of Rites, Li-chi*. Although the *Book of Rites* is a classic of the Confucian school, this passage is without doubt of Taoist origin. The passage reads in the translation by Wm. Theodore de Bary: [1].

When the Great Way was practiced, the world was shared by all alike. The worthy and the able were promoted to office and men practiced good faith and lived in affection. Therefore they did not regard as parents only their own parents, or as sons only their own sons. The aged found a fitting close to their lives, the robust their proper employment; the young were provided with an upbringing and the widow and widower, the orphaned and the sick, with proper care. Men had their tasks and women their hearths. They hated to see goods lying about in waste, yet they did not hoard them for themselves; they disliked the thought that their energies were not fully used, yet they used them not for private ends. Therefore all evil plotting was prevented and thieves and rebels did not arise, so that people could leave their outer gates unbolted. This was the age of Grand Unity.

Now the Great Way has become hid and the world is the possession of private families. Each regards as parents only his own parents, as sons only his own sons; goods and labor are employed for selfish ends. Hereditary offices and titles are granted by ritual law while walls and moats must provide security. Ritual and righteousness are used to regulate the relationship between ruler and subject, to insure affection between father and son, peace between brothers, and harmony between husband and wife, to set up social institutions, organize the farms and villages, honor the brave and wise, and bring merit to the individual. Therefore intrigue and plotting come about and men take up arms.....This is the period of Lesser Prosperity.

This ideal of the Grand Unity — or the Grand Harmony, or the One World, *ta t'ung* — can be traced through Chinese history to the present time, not only in the philosophical writing, but also in the practice of many secret societies. The effects of taoism were not only of a peaceful kind. The opposition taoism offered against

a differentiated social and political order did often link secret societies with taoist belief. And in times of economic distress and political disintegration the activities of secret societies resulted often in revolutionary peasant insurrections. The vague aim of many such insurrections was the establishing of the ideal social order of the Grand Unity in conformity with *tao*. In almost all great insurrections during the course of Chinese history there was a strong taoist element. This kind of taoism was, however, not a philosophic taoism as cultivated by scholars, but a superstitious folk-religion indulging in magic, alchemy and other mystical practices which were always part and parcel of popular taoism. Some taoist elements have even found their way into modern Chinese communism, not only in the communist-led peasant uprisings during the 1920s, 30s and 40s, but also in the idealized conception of the Commune. The Chinese word for Commune, *kung-sḥe,* is an expression found in Chinese writing as early as during the first part of the first millennium B.C. It has the meaning of early village communities of a primitive communist kind and bears similar connotations as the ideal social order of the Great Unity, *ta-t'ung*.

The concept of *tao* in the Confucian school, although going back probably to the same origins, had developed into directions quite different from that followed by the Taoists. The Confucian doctrine became later, after the beginning of the Christian era, a decisive factor in the formation of China's social and political structure, and it has therefore to be dealt with in some more detail. In the Confucion teaching *tao* is not merely the amoral way beyond Good and Evil; the Confucian *tao* is moralized, it is the principle of morality, of a moralized cosmic order. The Confucian *te* is the formation of morality, the quality of virtue: Humanness (or humanity or goodness, *jen* and righteousness (*i*). The superior man or the gentleman, *chün-tzu,* is supposed to be superior to the inferior man (or small man, *hsiao-jen*) not only in so far as he belongs to the ruling class, but also as to his moral behavior. Some passages of the *Confucian Analects* may illustrate the demands made to a person to be called a gentleman:

> When natural substance prevails over ornamentation, you get the boorishness of the rustic. When ornamentation prevails over natural substance, you get the pedantry of the scribe. Only when ornament and substance are duly blended do you get the true gentleman.[2]

Wealth and rank are what every man desires; but if they can only be retained to the detriment of the Way he professes, he must relinquish them. Poverty and obscurity are what every man detests; but if they can only be avoided to the detriment of the Way he professes, he must accept them. The gentleman who ever parts company with Goodness does not fulfil that name. Never for a moment does a gentleman quit the way of Goodness. He is never so harried but that he cleaves to this; never so tottering but that he cleaves to this.[3]

[The true gentleman] does not preach what he practises, till he has practised what he preaches.[4]

A gentleman takes as much trouble to discover what is right as lesser men take to discover what will pay.[5]

The demands that a gentleman makes are upon himself; those that a small man makes are upon others.[6]

A gentleman can see a question from all sides without bias. The small man is biased and can see a question only from one side.[7]

The gentleman acts according to the situation he is in and does not desire what is outside of it. If he is wealthy and honorable, he acts like one wealthy and honorable, if poor, and lowly, he acts like one poor and lowly. If he is among barbarians, he does what one does among barbarians, if he is in trouble, he acts like one in trouble. There is no situation into which the gentleman enters in which he is not himself. In a superior position he does not abuse his subordinates; in an inferior position he does not hang on his superiors. He makes his own conduct correct and seeks nothing from others, and so he has no resentment. He neither complains against Heaven nor blames men. Thus the gentleman dwells in calm and safety awaiting the commandments of Heaven, while the inferior man walks in danger seeking good luck. The Master said: "In the archer there is a resemblance to the gentleman. When he misses the mark, he turns and seeks the reason for his failure in himself.[8]

The gentleman considers it his duty to participate actively in social and political life as long as the person of the ruler and the general political conditions allow him to practice his *te* in conformity with *tao;* otherwise he should retire and wait for another opportunity. He should not be afraid of being poor and having no job.

A gentleman, in his plans, thinks of the Way; he does not think how he is going to make a living. Even farming sometimes entails times of shortage; and even learning may incidentally lead to high pay. But a gentleman's anxieties concern the progress of the Way; he has no anxiety concerning poverty.[9]

A gentleman may for some reason be poor and lowly, but he has to be educated, otherwise he would be a rustic and not a gentleman.

II

Learning and education was the way to become a gentleman and — an inseparable quality of the status of a gentleman — a member of the ruling class. It is obvious that the aim to become a member of the ruling class and to enjoy its privileges was the more

primary immediate objective, and only the more idealistic-minded people were striving for the moral qualities of a gentleman too, although in the Confucian theory both were linked inseparably with each other. Since the 7th and 8th century, and definitely since the late 10th century the almost exclusive way to social advancement into the privileged ruling class was the education in the Confucian doctrine and the successful passing of public examinations in this doctrine. The status of a member of the ruling class and a glorious official career were the most coveted ideals of all Chinese as it is illustrated in the following story: [10].

A young farmer, on the way to a far distant field, has to pass the night in a country inn. There he mets a taoist monk and complains that he has to live a hard peasant life and cannot achieve any more. Then the young man falls asleep and has a dream: After marrying a beautiful girl of a well known family he sits for the metropolitan examination and finds his name at the top of the list of the successful candidates. Thereupon he receives official appointment and has a splendid career in office. As a local official he is very popular and people express their respect and their gratitude. When in the West an enemy army invades the border areas and defeats the regional commander, he is commissioned to the border and inflicts a crushing defeat on the enemy stabilizing therewith the situation at the border. His achievements are perpetuated in a stone inscription. At his return to the capital he is honoured by the emperor. But subsequently he is slandered and degraded to a minor position in the local administration. After three years, however, he is recalled and pardoned and reaches the highest positions in the central government. Jointly with two others he directs government policy. But his enemies are plotting against him and succeed by slander to impeach him. He is imprisoned and tries to commit suicide, but his wife keeps him back. All others impeached together with him are executed, but he is spared and merely banished. Before long, however, his innocence becomes evident; he is recalled, rehabilitated, receives additional high appointments, becomes the emperor's closest adviser, and is overwhelmed with imperial favors and with the most outstanding honours. Only at an advanced age he is finally granted to retire and subsequently dies, leaving behind five sons, all in high official positions, and more than ten grand-sons. Thereupon he awakes and understands that men's life is like dream, and he does not any longer complain about his fate.

The story shows simultaneously the Confucian ideal of an active life with a successful official career and the Taoist escapism as a way out for those who cannot reach this ideal.

It is perhaps worthwhile to note that in China — deviating from other societies — different social classes had no different ideals of life. The scholar-officials were the leading class in Chinese society. Their way of life and their views were the ideal of life, coveted by all and emulated as far as possible. Even when, for instance, in the 16th and 17th centuries we can observe a development in Chinese economic life in some aspects similar to early European capitalism, the Chinese urban business-people — unlike the European burgher — did never aspire to arrange their way of life according to an ethos of their own class independant from the bureaucratic class of the scholar-officials. They spent a major part of their income for a pretentious standard of living imitating in every respect the wealthy scholar-officials. Thus they spent much attention to the literary education of their children, since they were eager to have at least some of their descendants pass the public examinations in order that they might become members of the privileged class or even officials.

A major reason for this lack of class-identification of the merchants and other classes probably was that in China an hereditary nobility as a ruling class gradually lost its privileged status after the 3rd century B.C. and eventually ceased to exist at all after the 8th century A.D. Gradually the hereditary nobility was replaced as a ruling class by a newly emerging bureaucratic class of literati and scholar-officials. The criterion for the constitution of this bureaucratic class was primarily the regular public examinations held on the prefectural, provincial, and metropolitan levels. Since the late 10th century everyone — whether the descendant of peasants or artisans, or of merchants, was entitled to sit for these examinations. Only a limited number of so-called mean people was excluded, such as descendants of government and private slaves, prostitutes, entertainers, government runners, and some special regionally defined groups. All others were admitted to the examinations. In practice, however, only people with considerable financial means were able to exempt one of their sons from working for the subsistance of the family and to pay for his education. Nevertheless, in theory the way of social advancement was open to all and also actually social mobility was considerable. Not a few

cases are known that men of the most poor and humble origin had climbed up to the highest positions in officialdom.

In summarizing it may be stated: the most coveted ideal of every Chinese was the status and a successful career of a scholar-official. What was the ideal pattern of these scholar-officials? Three years ago the Committee of Chinese Thought of the Association for Asian Studies published a volume *Confucian Personalities*.[11] Within this volume several contributors exemplify the effects of Confucian standards of values and of the Confucian tradition in shaping a number of personalities of the scholar-official elite between the 6th and the 19th centuries. Professor Arthur F. Wright, one of the two editors of this volume, summarizes the essentials of these contributions in an introductory essay on "Values, Roles and Personalities". He points out how "the Confucian tradition...molded the lives and the thought of the men who created and perpetuated the civilization of China — a civilization that represents one of mankind's great efforts to build, rationalize, and adorn the good society".[12] This good society should be brought about by a universal harmony created by "an ordered and frictionless hierarchy dominated by a benevolent ruler and a wise and worthy elithe."[13] This elite was consituted by

> the best of the scholar-officials. Steeped in the Classics and in history, shaped by stern family discipline, tempered by introspection, and sobered by their vast responsibilities, these men were thought to have the power to transform their environment, to turn ordinary folk into the path of virtue. When opportunity offered, they were expected to nurture the same virtues in their official colleagues and in their lord and monarch. They had the obligation to admonish their monarch when in deed or policy he did violence to the *li* [the norms or proper social behaviour] and the cardinal virtues. While working this moral transformation, they were to serve as interpreters and transmitters of the heritage and as artists and thinkers who would adorn and enrich it. If such men prevailed, they would preside over a balanced and homogeneous order; frictions and power struggles could not occur, violence and subversion would smile upon a world where nothing could disturb the delicate balance of all the functioning parts.
>
> Such beliefs and ideals, reiterated in each generation, constituted a set of ultimate values..... Ultimate values imply a set of operating principles and a set of desirable behavior patterns which, if followed, will serve the ideal order and give the individual a sure sense of contributing to its realization. In other words — for the purposes of education and socialization — a society's ideals are translated into a set of approved attitudes and behavior patterns. These in turn affect the choices an individual makes, the roles he assumes or rejects, and the ultimate configurations of his career and his personality.[14]

Professor Wright extracts a list of "Approved Attitudes and Behavior Patterns" from the *Analects* of Confucius, the basic text of

the tradition of Confucian values and of Chinese education from early childhood on. He gives the following thirteen points:

(1) Submissiveness to authority — parents, elders, and superiors
(2) Submissiveness to the mores and the norms (*li*)
(3) Reverence for the past and respect for history
(4) Love of traditional learning
(5) Esteem for the force of example
(6) Primacy of broad moral cultivation over specialized competence
(7) Preference for nonviolent moral reform in state and society
(8) Prudence, caution, preference for a middle course
(9) noncompetitiveness
(10) Courage and sense of responsibility for a great tradition
(11) Self-respect (with some permissible self-pity) in adversity
(12) Exclusiveness and fastidiousness on moral and cultural grounds
(13) Punctiliousness in treatment of others.[15]

How did these "Approved Attitudes and Behaviour Patterns" become effective?

> The Confucian curriculum, designed to instill ultimate ideals and operating principles in the minds of the young, gave relatively little weight to ethical theory, to abstract logically related statements about "the good". Instead it tended to teach by parable and example and, in this process, to make intensive use of minatory and exemplary figures of the past. These figures were not treated simply as bundles of desirable or undesirable character traits. They tended to be viewed in relation to their situations; their dilemmas, their choices, and the circumstances surrounding them were usually known. In this way the youth gradually came to know a variety of character traits operating in concrete situations and labeled with one of the great or notorious names of the Chinese past. The Classical curriculum was supplemented by historical and literary accounts and by popular didactic stories.[16]

As an illustration it could be added that also fiction and in particular the Chinese drama — which to this day is, quite contrary to the Western theatre, extremely popular in all strata of society and of a tremendous educational influence has symbolized various patterns of behavior under different circumstances in a number of standard types of roles abstracted from historical personalities. Thus the young man and prospective member of the scholar-official elite was confronted with numerous exmplary roles out of which he might make his choice of one most suitable to the conditions of

his time and his environment as well as to his personal inclinations. "The molding power of example, held as an article of Confucian faith, favored the establishment of certain fixed roles in life, which the young were exhorted and trained to play".[17] Or in the words of Robert Ruhlmann:

> Education relied mostly on imitation of one's elders, and moral excellence was thought to lie rather in the proper fulfilment of established *social* roles in family and community living than in individual accomplishments (as in Western civilization). The concept of "roles" was more stereotyped than in other societies, and the *right* and *wrong* ways to play these roles were more sharply defined.[18]
>
> Most esteemed of all roles is that of the scholar-statesman — a role that combines literary abilities with integrity of character and a capacity for applying the moral principles of the Classics to affairs of state.[19]

Age or changes in circumstances may bring about the necessity of role shifts. Particularly common was the shift from an active role to a passive one. An official, actively engaged in politics and society may be forced by circumstances to retire. In such cases of role shifts it becomes evident that Confucianism and Taoism — in spite of their basic differences — did not necessarily exclude each other. The same scholar-official could in times of a successful official career play a role entirely in accord with Confucian standards. But under changed conditions he may play a poet-recluse role and live a taoist life in retirement devoted to painting and poetry, or he may even turn to eremitism in a remote region concentrating on meditation or the *tao* of nature. Mr. Ch'eng Hsi deals in his paper in particular with this taoist aspect in the ideal of life of the scholar officials. Syncretism is a characteristic feature not only of Chinese philosophical thought as a whole, but also of the single individual embracing such different world-views as Confucianism and Taoism or even Buddhism.

It has been shown that there were different roles available which could be chosen as ideal examples in the life of the scholar-official. But is it not possible to reduce their attitude and their ideals of life to a more general pattern? Etienne Balazs has given a partial answer to this question in his essay on the "Significant Aspects of Chinese Society":

> Another common and important feature of official duties [of the scholar officials] was their political character. They did not require any detailed, specialized knowledge. What they did require was worldly wisdom and savoir faire, and a level of general education that admitted the usefulness of a certain amount of rudimentary knowledge about technical matters together with the fine art of being able to manage people; or, it might be better to say, these duties called on aptitude — acquired through experience

— for planning and directing public works and being in command of the technicians, experts, and specialists. The social system did not permit its elite to narrow their personalities by specialization. To know the classics by heart and have a smattering of music, to master the rules of polite behavior and acquire a polished literary style, to be something of a calligrapher and an occasional writer of verse — these were the kinds of accomplishment considered likely to contribute more to the exercise of social and political functions than would training in some profession or study of the exact sciences; and these were indeed both the outstanding virtues and the outstanding defects of Chinese civilization when compared with the later stages of our own. Hence arose the amiable dilettantism of the *chün-tze*, the gentleman who, in whatever situation he might find himself, had to act as the representative of a privileged governing elite.[20]

This dilettantism as an ideal of the 15th, 16th, and 17th centuries has been further elaborated by Joseph R. Levenson in his essay on "The Amateur Ideal in Ming and early Ch'ing Society: Evidence from Painting":

Probably more in the Ming period than ever before.....Chinese officials were amateurs in office. They were trained academically and (for the most part) tested by written examinations, but they were not trained directly for tasks to be undertaken.....The higher degree-holding members of the bureaucracy — the ruling class *par excellence* — were not identified with expertise. The prestige of office depended on that fact. The scholar's belle-lettristic cultivation, a type of learning divorced from the official tasks for which it qualified him, was essential — not to performance of official functions with technical efficiency (there it was rather inhibiting), but to the cultural celebration of those functions.

If the knowledge characteristic of officials had been a vocational, technical, 'useful' knowledge, then it would have been only a professional means, with no intrinsic quality to dignify the bureaucratic end. But when office could be taken to symbolize high culture, knowledge for its own sake, the terminal values of civilization, then office-holding was clearly superior to any other social role. No other sort of success (commercial, military, technological, or the like), which might be assumed to depend on a body of professional knowledge devised as a logical means to produce it, could compete in prestige with success in winning office; for the peculiar preparation for the latter success, by its aesthetic independence, its very irrelevance, logically to the bureaucratic end — at least in a specialized, technical sense, if not in a broadly moral one — made of that end the end of life.[21] In China, the men of social consequence in the Ming and early Ch'ing periods were hardly cultural philistines; the professional point in their humanistic studies was in their failing to have any specialized professional point. They were amateurs in the fullest sense of the word, genteel initiates in a humane culture, without interest in progress, leanings to science, sympathy for commerce, nor prejudice in favour of utility. Amateurs in government because their training was in art, they had an amateur bias in art itself, for their profession was government.[22]

This non-professional amateur conception may explain that a role shift of the kind mentioned was not the result of an inconstancy in character, but that it expressed merely two different aspects of the same basic attitude. According to circumstances a scholar-official

could change the role he played, but remain at the same time perfectly himself.

III

So far only the ideal of life of the individual has been considered. It has, however, to be integrated into the larger framework of the family.

> the well-ordered family wherein the adults learned how to manage community affairs and direct others for the common good while the young gradually learned to obey and to play their proper roles in the kinship hierarchy. The family was thus seen as a microcosm of the sociopolitical order; the wise father was a model for the wise ruler or minister and dutiful children were the models for properly submissive subjects who knew their place, their role, and their obligations to others.[23]

Often even a larger organisation than the family, the clan, was an important factor in setting the pattern for the life of the individual. Some clans fixed certain clan rules as guidance towards ideal conduct. A study of such clan rules, "An Analysis of Chinese Clan Rules: Confucian Theories in Action" by Mrs. Hui-chen Wang Liu presents very illuminating information on the ideals of Chinese society.

> After the earlier aristocratic clans declined toward the end of the T'ang period, the importance of the primary group was rediscovered by the Sung Confucianists, who reinstituted the clan system as a means of promoting self-cultivation, rectifying social customs, and stabilizing society.[24]

The clan rules are of a particular interest, since they appeal not only, and not even primarily to the scholar-officials, but to a much wider range of people. It is obvious that each clan could have only a very limited number of scholar-officials among its members.

> The principal function of the clan rules is to exercise social control upon the clan's individual members, and especially to provide normative orientation, with concrete specifications for proper conduct and detailed description of desirable and undesirable behavior. The rules derived mainly from the Confucian teachings, amounting to a sort of value scheme that was more directly applicable to behavior in and beyond the kinship groups than the broader tenets of Confucianism.[25]

Ideologically Confucian teachings are dominant in the clan rules, but in addition elements of Buddhism, Taoism and folk-religion can be found.

It is evident that the clan rules place their stongest emphasis upon *li*. In the words of the "Nei-tse" [a section of the Confucian classic, the *Book of Rites*] quoted by some clan rules, "*li* serves to determine the closeness or distance of relations, to settle what is the proper conduct in doubtful circumstances, to distinguish kin from non-kin, and to clarify what is right and wrong." The term *li*, sometimes translated as "propriety", refers not merely to rituals, ceremonies, and manners, but more important than that,

to proper conduct and its ethical basis. It signifies both the conventions and the principles which regulate all group life, and particularly the life of kinship groups. Take the ancestral hall and the activities there, for example; one clan rule explains, "The ancestral hall is established, first for the remembrance of the ancestors; second, for the purpose of uniting the sentiment of clan members; and third, for the sake of teaching those to come the virtues of filial piety and sincerity.[26]

The clan rules also quote from writings of the Han period (202 B.C.—221 A.D.) which

> (1) develop the Confucian doctrines on *li* to include an emphasis upon ...integrity; and (2)...advance the concept of...governing principles and discipline as being necessary for all organized groups. In short, in Han Confucian teachings, the basic emphasis on *li* took two forms: voluntary control by self-respect and disciplinary restraint by institutions.[27]

Besides the Confucian teachings the influence of the state on the clan rules is very important too:

> The traditional Chinese state was interested in maintaining order through both the law and moral education. It relied to a certain extent upon the clan rules, which incorporate excerpts from the penal code in their texts, to transmit the law to clan members, as well as to uphold law-abiding conduct in general. Above all, however, the clan rules served as an instrument for passing along the...imperial injunctions on moral conduct.[28]

Particularly important were the Six Injunctions of the late 14th century and the Sixteen Injunctions of 1670.

The Sixteen Injunctions read as follows:

1. Be steadfast in filial piety and brotherhood.
2. Be close to fellow clan members.
3. Be kind to community people.
4. Take care of farming productivity.
5. Be industrious and thrifty.
6. Support schools.
7. Abjure heretical religions.
8. Learn the law and statutes.
9. Follow the rituals in showing deference to others.
10. Attend to your proper vocation.
11. Instruct sons and younger ones.
12. Forbid false accusation.
13. Do not harbor outlaws.
14. Pay taxes.
15. Organize *pao-chia* neighbourhood units to maintain local order.
16. Resolve enmities.[29]

Moral education in conformity with government policy was one major purpose of the clan rules. But at the same time they also

express a certain suspicion towards the state and a warning against becoming involved with the authorities of government.

The attitude of avoiding the government is clearly seen in three injunctions which the clan rules generally give to their members. These three injunctions stem not so much from the imperial injunctions or from Confucian teachings as from the practical experience of the people in general. In other words, they reflect the effects of government operations upon the people. The first injunction is not to discuss political matters. An early Ch'ing genealogy contains a Ming clan rule which warns that political gossip is unbecoming to a cultivated man, that criticism of local government officials is neither loyal nor kind, and that ignoring this advice may bring disaster. Though such specific formulations are not numerous, practically all clan rules refrain from mentioning politics.

The second injunction is to pay taxes promptly, primarily in order to keep clear of the government. Prompt payment of taxes is both necessary and desirable - necessary because paying taxes is the duty of subjects who should be loyal to the government and grateful for its protection, desirable (and here the language of the rule is far more emphatic) because of the hardship which comes with the collection of tax arrears.

The third injunction is to avoid litigation. The Confucian precept that clan groups should settle disputes among themselves is naturally a point, but by no means the only point here. Many clan rules base their advice on experience rather than on theory. They point out that the clerks in the local government are like "tigers and wolves", that many magistrates are unreliable and unpredictable and some of them are corrupt and cruel, and that litigation is invariably time-consuming and, as a result, financially ruinous. It is for these practical reasons that one should avoid litigation as much as posible and use clan arbitration to settle disputes.

