Southeast Asians Want a Stable U.S.-Japan-China Triangle 
International Herald Tribune
May 14, 1996
Tommy Koh  

China has had a long historical engagement with Southeast Asia. At the height of Chinese imperial power, many of the small states in the region acknowledged its hegemony by paying tribute. As Asians have long memories, these recollections are lodged in the deep recesses of their minds.

For this reason, as China gains in economic, political and military power, it must behave toward its smaller neighbors in Southeast Asia with sensitivity. In the recent past, China has not always done so.

For example, it resorted to force to expel Vietnam from the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Last year it built some shelters for fishermen in another disputed area, appropriately named Mischief Reef, which is claimed by both China and the Philippines.

However, in the past 12 months China's relations with Southeast Asia have greatly improved, to the point where they are stable and positive.

A year ago, Beijing refused to accept a request from the Association of South East Asian Nations that the question of the South China Sea be inscribed on their bilateral agenda for discussion. Beijing has since reversed its position. When senior officials of ASEAN and China meet in June in Medan, Indonesia, the South China Sea will be on the agenda.

Last July, at the annual ASEAN post-ministerial conference, in Brunei, Qian Qichen, China's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, made three important statements. He said that Beijing would respect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, abide by international law and, most importantly, ratify the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Beijing is expected to do so next month. This is an important step because China will then be bound by the treaty's provisions, including the compulsory system of dispute settlement.

Another positive development is China's attitude toward the ASEAN Regional Forum, which has 19 members and is the only regionwide body for discussing Asia-Pacific security questions.

Initially