Confucian theory assumed that one who cultivated himself and disciplined his family should be able to influence society at large and contribute his share of leadership to government administration. While this assumption applied to a significant extent to the scholar-officials in government service, it was by no means applicable to the common people or private citizens, as can be seen from the clans' eagerness to avoid government interference. Despite the Confucian theory, the state definitely exerted a negative influence

upon the clan rules; that is, the rules reflect a distinct conflict of interest between the clan and the state. As might be expected, the clan rules do not admit this discrepancy. At most, they try to justify a certain degree of dissociation from the government by stretching the meanings of such virtues as loyalty and honesty and by emphasizing the desirability of law-abiding conduct according to the imperial injunctions, regardless of how the law and the government happen to be operating. In any case, what the clan rules value are principally order and security for the family and for the clan.[30]

The clan rules tend to combine theoretical teachings and practical experience, ideals and realities. By way of illustration we shall consider the five leading areas of interpretation: parent-children relationships, relationships between brothers, marriage relationships, clan relationships, and finally community relationships and friendship.

In parent-children relationships, a number of clan rules extol the value of filial piety on lofty philosophical grounds..... However, the leading justification for filial piety in the majority of clan rules is reasonable, humane, and practical. It holds that since the parents have done so much in rearing their children, it is only fair for children to express their gratitude in return by respecting, pleasing, and taking care of their parents.

What, then, constitutes filial piety in behavioral terms? The clan rules do not approve of going to such extremes as the famous historical example of cutting out a piece of one's own flesh as medicine to cure the illness of a parent. They confine themselves generally to an ideal on the one hand and a minimum requirement on the other. The ideal is to give the parents, in addition to their daily sustenance, a psychological satisfaction by understanding, anticipating, and meeting their wishes. Even when the parents happen to be senile, harsh, mistaken, or hard to please, a good son defers to them without showing displeasure, meanwhile trying tactfully to dissuade them from making serious mistakes or at least to shield them from their mistakes. The minimum requirement is to show due respect and to provide for the parents. Failure to exert efforts toward the ideal is not regarded as an offense, but failure to meet the minimum requirement is condemned as filial impiety...

To the value of filial piety, the clan rules add a realistic qualification. It is necessary for the parents to recognize the growing importance of their sons when they come of age and are ready to

take over the family affairs. It is also desirable for the parents to exercise their authority without partiality or abuse, but for the well-being of all family members. In other words, parental authority, though supreme in the family, is not absolute. It is qualified by the value of mutual kindness and understanding. In fact, a number of clan rules maintain that it would be advisable for the parents to be patient and tolerant in overlooking minor faults . . . .

Filial piety has a value greater than itself; the clan rules regard it as the basic element in all subordinate-superior relationships. Many rules project the spirit of filial piety into respect for elder brothers, for senior clan members, and for superiors in general....

Actually, however, the value of brotherly love is not on the same basis as filial piety. An elder brother is only a leader among equals, with no authority to regard his younger brothers as subordinates. Hence, the clan rules uphold brotherly love mainly by appealing to the extension of filial piety, to sentimental affinity, and to the practical advantages of brothers' co-operating with one another. The behavioral content of brotherly love as given by the clan rules clearly underscores its co-operative nature: affection and kindness on the part of elder brothers, respect and deference on the part of younger brothers. Essentially this means that brothers should compromise and not quarrel.

Brotherly love is essential to the realization of the ideal of the large joint family in which several generations live together. Not only did the clan rules extol this ideal, but the state gave such families official commendations. On the other hand, many clan rules recognize the almost inevitable frictions in large joint families. These frictions stem from many factors: the varying earning powers of brothers, the sharing of goods and services in the household, disputes over inheritance, favoritism of parents, and especially jealousy and resentment between sisters-in-law. The root of all these frictions is the fact that each component conjugal unit has an equal share in the common family property and resources.

The provisions of the clan rules vary on how to deal with these frictions. Some idealistic rules advocate the elimination or suppression of disharmony by moral persuasion and ethical control. On the other hand, a few realistic rules frankly admit the desirability of breaking up a large joint family when disharmony prevails..... One exceptional rule has a modern ring: it criticizes the large joint family for discouraging the talent and initiative of its individual

members. However, the majority of clan rules are in favor of a compromise between the ideal and the reality. They suggest that each conjugal unit may cook and dine separately while continuing to live with the other in the same household. In this manner, brotherly love can still be maintained. By implication, each unit may generally manage its own expenditures from whatever sources it has....

As for marriage relationships, the clan rules invariably stress the wife's virtuous qualities as being essential to the family welfare. Both for moralistic reasons and for reasons of social prestige, the clan rules insist that marriage should be arranged with a family of spotless background and matching social status. Some clan rules based upon experience have added two qualifications to this general proposition. First,.... "a wife should come from a family of slightly lower position and a daughter should be married off to a family of slightly better circumstances," so that married women will be satisfied. Second, they warn that social status should not be mistakenly equated with wealth and influence. Marriages motivated by considerations of wealth and influence frequently result in disputes and unhappy relations between the two families. Furthermore, wealthy and influential families often produce conceited and quarrelsome girls. The clan rules urge their members to look for girls with virtuous qualities, adding that such girls are likely to be found in families of high moral standing.

After marriage, according to the clan rules, a woman should follow the spirit of the "Domestic Rules" in the Li-chi. Ideally she should observe female seclusion and sex segregation, take her place next to her husband in the family hierarchy, identify her interest with the entire family rather than with her conjugal unit only, and fulfill her duties toward all other family members. In case her husband is over forty years of age and she has not had an heir for him, she should agree to his taking a concubine. In return, a wife is entitled to the respect befitting her status and to protection by the family and clan against mistreatment by her husband. On the mistreatment of a wife by her mother-in-law, however, the clan rules are silent.

The rules generally forbid a wife to assume power over her husband, although a wife will be highly praised for assuming family responsibility, taking care of the family's needs, and raising her sons from childhood when her husband happens to be stupid, ill-

behaved, or dead. The stipulation against a wife's assuming power under normal circumstances is dictated by the very nature of family organization. She must be made to subordinate herself to her parents-in-law and to get along well with her sisters-in-law for the sake of family order and harmony. If she should assume power over her husband, she would tend to favor her own conjugal unit over other component units in the family, and she might even disregard the interest of the whole family in favor of her own family by birth. This general proposition does not really preclude a wife's assuming control of domestic matters so long as what she does is not in conflict with family order, family harmony, and family interest. As a recent study points out, traditionally and also nowadays, in many families it is the wife who keeps the keys of the chest and controls the domestic economy.

With regard to clan relationships, one value which all clan rules highly cherish is that of clan leadership. According to the ancient classics, the leader should be chosen in accordance with the feudal principal of primogeniture, the heir of the eldest line of descent, called the *tsung-tzu*. The clan rules, however, have realistically departed from this principle. Some rules keep the *tsung-tzu* as a titular head mainly for ceremonial occasions, but others never even mention the title. The formal leadership of the clan is generally invested by the rules in the *tsu-chang* or clan head. A man chosen for this position, according to the rules, should have a fairly high generation-age status and a respectable enough record in the way of fairness, honesty, integrity, capability, and experience to command the respect of most clan members. He need not be wealthy or a scholar-official, but if he is, so much the better. The system of clan heads functioned with considerable effectiveness in rural areas until quite recently. A clan head, even when he was old, weak, and poor, still enjoyed respect and mediated between clan members. For such a person often embodied the kind of practical Confucian virtues which both the clan rules and the common people valued.

Another important value in clan relationships was cordiality and mutual respect among members. The main difficulty was class differentiation. Theoretically, the relationship between members was governed by their respective generation-age status; in reality, however, members of lower generation status might have higher social positions. The clan rules had to find a realistic solution to this problem....

The best solution the clan rules can offer is for those with better social positions to respect those with a higher generation-age status, and also for the latter to make due allowance for the former. The value of cordiality and mutual respect is thus redefined by the clan in terms of social reality.

Finally, with regard to community relationships, the clan rules betray a discrepancy between their moral ideals and their practical advice. They uphold the value of mutual help among community people and neighbours but fail to specify when and how such help is to be given. In emphasizing community harmony, the clan rules generally give the advice that one should defer to community people, tolerate one's neighbours, and be tactful toward all. This amounts to recommending a desirable minimum of involvement in community affairs. One clan rule frankly states: "Avoid being a witness or a guarantor and you will have no worry in your life," and "As an old saying goes, 'Many good deeds are not as good as none.' Though this statement is exceptionally outspoken, many other clan rules in less obvious words express the same lukewarm attitude toward community life.

The clan rules look upon community relationships essentially from the family and the clan standpoint....

The clan rules contribute to good community relations mainly by their negative restraining influence upon the aggressive misconduct of their members.

On the question of friendship, the clan rules are emphatically against keeping bad company, and especially against having friends who fritter away their time in entertainment, amusement, and unbecoming activities. They advise that one should not have too many friends, since this would entail too much expense and not enough benefits. Instead, one should keep a few well-chosen friends who are reliable and have good moral qualities. But even with such desirable friends, caution is still the watchword. One clan rule after another explains that though friendship is one of the five cardinal relationships honored by Confucian ethics, the members should be careful about it....

According to Confucian theory, as mentioned earlier, one should extend one's moral influence beyond the family and the clan to the community and society at large. By contrast, the value scheme of the clan rules is rather strictly family- and clan-oriented. The cohesion and consolidation of the clan group, while desirable, undeni-

ably led to tension in the community between the clan and other groups, notably the poor tenant on the clan property and especially the members of competing clans. At worst, the strong we-group feeling of the clans must have made for community disharmony, lasting resentment, and even inter-clan feuds.

Furthermore, in overemphasizing family and clan control over individuals, the clan rules point toward a kind of personality characterized by modesty, caution, and restraint. This type of personality was well suited to the stable social order in traditional China, which was rigid in structure and conventional in mores, but it was scarcely active, resolute, and energetic enough to fulfill the original Confucian ideal of leadership in the service of the community and the state.[31]

The clan rules are interested more in promoting ideal social customs than in discussing prevailing social customs; nevertheless, they cannot ignore the existence of the latter, many of which clearly do not quite agree with the Confucian teachings. In this connection we shall here consider the clan rules' pronouncements on two issues: first, the religious customs which prevailed among both the scholar-official class and the common people; and second, the remarriage of widows, which during the Ch'ing period was condoned only among the poor.

Neo-Confucianism took a somewhat ambivalent position with regard to Buddhism and Taoism. It was opposed to such of their practices and customs as conflicted or tended to compete with Confucianism; but at the same time it absorbed certain of their religious concepts on the philosophical level which were acceptable from the Confucian viewpoint. The clan rules in following the Neo-Confucianist teachings generally maintained the same attitude. They raise four major objections to religious practices. First, they make a distinction between acceptable religion and improper heretical beliefs. The acceptable religions are Buddhism and Taoism. Some clan rules admit that these religions are law-abiding and not without beneficial teachings, but it is generally argued that they are overly profound and abstract, and hence beyond the comprehension of the common people. The improper and heretical beliefs are those which lead people to believe mistakenly in gods, demons, promised good fortunes, and threatened misfortunes. Especially dangerous are the subversive secret sects, which the law explicitly forbids.

Second, the clan rules theoretically permit no religion to subvert the family and the clan institutions. Many of the rules forbid their members to join religious orders on the ground that parents do not rear their children for such a purpose. Other rules advise their members not to employ Buddhist or Taoist priests to pray for one's deceased parents because this would impiously suggest that the parents have sinned. The presence of priests at funerals is also viewed as contaminating the Confucian rites.

Third, the rules are most severe in condemning the practice of holding religious services in mixed company, which violates the principle of sex segregation. It is regarded as revoltingly vulgar for females to brush shoulders with strangers, and especially for them to make pilgrimages to temples.

Finally, the clan rules express mild skepticism about the magic powers claimed by various religions. Some rules raise the question whether prayers and offerings are not a form of bribery in the hope of buying good fortune, pointing out that if they are, the deities are hardly worthy of their names. Other rules give the rational advice that for illness one should spend one's money on medicines instead of on prayers and superstitious offerings.

The attitude on religious practices in the clan rules largely parallels that of the state....

There is nonetheless an appreciable distance between the attitude of the clan rules and that of the government. The clan rules express their objections to religious practices in relatively mild language, and rarely stipulate any punishment for disregarding these objections. In a few cases, they actually sanction placing Buddhist images next to the ancestral tablets and inviting Buddhist or Taoist monks to be the caretakers of ancestral halls. It is well known that the common people remained largely syncretic and polytheistic in their beliefs and customs....

The remarriage of widows offers another interesting illustration of the relationship between the clan rules and social customs. It was a few of the leading Sung Confucianists who first insisted that "losing chastity is a serious matter, while death by starvation is by comparison a small matter." At the beginning of the Ming period, the government adopted the policy of rewarding chaste widows with official commendation. The Yung-cheng Emperor of the Ch'ing period encouraged the building of memorial halls in honor of chastity and filial piety. With such government encourage-

ment, and with the spread of Neo-Confucian teachings, the scholar-official class came to regard the remarriage of widows as infamous.

Many poor families however did permit the remarriage of widows and in some cases even collected money from the prospective husband. A large number of clan rules do not discuss the remarriage of widows (except to forbid the remarriage of a widow to a clan member, or particularly to a brother of her deceased husband, in accordance with the state law) — probably because the practice was considered beyond hope of correction. A few rules give a realistic appraisal of the problem. They admit that "although the principle of chastity requires a woman to be faithful to her husband forever, even after his death, such conduct cannot be expected of, or imposed upon, every widow." These clan rules argue that though it is disgraceful for widows to remarry, adultery without remarriage would be far more shameful. In approving remarriage reluctantly, several clan rules add the condition that widows who remarry must leave their family property and children behind to be taken care of by kind members in the clan.

Confucian morality permeated society. Though the poor permitted the remarriage of widows, they did so only on practical grounds and for lack of alternatives. In most cases the clan organisation was unable to take care of widows whose families could not provide for them. Though a number of clan rules prohibit mistreatment, pressure, and other aggressive acts against helpless widows, and some provide mild punishment for such acts, many rules stipulate no punishment at all. The few clans which were able to give relief to poor widows from their charitable estates are the exceptions. Ironically, many clan rules show an eagerness to reap prestige for the clan from a widow of distinguished chastity by authorizing the use of common funds to solicit a government commendation for her and to build her a commemorative arch. Indeed, a chaste widow apparently got more consideration from the clan after her death than during her lifetime. It is reasonable to suggest, though, that if the clan organizations had been better able to protect and provide for poor widows, the clan rules might have been readier to prohibit remarriage in accordance with Neo-Confucianist doctrine.

Once again we find the clan rules, while adhering to Confucian theories in the main, making a concession to prevailing social customs. Such concessions were not made lightly. They were per-

missible only when clan rule compilers considered them to be matters of minor importance and when neither the Confucian theories, nor the existing circumstances, nor the clan institutions, were capable of furnishing a better solution.

The foregoing analysis has shown that the clan rules represent a second-layer value scheme in operation, beneath the idealistic value scheme of Confucian theory and above the *ad hoc* expediency of everyday family, clan, and social life. They form a sort of subdivision within Confucianism, mixed with the influence exerted by the state, upheld by the inspiration of certain model scholar-officials, compromised to a certain extent by practical considerations, and mainly dependent upon the amount of support they can derive from other scholar-officials and their families.

The clan rules appear to have been effective in helping people to live in accordance with Confucian ideals and to place a high value upon the Confucian virtues. However, the tremendous emphasis upon conformity also helped to produce a type of personality more introspective and circumspect, and less energetic and active, than what the Confucian theories originally visualized. The clan rules necessarily modified Confucian teachings in the light of practical experience. Their efforts to arrive at a really satisfactory synthesis, however, were limited, not only by the uncompromising nature of many of the Confucian theories, but also by certain weaknesses in the clan organization. These limitations unquestionably made the clan rules less effective in influencing the common people than they might otherwise have been. Nevertheless, not a few values upheld by the clan rules were generally accepted.[32]

The last part of Mrs. Hui-chen Wang Liu's article has been quoted almost *in extenso*, since it shows in a very illuminating way, how the lofty ideal of an orderly and harmonious society — the dominating ideal of Chinese culture — and the Confucian standard of values which should bring about this ideal society were operating in daily life. The patterns of behavior as exemplified in the clan rules have to a large extent outlived the traditional Chinese state and traditional Chinese society. Not a few of these patterns are still effective among the Chinese abroad, including those in Malaysia. Therefore Mrs. Wang Liu's study on the clan rules can perhaps contribute also towards a better understanding of some aspects of Chinese culture and of Chinese tradition in this country.

NOTES

1. *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, 3rd ed., Columbia University 1964, p.176.
2. *The Analects of Confucius*, translated and annotated by Arthur Waley, London, 1938, p.119: 16.
3. *Op.cit.* pp.102-103: 5.
4. „ p.90-91: 13.
5. „ p.105: 16.
6. „ p.197: 20.
7. „ p.91: 14.
8. De Bary *op.cit.*, (n.1) p.119: XIV.
9. *The Analects of Confucius*, *op.cit.* (n.2) p.199: 31.
10. See *T'ai-p'ing kuang-chi* by Li Fang, published in 977 A.D., ch.82 "Lä weng", ed. Chung-hua shu-chü, Peking 1962, vol. II, pp.527-528.
11. Ed. by Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, Stanford University Press, 1962.
12. *Op.cit.* p.3.
13. „ p.6.
14. „ pp.7-8.
15. „ p.8.
16. „ p.9.
17. „ p.10.
18. "Traditional Heroes in Chinese Popular Fiction", in *The Confucian Persuasion*, ed. by Arthur F. Wright, Stanford University Press, 1960, p.148.
19. Arthur F. Wright in *op.cit* (n.11) p.14.
20. In *Chinese Civilization and Bureaucracy*, Yale University Press, 1964, p.9.
21. In *Confucian China and its Modern Fate*, University of California Press, 1958, pp.16-17.
22. *Op.cit.* p.19.
23. „ (n.11) pp.6-7.
24. *Confucianism in Action*, ed. by David S. Nivison and Arthur F. Wright, Stanford University Press, 1959, p.64.

25. *Op.cit.* p.66.
26. ,, p.68.
27. ,, p.69.
28. ,, p.72.
29. *Op.cit.* pp.73-74.
30. ,, pp.76-77.
31. ,, pp.84-90.
32. ,, pp.91-95.

The General Attitude Towards Life of the Ancient Chinese Literati

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DURING THE PERIOD from the end of the Chou to the Ch'ing dynasty, to all appearances it was Confucius who influenced the style of thought of the Chinese literati. In fact the attitude to life of Lao-tzu and chuang-Tzu secretly had a profound influence on their lives.

Chuang-Tzu's philosophy is to follow nature. He advocated that there exist no such concepts as big, small; high, low; right, or wrong. Only human beings, whose knowledge is insufficient, make such comparisons and form such ideas. In the chapter of *Ch'iwu-lun* (adapted from James Legge's translation) he says:

> Since there is life, there is death; since there is death there is life. If there is no death, where is life? Since there is admissibility, there must be inadmissibility; since there is inadmissibility, there must be admissibility. Right comes from wrong, and wrong from right; for this reason the sage does not follow these concepts, but regards things in the light of their celestial nature.

Again he says:

> Heaven, earth and I were produced together, so all things and I are one. Since they are one, can there be speech about them?

He thought it unnecessary for men to debate and concern themselves about anything, and unnecessary to like anything.

Lao-Tzu in his philosophy teaches that there is no need for any kind of action; in his book Tao-tê-Ching he says:

> Practice wu-wei (non-action) and work without feeling the effort.

He considered that men should be soft and weak instead of strong and tough; wisdom and strength are not desirable, for nobody will attack the weakest and lowest and the most foolish.

In Tao-tê-ching he says:

> Heaven and earth are everlasting and eternal because they do not live of or for themselves. For this reason they enjoy eternity.

Again he says:

The highest excellence is like water; water benefits all things without striving, and always occupies the low position disliked by men. Thus its way is close to the Tao.

Again he says:

Only because one does not wrangle, there can be no fault.

Again he says:

When a man's hall is full of gold and jade, he cannot keep it safe. When wealth and honours lead to arrogancy he will bring disaster on himself. When a reputation has been attained through deeds a man should withdraw into obscurity according to the Way of Heaven.

Therefore backwardness is better than progress; only by keeping himself humble, by giving way and being conservative is a man safe.

Lao-tzu's ideas were very popular among the people during the Han dynasty. Several employers and ministers adopted his philosophy in ruling the country, their policy being not to establish new institutions and to leave old customs unchanged; only by maintaining a state of security and peace would they be successful, as in the story of Ts'ao Ts'an recorded in the section of Ts'aohsiang-kuo shih-chia in the 54th Chüan of the *Shih-chi*, which runs:

Having heard that in chiao-hsi there was a man named Ko-kung who understood the teachings of Huang and Kao. Ts'ao sent a representative with valuable gifts to summon him. On his arrival, Ko-kung recommended the principle that the best way to rule the country is by "inactivity," for then the people would be at peace. Everything he said was based on this principle. Ts'ao Ts'an offered his main chamber to Ko-kung as residence, and followed the Huang and Kao method in ruling his country.

The book also says:

When Ts'an took on Hsiao Ho's post as Prime Minister of the Han Empire, the way affairs were managed remaining unchanged, following completely the methods of Hsiao Ho. In his selection for local officers he shrank from choosing orators, but engaged sincere, kindly men and gave them posts as secretaries; he dismissed those skilled with works and those desirous of winning reputations. He drank good wines day and night. Whenever other ministers, inferior officials or guests, seeing that he did nothing at all, came to try to advise him Ts'an offered them good wine and prevented them from speaking. Once they were drunk he sent them away, so that none had managed to talk with him; this happened frequently. The garden of the Prime Minister's house was near the quarters of the officers, who were given to continuous revelry. Although the attendants disliked this, there was no way of stopping it. Consequently they asked Ts'an to walk in his garden, where he heard the drunken officers shouting and singing. Instead of summoning and punishing them, as the attendants expected, he asked to be served with wine, and sat down to drink and shout as his answer.

Later he once held an interesting conversation with Emperor Hui-ti; the text was as follows:

Ts'an removed his hat and saluted the Emperor;

'If your Majesty were to compare your wisdom and military ability with that of the Emperor Kao, who would be superior?

The Emperor replied: 'How would I dare compare myself with the deceased Emperor!

Ts'an said:

'If your Majesty were to compare me with Hsiao Ho who would be worthier?'

The Emperor said: 'You appear to be less worthy than he'.

Ts'an answered, 'Your Majesty's words are true. The Emperor Kao and Hsiao Ho unified the empire, and undoubtedly established law and order. Now Your Majesty reigns; I Ts'an, and others do our duty; we honour his laws and make no alterations. What could be better than that?'

The Emperor answered: 'All right. This is enough'.

After the death of Ts'ao Ts'an, the common people composed a verse for him:

'Hsiao Ho made the law,
Simple and clear.
Ts'ao Ts'an succeeded him,
Maintaining it without change.
Together with quietness.
People live in peace.

During the Wei and Chin dynastics the philosophy of Lao-Tzu and Chuang-tzu became more influential to the literati, and the so-called 'Pure talk' became a fashion. The rhythm of the life of the literati turned to be more easy-going and leisurely, and was much closer to nature. They were able to make further appreciation of the natural beautiful scenery. This was especially so in the Eastern Chin Dynasty when North China was occupied by foreign tribes and the Chin capital was forced to move to Chien-k'ang the city at the southern bank of the Yang-tse River, and a large number of literary men were gathering in that area which is full of beautiful hills and rivers. The scenery and vegetation of that place appear to be most attractive to man's senses. Therefore, both the Southerners and the Northerners took delight in that poetical environment. Their life became more and more enjoyable and reckless:

In the 4th Chüan of Shih-shuo hsin-yü we find the story about Wang Hui-chih (Wang Tzu-yu):

"Wang Tzu-yu lived in Shan-yin. He woke up one night when it was snowing heavily. He opened the door and ordered drinks while he saw that his place was bathed in a glistening white light. He felt unsettled and chanted the verse Calling Hermits by Tso Szu. Suddenly he remembered Tai An-tao who was then living in Yen, immediately he took a boat to try to pay a visit. When he arrived and reached Tai's door he decided to return home. When he was asked about it, he said, 'I started my trip when I was in high spirit, and I returned home after that spirit was over. Why should I see Mr. Tai?'

Shan-yin and places surrounding it are the highlights of beautiful scenery at the southern bank of the Yang-tse River. This can be proved by the words of Wang Hsien-chih (Wang Tzu-ching) which we can find in the first Chüan of *Shih-shuo hsin-yü*. They are as follows:

Wang Tzü-ching said: 'One who goes along the roads of Shan-yin will find that mountains and streams mirror each other, and there is so much to see that one does not know where to turn one's attention. It is more difficult to get rid of the impression made by the transitional period between autumn and winter.

In the same Chüan of the same book we find some words of Ku K'ai-chih (Ku Ch'ang-k'ang) who was a great painter of the Eastern Chin Dynasty. It says:

Ku Ch'ang-k'ang was asked about the beautiful scenery of K'uai-chi after he returned from that area. He answered, 'hundreds of cliffs rival for supremacy, Thousands of streams vie for speed. Dimly the trees and grasses spread over like heaving clouds and glittering vapours.'

Such scenery surely had offered Ku K'ai-chih sufficient inspiration to enable his being one of the greatest painters of China and to develop a new fashion. His artistic works also inspired the painters of later generations with boundless knowledge. Although Ku K'ai-chih was not the earliest painter of China, he was the best known of the early generations. He was at the same time a man of good taste. In the 6th Chüan of *Shih-shuo hsin-yü* there is a story about him:

Ku Ch'ang-k'ang started to suck a stick of sugar-cane from the wrong end. When asked, he said, 'I do this so as to approach gradually a better stage.'

From this fact we can see his philosophical manner, which is without haste and impatience and one can expect happiness following the end of misery. This kind of human life should grow more and more interesting after one has tasted it for a long time. In the first Chüan of *Hsuan-ho hua-p'u*, it says:

K'ai-chih usually kept his figure paintings for years without dotting the eyes. When he was asked, he answered, 'Whether the four limbs are well portrayed or not has nothing to do with one's beauty. To catch the real spirit in a portrait is right here in the eyes.'

It was not laziness that made him take years to finish an artistic work, but it was because he needed concentration. In the second Cüan of *Li-tai ming-hua-chi* by Chang Yen-yüan of the T'ang Dynasty, it says:

In the artistic works of Ku K'ai-chih we find that his strokes are tight, forceful, and continuous, they come round in order, but are graceful and sweeping. The style seems easy-going, but the rhythm is like storm and lightning. His ideas came before his brush works, and they are still active

even after the end of the scroll. That is why he can make a perfect expression of his spirit.

Such was Ku-k'ai-chih as a representative of artists. If one can understand the spirit of his way of life we can understand at least half of the traditional spirit of the ancient Chinese artists.

Art is produced after people have leisure in their life, and the function of art is to fill in the gaps of leisure so as to enrich human life. Since Chinese paintings, no matter whether they are complicated or simple, sketchy or minutely portrayed, are produced in a leisurely and peaceful life, they should be appreciated in leisure and in a peaceful environment so that the spirit can be realized. Only because the Chinese artistic works are produced in peace, therefore, they offer people an atmosphere of peace. This also has some connection with the idea Chung-yung (Doctrine of the Mean) of Confucianism.

Again, let us see the Playful Song on Wang Tsai's Landscape Painting, by Tu Fu of the T'ang Dynasty:

He took ten days to paint a river, and five days for a rock.
Only under the condition that he would not be rushed,
He can consent to offer his brush works.
Grand are the views of K'un-lun and Fang-hu.
Hanging on the white walls in your lofty hall.
In the places Pa-ling Tung-t'ing and Japan in the east,
Rivers by the red banks communicates with the Milky way.
There are clouds drifting after the flying dragons.
The Boatmen and fisherman head for the bank of the river
When the mountain trees are bending in the hurricane.
He is excelled in painting distant landscape and there was no parallel.
At a foot's length, it presents a view of ten thousand miles
Where on earth can we find a pair of sharp scissors made in Ping-chou
That we can use to cut into halves the water of Wu-sung?

This description also shows the calm and easy-going spirit of the Chinese painters as well as the wonderful standard of their works.

In the 11th Chüan of Yün Shou-p'ing's *Ou-hsiang-kuan-chi*, it says:

The state of extreme loneliness is most suitable for one to paint. The so-called heavenly real man cannot be understood by the commoners who live in the dust. The idea of ten days for a river and five days for a rock touches the truth of creation. It is calm and profound. How can this calmness and profundity be expressed by hasty strokes?

It was not laziness or idleness that made one take ten days to paint a river and five days to paint a rock. It was in order that the artist can concentrate and be most careful in his painting. Only because this kind of artistic work is produced from calmness

and profundity, the spirit is at one and undivided. Therefore, it requires a calm heart and a concentrated mind with a clean room and burning incense for one to appreciate the excellence of this art.

Traditional Leadership in a new nation: The Chinese in Malaya and Singapore*

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THE NATIONALISM OF MALAYA and Singapore has so far had an unmilitant glow which nationalists of other South-east Asian nations have been tempted to deride. The present nationalist leadership is often thought to be amiable and easy-going because independence had come more easily than elsewhere. But the evolution of this leadership was a much more complex and difficult process than it has appeared on the surface. It has undergone shifts and turns as tense as most historic power struggles and will probably be facing more in the years to come. Since the Second World War, three stages of evolution may be discerned. First of all, there were the three turbulent years 1945-1948 when Malaya saw the rise of a well-organised Malay nationalist movement. At the same time, non-Malay expectations had been aroused by the British proposal for a Malayan Union and, to some extent, misled by the communists who claimed to represent a militant multi-racial nationalism. The second period from 1948 to 1955 was one when a new formula was being found for Malayan, as distinct from Malay, nationalism.[1] The British steered carefully between Malay extremists and Chinese communists and accepted the growth of the conservative Alliance of the UMNO (United Malay National Organisation), the MCA (Malayan Chinese Association) and the MIC (Malayan Indian

* As Chairman of the session on Chinese culture, I spoke briefly on traditional leadership along the lines of this paper which had been written earlier for another meeting (1963) and was later persuaded to include the paper here. This paper will also appear in *Leadership and Authority*, University of Malaya Press, Singapore.

Congress). The third stage since 1955 was one during which the Malay leaders were eager to gain independence for Malaya and sought Chinese and Indian cooperation to press the British for Merdeka (Freedom). This stage is still with us, for Chinese and Indian co-operation is still being sought to build the Malayan nation. The leadership of the Alliance, however, is mainly Malay. At this point, if a definition of Malayan nationalism is to be attempted, as it is, rather than what some politicians would like it to be, it could be given as follows: Malayan nationalism consists of Malay nationalism and the ideal of Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership in the new nation.[2]

All three of the communal groups in Malaya have been described at one time or another as divided and disunited, and problems of leadership have troubled each of them. The Chinese have been, in some respects, the most divided of the three. From the early days of rival guilds and secret societies to the modern left-right political alignment — Kuomintang and Communist, MCA and MCP (Malayan Communist Party) — and the more recent dichotomy of English-educated and Chinese-educated, it is rarely that the Chinese have themselves felt or have been seen as united. Today, different groups of Chinese have different attitudes towards the nature of the new nation-state and questions like whether a divided Chinese community will not be easier to win over to the idea of national unity than a united one has been a subject of policy discussions of various political parties in the country.

The categories of division, however, have never been agreed upon and a great deal of confusion has arisen because different criteria have been used by different sections of the Chinese people themselves. For example, those who think entirely in terms of left-wing and right-wing politics find that most Chinese cannot be easily classified in either category, although they can be more readily defined in terms of western-type class distinctions like "middle class" and "working class" than the Malay and Indian communities. Class divisions are certainly helpful for a study of large urban areas like Singapore, Penang and Kuala Lumpur, but for the structure of Chinese society in small towns or even in the "new-villages", it still seems premature to think in class terms. In any case, the difficulty is not so much in determining the "working class" because it is possible to point to an emergent Chinese industrial proletariat in several centres on the west coast of Malaya. What

is really difficult is in determining whether the term "middle class" as often used by western observers to describe Chinese merchants, professional men, teachers and civil servants, is as yet meaningful. Similarly, a division according to English or Chinese education is unsatisfactory because it excludes large numbers of the illiterate and because many important Chinese leaders refuse to see themselves as purely one or the other.

In any study of leadership in the Chinese community, it is important to note from the start that the Chinese are not only wealth-conscious, but also status and education conscious. In traditional society in China where education was for the few and led to great honours, the leaders of state and society were the scholar-officials, the *shih*. Today, the term *shih* is regarded with disapprobation as it has associations with an obsolete Confucian state, but the fact that the Chinese in Malaya value education highly and that the educated few have come to play a dominant role in the community suggests that we might still usefully employ the concept of the *shih*, if not the term itself. This would have to be done very carefully and it is clear that modifications and re-definitions would be needed.

In this paper, it is planned to approach the problem of leadership historically and through traditional categories. It is hoped that the traditional categories applied to the changes in Chinese society over the past six decades can bring out significant features of present developments and be shown to be still a useful tool of analysis.

First, let me state the classical ideal in China which has been accepted since the Han dynasty (206 B.C. — A.D. 9)[3]

The Traditional Hierarchy (Ideal)

Shih	=	Scholar-officials
Nung	=	Peasants
Kung	=	Artisans
Shang	=	Merchants and shopkeepers

This ideal position was, however, in practice, constantly undermined by the importance of wealth as a factor in social mobility and since the Sung dynasty (960-1275), the real status of the merchants had, in all but name, moved up to second place, while most peasants were thought to be the lowest stratum in society. The hierarchy thus modified would look like this:

The Traditional Hierarchy (*Real*)

Shih	=	Scholar-officials
Shang	=	Merchants and shopkeepers
Kung	=	Artisans
Nung	=	Peasants

In Malaya, as in all areas where the overseas Chinese settled, this traditional scheme had all but broken down. The Chinese had gone out in search of wealth, and commerce and shopkeeping were the only sources of wealth open to them. And as the merchants were the most obviously successful in terms of wealth, wealth became the criteria which determined a man's status in society. The few semi-literate men who went abroad as clerks and accountants, or occasionally to be teachers of the merchant's children, were regarded as no better than superior artisans while the vast numbers of peasants who went out to become rural or mining labourers were merely other varieties of workers *(kung)*. Thus, there were broadly only two divisions in overseas Chinese society — merchants and those who aspired to be merchants.[4] Both the scholar-officials, the most powerful group, and the peasants, the largest group in China, had no Chinese equivalents in Malaya. So the Chinese traditional hierarchy would be further modified thus:

The Overseas Chinese Hierarchy

Shang	=	Merchants and shopkeepers
Kung	=	(a) Clerks, teachers (?*shih*)
		(b) Artisans
		(c) "Squatters" (D*nung*)

But, in fact, the situation was not as different from the traditional hierarchy (Real) as one would expect. In Chinese eyes, there was an equivalent of the scholar-official groups in Malaya which consisted of British officials in the Straits Settlements and of British officials assisted by Malay aristocrats in the Malay States. Also the Malay peasantry formed the *nung*. This hierarchy in the second half of the 19th century then would appear as follows:

Shih	=	British-Malay officialdom

Shang	=	(a) British merchants favoured by officialdom
		(b) Chinese merchants
Kung	=	(a) Chinese clerks and teachers
		(b) Artisans and labourers
		(c) "Squatters"

Nung	=	Malay peasants

As long as the highest category of British-Malay officialdom was closed to them, the Chinese were on the whole content to strive to be successful merchants. But they were probably aware that, while the three categories of merchant, artisan and peasant were defined largely according to wealth, the top group of officials was not, and owed its position to public office as well as to birth and less tangible factors of influence and status. In time, as some of the Chinese probed to find gaps to enter this group, they found that the "professions" as understood by the British provided such a gap and could give them an opportunity to rise to the top. Thus, many educated their sons in English schools in Singapore and Penang. The successful ones went on to Britain and other British territories to study medicine and law. The less successful became schoolmasters and clerks, some of whom might enjoy the higher status merely by association with British officialdom. This remained so until the first three decades of the 20th century.

After the revolution of 1911, Chinese nationalism aroused the Chinese everywhere to learn Chinese and set up Chinese schools. In Malaya, there was great enthusiasm for the Chinese national language in the 1920's and 1930's, and by 1941, there arose a whole generation of educated young men, many of whom had come from China as teachers and many others from Malaya who had been to universities and well-known high schools in China.[5] These men were highly thought of and were equated in the Chinese mind with some kind of modernized *shih*. This did not stop many of the merchants from sending their sons to English schools which provided an entry into the local officialdom. Although it was thought by the community as a whole that it was more glorious to be a member of the elite in China, some of the Chinese did not fail to notice that elite status meant as yet nothing in Malaya. Thus until 1941, most Chinese were content with the available channels of social ascent from the *shang* and *kung* stages to the *shih* stage which meant being a member of the elite in China or a "professional man" in Malaya.

Since the Second World War, however, when the weakness of British power was revealed, the rising tide of anti-colonialism both violent and moderate has given the Chinese a different view of political power and elite status. The growing group of educated

Chinese had come to resent their exclusion from the status and power which they felt their education qualified them for. They began to attack the pre-war British-Malay officialdom in at least two ways. The English-educated, who had been given tentative recognition, formed moderate political parties to force the British to open the doors of officialdom wider and give them a bigger share in social and political responsibilities. The Chinese-educated, who saw no prospect of being recognised as part of the elite ruling group, tended to support the MCP in its attempt to drive the British out altogether. This has led many politicians to talk of English-educated and Chinese-educated Chinese as different political types. Certainly their political positions were very different, but the difference is perhaps not as deep as is depicted. What both the English-educated and Chinese-educated have in common is the belief that they have been unjustly excluded from their rightful status in society. Their different educational background has emphasized their different degrees of exclusion and led them to employ different means of achieving what they both consider their due. Perhaps we can better understand this situation by representing schematically the social hierarchy which the Chinese community seems to have evolved after the war:

The Malayan Chinese hierarchy today

Shih = Educated elite (Civil servants, teachers and professional men)

Shang = Merchants and shopkeepers

Kung = (a) Urban workers
(b) "Squatters", now living in towns and "new villages"

It may be argued that a resort to a traditional scheme like this one above cannot suit the present circumstances in Malaya as the present trend is to regard societies in western terms such as "middle class" (*shih* + *shang*) and "working class" (*kung*). That is the classical western division which may, in time, fit the Chinese in Malaya, but I intend to suggest in the following pages the reasons why, in terms of (a) political heritage, (b) political behaviour, and (c) attitudes towards Malayan nationalism, the real divisions are on lines similar to traditional status which can still be considered valid for a society where education is still the privilege of rather few.

It has been suggested earlier that attitudes towards Malayan

nationalism is a divisive factor for the Chinese community. The English-educated, for example, have been on the whole more ready to consider being loyal to the new nation, while the Chinese-educated feel that they have gained no advantages by helping to drive the British away. If anything, the Chinese-educated find that they have lost ground, for example, in the vital field of education. The strong education policy of the new Malayan nation appears now to be more disadvantageous to them than the laissez-faire policy of the British colonial government. But although educational background is an important factor in dividing the educated Chinese, it is not enough and does not seem to me to be a satisfactory approach towards the complex ways in which the Chinese community is divided. I have therefore suggested that we can better understand the situation by referring to the Chinese conceptions of the educated elite (*shih*), the merchants and shopkeepers (*shang*) and the workers (*kung*).

The elite could certainly be sub-divided into the English and Chinese-educated. Among the former would be the civil servants, lawyers, doctors, architects, engineers, teachers and clerks in government service, the people who in European society would be included in the category "middle class". Among the Chinese-educated would be various kinds of university and middle-school graduates, including those who have been underemployed or frustrated by the workings of an "English-language" state. Both groups owe their numbers to the great social mobility in Malaya and both are constantly being increased in size by those of merchant and worker origins who are recognised as deserving of elite status and privileges. The difference between this idea of the "elite" and that of the "middle class" is that the elite assumes that it is superior to the group *below* it, the merchants, while the middle class would include the merchants. Also, the elite derives its superiority from education and public office while the middle class is largely defined according to income, occupation as well as education. The superiority which the elite assumes does not preclude co-operation with the merchants in public action, as long as the merchants accept the social, moral and political leadership of the elite. It may be argued that surely this elite has a western equivalent in the intellectual. There is certainly some resemblance, but there are important differences. Firstly, the traditional Chinese elite had privileges which the western intellectual did not at any

time enjoy. Then, the western intellectual was often alienated from his society and distinguished by his rejection of traditional values, while a member of the elite in China was an accepted and recognised leader of his society and one who could lead the people both to orthodoxy or change, reform and even revolution. In Malaya, the English-educated are closer to the idea of the intellectual because most of them suffer from some measure of alienation by having accepted a system which excluded the majority of the Chinese. The Chinese-educated, however, have never lost the conviction that they are the rightful leaders of state and society and that leadership is a moral responsibility. And by their challenge to the English-educated, they have also influenced some of the English-educated leaders to see themselves also as the elite, at the top of the Chinese hierarchy, as for example, the present leadership of the PAP in Singapore.

The status of the elite determines the place of the merchants and the workers. In traditional China, some of the scholar-officials had idealised their relationship with the peasants in order to devalue what was considered the unproductive wealth of the merchants. The greater number of officials, however, had been ready to tax the peasants heavily and to benefit from the wealth of the merchants. This phenomenon appears to exist also in the Chinese hierarchy in Malaya and it cuts across the dividing lines of education and is true for both English and Chinese-educated. The only difference is that instead of the Chinese "peasants", which is a negligible group in Malaya, the elite now either idealise their relationship with the workers or are ready to be the leaders for the economic interests of the merchants. In modern western terms, the first may appears as the idealistic leadership of the "working-class" in the struggle for a Socialist or a Communist society and the other as the realistic leadership for a "middle-class" democracy.

This does not mean that neither the merchants nor the workers in Malaya genuinely identify themselves with their western counterparts and recognise the employer-employee tensions. There seems to be no doubt that they do. The contrast, however, lies in their attitudes towards a distinct group of educated men to whom the workers look for leadership and to whom the merchants have surrendered the claims to leadership which they had had in a pioneer Malaya under colonial rule. Unlike in western domocratic society where a "middle class" of capitalists, professional men, intellectuals

and even farmers may be set against a "working class" of urban workers and dissatisfied intellectuals, the struggle among the Chinese in Malaya can be more accurately described as that between the elite who lead the bulk of the workers and the elite who consider their interests to lie with most of the merchants. In this modified form of the traditional hierarchy, both the workers and the merchants share the heritage of elite leadership.

It is not suggested that the heritage of elite status and privilege includes the heritage of Confucian ideology. Both the sub-groups of English- and Chinese-educated have, in fact, inherited ideals from the West. The difference in educational background, however, meant that they have inherited different western traditions and in different ways. For example, the English-educated have studied British models of government and have learnt to organise political clubs and debating societies as a prelude to a political education. They have tended, on the whole, to accept ideals of personal freedom, but when they adopted the ideals of social and economic equality, they have been content to obtain these ideals through democratic means and by methods of constitutional change. The important point, however, is that they have learnt from their western models directly, either in English schools in Malaya or through visits of western countries. The Chinese-educated, on the other hand, have learnt of the west mainly through the refracted angle of the Chinese text-book, the political pamphlet and their Chinese teachers. Most of all, they have been specially impressed by those ideas which have taken root in China itself, republicanism, revolutionary politics and communism. In their organisations, too, they differ sharply from the English-educated. Their political education begins in school, in their literary clubs and in the public reading-rooms, and in all their organisations they firmly believe in discipline, loyalty and authority.[6]

Although the different educational background has given each of the two groups a different political experience, they have one important experience in common. Most of them share a desire for a modern society and are prepared to do away with obsolete Chinese values. In spite of many disagreements, they want the same things, for example, equality for women, better standards in education and in public health, a broader national, even international, outlook and a more equitable distribution of wealth. It is for causes such as these that sometimes, despite different ideas about

methods, they seem able to get together in the same political parties.

In contrast, neither the merchants nor the workers have a coherent political heritage. The merchants had, in the past, often been leaders of secret societies or of guilds, clan and district associations, and during this century, they have organised chambers of commerce on more or less western lines. Most of theme are barely literate and as the group also includes both Chinese- and English-educated who share similar interests, there is no cleavage arising out of educational differences. Some of the merchants with political experience had been supporters of the Kuomintang before the war and had identified themselves with the nationalist revolution of Sun Yat-sen.[7] This gave them a China-orientated outlook which has not helped them to gain the political leadership of the community in an idependent Malaya. The few who have adapted themselves to post-war politics are often themselves English-educated and they share with the English-educated elite a respect for the British system.

As for the workers, most of these in Singapore are bearers of secret societies as well as of trade union traditions, but in the Federation, many are still organised in traditional guilds and some have never experienced a formal public organisation. They do have some political values in common, although they themselves only dimly perceive these values and rarely understood their implications fully. These values include the belief in the right of rebellion in times of grave injustice or economic crisis and also ideas of rigid discipline and unquestionable authority, both derived from their secret societies and both colouring their attitudes towards trade unionism. Such ideas make them excellent material for the left-wing elite, whether English- or Chinese-educated, to lead to reform and revolution. As long as their educational standards remain low, however, they still cannot offer political leadership and have to be content to be organised by the elite.

We can now try to see how such an elite-led society responded to the political changes of the past two decades. The earliest Malayan political party, the MCP, is a good example of how the Chinese were able to utilise the latest techniques of political control, for example, the methods of communication, of indoctrination and propaganda and even of guerilla training. But the initial success of the MCP cannot wholly be explained in terms of such techniques.

Negative and external factors such as communal pressure on the Chinese not to fight against Chinese communists; the demoralisation of the Chinese community under Japanese rule which made them submit easily to the tactics of intimidation; the Chinese distrust of British officialdom; and the incalculable impact of the communist victory in China in 1949 all played a part in Chinese thinking. But perhaps a deeper explanation should be sought in the structure of Chinese society itself, in the question of leadership and power. The accepted merchant leadership (through guilds and clan and regional associations) of the pre-war period had its authority undermined partly because many merchants were accused of collaborating with the Japanese, but the main weakness was the inability of these leaders to adapt themselves quickly to the new political position. In their place were younger men, specially those educated in Chinese schools just before the war, who were looking for a lever with which to raise themselves to political power. There were those who turned to communism and socialism and appealed to the urban workers for support; there were others who saw the MCP and its underground cells as an organisational attraction to thousands of Chinese who believed in their traditional right to revolt against an unpopular or foreign dynasty through their secret societies. For all these men, there was the common background of the discontented elite leading the dispossessed workers in Malaya (instead of peasants). Among the discontented elite, there were both the English- and Chinese-educated. Of these, the former could be won back to the service of the "English-language state", but the latter were left to accept eclipse or to resort to force.[8]

The Chinese merchants who lost their place as leaders after the war were unable to regain their position in a society which favoured the elite. They were unwilling to follow the communists but, even more important, were unable to find alternative leadership among the English-educated who were for a time reluctant to enter politics. It was not until the MCA was founded in 1949, and especially after it became politically active in 1952, that a recovery of confidence was possible. Although the MCA leadership consisted of men with commercial interests, it had to be one with some knowledge of the Malayan official machinery. Therefore it was not wealth or business acumen, but English education which gave the leaders elite status. For example, Dato Tan Cheng Lock had been a schoolmaster in an English school and had participated in Straits

Settlements government before the war; Tun Leong Yew Koh was a British-trained lawyer and Col. H.S. Lee was educated in Cambridge. In Western terms, they may be considered as members of a "middle class", but to the majority of the Chinese, the operative fact was probably their elite status.

The success of the MCA and the failure of the MCP did not alter this underlying basis for political action. The MCP had failed largely because the British were too well organised and Malaya had found a working political formula in the UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance, but also because many Chinese felt that they had found an alternative leadership in a more conservative and moderate elite. And there does not seem to be an alternative to an elite leadership of *some* kind in Malaya. For example, when Lau Pak Khuan and his merchant colleagues of Central Perak tried to revive the outdated merchant leadership and formed the Federation of Chinese Guilds and Associations in 1957 to protest against the new constitutional proposals, the lack of elite leadership was certainly one of the reasons why the organisation failed. In fact, elite leadership does not seem to be confined to the Chinese themselves, for the Tamil lawyer, D.R. Seenivasagam, was able to take advantage of the failure of Lau Pak Khuan to win Chinese support in Central Perak for his party, the PPP (People's Progressive Party).

The success of the PPP in the Kinta Valley in Perak suggests that both merchants and workers can still be led without reference to modern western ideology and that leadership need not be based on communal identity alone, nor on clear-cut left- or right-wing ideas. This would appear to contrast sharply with the temporary success of the left-wing party in the Federation, the SF (Socialist Front, consisting of the Labour Party and the Party Ra'ayat). This party gained ground among the Chinese since the decline of the MCP and it is probable that some of the supporters of the MCP now support the SF. But it would be premature to conclude that the Chinese support of the SF reflects loyalty to left-wing ideology and to the ideas of the class struggle alone. For example, when the MCA was split during the 1959 elections, the MCA "rebel" vote went partly to the SF. This suggests that a considerable portion of SF support represented merely votes against the Alliance government. The anti-government votes in 1959 were shared by the SF, the PPP and independent candidates and this indicates that the Chinese are still more inclined to vote

for various elite leaders rather than according to political alignments.

In Singapore, there is greater political sophistication and class divisions along western lines — "middle class' and "working class" — are much more meaningful there than in Malaya. Thus the large group of working class in Singapore is assumed to be susceptible to left-wing political leadership and is often given as the reason why right-wing "middle class" parties like the MCA (Singapore), C.C. Tan's Progressive Party, E.K. Tan's Liberal Socialist Party, and Lim Yew Hock's Labour Front and then People's Alliance, received relatively little support, while a left-wing party like the PAP was so successful in the 1959 elections.[9] Yet it is significant that the Chinese leadership of the PAP as well as most of the Chinese leaders of the "left-wing rebels" who split from the PAP to form the Barisan Socialis are English-educated and university-trained. However broadly based both the parties may be, the elite status of the leaders in the eyes of the Chinese community is unmistakable. It seems possible to say that this is a variant of the struggle between combinations of elite-workers and elite-merchants we have seen in Malaya and is developing into a struggle between different groups of elite for the support of the same workers. This view would seem to be more true than that which regards the struggle as between "middle class intellectuals", for the idea of having such intellectuals as their leaders would still be abhorrent to the anti-merchant workers of Singapore.

It would be misleading to regard the elite as a permanent feature in a rapidly changing society like Malaya. It is not impossible for the *shih* and the *shang* to reconcile their status differences to form a western-type "middle class" in response to the demands of the Malayan (Malaysian) nation. However shallow Malayan nationalism may appear, it is supported by the machinery of the modern nation-state, the immediate aim of which is to create a united nation out of a highly complex plural society. Although the task is an extremely difficult one, the purpose is clear. For that purpose, the government's policy towards the Chinese has been to win them over to give their loyalty to Malaya alone. To the English-educated, it has offered a broader professional and civil service entry into the ruling circles than was possible under British rule. To the rest of the Chinese community, it has offered opportunities for the Chinese school teachers to join the national edu-

cation system and for the Chinese merchants to participate in the industrial growth of the nation. These are long-term policies which are expected to lesson the Chinese feeling that they are being discriminated against and to provide enough incentives for the Chinese to abandon their communal living and share some of the values of the Malay people.

But the policies reflect the view that there is a Chinese "middle class" who could be won over to Malayan nationhood and that this "middle class" would then lead the other Chinese to accept the national ideal. As I have suggested above, it is premature to think in terms of a Chinese "middle class". In order to have a better understanding of the Chinese response and attitudes towards Malayan nationalism, we can still usefully consider them in terms of the *shih* elite, the merchants and workers.

First of all, the elite group has been badly divided by its different positions concerning Malayan nationalism. This division stems from a number of historical factors, the most important of which is the resentment the Chinese-educated feel towards the English-educated for being able and willing to serve the "English-language state" from which the Chinese-educated have been excluded. Since 1945, the increasing number of English-educated to be given jobs with the government had created barriers which only a few on either side have been able to overcome. Another important factor is the different understanding of the word "nationalism" itself. To the English-educated, the word has largely meant serving and being part of an English-language nation and being rewarded for loyal and devoted work. Recently, most of them have accepted the idea of a "Malay-language nation", but their function remains the same, and, having learnt one non-Chinese language, learning another does not provide any serious difficulties. To the Chinese-educated, there is only one possible meaning to "nationalism", that associated with Chinese nationalism, that is, an emotional commitment to a long historical tradition. This has made them fear the Malay element in Malayan nationalism, for they assume rightly that the Malay-educated Malays have a similar conception of nationalism. Also, the English-educated who are familar with the British constitutional monarchy find nothing strange in equating nationalism with the Malayan monarchic system. The Chinese-educated, on the other hand, have long associated nationalism with the over-

throw of a foreign monarchy, with republicanism and with revolutionary politics.

These are indeed serious differences which may lead us to conclude that in their attitudes towards Malayan nationalism, the Chinese elite have never before been as divided. Yet it would be wrong to think that the Chinese-educated would refuse to accept a role in the Malayan nation. *The crucial feature of the elite is that its claim to status rests on its actual or potential association with public service or political power*. Before 1957, many of the Chinese made the obvious decision and chose to return to China. Since independence, however, this identification with China has not been popular and many are prepared to find their place in Malaya. The problem has been, in some cases, an agonising one of how to reconcile their Chinese identity with Malayan nationhood. Others more enterprising, have shown a readiness to learn Malay (both in Singapore and in Malaya) and have also been willing to cultivate left-wing Malays and to join up with groups of Malays dissatisfied with the amount of English still used in the country. They seem to have concluded that English education is the common enemy, since that seems to be the basis of the Malay-Chinese-Indian partnership which rules the country. As for the bulk of the Chinese-educated elite, they are hesitating between seeking preferment through either English or Malay and modifying the ways they can continue as Chinese communal leaders. No one has been able to ignore the pressure of Malayan nationalism, although it has not yet threatened the elite status which both the Chinese-educated and English-educated still enjoy.

It is fair to say that a reconciliation with Malayan national aims could come more easily to educated elite groups than to merchants and workers. This will be difficult to prove but it can be expected to happen if a society rewards merit consistently and without discrimination between men of different communities. Since this is thought to be difficult in Malaya without depressing further the position of the Malays, then that section of the elite which is excluded, especially the younger generation, is likely to provide the strongest resistance to reconciliation and will encourage the will to resist in the merchants and workers they are still able to lead. But as these younger elite cannot offer an alternative to the present multi-racial nation-state without calling once again for the revolutionary methods which have been discredited, they are unable to

stir the Chinese merchants and workers against Malayan nationalism. Thus, although both the merchants and workers remain proud of their Chinese identity and continue to be the main support for the Chinese school system, their attitudes towards Malayan nationalism are inclined to be negative and at most sceptical. They seem to be contented to be left alone to sit on the fence and would rather not be politically active unless they feel themselves discriminated against. Unlike the excluded elite, they are useful and are needed to contribute towards the industrial growth of the new nation. There is no immediate pressure on the two groups to "assimilate" and, as long as they do not threaten the stability of the nation, they may not be asked to do so for some time.[10]

But two long-term features of the new nation must be considered as crucial to the Chinese in Malaya. Malayan nationalism would hardly be a powerful and imaginative political end without, on the one hand, the democratic system and, on the other, the policy of universal education recently agreed upon. Both these features will act directly on breaking down the status hierarchy which seems to dominate Chinese political leadership today. The democratic system calls on all three groups of Chinese to participate in the choice of the government and the opposition. With every party and every election, Malayan nationalism has to be re-affirmed and the Chinese, whether they like it or not, are forced to think about its implications. The elite cannot be expected to oppose the nation-state as it is already conceived, nor will the merchants and workers be allowed to postpone their decisions about the nation indefinitely. In fact, during and between elections alike, the total machinery of the state is organised to bring the people at all levels into its range and persuade them to commit their energies towards the building of a nation. As long as the state survives (it may also thrive and prosper), the Chinese will be asked to think outside the confines of their own political experience and learn the methods of the democratic states. Local government in the towns and "new villages" had already introduced the Chinese to campaigning and political responsibility. Both national parties and regional parties have set up numerous branches where young Chinese prepare themselves for future state and national elections. The more the non-elite are introduced to the detailed organisation of democratic politics, the more they will realise that elite leadership has severe limitations and is, in fact, an obstacle to their own political ambitions. *The*

idea of public office being open to all who are willing and able will probably undermine the present Chinese status hierarchy.

From the national government's point of view, the English-educated elite have already accepted Malayan nationalism as their own. This has alienated them from the Chinese community to some extent and has reduced their capacity to be its leaders. But the remaining elite leadership, the Chinese-educated, are being forced to depend on the democratic machinery to remain as leaders. This dependence will continue to give them a new function as elected representatives and this must, in time, change their elite status.

The long-term effects of the policy of universal education on the Chinese social structure can be even more important when seen in terms of the status hierarchy. The ideals of Malayan nationalism are being introduced to the Chinese through every school and so are the tenets of democratic rights and responsibilities. Also, more educational opportunities, and perhaps better facilities, can be expected to transform the hierarchy at present headed by the educated few. It is doubtful if an elite society can survive a tenacious policy to give everyone an education, however minimal that education may be.

The short period since the establishment of independent Malaya has been such a revolution in political and social values that the role of the Chinese has really to be studied within the new framework of the nation-state. The approach taken in this essay has shown the changeability of the Chinese community. From the pre-war *shang*-dominated "overseas Chinese" society, there has developed during the anti-colonial years between 1945 and 1957 a *shih*-dominated "Malayan Chinese" society which had itself contributed towards Malaya's national independence. This society is now under pressure from a nationalism which grows increasingly vigorous. There is no reason to believe that, in the coming generation, the "Malayan Chinese" society will not change again, this time into a "Malaysian" society in which the Chinese will form an important part. But before this can take place, the Chinese will probably have to take one final step away from the elite concepts derived from their traditions in China towards a democratic society they must help to evolve in Malaysia.

NOTES

1. By *Malayan* nationalism, I refer mainly to the nationalism evolved in Malaya, but it embraces the nationalism of the peoples of Singapore.
2. For a fuller discussion of this, see Wang Gungwu, "Malayan Nationalism", *Royal Central Asian Journal,* XLIX, pts. III & IV, July-October 1962, pp.317-325.
3. This problem has been widely discussed by sociologists since Max Weber. Recent studies are Fei Hsiao-t'ung, *China's Gentry*, Chicago, 1953; Chang Chung-li, *The Chinese Gentry,* Seattle, 1955. For South China, from where most overseas Chinese come, see M. Freedman, *Lineage Organisation in Southeastern China,* London, 1958. The most recent analysis of South China social structures is W. Eberhard, *Social Mobility in Traditional China,* Leiden, 1962.
4. In his study, *Leadership and Power in the Chinese community of Thailand,* Cornell U.P., 1958, pp. 77-108, G. William Skinner uses "elite" in a way which could also be applied to the pre-war situation in Malaya, but the status of the intellectual elite who became important after the war in Malaya can perhaps be better compared with the traditional *shih* elite. Being unassimilated, as the Sino-Thai could also be, the Malayan Chinese leadership was forced to choose between a modern "middle class" identity or an essentially Chinese "elite" identity.
5. V. Purcell, *Problems of Chinese Education*, London 1936; *The Chinese in Malaya,* London, 1948.
6. Stanley Spector, "Students and politics in Singapore", *Far Eastern Survey,* XXV, 1956, pp.65-73.
7. Png Poh Seng, "The Kuomintang in Malaya", *Journal of Southeast Asian History,* vol. 2, No. 1, 1961, pp.1-32.
8. See G.Z. Hanrahan, *The Communist struggle in Malaya,* New York, 1954; Lucian W. Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya: its social and political meaning,* Princeton, 1956.
9. This paper was written in 1963. My remarks are therefore confined to the period before "Malaysia" developed into a major political issue.
10. This position has changed since the formation of Malaysia and the separation of Singapore.

The Malaysian Mosaic of Languages

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IN MALAYSIA TODAY we have a number of languages, each with its own origin and history and each plays its own individual role in the development of a multilingual society. Such a situation is brought about by the political and social conditions in Malaysia itself.

The languages which underlie the Malaysian society from the point of view of history and origin, can be classified into four main groups, namely:

1) indigenous
2) immigrant
3) colonial
4) creolized — pidginized

Indigenous languages

The indigenous group again has its own subdivisions according to the part each plays in the society. In one instance there is Malay, an indigenous language, which even before achieving its national language status, had already exhibited its significance as a common language among the people of various ethnic and racial groups in Malaysia, especially among the non-English educated members of the society. The role exercised by Malay as *lingua franca* has a long history which dates back to the early centuries of the Christian era, when Malay traders sailed the straits and seas of South-East Asia in quest of a living and thereby introduced their language to the people whom they encountered in the various ports.

The division of the Malay language into dialects seems in general to coincide with the division of Malaysia into its various political units. Thus we have Johore Malay, Kedah Malay, Kelantan Malay, Sarawak Malay and so on. There is indeed a considerable amount of overlapping in this dialect-state situation especially along the

state boundaries, so much so that the areas around the boundaries are themselves the zones of transition of the different dialects.

It has been traditionally assumed that the Johor-Riau dialect is the standard dialect. This assumption is based on the existence of the Johore Empire, in the seventeenth century, which covered the states of Trengganu, Pahang, Johore and the Rhio Archipelago. Also morphologically and syntactically, the Johore dialect is close to literary Malay. Thus the dialect came to be adopted by Radio Malaya and subsequently Radio Malaysia, and it is not until recently that things start to change, so that one notices now that there are certain deviations in pronounciation from the so-called standard Malay, in the idiolects of quite a number of speakers. Such deviations comprise:

i) the pronounciation of the final 'a' in orthography as [a] while in the Johore dialect it is [ə];

ii) the replacing of [8] (velar fricative) by [r] (alveolar trill) in the initial and medial positions. (It should be noted that in colloquial Malay of all dialects in Malaya, there is no such phone [r] instead there is the phone [8], but nevertheless Radio Malaysia has from the very beginning chosen [r]);

iii) the pronounciation of the final 'r' instead of replacing it by silence as found in the Johore dialect.

The deviations cited above are not merely following orthography. We can refer their presence to social as well as political factors. The introduction of modern systems of communication such as the roads and railways facilitated the intermingling of people speaking various dialects, and this intermingling was later intensified by the forming of the Federation of Malaya in 1947 and the achievement of independence from the British in 1957. Most of the politicians from the north, in their public speeches would discard their provincial traits and speak a dialect which they were taught during their school days and which is still the dialect of the schools of the northern states of Perlis, Kedah and Penang. This dialect is none other than the traditional standard dialect (the Johore dialect) plus the above-mentioned deviations, and is close to the Malay used by Indonesia as her national language.

Indonesian Malay, or Bahasa Indonesia with its prolific literature, exercises a significant impact on the development of the

Malay language as a whole, and to some extent on its pronunciation, via Radio Republik Indonesia and close contacts between speakers from both areas before the Confrontation. The merging of the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak with Malaya to form Malaysia again supports the use of this particular dialect, as the common and official dialect of those people there is similar to Indonesian Malay or the Johore Malay plus the deviations.

It should also be observed that Malay is the first language not only of the Malays but also of a handful of Chinese whose ancestors had immigrated into this country since the fifteenth century. These people are predominantly domiciled in the state of Malacca, and are notably known as the *Babas* to whom the Chinese language is just as foreign as it is to the non-Chinese members of the community.

Other indigenous languages of Malaysia have never acquired any status other than that of the vernacular. They are limited only to their own language communities and some are taught in schools. These languages predominate in the Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak though some are also found on the Malaysian mainland.

Below is a list of the native languages of the above-mentioned territories:

1) Iban. This language is also known as Sea-Dayak which spreads throughout the five divisions of Sarawak but is largely found in the Second and Third Divisions. It shows a very close relationship with Malay, so much so that it has been treated by several authors as a dialect of Malay.[1] No doubt, structurally, Iban seems to show the same patterns as Malay, but the great difference in the bulk of the vocabularies of the two languages would not permit a Malay-speaking individual to understand Iban or even to recognize it as one of the Malay dialects. Historically, it could be that Iban was just a dialect of Malay but this dialect, as time went by, drifted further and further apart from the other dialects, until the changes that it had undergone enabled it to achieve the status of a language.

2) Land Dayak which is spoken in various dialects along the Sadong, Samarahan, Sarawak and Lundu rivers.[2] This language is also known as Bedayuh.

3) Melanau, the language of a people known by that name which inhabits the area "extending from the mouth of the Rejang river to the mouth of the Baram river and extending inland some twenty

miles from the sea."[3] Melanau like any other language has many dialects but the one which shows a high degree of diversity from the other dialects is the Melanau of Bintulu, which according to R. G. Aikman, "must be one of the few if not the only, speech in the whole island of Borneo which does not use the word *malam* for night".[4] Aikman also notes down two important aspects of the Melanau language[5]:

i) A Melanau man can easily understand Sekapan which is spoken in the upper reaches of the Rejang river, approximately below and above Belaga. This in itself implies the close relationship between Melanau and Sekapan.

ii) A comparison of word lists of Melanau and Land Dayak shows that 40% of the words compared are the same.

4) Bisaya: the name might suggest that there is some relationship with the Bisaya of the Southern Philippines, but linguistically this assumption is not that valid. Cense and Uhlenbeck write:

"Phonetically Bisaya would seem to show some peculiarities which also occur in the languages of the Philippines, but as far as one may conclude from the translation of the Gospel, it seems to lack the abundance of morphological elements proper to those languages."[6]

Further to this, materials of the Bisaya language collected by research-workers such as Ray, Leach, St. John and de Crespigny do not seem to indicate any relationship with the Philippine Bisaya.[7]

The Bisaya-speaking people of Malaysia occupy the area along the lower course of the Limbang river of the Sarawak territory near the Brunei border. In Sabah this language is spoken among the Bisayas of the Padas and Kelias river basins.[8]

5) Murut: When talking of Murut, one must bear in mind that this term signifies two groups of people who are linguistically different and who are classified as the "Sarawak Murut" and the "North Borneo Murut". The latter which belongs to Indonesian Borneo is spoken "in an area which extends roughly between 116° and 118° with the frontier of Indonesian Borneo to the south, and a line running from Keningau (approx. 5°20') via Upper Kinabatangan and Upper Kwamut to Cowie Harbour."[9] This North Borneo Murut, unlike the Sarawak Murut, belongs to the so-called Philippine type, and this is evident from "the grammatically elaborate

use of the prefix system and (in the second degree) in the similarity of the phonetic changes".[10]

The Murut of the Malaysian territory is the Sarawak Murut which is spoken in the upper course of most Borneo rivers, for example the Rejang, Baram and Limbang.[11] In Sabah, the Sarawak Murut is spoken by "a small patch of villagers, who originated from Indonesian Borneo, where they are known (to complete the confusion) as Lun Daya."[12]

6) Kelabit: the Kelabit-speaking people are found side by side with the Sarawak-Muruts.

7) Kayan: this language is spoken by the Kayan tribe which occupies "the middle and upper reaches of most of the main rivers of Sarawak and Indonesian Borneo."[13]

8) Kenyahs: the Kenyahs live side by side with the Kayans and are often considered together, but from a study of their tradition, folklore and language it is obvious that the Kayans and the Kenyahs are originally different.[14]

9) Punan or Pennan: this language seems to bear a certain relationship, though a far one, with Kenyah,[15] and its speakers who are still nomadic are found in the headwaters of the Balui and the Belaga rivers in the Third Division and in the Tinjar, Baram and Tutoh areas in the Fourth Division, and most probably in the ulu Belait and the headwaters of the Limbang river.[16]

There are still other minor languages such as Sibop, spoken in the Tinjar river basin, in the region between the Rejang and the Baram rivers;[17] Kajaman, Lahanan and Sekapan which are found along the tributaries of Upper Rejang.[18]

On the Malaysian mainland, the indigenous languages other than Malay, are the languages of the aborigines or *orang asli*, who until recently, have inhabited only the jungles. Dr. Iskandar Yusof Carey classifies the aborigines into four major groups, each with its own language.[19]

1) Negrito, which is the oldest and smallest group, found in Kedah, Perak and Kelantan. This group consists of tribes which may coincide with dialects. They are the Kensiu, Kintak, Jahai, Mendreq and Bateq tribes.

Physically, the Negritos are very different from the Malays, and they seem to show similarities with the tribes found in the Andaman Islands, the Philippines and New Guinea. Where language is concerned, Dr. Carey is of the opinion that with the exception of

Proto-Malay in the south, the languages of the aborigines are "*not* dialects of Malay, but languages in their own right, with extensive vocabularies and well-defined grammatical structures." My own data on the Kintakbong dialect collected in Baling towards the end of 1963 supports this view about the language of the Negritos. I tried applying Swadesh's original list of basic core vocabulary (but not without eliminating the cultural items which are only applicable to the Indo-European culture) and a comparison of this with Malay does not result in any pairs of cognates. One thing is certain is that there is a considerable number of Malay loan-words in Kintakbong.

2) Senoi: the Senoi group, consisting of two major tribes, the Temiar and Semai, forms the largest group of aborigines. There is a probability that the Senoi language is related to those of the Mon-Khmer peoples of Vietnam.[20]

3) Proto-Malay: the Proto-Malays are made up of the Belandas, Temuan and Jakun tribes. The language of this group is an archaic form of Malay.[21]

4) Tribes which do not fit into the three groups previously discussed: they are the Semelai of Negri Sembilan, and the Jahut, Che Wong and Semoq Beri of Pahang.

Through contact with other civilized races of Malaya, especially the Malays, the aborigines are slowly coming out of their seclusion. They have become familiar with the Malay language not just through social contact but also through education which has already been enforced on them. In this way the aborigines acquire bilingualism, and a few may have gone beyond that by having the opportunity to learn English.

The assimilation of the aborigines who only number up to 45,000[22] with the other races particularly the Malays, might in no time bring about the displacement of their languages if no step is taken towards preserving them. This catastrophe is most likely to happen, especially if we take into view the population of each aboriginal language community. Moreover, when once education is introduced to them, coupled with their daily contacts with the other races, there is every likelihood that sooner or later their own various mother tongues spoken by so few, would have a minor function in their life. It is evident that at present the national (Malay) language or English would be more beneficial to them in their striving to achieve social status equal to that of other fellow

citizens. One way to ensure the perpetuation of the aboriginal languages in our society is to see that the aborigines are taught in their vernaculars, and this is no small undertaking. The achievement of this ideal involves a great deal of work in order to be able to produce grammars of these languages, let alone their literatures if there happen to be any.

As it is, only very few people are interested to know about and still less to understand these languages, and these are the people whose interest in the aborigines is either anthropological or linguistic. A knowledge of the structures of these aboriginal languages will be of great value not only to the comparative linguist who is concerned with the grouping and sub-grouping of languages, and of language movements through history, but also will be a help to the archaeologist or the historian in his study of migration in this part of the world. An anthropologist or a sociologist will no doubt have his interest centred on the language as an instrument to the understanding of other aspects of culture and social life of the people concerned, for language "is at once a social *institution*, like the laws, the religion, or the economy of the community, and a social *instrument* which accompanies and makes possible all other institutions. As an institution it may become *a symbol of the community group;* as an instrument it is *a system of symbols*, the meaning of which are identical with the culture of the community."[23]

Immigrant Languages

Statistically, the most important of the immigrant languages is the Chinese language with its various dialects which are mutually incomprehensible. Next come the languages of the Indian Peninsula and Ceylon which comprise Tamil, Telegu, Malayalam, Hindi, Punjabi, Urdu and Sinhalese.

The two groups of languages mentioned above are found all over the country. The Chinese language seems to concentrate on the urban and tin-mining areas although it has gradually spread into the rural areas. The distribution of the Indian languages varies according to the nature of each language community. In view of the nature of the immigration of the Indians themselves, there is reason to expect the Tamil, Telegu- and Malayalam-speaking people to converge on the rubber estates. The Sikhs whose language is Punjabi engage in business and in this way they are mainly found in big towns and cities.

In the northern states of Perlis, Kedah and Kelantan, there are about 21,000 Thais[24], and these people intermingle freely with the other races especially the Chinese and the Malays, but nevertheless they still preserve their language of origin. In these states too it is common to meet Thai-speaking Malays who are immigrants from Southern Thailand. In Kedah, from Jitra northwards one finds here and there villages of these Thai-speaking Malays, the most notable ones being Changlun, Hosba, Ason and Jitra.

Arabic, although an immigrant language, seems to have a greater bearing on the Malays, the indigenous people, than any other immigrant language. Likewise, the Arabs of this country, more than any other immigrant people (except of course those of the Malay race who migrated from Sumatra and other Indonesian islands) have been completely or almost completely assimilated with the Malays through intermarriage, and it appears that most of them have adopted Malay as their first language and have forgotten their language of origin. This is made possible by unity in religion. Nevertheless there is an irony in that the Arabic language in this country is not so much preserved and perpetuated by the Arab immigrants as by the indigenous — the Malays. Arabic is taught and is the medium of instruction in Arabic schools run by Malays, and at present, there is a higher institution of learning, the Muslim College, which uses Arabic as its medium of instruction, and which very soon will be elevated to the status of a university.

Other immigrant languages of this country are Javanese, Achinese, and Mandailing, which have migrated from Java (as regards the first mentioned) and Sumatra. The Javanese mostly have made their homes in various parts of Selangor, particularly the Kuala Selangor and Tanjong Karang areas, while the Achinese are scattered all over Kedah, besides giving a landmark to Kedah itself by making Yen their "colony". The Mandailings are mostly found in Southern Perak, especially in Teluk Anson and Gopeng.

These language communities are so small that there is always the tendency for these languages to undergo displacement due to the choice of the speakers themselves for a system of expression which serves as inter-group communication, the Malay language. The fact that this group of immigrants tends to be overlooked as immigrants and is identified with the Malays, is borne by their origin of the same racial stock and their professing the same religious belief, Islam. Coupled with these, their knowledge of the

Malay language crumbles any barrier in their communication with the indigenous Malays. Their acquisition of Malay could have taken place before their migration into Malaysia (since as mentioned before, Malay has for centuries been the *lingua franca* of South-East Asia), or even if this proves to the contrary, it is not difficult for them to acquire Malay which is genetically related to their respective mother tongues, in a short space of time.

There are certainly other immigrants from the Indonesian islands, for example those from Minangkabau, Medan, Langkat, Deli and so on, but their paroles seem to indicate that they are only dialects of Malay.

The many immigrant languages of Malaysia (other than English, which according to my classification falls under the colonial group), are limited to their function of being the medium of group communication. The priviliged ones are Chinese and Tamil, as manifested by the many schools established which use those languages as media, especially after the declaration of independence in 1957, when Chinese and Tamil schools started to receive government aid, a privilege which they so little enjoyed in the colonial days. Both these languages have their own individual places in the present set-up of the Faculty of Arts, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, in the form of the Departments of Chinese Studies and Indian Studies, respectively. As such it is hoped that in time to come each of these languages would shed the tradition of being understood only by the members of its community.

The Colonial Language

From its non-indigenous and immigrant nature, English can be classified under the immigrant group, previously discussed, but the status attained by English, as opposed to other immigrant languages, favors that it be considered separately.

The English language first made its entrance as the language of a small group of people who held the reins of the administration of this country. With power in their hands, they made their language the most indispensable requirement in the achievement of social and economic status. The language came to be taught for all, and the people from the highest to the lowest stratum of the society realised the necessity and importance of English in their life. In a way it can be said that the English language was indirectly forced upon the people. As a result, English medium schools

have far outnumbered vernacular schools, be they Malay, Chinese or Tamil.

In the old system of education, school children wishing to be educated in English were given two alternatives:

Either 1) They received their education in English from the very beginning (i.e. primary one) until they reached university level.

Or 2) They received the first four years of their primary education in the Malay school, using Malay as medium, and continued the rest of their education in English-medium schools, by first undergoing an intermediate stage of two years, the Special Malay Classes I and II.

The non-Malays chose the first alternative, while among the Malays, there was a divided opinion. Some anxious to have their children well-educated disregarded the vernacular and chose the full English education, while others feeling that the vernacular should also be upheld, turned to the second alternative. Economic factors also played a part in enforcing the choice of the second alternative, since education in the English medium schools involved money as compared to the free education available in the Malay schools at that time. There was no secondary education in the Malay medium previous to the independence of Malaya, and to the Malays the only chance open to them for secondary education was at the English medium school. This was unlike the Chinese, as secondary education in the Chinese medium was already in force.

The English language has imposed a pressure of prestige among the people. Its pressure and importance are still felt even at the present moment when all efforts are being reinforced towards the establishment of Malay as the national language. In the Malaysian society today, English exercises three main functions:

1. It is the language of science and knowledge. Higher education in Malay for all up to the university level at the moment, is still handicapped by the lack of teachers who are able to deliver their various courses, especially the technical ones, in Malay and the lack of text books in the national language to meet the needs of education. Even when these conditions are fulfilled, English will still be an asset in the acquisition of knowledge and science. It is a world language and through it man can have contact (as a

step towards knowledge) with that part of the world other than his own.

2. English still acts as a means of communication among the educated people. It is even the first language of a portion of the society, namely the Eurasians, who number approximately 11,000[25] (not to mention the British people who live in Malaysia temporarily while executing their business or who have settled down in this country as Malaysian citizens). There are Chinese and Indian families which use English as their first language, having almost or entirely forgotten their mother tongues. Thus it can be said, to a small section of the Malaysian society, English has been transformed from a colonial language to one of the many vernaculars. In connection with this transformation, an important point has been observed by Le Page,[26] that " . . . although the history of English-medium education in Malaya is comparatively short, a distinctive Malayan English is already emerging, speakers of which from the three major communities — Malay, Chinese and Tamil — have a number of linguistic features in common."

3. English also serves as a social identification of the individual. It is one (if not the only) symbol of urbanization. Since English-medium schools are built in urban areas, it follows that all English-speaking people (even if their knowledge of English is scanty) are urban or urbanized, but not all urban people are English-speaking. Consequent to this, English has become an epitome of fashion in the society. It is normal for people of the same vernacular to converse in English with no legitimate excuse whatsoever, or simply because they can express themselves better in the language in which they were given their education. In the upper class shopping centres such as those along Jalan Mountbatten and Jalan Tuanku Abdul Rahman, or even in the middle class section of Petaling Street, one is liable to get better attention from the salesman or the salesgirl if one were to speak in English (even if it were broken English) than if one were to resort to Malay, the *lingua franca*. A glance should also be turned on the individuals in high office and business, who until today still hold preference for clients who can understand English.

Creolized and Pidginized Languages

There is one creole language which so far has come into existence in Malaysia, and that is the Portuguese Creole which is

spoken in Malacca by a very small community of the descendants of Portunguese colonialists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, who have undergone the process of cultural assimilation through intermarriage and social contact. Le Page in his unpublished paper, "Multilingualism in Malaya", has noted that this Creole is similar to the Creole in Macao though more conservative. He adds that this Creole "exhibits the characteristics of Creoles in many parts of the world; the inflectional endings of Portuguese have to a large extent been lost, there is a considerable overlay of Malay loan words in the vocabulary, and the Portuguese base itself is archaic."

Pidgins in the Malaysian society number more than Creole. One pidgin language which is common throughout Malaysia, as a means of intergroup communication, is the bazaar Malay or the "bahasa pasar". This pidgin alone is the reflection of the plural society that prevails in Malaysia today. The pidgin is supposed to have Malay at its base and this is proved by the presence of a majority of Malay words in the vocabulary, while there is a free in-flow of vocabulary items from English, Chinese and Tamil. Thus it is not difficult for a multilingual to determine the Sinic, Indic and Indo-European elements which together embody this *lingua franca* which is an important instrument of socialization, especially among the non-English educated members of the society. It should also be observed that the Malays themselves whether educated or not, are greatly influenced by this *lingua franca* when they converse with non-Malays. By doing so the Malays, instead of fostering a stimulus among the non-Malays to learn the language properly, only dampen it.

Other pidgins which are in existence in Malaysia are the Chinese pidgins, for instance the Hokkien pidgin in Penang and the Cantonese pidgin in Kuala Lumpur.[27] The rise of these pidgins is due to the mutually incomprehensible nature of the Chinese dialects themselves. Hence these pidgins serve as *linguae francae* of the Chinese population of various dialect groups. When talking about pidgins, one must also include the Malayan English, mentioned before, which is also a pidgin language.

The National Language and Conclusion

We have seen previously how English as an immigrant-colonial language has influenced the economic and social life of the people

of Malaysia. To a small portion of the society English has become the vernacular language, and is part of the basic structural life of that portion, while to the rest, it is the embodiment of the super-structural life.

Since 1957, the people of Malaya have witnessed another wave of change in their society with the establishment of Malay as the national language, and this change affected Sabah and Sarawak when they joined Malaya to form Malaysia in 1963. The setting up of a national language in Malaya and subsequently, Malaysia, is necessitated by the multilingual nature of the society itself. It is imperative that a multilingual and multiracial Malaysia should have one unifying factor to give the people the feeling of oneness. Language as a system of formal expression is the best solution in the search for a binding factor.

Malay, as mentioned before, differs from English in the fact that it has become the *lingua franca* throughout Malaysia, to the lowest stratum of the society. To the non-Malays, the adoption of Malay as *lingua franca* would not be as difficult as adopting it for official, educational and technical purposes. Non-Malays may have acquired the capacity to express themselves well in casual Malay, but not so when they have to make use of the language in formal situations. Such a setback is not the ordeal of non-Malays alone, but also of most Malays, as the Malay language had for some time undergone a partial and temporary displacement by the English language in the educational and professional life of the Malays.

The making of Malay as a medium in scientific, administrative, legal and other matters calls for great effort in the coining of terminology and the writing and translating of textbooks, as well as fresh learning and hard work on the part of, not only the non-Malays, but also the Malays themselves. Thus it is erroneous to harbour any misconception that the Malay language as the national language is imposed on the society to the disadvantage of its non-Malay members and to their being dominated by the Malays. This delusion is entirely based on the shallow and narrow view that the Malay language will make Malays, rather than Malaysians, of the non-Malay population. We have witnessed that the English language has not converted any non-Englishman into English either in Malaysia, India or any other part of the world.

Language, race and culture are not always correlated though

belong to four distinct culture areas — the simple hunting culture of western Canada and the interior of Alaska (Loucheux, Chipewyan), the buffalo culture of the Plains (Sarcee), the highly ritualized culture of the southwest (Navaho), and the peculiarly specialized culture of northwestern California (Hupa).[29]

Language is both a system of expression and the content of that expression. As a system of expression, it can be likened to a conveyor. The conveyor can be changed without affecting the content and vice versa. When this is applied to the Malaysian society, it can be seen that the non-Malays should not have any fear of being converted into Malays through their acceptance of Malay as the national and official language, as Malay will just be another system of expression for them, while at the same time they can preserve their various races and ways of life. The national language as a common system of expression is essential in the endeavour to build a united nation from a mosaic of language communities.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Cense, A.A. and Uhlenbeck, E.M. *Critical Survey of Studies on the Languages of Borneo*, 's-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1958, p.10.
2. *Ibid*. p.16.
3. Aikman, R.G. *Melanaus*, in Tom Harrison (ed.), *The Peoples of Sarawak*, Kuching, 1959, p. 85.
4. *Ibid*, p.86.
5. *Ibid*, pp.86-87.
6. Cense, A.A. and Uhlenbeck, E.M., *op.cit.*, p.21.
7. *Ibid*.
8. Bewsher, R.A., *The Bisaya Group*, in Tom Harrison (ed.)*op.cit.*, p. 95. *of Sarawak*, p. 95.
9. Cense and Uhlenbeck, *op.cit.*, p.23.
10. *Ibid*, p.24.
11. Harrison, Tom, *The Kelabis and Muruts, op.cit.*, p.57. *op.cit.*, p.57.
12. *Ibid* pp.58-59.
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14. *Ibid*.
15. Urquhart, I.A.N., *Nomadic Punans and Pennans*, in *The Peoples of Sarawak, op.cit.*, p.75.
16. *Ibid*, p.74.
17. Cense, A.A. and Uhlenbeck, E.M., *op.cit.*, p.35.
18. *Ibid*, pp.35-36.
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23. Haugen, Einar, *Bilingualism in the Americas: a Bibiliography and Research Guide*, Publication of the American Dialect Society, University of Alabama Press, November, 1956, p. 87.
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26. *Ibid*, p.39.
27. Le Page, R.B., "Multilingualism in Malaya," CCTA/CSA *Conference on Multilingualism*, Brazzaville. July/August, 1962.
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Science, Bureaucracy and Democracy: The Individual in Mass Culture in the West

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I

OF THE VAST ARRAY of cultural elements that have been or are now subsumed under the label of Western Civilization, an observer can claim familiarity by direct experience, or even by the extension of experience through education, with only a few. Any report on so complex a subject will be modified, implicity if not explicitly, by the specific heritage and specific training of the reporter. The choice of subject matter as well as the style of treatment so conditioned by the background of the reporter will give varying degrees of satisfaction to others of different heritage and different training. Thus, it is not inappropriate to preface this report with two small biographical notes: by heritage, I am American; by training, I am a social scientist. The biases, therefore, may be less satisfactory to an Englishman, Frenchman, German or Greek. The emphases may not entirely please the philosopher, theologian, historian or poet.

Further, I must emphasize that this is not intended as a comparison of cultures. My task, to describe features of modern Western culture, does not include contrasting Western culture with any other. Nor does it imply the determination of unique features of Western culture. After centuries of contact which have grown ever more frequent, similarities of features among cultures are no cause for wonder. And even unequivocal specification of origins of cultural features gets lost in the maze of the flow of communications across cultural boundaries, communications which must have begun long before they could have been recorded.

This leads to one final qualification. If there is any one law of nature for societies, other than that its members will die, it is that societies will change. My task in this paper is to discuss Western

culture in its modern configuration. I am not concerned directly with what Western culture has been nor with where it came from. This is not to deny the relevance of questions of origins and historical development; it is to relegate such questions to other papers and other discussions. It is a basic assumption underlying this paper that whatever Western civilization has been, and wherever it came from, it has changed, it has become something new, and that new development deserves to be described in its own terms.

II (*a*)

A central focus in Western culture, diffusing through many specific cultural elements, is a concern for ways of knowing the response of the individual mind to both internal and external stimuli, especially as it concerns interpretations of reality. Such ways of knowing, rationality, is symbolic of a total, integrated cultural orientation to man's relationship to the universe. In modern Western culture, speculation about the nature of reality has increasingly emphasized the relationship of the knower to the known, recognizing knowledge as the product of the act of an individual. As such, it becomes a social phenomenon, which can itself be investigated in terms of a sociology of knowledge. The very act of knowing is transformed from the immutable to the variable through the influence of individual psychology providing theories of perception and learning. And the transfer of knowledge, part of the act of knowing itself, is mediated through a socially created channel which is thus subjectable to variable analysis of language and communication.

Psychological and sociological theories, as well as the newer linguistic and information theories, are technical fields of study.[1] The point to be emphasized here is that discoveries in these disciplines have pervaded modern Western culture bringing a particular view of rationality, and this notion of rationality is basic for the understanding of reality that underlies the structure, concept and ideas of the modern West.

There are at least two distinguishable but interrelated themes discernable in western rationality. First, Western man looks upon nature and the universe around him as a field on which to operate, a field from which he as individual and as operator is analytically, and often psychologically, separable. For modern Western man, the field, nature, is orderly, and thus knowable, and, derivatively within the limits of knowledge, controllable. Second, the orderly

universe is in movement, in process. Elements of the universe are to be related not only in space, but in time. An explanation is not only of being, but of becoming, and indeed also of going — indicating a mentality aspiring to prediction.

Putting these two elements together, the aspirations of Western man are not towards ideal states, nor ideal conditions, but rather towards ideal processes. Philosophy is not perfect wisdom, but the process of explanation. Art is not a condition of beauty, but a process of expression. Education is not a quantity of knowledge, but a process of learning. Economic well-being is not a condition of surplus, but a process of sufficient production and efficient distribution. Political well-being is not a utopia but a democratic process for resolving conflict.

Related to the concept of process in the structure of modern Western thought is the basic notion of causality. If there is an effect — and all events may be looked upon as effects — there must be a cause. If there is a consequence, there must be a condition. If there is an edifice, there must be a constructor. The concept of causality, and the consequent search for causation, lies deeply embedded in Western culture. It is reenforced in its position by the course of Western history and Western philosophy. Indeed, it is even built into the time sequential structure of Western languages. But, as the concept of causality itself is a product of culture, it too undergoes change. From a notion of strictly determined cause in a mechanical universe, it is being transformed into a notion of probability in a world of chance.[2]

The notion of process, of movement, of cause, circumscribes all ideals of modern Western man. It is implied in the symbols he uses to express his goal, such as progress, growth, development. And even when the element of process is not immediately obvious in the symbol, it lies just beneath the surface of Western man's understanding of the symbol. Self-realization of the individual personality is not a static ideal state, but rather a process of striving for an approachable but unreachable approximation. Plato could express justice only as a process of governing; modern Western man's ideals are involved with the process of living.

II (*b*)

The foregoing discussion of the structure of Western thought suggests that the most profound concepts of modern Western culture are related to particular ways of knowing. Underlying these

concepts, providing a major link of functional similarity among all territories labelled "Western", and providing, too, the most persistent sense of continuity through time with its own antiquity, there is a theme which can be summed up by the term "science", a unique approach to seeking after explanations of the world.[3]

The scientific approach, as the term is being used here, implies special conditions. First of all, it is self-conscious, and requires continuous self-justification. Science demands that attention be paid not only to the results of its search, but also, perhaps especially, to the techniques for carrying on the search. It requires not only wide acceptance of the proffered truths, but also agreement as to the technique — and agreement as to some independent testing of the result. The scientific approach requires an ultimate reference to sensory data, some empirical sign that will serve as the raw material for the investigation. All kinds of sophisticated manipulations and rules of logical extrapolation may be applied; but somewhere must be something seen or heard, felt or tasted, some link with the world of the senses. The scientific approach implies that the technique must be stated in such a fashion that any investigator following the technique, whether he possesses the genius of the originator or not, can produce the same result. The scientific approach, in other words, derived from the basic assumption of an orderly universe, is a deliberate search for explanations of the movement of the world through time according to methods communicable and sharable among all who subscribe to them, resulting in cumulative knowledge (itself a process), reducing in infinite regression the aspects of the human condition still hidden from its search. If there has been a revolution in modern Western culture, it has been a scientific revolution, letting loose forces of the mind in an inexorable expansion of the limits of human knowledge. Yet the very scope of the explosion carries with it its own sense of humility. For with each leap forward in discovery, there is opened to view the vastness of how much there is that could be known, and how little in comparison man knows of it.[4]

Many people in the Western world, scientists among them, are concerned over the seemingly breakneck speed of scientific discovery. They rail against the sciences outrunning societies' ability to comprehend, much less control their implications. This fear is made poignant by the ability recently acquired to wipe mankind totally and utterly from the face of the earch. That modern Western

man can destroy himself is clear; whether he will or not is an open question; whether he thinks he will or not must be answered clearly in the negative. The very optimism of continuous scientific discovery includes an optimism as to the discoverability of forms of social organization commensurate with the scientific responsibility. We can only hope he succeeds.

We hope he succeeds, for in the structure of modern Western culture he will not retreat from the science, and he will not stop the scientists. Indeed, he cannot, for the progress of science is too much a part of his cultural being. He can, however, and does, rely on the sense of the scientist himself, sharing all aspects of modern Western culture, including the humanistic. Scientists are concerned for their own social responsibility, their share of responsibility for the well-being of society, including the well-being of science.[5] Both as vested interest and as social ideal, control over the destructive potentiality of science is exercised.

I do not mean to imply that science and its products define all of modern Western culture. Nor, again, is the progress of science unconstrained by other aspects of culture. But, over time and over space, in any conflict between the demands of scientific knowledge (as distinguished from the applications) and any other mode of thought, truth as defined by science will prevail. Not only is the scientific approach self-perpetuating, the followers of other modes of activity will modify their behavior accordingly. The artist will utilize new materials; the philosopher will rationalize ethical and spiritual theories; the farmer will apply chemical fertilizers; the businessman will merchandise new products. And, governments, made up themselves of "new" men, will try to regulate the behavior of the science-modified, "new" Western man.

It must be emphasized that in the modern Western world the scientific approach in the quest for knowledge is not restricted to the traditional "physical" sciences; it applies equally to the newer sciences of society, behavior, and personality. It applies to business organization and the modes of production and distribution of goods. It applies to political organization and government, and even, though perhaps to a lesser degree, to the arts. To an ever greater degree, the basic concepts of modern Western culture are scientific.

III (*a*)

Whatever the causes — and the scientific frame of reference

must be included among them — recent Western history includes the phenomenon of a cumulative increase in the rate of economic production. And, as an integral and concomitant part of the particular economic process, distribution and consumption have both increased in quantity as well as diffused through ever larger segments of the society. Associated with the process has been a continuous increase in the size of secondary social units involved in socio-economic activity. The result is that modern Western society has been characterized as mass society, and a society of "high mass consumption".[6]

The increase in the rate of economic production has brought about the fantastic outpourings of goods and services (remarkable not only for the quantity but also for the variety) that is now taken for granted in modern Western life. By this process of production, distribution and consumption, and from the impact of the number and variety of products, modern Western society is subjected to a conscious, continuous, and rapid modification, innovation, and change. In a man's lifetime, he will use new techniques for work, travel, communication, medicine, education, entertainment and spiritual expression. He will use new products to fill his home, his office, his farm and factory, his schools, hospitals, theatres and temples. And, more important, he, individually, demands and fully expects to experience the changes.

Differing from his grandparents, and even from his parents, modern Western man is not surprised nor awed by invention and innovation; he leaps to adopt new inventions, thus speeding the process of change. And with the cumulative growth of science and technology, the physical surroundings of life undergo rapid renewal, so that change itself becomes part of the way of life. Modern Western man expects to have electronics run his home; he expects more rapid transportation and communication. He expects to reach the moon, and to conquer cancer. He is already exploring outer space, and has taken steps towards establishing mastery over the resources of the ocean depths. And, he faces with equanimity the prospect of revealing basic secrets of life itself in the biochemical deciphering of genetic messages. Further, he fully expects a new revolution, already begun in automation, which is relieving him of many manual tasks — and in cybernation, which will relieve him of the necessity of directing the automatic equipment — and he expects to solve the concomitant social problems as well, for the

machine itself will help. A machine that plays chess is no surprise; nor will it be a surprise when the machine starts winning the games with regularity.

It is not only the massive productive capacity that is the characteristic of modern Western society; more significant is the revolution in distribution. The concentration of wealth and style in the hands of the few at the expense of the many dissipates, and the pyramid of economic well-being flattens out. Food, clothing, and shelter for the masses are no longer at a bare subsistence level, and the class of deprived people becomes a minority instead of the majority. Indeed, the very definition of the subsistence level, and thus poverty, moves upwards, so that what is considered deprivation today would have been luxury a few generations ago.

Mass distribution and mass consumption are not restricted to material goods. The same phenomenon is seen in all realms of life. Education is no longer the privilege of the few, but the right of the many, and all aspire to the highest reaches of it. Art, literature, music, leisure and travel have become available to ever increasing numbers of people, and more to the point, they are becoming the normal fare for the masses instead of remaining the private preserve of the privileged few.

Mass consumption is not only a passing phenomenon in modern Western society; it is a basic cultural necessity. The process of social, economic, and cultural growth depend on it. To sustain the process — and thus to sustain the society — it must continue, and much of modern Western man's activities and energy are devoted to assuring its continued expansion in all fields. The process of growth thus becomes a generic structure of modern Western culture.

In the midst of mass consumption, there remain a few who complain bitterly of the trend. They see the destruction of artistic values in the drive towards mass distribution of high culture, claiming that it forces a leveling of standards to that of mediocrity. Prophets of doom already see the erosion of social stability and spiritual drive as a result of the floodwaters of mass consumption and affluence. But, alarmists and elitists are not new phenomena in Western society, and in modern Western culture, they are themselves subjected to the moderating influences of mass culture, as they partake of the fruits of affluence. Few of them turn off the electricity or spurn the automobile. Those few who do so become

minor deviations from the main course of Western culture, oddities, kept on as additional demonstrations, if any were needed, of the values of freedom and choice in modern Western life.

The relationship of economic and physical well-being for the masses to what are traditionally called spiritual values is of interest. To my knowledge, there is no necessary contradiction between affluence and spirituality, nor is the presence of affluence by itself a sign of the absence of spirituality. Man can be selfless in the presence of the spirit of production, and find honesty, honor, and faith therein. He can undertake obligations of sharing material well-being more easily in the presence of affluence than in its absence, and thereby serve his fellow man. There is more poetry being written now in the West than ever before in its history; there is more music being composed, played, and heard, more pictures being painted and seen, more drama and dance being performed and appreciated, and more philosophy being thought and taught. Whether the current outpouring is any less or more spiritually significant than in the past is not for me to say; but for every critic who condemns the contemporary, we can find those of equal persuasiveness to defend it. In any case, if successful attacks on the scourges of hunger, disease, poverty, and human misery in general is a sign of the lack of spirituality, so be it. Modern Western man will still seek to cure cancer, produce more food, exploit the resources of the earth, build new industries, increase the rate of economic production, and distribute more widely the results of these activities.

III (*b*)

Associated with science and technology manipulating the physical world in the transformation of society has been the profound changes in forms of social organization.[7] In this sense, leaving out references to the primary family unit, the development of modern Western culture can be characterized by the growth of large scale secondary associations into functioning, operational units, the standard of evaluation of which is efficiency. These bureaucratic structures pervade much of modern Western life; they have made the increase in economic productivity possible, and they are the basis for the political order. They are influential in education, in medicine, in science, in the church, labor unions, and, through the contributions of large foundations, even in the arts.

The central theme of modern Western bureaucracy as a form of

social organization is the emphasis on a concern of the participants in the organization for the outputs of the system. This concern is the basis for measurement and evaluation as to who can enter the organization, who can aspire to promotion, and who can lead it. The standard, efficiency, is there for all to see. And in the face of it, all men are equal.

The growth of bureaucratic organization removes the enterprise from the hands of the family, the lineage, and places it under the control of abstract general rules systematically derived and pragmatically tested. The sense of abstract generalized rule pervades not only government run by law and public administration, but also business controlled by cost accounting and business administration.

The key to the system is the general, abstract rule cutting across any other basis for social solidarity. From this derives patterns of law, contract, property, all the patterns of rights and obligations according to which modern Western men relate to each other. And in the face of these rules, all men are equal.

The spirit of bureaucracy, as elaborated by Max Weber and his followers, stressing the adherence of all who participate to the rulers of organization and the purposes of the structure, implies the professionalization of the management of the organization, whether public or private. The manager becomes an occupational role to which any individual can aspire. As an occupation, the manager's responsibility is modified, changed from what it might have been as an "owner". The corporation as well as the government agency takes on a sense of social responsibility as the managers join as a class with other professionals in the broader concerns of the society. They are, with other professionals and intellectuals, a mobile group, with pride in a talent which is subject to criticism of performance. They thus bring to the organization a sense of trained competence; management like labor becomes a skill, and both are responsible for the efficient use of the enterprise.

In modern Western culture the particular shape taken by growing bureaucracy has allowed the association of large numbers of people in voluntary cooperative activity leading to shared satisfaction based on individual responsibility and mutual trust that each will perform adequately. While economic incentives and the need to earn a livlihood may be influential in the assurance of performance, the spirit of cooperation includes much more: the indi-

vidual's sense of accomplishment, self-respect, and pride are all involved.

Further, by stressing dedication to the output of the particular organization, and by evaluating only on the basis of contribution to that output, the organizational structure demands only a part of the individual's involvement. The life of modern Western man is more clearly than ever before divided into roles — economic, political, social, etc. His political affiliations tend to be independent of his place in the economy; his job does not depend on his family life. While obviously the various roles are interrelated, modern Western man is tending to judge them separately. He also expects the organizations in which he finds himself to remain true to their purposes. He does not look for political satisfaction from his industrial or professional attachment; he would resent family ties intervening in business or government. In all these, he expects equality of treatment: all men stand equal in the face of the standard of efficiency according to the rules and the purposes of the structure.

The very size of the associations made possible by the spirit of bureaucracy is a noteworthy development in modern Western culture. And, in seeming paradox, by making the organization abstract, Western man's sense of individuality is enhanced.[8] Dostoyevsky in the parable of the Grand Inquisitor,[9] points to the horror of man's refusal to accept his freedom; modern Western society, through the growth of abstract bureaucracy based on "rational" rules of organization and efficiency has reversed the trend and encourages — indeed forces — modern Western man to be an individual and to be free. In modern Western society, we may sometimes still talk and argue according to Karl Marx; we live according to Max Weber.

IV (*a*)

The western ideal is still based on the individual. But, it is a strange, very different individual from his Graeco-Roman ancestors. He is no longer pure mind nor pure spirit, nor a simple manifestation of god. The argument of spirit versus matter is not solved, but ignored. Indeed, the favorite debating society controversy of environment versus heredity in the make-up of men is also relegated to the realm of sentimental reminiscence as social and biological science goes far beyond such simple dichotomy in its analysis of the psycho-physical being.

Since Freud and the psychoanalysts, Western man is a product of id, ego and super-ego, child reared and toilet trained into a personality system in interaction with the external world. His wants are now drives, his goals are now motives, his ideals are now culturally derived value orientations, his pleasures are now ego-gratifications, and his very view of the physical world is now filtered through a set of variable percepts. His language, once thought his natural human heritage, has been analysed into basic segmental utterances, made up of phonemes organized into morphemes, and the once believed to be clear meanings of words has become a problem of semantic differentiation. Every secret of his heart is revealed to be a product of his upbringing, fraught with anxieties, and derived from sometimes sublimated, sometimes open neurotic impulses.

With the tools of human understanding that have been created by the revolution of social science, Western man has become the target of behavioral manipulation. His desires can be forecast, his tastes can be shaped, his values can be altered, and his very personality can be engineered. The salesman seeking his money, the politician seeking his vote, the employer seeking his skill, all have available a set of tools to test, probe, analyse and operate on his personality and his social conscience for the more effective prediction of their chances of success.

Yet at the same time, while the humanist rails bitterly at such social engineering, the very techniques of social engineering, and the discoveries which led to them, have given man the tools and techniques for combatting the ravages of mental disease, social disorder, and poverty to a degree never before known. The stresses and strains of Western industrial society, the anxieties born of urban anomie, the neuroses derived from too rapid social change, all these may have been consequences of the advances of Western civilization. Yet, they were, in a very real sense, inevitable. Once the process of discovery was set in motion — and no one knows why or when that occurred — then the forces involved were monumental, and could not be reversed. Rousseau may have dreamt of a noble savage, free from the concerns of civilization. But, Western man cannot and would not give up his technology, his science, his electricity, his internal combustion engine, his medicine or his psychoanalysis even if the choice were presented to him. And with

each advance, new problems emerge presenting to Western man only the notion that there are new challenges to be met.

When the factory system became widespread, in England, in France, in Germany, in America, it resulted in the trend for increasing levels of productivity, the end of which is still beyond imagination. But, it brought with it social consequences which were nearly the ruin of Western civilization. The factory system brought the degradation of the worker, the exploitation of the many for the sake of the few, it brought poverty and disease concentrated in urban slums, reducing men to the level of animals. But while some got rich, and some achieved fame, many were repulsed, and many were appalled, and took action — only one of whom was Karl Marx. Of the many reactions to the problems created by the industrialization of the Western world, some are remembered for their effort, such as Robert Owen in England, or Fourier in France. Most are forgotten. But the problem was met and solved. We might hope that solutions could have been forthcoming with less pain and suffering and human misery. But, for nineteenth century man, not quite as accustomed to rapid change and innovation as his twentieth century descendents, the change nevertheless came.

Marx predicted the doom of the Western system. He claimed that not by human choice, but by some iron law of history, a revolutionary upheaval caused by the inevitable spread of misery and consequent class consciousness and warfare, the industrial system would bring about its own destruction. He said, after all, that "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, it is their social existence that determines their consciousness."[10]

It is not surprising that Marx said these things, for Marx himself was a Western man, and the ideas he espoused were typical of his era. His economics were from Ricardo; his philosophy from Hegel. He is remembered not for the accuracy of his analysis, but rather for the vitality of the movement he provoked.

Marx was wrong, of course. Value in economics does not depend on the labor contained in it. The history of all hitherto existing society is not the history of class struggle. Indeed, there are no iron laws of history, but only faulty singlefactored *post hoc* explanations. The very movement he provoked would not have persisted had not the obvious errors been subordinated to the hard facts of pragmatic situations. It took a man not of the West to

admit — indeed boast — of the corrections of Marx's errors. It was Mao Tse-tung that put the final lie to Marx. It was not the social condition of man that creates his class consciousness — for how could there be a peasant-based communist? It was the act of will to become a communist that was determinative of class consciousness.[11] This may or may not be a valid psycho-social generalization; it was certainly a successful political slogan. But the one thing it is not is Marxian.

Marx, and others, predicted the doom of Western civilization in the degradation of the factory system. But, Western civilization did not die, nor did it long continue the social evils that originally accompanied the factory system. New economic theory came to recognize the need for distribution of consumption capacity. New social theory came to recognize the right of labor to organize; new political theory came to recognize the obligation of the body politic to guarantee basic conditions for a good life.

The impact of the developments in science, both physical and social, and the impact of the development of the economy and society on the individual and his self-perception have been profound. Nevertheless, there remains at the core the faith that the individual is the basis of life, and reality becomes meaningful only through the individual's intercession. The individual will define his own interest, his own well-being, his own truth, his own society, his own state. For modern Western man, to neglect the individual is to deny life, for modern Western man will proclaim that he is, and will remain, an individual.

IV (*b*)

The growth of the economy is associated and interwoven in time with the growth of the nation-state as a form of political organization. In the West, the origin of the nation-state is customarily dated from 1648 and the Peace of Westphalia, when the rights of the territorial king were affirmed over those of the supranational church. But, the nation-state in the West, as we know it today, was not the product of struggle of state against church, of internal autonomy versus external authority; it came about as a result of the struggle of citizen against ruler. And this latter struggle ended with a convincing victory of the claims of the citizen. Now, the nation-state is the "property" of its citizens, and it is inconceivable to the contemporary Western mind that it could have been

accepted as the private domain of the ruler, even while the symbolism of monarchy is sometimes maintained.

The attributes of nationhood summed up in the notion of sovereignty, or sovereign independence, are too well known to need repetition here. So too are the alleged cultural qualities of nationality summarized in terms of similarities and differences, in-group and out-group. So too are the emotional attachments in terms of loyalty, patriotism and identification. It is, however, interesting to note that in the West where once insult to national honor was cause for war, the emotional as well as the cultural and political consequences of nationhood are undergoing modification.

At the very point in time that the nation-state system reaches its greatest geographic extent, it is, in the West, being undermined at least to some degree by the growing awareness of interdependance of nations. The emotional attachments of nationalism are mellowing into more comfortable feelings of acceptace of a national label as a minor characteristic of the individual, one which is of decreasing significance. Culturally, while obvious differences still remain among the peoples of the West, their various ways of life are becoming less distinguishable, as they themselves pay less attention to the differences. National identification among the peoples of the West becomes far less important as a basis for association than factors such as level of education, occupation, or personal taste. While this may have always been true of small groups of elites, it is now becoming true of wider and wider circles of the populations. Consciousness of national identification does not disappear; it just appears less and less significant.

Politically, the manifestation of the mellowed nationalism is seen in the growth of international organizations, private as well as public. While the immediate problems of the North Atlantic community are self evident, there is little doubt that the trend is set, and in spite of temporary setbacks, the growth of supranational authorities will continue.

The state in its present political form emerged from the struggle between ruler and ruled. The growth of democracy in the West is the result of that struggle.[12] The battle for human dignity for any individual, the battle for human rights and freedom was originally a battle against government, the oppression of the ruler. The overwhelming power of the ruler had to be constrained, limited, circumscribed and controlled if man was to be free. Indeed, if man

was to be free, he especially had to be safe from the arbitrary whim of the ruler, the casual accident of the personal interests of whoever happened to gain power, whether by birth or by conquest. The state, the political organization of the community, with all its power and authority, could not be the private preserve of a privileged few. The rights of man, a self-evident truth, were inalienable, in the words of the American Declaration of Independence, and "to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

The basic battle for democracy was fought and won. Government, for Western man, is responsible to the public at large, and is indeed chosen by the public by positive action. Having made that profound change in political ethics, the power of government, it is now presumed, is turned to the service of man. Government is no longer an oppressive instrument of the few to exploit or live off the labor of the many; it is rather an active participant in social innovation and social progress, responding to the self-expressed needs of the whole population.

Having struggled against government in the past, having reduced government from its former absolute authority, Western man now considers government to be one and only one of many social institutions, one and only one form of social control. While it may be an important institution, more pervasive than most, it is still limited in its scope, and constrained to stay within its realm. There are for Western man areas from which governmental authority is relatively excluded, forms of activity over which government has little or no authority. And before government, or any official of government, can intrude into new realms and expand its area of authority, it must first secure the permission of the public in the form of a generalized rule, or law. Indeed, each act of public authority must be justified in terms of previously agreed upon rules to which officialdom will be held accountable. The rule of law is so basic to the thinking of modern Western man that he can conceive no other acceptable form of socio-political organization; any other arrangement will be seen as pathological.

Government, the state, has become a guarantor, subject to the control of the rule of law, of the rights, the freedom, the security, and the well-being of all its citizens. Elections for Western man, the act of voting, is far more than a process for the selection of representatives. It is a symbolic act of profound significance of the

public's right to a political authority responsible to the civic order. And so it is understood by governor and governed alike.

V

In this paper I have argued for three main themes in modern Western culture, each with its own minor premise. Obviously, the characteristics do not apply with equal validity to all Western societies, nor to all individuals within any society. Indeed, one can find contradictions within the argument — such as that between bureaucracy and individualism — and conflicts between the hypotheses and concrete reality, such as shortcomings in the practices of equal treatment for all.

But, as a product of Western culture, such contraditions and conflicts rather than destroying the argument, point merely to the need for testing. For I have not presented absolute conditions nor ideal states. I have tried to present trends and point to directions. I have talked of being and becoming, rather than only being. I have tried to cut into a continuous process to delineate a moment of time, and by so doing, I distort the process.

Modern Western culture is in movement, in change. The structure of that culture-in-change is bureaucratic, based on mass production and a technological economy. The concepts of that culture-in-change are scientific, based on the knowledge of reality in process. The ideals of that culture-in-change are democratic, based on faith in the integrity of the individual. According to law and according to principle, the goals, the beliefs, the techniques, the results are there for all to see—and to share if they would do so. And to those who would not, modern Western man offers no apology, for he believes in what he is doing with all the profundity of his faith.

NOTES

1. The literature of these fields is already immense and is still growing. For an influential summary of some of the innovations, see G. Lindsey, ed., *Handbook of Social Psychology* 2 vol. Cambridge, Mass., Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1954. See also Norbert Wiener, *The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society,* Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, 1950.
2. See, for example, J. Bronowski, *The Common Sense of Science,* Penguin Books, 1962.
3. As concern for the particular forms of knowledge spreads, more attention is paid to the philosophy of science itself. For examples in and about this development, see Hans Reichenbach, *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy,* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1959; K. R. Popper,*The Logic of Scientific Discovery,* New York Basic Books, 1959; R. B. Braithwaite, *Scientific Explanation,* Cambridge University Press, 1953; E. Nagel, *The Structure of Science,* New York, Harcourt Brace, 1961.
4. "Science itself depends for its life on the prior acceptance of certain values, such as.....the value of remembering the vastness of the universe in comparison with the finite knowledge of men at any particular moment." Karl Deutsch, "Scientific and Humanistic Knowledge in the Growth of Civilization," in Harcourt Brown, ed., *Science and the Creative Spirit,* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1958. See also Fred Hoyle, *Of Men and Galaxies,* Seattle, University fo Washington Press, 1964.
5. Thus, for example, the publication of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* with its warnings of the nearness of doom. See also Brown, *op.cit.*
6. The term is from W.W. Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth,* Cambridge University Press, 1961. See also J.K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society,* Penguin Books, 1963.
7. In this section I have relied heavily on the work of Talcott Parsons, so much so that I cannot begin to acknowledge each specific idea. I can only apologize for any misuse or misinterpretation of his conceptions. Most specifically, for this section, see Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies,* Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1960. Also, Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action,* Harvard University Press, 1951; Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelzer, *Economy and Society,* London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. See too Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization,* Oxford University Press, 1947.
8. This point is made by Edward A. Shils, "Mass Society and Its Culture," in Norman Jacobs, ed., *Culture For the Millions?* Princeton, D. Van Nostrand, 1959.
9. *Brothers Karamazov,* London, J.M. Dent, 1927, Ch. V., Book V.
10. Karl Marx, "Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy," quoted in George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory,* 3rd edition, London, George G. Harrap, 1961, p.775.
11. This point is made by J. K. Fairbank, *The United States and China,* revised edition, Harvard University Press, 1959, pp. 240-241.
12. A further result has been the growth of efforts to formulate a modern general theory of democracy. See, for example, Robert Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory,* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956; A. D. Lindsay, *The Modern Democratic State,* Oxford University Press, 1943.

The Cultural Aspects of the Colonial Period of Malayan History

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JUDGING FROM THE ABOVE TITLE one may expect to be confronted here with a treatise on Malaysian culture in all its aspects during the colonial period. It is hardly conceivable, however, that this should have been the intention of the organizers of this Conference, because such a topic would open up a field of a very wide scope which, in spite of the relatively brief duration of the colonial period in Malaysian history, can hardly be discussed properly in one paper. According to the programme, moreover, my colleagues are dealing with the indigenous, the Malay, the Chinese, the Indian and the Islamic elements of Malaysian culture so that I cannot hope to add anything fresh to this in a paper which, because of its nature, would have to be no more than a summary of the cultural aspects of the colonial decades. I may suggest to restrict my topic to a discussion on the impact of Western civilization.

At this point a Malaysian observer may well pose the question if such a limitation would not result in a very considerable narrowing down of this paper's scope. Is it not true that concern for cultural values was not among the most notable of motives behind Western activities in this region and that, consequently, the contribution of the West to Malaysian culture is hardly worth devoting a paper to? As an Indonesian diplomat once put it before an audience of Malayan university students: "We have learned nothing from the Dutch colonialists."[1] This was certainly not the only *canard* in his talk; yet we cannot simply dismiss it as an extremist's remark, because it represents a trend in the present-day Asian appreciation of the colonial period. It is, in fact, part

1. Major-General Gusti Djatikusumo, in a talk delivered at the University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, on 16 July 1963.

of the Asian response to European colonialism. Just like political nationalism was the Asian answer to Western political domination, so is the playing down of the cultural influences of the West an Asian reaction, not so much against these influences as such but more directed against any feelings of inferiority which might have grown out of the humiliating experience of colonial rule and, more in particular, of the view, often expressed in overconfident European circles, that the West was bringing the light of civilization to the East.

It is not easy for a historian to argue about this Asian notion that the West did not, or hardly, contribute anything to the region's cultural development, especially not under the present circumstances now that many of the appreciations of the colonial period are coloured by anti-colonial shibboleths — and not only in Asia. Colonialism is bad and colonialist are wicked; we often come across such utterances, in the first place of course in the field of politics which offers unsurpassed opportunities for voicing platitudes, but also in modern historiography.

When we discuss the role of historiography in this respect, it should be remarked at once that in the judgements it is passing on and the space it is devoting to Asian developments now, historiography has made up for its attitude in the past, which mainly consisted of negligence or of displaying an air of European superiority. Such a change is, by the way, nothing new: history, or rather what we call history, is a version of the past, based on the historical events themselves as well as on the interpretation given to these events. As the interpretations change, the version itself changes as well. The factors which are responsible for this continuous reshaping of "history" are manifold: new generations have new ideas, they come with new theories and they adapt themselves to new circumstances. What happens to the historical sections of the Soviet Encyclopedia after each downfall of a top-leader may be an extreme example of this procedure, but it is not essentially different from what happens, in a more restrained way, to all historical writing. And sometimes it is not even that restrained.

Until the 1940s, when the Asian world was dominated by the West, historiography treated Asia from this angle: a dependency of Europe. Before the Europeans arrived in the East, Asian history was considered unimportant; after the Europeans had taken over control, Asian history was seen as yet another chapter of British,

French, Dutch or Spanish history. Those who were dealing with Asia were either linguists and scholars interested in a particular Asian culture, or civil servants writing a handbook for their successors — and they were not necessarily inspired by admiration for the Asian peoples and cultures they were describing.[2] The few historians who were interested in the Asian side of Asian history were wasting their valuable time according to those guild-brothers who had safely entrenched themselves in the study of the Hanseatic treasurers' accounts or Bonaparte's Italian campaigns.

At present, however, after the emergence of independent Asia, Asian history is considered more important. And not only the historian's horizon has widened, but his concepts and ideas have changed too. European colonialism is no longer surrounded by the aureole of high ethical principles and nobleness. Under the present-day circumstances a certain debunking of colonialism was inevitable, but it was also unavoidable that the pendulum should occasionally swing too far to the other side. It is here that we are facing a danger. Our understanding of the past may not have been served well by subordinating Asia to Europe and by judging Asian developments according to European standards, but the disadvantages of this are certainly not remedied by minimizing the European role in Asia and vilifying colonialism as the darkest period Asian peoples ever went through.

The second factor which makes it difficult for the historian to dismiss the view that in the cultural field Europe had nothing to offer and did in fact offer hardly anything to Asia, cannot be reasoned away by stressing merely the historian's need to be objective. Appearances are against the colonial period in this respect. It is true that religious fervour was one of the motives which propelled the Portuguese into their activities around the globe, but the point might well be made whether this was not more of a cover-up or a conscience-soother for their other, more wordly, motives. The Dutch immediately turned St. Paul's Church into a Protestant place of worship after they had taken Malacca in 1641, but this was part of their anti-Catholic attitude rather than of any Protestant zeal. It was, at any rate, no indication that religion was more important to them than commerce and in fact the Dutch achieved more results out of their contacts with the peoples of

2. See, for example, the tone and the tenor of G. E. Harvey's *History of Burma,* London, 1925.

Southeast Asia by not stressing the religious point than the Portuguese did by emphasizing it. What did they, the Portuguese and the Dutch, contribute to Malayan culture? And the British? Apparently not much. But if one looks deeper and, especially if one widens the meaning of the terms "culture" and "civilization", one has to admit that the colonial era meant far more to Malaysia than the introduction of the tin-dredge, the turf-club and brandy V.S.O.P.

It is true, of course, that there was a large amount of hypocrisy in the Western contention that the West was bringing civilization and enlightenment to the East. It is also true that the first specimina of Western Man coming to these shores hardly qualified as the exponents of Western culture. But is not this true for all similar developments? Alexander the Great, a barbarian painted over with a thin layer of cultural varnish, wilfully destroyed the Persian imperial city of Persepolis, but his exploits marked the start of that remarkable Hellenistic civilization in large parts of Western Asia. The first wave of Muslim conquerors in India did not exactly consist of civilized men, but in the Mughul era India witnessed one of its greatest cultural epochs. It is true that Hindu civilization and Islam spread peacefully into Southeast Asia, while Western cultural elements were in general introduced only after Europe had fought its way into this region by force. But this did not place Western culture in a disadvantage. It is, after all, not the *conquistadores* who count in this respect, but the men who followed in their wake: the priests, the administrators, the civil servants and, during the 19th century, the doctors, the teachers, the scholars, the scientists and all those other private persons and their families who built up a thriving European community, a European enclave, radiating its influence in the Asian world.

Even in the early period of European contact with Asia, Western influence was not completely devoid of cultural elements. Albuquerque and his roughnecks were followed by quieter people, Catholic priests, for example (and among these nobody less than Franciscus Xaverius) who were engaged in spreading this aspect of Western civilization, and others, whose ways of life are still reflected in the folk-music and dancing of the Malacca Eurasians. The Dutch are a definitely less gay people than the nations of Southern Europe: no folk-music and dancing. They built themselves a solid *Stadthuys* as an indication that they meant serious

business, described in a history book for Malayan secondary schools as "Jual-beli" and "Pena'lokan".[3] They stayed longer than the Portuguese did and although more of their buildings survived and the atmosphere of at least one street is typical of a Dutch provincial town (if one discounts the weather), they left less traces in other respects. There is no tangible Dutch-Eurasian community, there is no Calvinism. There are only some words in Malay and two street names which iconoclastic authorities deemed fit to change a few years ago.

II

The real impact of Western civilization started when Western domination in Malaya began in all seriousness, i.e. in the late 19th century. It is here that we meet the British and here too that we have to define the terms "civilization" and "culture" in a broader sense. One may well expect an Asian observer to admit on the one hand that the influence of the West on Asian society has been tremendous indeed, but to add at the same time that this influence can hardly be termed a cultural impact. If anything characterized the colonial period in Malaysian history, it was the fact that the region was pushed into the age of modern technical science. It was opened up and its resources were exploited with the help of modern machinery; economically it was taken out of the traditional pre-capitalist sphere and brought into closer contact with the outside world which was dominated by a capitalist economy. All this certainly constituted a revolutionary change, but can it be classified under the headings "civilization" or "culture"?

What we call civilization is in fact the sum-total of the achieve- usually not the first items one thinks of when referring to civilization, and they are not covered by the definition of culture as long as one regards only religion, literature and fine arts as coming within that definition. The point may well be made, however, whether this is not too highbrow an attitude.

What we call civilization is in fact the sum-total of the achievements of human activity, human endeavour and human reasoning; it is the over-all result of Man's quest for knowledge and his search for materially speaking, a better world to live in, as well as of his pursuit of enlightenment, his love of beauty and refinement and his wish to establish the relation between himself and the unseen. It is

3. Husein Ahmad, *Sejarah Tanah Melayu 1400-1963*, pp.81-2.

not restricted to spiritual and aesthetical values. If the discovery of fire by some prehistoric anonym or the making of gun-powder by a Chinese are to be considered important contributions to civilization, then there is no reason why the invention of the steam-engine or the use of nuclear power should not be regarded as such. So also civilization is not confined to those achievements which we consider good or right. Human sacrifice was an element of the Aztec and Phenician civilizations; *suttee* was practiced in Hindu culture; are these therefore less great cultures than others? Is a society in which prostitution is unknown better than one in which it does occur? Is the preoccupation with military affairs, as in Assyria, or Sparta, or Germany, just an aberration, or is it an element of these particular cultures?

When we are discussing civilizations we cannot leave out those aspects which apparently do not fit in with our notions of civilized behaviour or culture. Our standards are subjective and, as such, not applicable to judge human ways of thinking or cultural achievements, especially not when they are related to circumstances different from our own. Several aspects of a particular culture which are repulsive to us, were perfectly acceptable to those who took part in these cultures. The 19th century West used to look down upon Asian civilizations as stagnant and devoid of any ideals and ideas of progress. This appreciation, completely based on Western standards and Western feelings of superiority is hardly fair and, for one thing, no more valid than the appreciations of the 18th century when European Rationalist philosophers — influenced by the stories of Jesuit missionaries which were circulating among the intellectual elite — rated China's civilization at a higher value than that of their own society. Similarly it is not fair to judge Western civilization only from the point of view of the technically less developed cultures, to look down upon it as the culture of the machine, the managerial disease and the stomach-ulcer and to draw the conclusion that the primacy of technical progress and the preoccupation with efficiency detract from the value of Western civilization. It is not only in the non-Western world that doubts are raised as to whether technical elements should be considered cultural achievements. In the Western world these doubts exist too, among the cultural highbrows of course, but also among those who in their hearts fear the ultimate effect of the constant process of

technical development on society. But, whatever the end of the road may be, it should be made clear that this technical development took place within the framework of Western society, against a background of centuries of Western reasoning, that it was the expression of a Western spirit and of the Western mind and that it was — and still is — part and parcel of Western civilization.

It was in this respect that the West contributed tremendously to the development of Malayan and Malaysian society. It may be true that many motives behind the Western penetration and the introduction of Western elements in Asia were not without concern for the West's own interests, that many benefits which the Asians derived from the encounter with the West were not primarily intended to be benefits for the Asians and that, finally, in many other cases Asians were caught in the wheels of a development they were psychologically incapable of following, but all this does not devaluate the magnitude of the Western impact. Roads, railways and bridges were constructed, facilitating communications. New methods of tapping the region's mineral resources and modern agricultural research were introduced to raise the production capacity of the country. Industrialization made a start — it is admitted that it was an extremely modest start under the colonial conditions, but a start, nevertheless, which laid the foundation for a more substantial development under post-colonial circumstances. Western medical science and Western notions of hygiene made great results in helping Asia to get rid of, or, at any rate, to contain such scourges as malaria, cholera, leprosy and beri-beri. The penetration of the West took the region out of its isolation and enabled it to make contacts with the outside world and to adjust itself to the modern era.

III

That Malaysia was equipped with the tools for material advancement was by no means the sole aspect of Western civilization in modern Malaysian society, although it was the most spectacular element and as such tending to dominate the whole scenery, literally as well as figuratively. But Malaysia, like the rest of Asia, borrowed other elements from Western culture as well, and these too have been important in shaping modern Malaysian society. If there is one other aspect of the meeting between West and East which we may consider of particular interest, it is the fact that this

penetration of the West provided the channels through which Western ideas and ideals could reach this region. In this field of ideas — religious, economic, educational, legal, political — the West made its second greatest contribution in making modern Malaysian society what it is today.

As far as religion is concerned, one may well wonder whether there is anything impressive in the position of Christianity in this country, if one compares the number of Malaysian Christians with the overwhelming non-Christian majority of the population. The influence of any religion on a society and the role it is playing in that society are, however, far greater than the numerical strength of its believers would seem to indicate. Christianity, both in its Roman Catholic and its Protestant form, is closely connected with the philosophical basis of Western civilization as well as it is at the roots of Western moral and ethical values and of Western social behaviour. As such it contributed, indirectly, to enriching Malaysian culture to no lesser extent than it did by its direct impact. This direct impact, moreover, is not necessarily restricted to spreading religion. There are hospitals, schools, charitable institutions, to mention only a few, run by the churches or affiliated Christian bodies and their influence on Malaysian society radiates far beyond the narrow circle of those who are registered as Malaysian Christians.

In the above section schools were mentioned in passing. Education is, of course, another aspect of Western civilization. It is, in fact, the one aspect which has taken Malaysia — and Southeast Asia as a whole — by storm. The colonial rulers, for reasons of their own, were rather reluctant in providing facilities for more Western education than that necessary for training Asian clerks, but the Asians themselves clearly understood the importance of it, both as a means of pushing their countries up to a new and brighter future, and as a condition *sine qua non* for obtaining better opportunities — in terms of jobs — for themselves or their children. It is not easy to measure the influence of Western education, because literacy in English is only one criterion. But it may well be assumed that in a country where the secondary-school system, in whatever language stream, is geared to Western education, its impact is great, especially on the younger generation, and that its influence is growing.

Greater still seems the impact of Western political thought, or in

a wider sense socio-economic thought. There is no denying, whatever the Asian symbols used and Asian traditions still upheld in this respect, that the structure of the present-day Malaysian state, its government, its administration of justice, its political system, are based on Western ideas and that they are basically Western in form. The concept of a nation which was — and still is — at the roots of 20th century Asian nationalism and which is presented today as the necessary condition for making Malaysia a success, is derived from the West. Though this concept in itself may be vague and it may occasionally cover something which seems quite artificial, yet it constituted the ideological background of nationalism as well as of the emerging independent states, even in Malaya or Malaysia, where the communalistic obstacles to accept any ideas of togetherness and of belonging to one nation were — and are — far less easily to be overcome than almost elsewhere in Asia.

If the ideological foundation of nationalism was Western, so were many of the other ideas which were adopted at the same time. Nationalism not only advocated to put an end to European political rule and Western economic domination, but it also aimed at building up a new society. This trend of modernization, of rejuvenating Asian society, made 20th century nationalism clearly distinct from all forms of anti-Western resistance which had existed in the past. These resistance movements had been passive, in the sense that it had been their only concern to defend the old traditions and the old order; they had been unsuccessful in repelling the West not only because of a discrepancy in arms but also because of the discrepancy in ideas. Modern nationalism on the other hand was an active force, not so much attempting to defend or revive the past but more to look forward towards the future.

In order not to fail this time Asian nationalism had to be equipped with a set of new ideas and values, and as only Western ideas, values and standards seemed to count in the world of the early 20th century, especially in the political sphere which was the main field of activity of nationalism proper, it stands to reason that they provided Asian nationalism with the necessary means to achieve its end. This does not mean that all links with the pre-colonial past were severed: the Asian nationalists were proud of their historic traditions and they could use these to boost their nations' morale, but they realized also that the old order would be unsuit-

able as a basis of the new society they envisaged, because it would be incapable of coping with the problems of the modern era. Neither does this adoption of Western ideas and values mean that the West had a monopoly of giving Asia the means of building up a new society; many ideas and values emerged out of Asia's own traditional and cultural sphere. Thus the role of Islamic modernism in this respect should by no means be overlooked.

But in the political field the West was the main source of ideas which were going to be adopted by modern Asian generations. In their fight to undermine Western political and economic hegemony in Asia, Asians borrowed the tools from the West. They did so because these Western tools were more useful for their purpose, which was not only to build up a new society adapted to the modern age, but also to fight their Western adversaries with their own weapons in their own arena. Behind the Asian acceptance of Western ideas and values there might also have been the conviction — admittedly rather naive — that the Western colonial powers might be sufficiently reasonable not to refuse to their Asian subjects what their own nationals were enjoying themselves.

It is because of these considerations that Asians advocated Western education, not because it was better but because it was geared to the needs of the modern era. They adopted the ideals of democracy and of a parliamentary regime, which had to replace the autocratic forms of government both of the pre-colonial and the colonial periods. They organized themselves in a modern Western way, in political parties; they contested elections and occupied seats in the legislatures and, occasionally during colonial rule, in the executives. In their fight for better living conditions for the mass of the population they adhered to ideologies like socialism and communism. For the administration of justice Western legal principles and concepts — unlike most of the above-mentioned Western concepts imposed by the West — were preserved, at least in those fields not covered by native "adat" or by religious laws.

It would hardly be fair to point out that in many independent Asian countries some of the above Western values and ideals might have been accepted in the beginning, but that they seem to have been abandoned altogether after the nationalist politicians had become the Sahibs or the Tuans themselves. It is, for one thing, not an Asian monopoly to make a farce of a democratic parliamentary system, as the history of Europe during the past decades clearly

shows. The importance of the ideas borrowed from the West is not to be measured by the way in which they are, or are not, put into practice in independent Asian states. Neither is it to be judged by some outward symbols like the wig or the mace. The real significance of these ideas lies in the fact that they have been instrumental in shaping the basic structure of the modern Asian states, of their legal and administrative systems. They have also contributed to creating an Asian sense of self-consciousness. Peoples, made up of serfs of their own feudal rulers, and coolies of their colonial masters have been made self-confident nations, proud of their own cultural heritage of course, but their self-respect greatly strengthened by Western ideals. Whatever the subsequent political developments, Asia cannot possibly discard such a legacy from the the West.

IV

Finally there are those aspects of Western culture which are exclusively within the province of the Arts Council. It may well be stated from the outset that the sum-total of Western cultural influence in this field is not greatly impressive. One can, however, hardly expect this to have been otherwise — and for two reasons. First, these elements of Western culture penetrated into a society composed of three ethnic groups each living in its own cultural sphere which was quite different from that of the West. Taking into account that any process of cultural adaptation takes a considerably longer period of time than the few decades during which the West has been in close contact with Malaysia, it is no wonder that these aspects of Western culture have made no more headway than they actually have. They may have been accepted by individual Malaysians who, because of their Western education had been given easier access to them, but they were certainly not accepted by the Malaysian society as a whole or by each of the Malaysian ethnic communities, nor by those individual Malaysians who continued to live in their own cultural environment and to whom they represented a foreign and unfamiliar culture. In many cases they did not even appeal to Malaysians who had been enjoying a Western education and to whom, consequently, these elements of Western culture might have appeared less foreign and less unfamiliar, but to whom all the same they did not represent the need which could not be possibly satisfied within their own cultural sphere. Foreign cultural elements are the easier accept-

able as long as there is no equivalent in the cultural sphere of their own society — which accounts for the eager adoption of Western technology and Western political concepts. But in the fields of "fine arts" Malay, Chinese and Indian cultures were offering these equivalents so that there was less need for accepting or adopting what the West was introducing.

Modern Western painting is being practiced by Malaysians, as any visitor to any arts exhibition may notice, but this is only one aspect of Malaysian painting and one may well suppose that, among the Chinese for example, traditional Chinese painting is more widely appreciated. Western sculpture does not seem to have been greatly accepted by Malaysian artists—it is, at any rate symptomatic that the National Mounment in Kuala Lumpur's Lake Gardens had to be commissioned to a Western sculptor. Western music and Western plays are being performed before an audience which is usually about half composed of Europeans and for the other half of Western educated Malaysians — the common Malaysian apparently preferring his own Malay, Indian or Chinese music and theatre, and if some aspects of modern Western dancing and music are more widely accepted by Malaysians they are usually those aspects which appeal to a particular age-group but which are dropped when people become older and their muscles more stiff. When one comes to realize how brief the periods are that a really good film — that is a film with artistic value — shows in Malaysian cinemas, one has a clue as to the average Malaysian taste in this respect as well. The one form of art which seems to have been most influenced by the West is architecture, which is following Western precepts of style and functionalism. But here too the inspiration is often derived from the Orient rather than from the West and the only thing which may be said is that at present the results of that mixture are in general more acceptable from an aesthetical point of view than the natural children of Queen Victoria and Khalif Harun al-Rashid with which Kuala Lumpur was decorated in previous decades.

If, seen from an Asian viewpoint, the alien character of these elements of Western culture, together with the relative briefness of the period of contact between East and West make up the first factor accounting for the non-impressive nature of their impact on Malaysian society, then their almost exclusive appeal to the educated classes is certainly the second. This is nothing new and

it does, as such, not prove anything with regard to either the taste of the average Malaysian, referred to above, or the value of Western culture. The aspects of a civilization which may be classified as "fine arts", are usually best appreciated by those members of a society who have had the opportunity of the best education. In Western countries art exhibitions and concerts are in general attended by those who belong to the intellectual or well-educated classes, or by those who do not but for whom such visits contribute to their social prestige. The exponents of a civilization, those who consciously take part in the cultural manifestations of their society belong in general to the thin top layer of that society. If this is the case with any culture in any society, it is the more so when it comes to appreciating Western cultural elements in a non-Western and culturally basically different environment, in which the circle of people open to such elements is necessarily narrowed down to the Western educated groups. With regard to Western influences on literature the picture is more or less the same. There are many Malaysians who are able to enjoy Western literature, but here again, they are only those belonging to the intellectual elite with a Western educational background. Enjoying literature is only referring to the passive acceptance of this aspect of culture. As far as the active, the creative part is concerned, the impact of the West is less easily to be determined, at any rate by the present reviewer. The language is a criterion, of course, but not the only one, because the choice of the subject-theme, the composition, the structure and the style of the various literary works have to be taken into account as well. I must state that I am unfamiliar with modern Malaysian literature in Chinese and Tamil, so that I am not competent to pass any judgement. My notions about modern Malay literature are the result of information passed on by those scholars, mainly Dutch, who tend to compare the situation in this country with that in Indonesia, which makes me no more competent than in the previous case, as I realize that any judgement based on such comparison is hardly a fair one. If any comparison with Indonesia holds water it is the one with regard to Malaysian "belles lettres" written in English and the Indonesian counterpart written in Dutch: if Malaysian-English literature is not impressive, quantatively as well as qualitatively, Malaysians may derive comfort from the fact that neither are the Indonesian literary works in Dutch.

V

When one sets out to discuss the several aspects of Western culture and to attempt judging their influence on Malaysian society, one has to work primarily with imponderables, as in so many instances of historical research. There are no facts and no statistics; and the few data available — as for example the number of Christians, the number of schools and their pupils, the figures for literacy in English — give a clue only to some minor aspects. For the rest one has to grope in the dark or to guess on the strength of outward appearances and, outward appearances being what they are, one's guess is as good as that of anyone else.

There is a second problem. Even if the impact of any particular aspect of Western culture could be measured in a more distinct way, it would still hardly serve to present a clearer picture as to the attachment to Western culture either of any individual or of each of the Malaysian ethnic communities — not to mention Malaysian society as a whole. An Asian appreciating classical Western painting may abhor modern Western music, in which appreciation or lack of appreciation not only his cultural background may play a role but his personal taste as well, as in the case of a European who reacts in the same way to both painting and music. It does not make him less open to Western culture than the man who appreciates both aspects favourably. A Western education does not necessarily Westernize an Asian. Similarly an Asian with a Chinese, or Malay, or Indian cultural background is not necessarily immune to Western cultural influences and less so from the Western ways of life. A Malaysian may have changed to Western clothing, he may be living in a Western-style dwelling, enjoy the comforts of a Western way of life and doing his business in that tempo and under that nervous strain which are so typical of modern Western society, but still he may be no more open to Western culture than the Chinese lady, wearing sarong and kebaya, is to Malay culture. We may furthermore even speculate whether some of the above-mentioned ways of life are not modern, in an international sense, rather than specifically Western.

The main point, however, is that, although some aspects of Western civilization seem to have made significant inroads in Malaysian society, it is impossible to present any clear view as to the extent in which they have been adopted. How deep does the influence of Western civilization go? Is it only a varnish?

To measure this we have no standards and no certainties. The only thing we know is that an Asian society has been subjected to the influences of Western culture, that some of these influences seem to have made great impact, while others seem not to. The only material to work with, finally, is Man himself, living in that society at the crossroads of civilizations, his own cultural traditions and his attachment to these, his susceptibility to other cultural influences, his conscience and his personal taste, his pursuit of a better life and his ability or willingness to adopt, or absorb, or reject, those aspects of life which he is facing.

Acculturation and Modernization in Malaysia and the Arising World Culture

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IT IS OBVIOUS that secular modern culture, i.e., our twentieth century worldwide culture, dominated by the progress of science, technology and economics, has its main sources in the culture of Greece of the epoch of the axis of history, enriched by the Roman culture of Christianity during the Middle Ages, which derived from the Semitic religious culture from the Arab Peninsula.

But when we intend to analyse the structure, the concepts and ideals of this secular modern culture, I think it suffices to take as a starting point the Renaissance, since it was indeed with the Renaissance that a new atmosphere of human freedom and creativity, stimulating human curiosity for the secrets of nature and human lust for adventure, encompassed Europe.

In the late Middle Ages, Western Europe underwent a series of tensions and conflicts, which activated the European mind. There was first of all the Crusades, which mobilised European Christendom in a holy war against the Muslim power in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean, resulting not only in the liberation of many slaves, who reinforced the burghers in the cities, the new centers of trade, industry and secular burgher culture, but which also brought to Western Europe the cultural goods of classical Greece, Byzantium and the Muslim world. Closely related to the Crusades was the rise of the Italian and North European city states, in which the burghers were able to develop their trade and industry, thus laying the foundations for a secular burgher civilization, such as in Florence, Venice and the Hansa cities in Northern Europe. At the same time the balance of power in Western Europe was disturbed by many controversies. There was the struggle between

the universal power of the Pope and kings. It was the national kings who gradually received support from the burghers. There was the struggle between the Church and the New Humanism, which penetrated Europe as a result of the renewed contact with classical Greece.

In the struggle of these various forces at the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Renaissance the liberated energies became more and more organized in a new social organization, which gave freedom and opportunity of development to the people. While during the Middle Ages Europe was under the dual leadership of the Pope and the Catholic kings, in the Renaissance through the opposition to the Church and its feudal representatives new national units came into being in various parts of Europe, in which the liberated burghers of the cities, the peasants and the nobility were organized under a new territorial king, and in which they were able to pursue their religious beliefs as well as their new ambitions in trade, industry, art and science. Herewith was the foundation laid for the *secular national state*, in which the king or in modern terms the government and the people, i.e. the citizens formed an organization, the aims of which were power, greatness and prosperity. A new relationship came into being between rulers and the ruled. The latter were no longer entirely dependent on the former, but they became gradually partners. These territorial states became more and more integrated by an expanding administration, tax management, chancery procedures, which went together with the creation of royal laws, an army, etc. for the protection of the whole of the political community. Local customs, laws and institutions were gradually replaced by customs and laws for the whole country. A new feeling of common responsibility arose which marked the awakening of nationalism in the new political units. Out of the resistance against papal power emerged a strong sentiment of solidarity between the king and the citizen. Add to this the increasing use of local languages in place of the universal Latin and we have an idea of the new political atmosphere, which was dominant in the rising new national states of Europe, which in the subsequent centuries were able to mobilize manpower, wealth and knowledge as never before in history.

During the 17th century the power of the king increased, absolute monarchies arose in France, Austria, Spain and especially Prussia.

This development in the political structure of Europe went together with a great change in the mentality of the people. After the devastating religious war during the Reformation, a steady growth in reason and rationality was discernible, which in the coming centuries determined the cultural structure of Europe. The impact of this rationality was strongest in the absolute monarchy of continental Europe, especially in France. It cut into the very foundation of absolute monarchy. It was the time when ideas about liberty, the rights of man, the dignity of the individual, and the sovereignty of the people, gradually stirred discontent among the people. It was also the time that ideas formulated by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the source of power fell on fertile soil in the discontented European atmosphere. Especially Rousseau's Social Contract, which justified the power of the government only on the basis of a contract between the government and the governed, had a great influence on the political thinking of the 18th century. Without the divine basis, the power of a secular monarch became only usurpation and the common man had the right to rebel. America was the first that experimented with the new ideas of the relationship between the people and the government of the national states, and in 1789 the democratic revolution was transplanted to Europe, when the French Estates General transformed itself into the National Assembly, which in the constitution formulated the rights of man. The French Revolution was not only a milestone in French politics, but influenced the political life of the whole of Europe, South America, and we can even say the countries of Asia and Africa of to-day. With it the "Ancient Regime" was closed, and during the whole of the 19th century these ideas of the rights of man, of liberty, of equality, of the sovereignty of the people were worked out, not only politically in the universal right to vote, in the equality before the law, but also in the system of compulsory education, in the protection of the citizen. The people replaced the divine king as sovereign.

But the sovereignty of the people was not once and for all established. During the 19th and even still in our 20th century it has become again and again evident that the theory of the sovereignty of the people is in itself full of contradictions, and can easily be misused by ambitious dictators and skilful agitators for their own selfish ends.

Already during the 19th century, it had become clear, that the

right to vote was not enough to guarantee the interest of the people. Political equality did not mean much, it did not lead to economic equality, since in the atmosphere of liberalism, the strongest and most clever were always at an advantage compared to the common people, which resulted in a continuously widening economic gap between the various groups in society. Socialism emerged struggling for a fairer distribution of the new wealth, a result of the progress of industrialization and the opening of many new resources during the 19th century.

The most characteristic trait of modern culture is the belief in man's limitless possibilities, his capacity to know as well as to master his surrounding nature. The revealed religious truth has been constantly under attack since the Renaissance. It suffices to mention here the names of thinkers and scholars such as Giordano Bruno, Copernicus and Galileo who during the 16th and 17th century struggled and suffered for their newly found truth and convictions. In the following centuries this struggle was continued by scientists like Linnaeus, Darwin and others who investigated nature objectively. In the 19th century the power of the Church had decreased tremendously, so that it was possible for Darwin to publish his ideas, without endangering his life. But between Darwin and the Renaissance lies the Enlightenment, when reason had reached its highest peak and power, had even become a new belief and religion itself during the French Revolution.

During the last decade of the 19th century and the first decades of the twentieth century, the fight against religious truth still continued, even militant atheism arose and gained power, especially in the circles of Socialists and Communists.

The characteristic of modern science is the rigour of its methods of inquiries, aiming at a positive accuracy of knowledge. To arrive at knowledge has been man's aim through the ages. Especially the Greeks went a long way in their observations and experiments with nature, and therefore are considered the great forerunners of modern culture. The Arabs during the Middle Ages and later the Europeans of the 14th, 15th and 16th century were driven by the same curiosity and attitude towards the surrounding world. During this period we discern a new scientific creativity in Europe.

But the decisive period for the growth of science in our modern culture did not take place in the early Renaissance, not even in the

15th or 16th century, but in the 17th century, well supported by the following factors:

First there was the strong consciousness among scholars, that scientific conclusions must be based as far as possible on quantitative measurements. This consciousness had been prepared by various developments in mathematical thinking. There was the introduction of Arabic numbers, already commonly used in Europe at the end of the 16th century. At the turn of the 17th century John Napier invented his curious "bones" for calculating, followed later by the discovery of his celebrated logarithms. This was also the time that the ancient habit of adding and subtracting from left to right began to be replaced by the much quicker way of adding and subtracting from right to left. But of greater importance for the development of the consciousness of mathematical thought was the change in the character of speculative thought, lead by thinkers like Galileo (1564-1642), Harvey (1578-1657) and Pascal (1623-1662).

In this new mathematics the notions of continuous functions, of periodicity and general recurrence, took the place of the intuitive insight by the earlier generation of scientists, and gave to their conclusion a solid provable basis in the form of abstractions at the highest level. It was also at that time that the calcules of probability were consciously expressed by Fermat, giving a basis for the mathematical theory of risk, which in our time, we can say, supplies the general form in which the natural sciences as well as the social sciences express their laws. It is indeed justifiable to say with John U. Nef that "if any period can be singled out as the one in which the language of modern science was invented and first used, that is the period of the 17th century. The procedures and the ways of stating scientific propositions employed by Rutherford and Einstein and Poincare were already employed by Galileo and Kepler and Fermat."[1]

Another factor in the revolution of science in the 17th century was the insistence on observation and experiment as the only valid proof of any scientific proposition. This was a complete break with the truth of religion and art, which had dominated all the cultures of the world hitherto. A new scientific truth emerged, rivalling with and even attacking religious truth as has been men-

1. *Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization*, Harper Torch books, 1960, p.31.

tioned earlier. New methods as well as new instruments were created to implement the achievements of this new formulation of scientific truth.

With the establishment of the new scientific attitude, thought and methods, the following centuries witnessed a continuous growth in human knowledge in the widest sense of the word. Science has become a restless frontier, always moving ahead. It is not our intention to follow the growth of the knowledge in various scientific disciplines during the 18th, 19th and 20th century, neither to give here an assessment of the total achievement of science in the last two or three centuries. But this continuous growth is not at all astonishing, since through its increase and especially through its multiple application in technology, in medicine, in the production of goods and in the speed of transportation and communication, people gradually realized that it was science which was the new hope of man for his economic well being, his health, his comfort as well as his pleasure. It is not surprising that gradually the value of science has become more and more pronounced and has attained status and prestige. Universities arose everywhere, equipped with libraries and laboratories, where the progress of science was expressively and systematically pursued. Through scientific societies, magazines, and congresses science has become an international concern, and exchange of knowledge takes place on a global scale.

Compared to the knowledge or truth of religion which is static and once and for all established as the result of divine revelation, scientific knowledge of nature is dynamic, constantly improving through new experimentation and through new formulations based on a constant accumulation of facts. With this development of science a new attitude toward nature arose, a worldview emerged and a new cultural atmosphere was created, an atmosphere of cultural progress based on the expanding knowledge of man, which at the same time meant the expanding power of man over nature. J. B. Bury points out that the idea of progress did not exist in the Middle Ages, not even during the early Renaissance, but was first established in the 17th century as a result of the Cartesian affirmation of two positive axioms, the supremacy of reason and the invariability of the laws of nature. Together, these axioms put an end not only to the authority of the church, but also to the autho-

rity of Greek and Roman thinkers.[2] Gradually a shift took place among cultural values, from the dominance of the value of the holy to the dominance of the theoretical value of science. The church gradually lost its influence in the life of culture to science. Universities and other learned institutions gained more and more importance in the life of society and culture.

The increase of human knowledge of the laws of nature played even a more important role in the change of the totality of society and culture, since it is through this ever-expanding knowledge, that man's power over nature continuously increases by the conscious development of technology in the service of man.

If we speak of technology as a byproduct of science, we must not forget, that in reality the relationship of technology and science is a dialectical one. New knowledge of the laws of nature, new discoveries of the potentialities of nature, unavoidably lead to an improvement of technology, but on the other hand an improvement of technology, which puts at the disposal of man new tools and implementations, and enables man to arrive at more accurate knowledge, more generalised laws. But it is clear that the most important contribution of technology is not in the first place the implementation of the experiment of science itself, but the immense power with which it provides man, making possible the tremendous progress of society and especially economics during the last centuries.

The development of technology — speaking in the broadest sense — is nothing else than the perfection of the human hand, the human sense organs and human energy, which means that man's material as well as spiritual achievement can be multiplied endlessly. We have seen that with the discovery of optical laws, man was able to enhance the capacity of his eyes to extremely small and to extremely far removed entities. The advance in the knowledge of shipbuilding and seafare resulted in the discovery of America and the opening of the sea route to the Orient, pioneered by the Portuguese and Spaniards. The further improvement of navigation and the production of arms gave to the European nations the possibility to build up their great colonial empires, so that at the beginning of the twentieth century nearly the whole of Asia and Africa came under the domination of European powers.

2. J.B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, New York, 1955, p.64.

The expansion of transportation, so important for trade as well as for political action, received a strong stimulus from the invention of the steam engine, which was again related to the extensive use of coal and iron. During the 19th century transportation made new progress through the use of oil instead of coal. Electric power, telegraphy and radio finally have made possible communications and relations between the remotest areas. With airplane and radio a new era was introduced; distances have shrunk so much that we can really speak of one world with innumerable possibilities of cooperation, but also of conflicts and even war.

The impact of the progress in technology was no less impressive in the field of agriculture, cattle breeding and fishery. But industry received the greatest impetus; the Industrial Revolution, starting in England during the 18th century spread quickly through Europe and America and gradually through the whole world. Our modern culture is called industrial civilization.

The Industrial Revolution is essentially nothing else than the adjustment of industry in its production of goods to the progressive attitude of science and technology. Before the Industrial Revolution, production was still under the influence of religious and artistic concepts. The hand was still the most important tool in the production of goods. The innovation which we identify with the Industrial Revolution was the production of cheap wares in ever larger quantities, which started in Britain and was especially associated with an extensive use of cast and pig iron and coal fuel.

This English style of industry was at the middle of the 19th century characterized by an extensive network of railroads, cotton mills and hundreds of other new and improved machines and devices. Innumerable applications of steam power to iron machines were found; wooden looms and spinning wheels, powered by human energy in country cottages were replaced by spindles and scores of steam-driven looms. The products of these industries exceeded by far in cheapness, uniformity and above all quantity the products produced by hand.

In the second half of the 19th century the lead in technology and industry started to move to the continent of Europe, especially Germany, and to the United States. Germany and the United States of America introduced a wider variety of materials and utilized new sources and forms of energy, although the primacy of iron and coal remained in the beginning. It was only after World War I

that a larger diversification set in, with the development of electrical, chemical, petroleum and light metal industries and the increasing production of automobiles, radios, airplanes and synthetic materials. But also an expansion in the coal industry took place in the sense that out of coal various chemicals were produced as aspirin, dyes, explosives etc. After the invention of the Bessener converter in the middle of the 19th century iron could be converted in great quantities into indefinite variations of steel, which were used for the production of various modern products. A characteristic feature of modern industry is the important role of chemistry. Deliberate manipulations of molecular, atomic and subatomic particles, forces and properties gave a vast new range, a subtle flexibility, and an unparallelled precision to human control of both matter and energy.

Since the Renaissance the production capacity of the world has increased tremendously; expanding transportation and trade, resulting from the increasing speed and volume of transportation, gradually made all the products of the world available everywhere; the use of steam and later electrical power for more and more efficient machines, made cheap and uniform mass production possible, so that products, which in an earlier time were only available for a small minority of priviliged people, gradually reached more and more hands.

In the 19th century, through the various forms of socialistic movements and through enlightened enterprises, labour conditions improved; a larger part of welfare and prosperity was supplied for the workers and gradually they participated in the use and enjoyment of the products of scientific, technological progress. In our age it was Ford who discovered that the workers constitute a great consumer potential, and thus that the expansion of production is not necessarily controversial to a higher level of income for the labourer. Thus we arrive at an economy of high-production and high-consumption. The fast expansion of production in kind and in quantity brings a new relationship between production and consumption, between offer and demand. It is not primarily demand which determines the production of goods. More and more an opposite process takes place, the producer attempts continuously to create new demands by producing first the goods, so that a highly sophisticated sales machinery is necessary.

We have seen how during the last four centuries a continuous

secularization process took place in Western culture: the religious value gradually receded and became replaced by a steady increase of the scientific and the economic value which together produced the modern world-wide technoloby. In my earlier paper on the confluence and conflict of culture in Malaysia in world perspective, I have limited myself to the characterization of the confluences and conflicts of religious oriented cultures. It is true that the concept of Islam because of its absolute monotheism, the stress it puts on man's responsibility and the influence it received through the contact with secular philosophy and science of Greece, could potentially have embraced a secular culture, but as has been said before, although officially it had won the cultural confrontation, in the Malay archipelago essentially this was a Pyrrhic victory: the Malay and Indian concepts and ideals have penetrated and paralysed it at its very core. But even if Islam in this part of the world had developed the potential inherent in its concept of man as the master of the world, as a religious system expressing the value of the holy, based on the truth of religion, it would not have been able to withstand the attack of modern science and economics. The liberation of Western thinking from Christianity, a semitic religion like Islam, gives us an insight into the force of the secular concepts and ideals, which have their origin in Greek science and philosophy and which have become the very core of modern culture. In reality the secular concepts and ideals have not only challenged Western Christianity, but the religious systems of the whole world, be it Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Islam, Laotsianism, etc. and it looks like they have not yet exhausted their offensive and creative power, so that in the coming decades, maybe even centuries, religion will still be on the defensive: universities, banks, factories will become more important cultural centers than church, mosque, temple, etc.

After the characterization of this modern culture, we can come back to the cultural problem of Malaysia in the context of Southeast Asia. In the first one and a half millennia A.D., the cultural confluence and conflicts in Southeast Asia, as has been said before, took place between native Malay culture in the broadest sense of the word, Hinduism and Buddhism, and Islam. The impact of Chinese social philosophy as well as Chinese religion was relatively small.

It was after the sixteenth century that the first real contact of

Southeast Asia with European culture took place, through the Portuguese, the Spaniards, the Dutch, the English and the French. Although the first motives for the adventurous trips of the Europeans which led to the discovery of Southeast Asia were of mercantile character, the Europeans were no less interested in the spread of their religion. Malakka the trade center of the 16th and 17th century became also the center of a Catholic mission after its conquest by the Portuguese. Thus the struggle between the two semitic religions in Europe, the Middle East and Africa was carried over to Southeast Asia. Christian missionary activity had its greatest success in the Philippines and the Moluccas, where Christianity was able to get a foothold against the expanding Islam. During the following centuries, when the position of the Christian religion in Europe itself became weakened through the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the advance of humanistic and socialistic movements, the religious accent in colonial contacts shifted to the political and economic field. For the expansion of colonial economic enterprises and colonial administration, not only a great number of labourers was needed but also civil servants and artisans. Through humanistic and socialistic movements in Europe in the second half of the last century, a certain humanism, which tended to enlighten the native population of the colonies was introduced into the colonial policies of the Western powers. It was the time that Western schools started to be opened for the natives, and thus a certain acculturation of Western science, technology and economics started to develop in the native communities.

It must be remembered that in the 19th century the feudal kingdoms in Southeast Asia, like in most parts of Asia, were in decline. The many small kingdoms fell one by one by force, manipulation and persuasion of the Western colonial powers, which had at their disposal all the achievements of the scientific, technological and industrial modern culture. The economy of the people of Southeast Asia was, to a large extent, still the same self-supporting rice growing agricultural economy of centuries ago. The colonial regime could expect little from this closed economy. We have seen how in the 19th century the Dutch government forced the Javanese peasants to grow products for the world market which was more advantageous, viewed from modern market and money oriented economy. Later it discovered that it was even more advantageous and ethically more defendable, if Western enter-

prises were allowed to exploit the land themselves for the world market. That was the beginning of the great European estates and mines in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and the continent of Southeast Asia. The government did not need to intervene in the economy of the native population, who lived peacefully in their own villages. The overproduction of rice, and the gradually rising need of money to pay taxes and to buy other necessities such as salt, textiles, etc. was to a certain extent advantageous for the colonial government and enterprises. It could avail itself of cheap labour, since the wages were related to the price of rice, which was the staple food. In the history of Southeast Asia, it was especially overpopulated Java which provided the labour force for Western enterprises. But very early already China and to a certain extent also India, became inexhaustible sources for labour.

Thus at the beginning of the twentieth century, there existed two kinds of economics: a native rural economy, more or less self-supporting and rice growing, in which trade and money did not play an important role, beside a Western economy, which was oriented towards export and the world market, and the only aim of which was economic gain. I do not need to elaborate on these two systems of economy, since much has already been written about them especially by Dutch scholars such as Boeke, van Gelderen, and others.

Concerning the cultural relations in Southeast Asia, it is interesting to see that the Chinese who in the acculturation process of their expressive, i.e. religion- and art-oriented cultures until the arrival of the Western powers, played a very minor role; in this second, progressive, i.e. science- and economic-oriented, culture came gradually to the foreground, first as traders and later, from the second half of the last century until this century, also as labourers. H.J.H. Alers[3] has indicated the interesting phenomenon, that the Chinese gained a strong position in the commercial and industrial money-economy in the center of Southeast Asia, where the self-supporting rice economy is the weakest, i.e. Malaysia; it is also in these areas that they are numerically relatively strong. They have, however, not been able to penetrate more deeply in the re-

3. Dilemma in Zuid-Oost-Azie, Leiden, 1955.

latively closed, self-supporting rice producing communities such as Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Java and the Philippines. In these areas they have only a functional position i.e. as intermediary in the trade of the products of village and industry for the consumption in these communities. But in Malaysia, where rubber and tin are the most important products for the world market, their position is economically much more important not only as intermediate traders, but also as agricultural and industrial producers for the world market.

It is clear that being an epiphenomenon of the colonial progressive science-, technology- and economic-oriented culture, the Chinese belong to the group which first participated in the spread of the progressive culture in Southeast Asia. And since the group which settled down in Southeast Asia comprised mostly labourers and traders i.e. the group least influenced by the high culture of China, it goes without saying that they accepted the progressive modern culture with little resistance.

But as has been said before, at the same time that the Chinese started to participate in modern culture, also a small number of the elite of the native population of Southeast Asia came into the orbit of this modern Western culture, i.e. visited European schools, became civil servants, etc. And it was this group which later became the leaders of the struggle for the independence of the countries of Southeast Asia from the colonial power of the West. On the other hand, it was also this Western-educated minority which struggled against the stagnation, apathy and backwardness of the old society and culture, against the closed self-supporting, backward rural economy. With all their power and knowledge they attempted to change their own society and culture in line with the progressive, modern culture of Europe. From this point of view the Western-educated Southeast Asian became the ally of the European and Chinese in the creation of what we call modern culture, i.e. secular, progressive culture, dominated by science, technology and economics.

Essentially all the new nationals in Southeast Asia, we even can say in Asia and Africa, however different their present form and progress, are national states in the Western European tradition,

which developed since the time of the Renaissance, A glance at their constitutions will reveal this. Thus their institutions, derived from these constitutions, are also basically modern institutions, run to a great majority by individuals who have a modern education, which is basically the same in the whole modern world. The concern of these states is the promotion of modern education from primary school to university, along with the promotion of public health, building of roads, the development of a modern agriculture, all of which are modern values and ideals. Industry and prosperity has become a keyword in the new progressive culture of these states and it is only insufficient know-how, capital, and organizational experience which prevent their achieving the progress towards which their leaders are aiming. Thus we see that also in the new states of Southeast Asia as in the other new states in Asia and Africa, national independence is considered not as a necessary step to get rid of the progressive culture of the colonial powers, but on the contrary as a necessary condition for the wider and equally distributed achievement of that progress of the modern world, such as has developed during the last centuries in Europe and America. Thus universities, banks and factories have become the most important centers in the atmosphere of the developing countries of Southeast Asia, replacing the old centers of the expressive culture of the past. Everywhere intellectual, technological and economic progress have become the most important goals.

Thus we face the paradoxical fact, that the great struggle against the colonial Western powers in Asia and Africa since the beginning of this century, resulting in the independence of so many Asian and African countries, instead of creating a great variety of cultural entities based on so many cultural traditions, tends to bring a more or less cultural uniformity, based on the values of science and economics all over the world. Everywhere the old tradition has been weakened by the introduction of modern education, transportation and communications and also through the spread of ideas and commodities from all parts of the world. The attack of science, which was directed against Christianity during the last three centuries, already has turned towards the other religions of Asia, which were the sole determinants of the old Asian and African expressive cultures.

The great transformation of Asian cultures from the domination

of the expressive aspect to that of the progressive aspect of culture, is to a large extent a recapitulation of what has taken place in Europe since the Renaissance. Only the pace is somewhat faster, since they are able to take advantage of the experiences and achievements of Europe and America. The more modern education, science, technology, transportation, industry, etc. develop in the new Asian and African countries, the more their cultures assume characteristics similar to the cultures of Europe and America. Hotels, airports, banks, universities, hospitals, etc. are already the same the world over. In food, dress, home decoration, etc. certain tastes and styles are spreading rapidly over the world. The characteristics of the larger cities of the world are more or less international and cosmopolitan. In the arts the same amalgamation and unification takes place. Modern literature, modern painting, sculpture and architecture have assumed a similar character the world over.

But not only the useful and harmless aspects of modern culture have spread to the Asian and African countries, the less desirable and dangerous traits such as crime and modern diseases, deliquency, mundane city life, hollow and misleading mass entertainment, movies, sex books, comic strips, etc. have also spread at the same time.

But as in Europe and America, religion is not vanishing from the totality of cultural life in Asia and Africa, since the religious value of the holy is as essential for the life of the mind and culture as human knowledge of nature around us. We even can say that the religious value is deeper embedded in the human psyche than the scientific value. Together with the aesthetic value, it forms the rich emotional core of every culture from which derive human feelings of responsibility and creativeness. Viewed from a higher level of conceptualization, even human rationality and efficiency have their roots in feelings and are always in danger of exhausting themselves in empty verbalism or aimless activities. The increasing predominance of science in culture will one day reach a saturation point where the attacks of science have exhausted themselves and a counter attack of religion will be inevitable. The knowledge gathered by science, however useful it may be for an orientation of our physical surrounding, or into the depth of the human soul, does not touch the last essential problem of the meaning and destiny

of human life. In this sense criticism of religion by science can only aim at its unessential features, in which the various religions differ from each other or in which religion has been dominated too much by blind belief and superstition. But it is just the integrating ethical force of the religious value in the total structure of the human mind and culture which science is not able to provide. There is no doubt that the real meaning of life derives from a deep belief.

Since it has been religion which provided man with ethical consciousness, and art which has given man joy and happiness in the process of creation for its own sake, it is clear that the weakening of religion and the arts in modern culture has its repercussions on the integration of the personality of modern man: the progress of science, technology and economics, which has made man more powerful, at the same time attacks him at the very core of his soul, resulting in frustration, anxiety and neurosis. The powerful man of modern culture is insecure in the depth of his existence.[4]

Thus a new readjustment of the relationship between the progressive and expressive aspects of culture is unavoidable. The great handicap for the expressive aspect of culture at this time is that — being a product of a remote past — religions are lacking the universality of scientific truth. In the world-wide contacts between religion and other cultural expressions as a result of the progress of transportation and communication, the variety of religious expression tends to weaken religious belief. Viewed from this standpoint the present prevailing trend of religious tolerance — so desirable in itself — is a negative attitude which does not enforce religious belief and practice.

Malaysia in that respect is in a rather favourable situation, since in the rise of the new world-wide progressive culture, which has to come to a new equilibrium with the expressive aspects of culture, it accommodates within its own boundaries descendants of all the great cultural traditions from the epoch of the axis of history.

4. In his book "Economics of Mental Illness and Health" (New York, Basic Books, 1959) Dr. Rashi Fein terms mental illness as America's number one health problem. He estimates that one half of all the hospital beds in the USA is occupied by the mentally ill. He further estimates the direct cost of mental illness to the American economy at more than US$1.7 billion a year. Including private psychiatric care as well as private general and specialized medical care of the mentally ill; the conjecture range of this direct item is from nearly two billion to nearly three billion or about US$150 for every American, regardless of age.

More than in any other part of the world a direct confrontation of cultures takes place in Malaysia not only with its dangers of conflict, but also with its various possibilities for a deeper mutual understanding which may even lead to a fertile synthesis. It is clear, however, that in order to achieve this long-range aim, a real interest must arise for the study of the various great cultural traditions. Translations must be made available over a field as wide as possible, and scientific and tolerant dialogues must be encouraged. I am even of the opinion that in not too far a future the classics of these great traditions not only should be available in every library, but that their best representatives should become an integrated part of the curriculum of every high school.

The more or less negative attitude of tolerance which, we can say, dominates at present the relations between religions in the modern world, has to make place for a more meaningful situation of mutual understanding, which is only possible if the followers of the various beliefs have the courage to raise their respective concepts to as high a level where differences disappear and their similarity in their belief in God and in the unity of the human race will become more apparent. "Because, everything, which raises, converges" says Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the courageous French Jesuit, who has made the greatest effort at a synthesis of science and religion in our time. It is clear that on this long road of mutual religious understanding and social solidarity science will be of great help, since the modern scientific attitude, concepts and logic, are more universal than the present religious and artistic concepts. But on the other hand, nothing is more needed than a synthetic creativity, which will be able to arrive at new, more comprehensive social and cultural structures, out of which must arise a more comprehensive ethical consciousness. We cannot accept the cultural attitudes, concepts, logic and ethics of the epoch of the axis of history, as the ultimate social and cultural achievements of mankind; neither can we accept the modern national state deriving from the political developments in the West during the last four centuries as the last form of human political organization. The new social and cultural atmosphere in the world, created by the unifying speed of transport and communication, resulting from universality of science and technology, is full of signs that

greater and more comprehensive social and cultural structures than those of the axis of history are coming. And it may be that in this world-wide social and cultural process, Southeast Asia, and especially Malaysia, is in a better position than any other part of the world to make a contribution, not only because of its world-wide and inclusive social and cultural heritage, but especially because of its own urgent need for the creation of a broader social and cultural structure, which will unite its multi-racial and multi-cultural people.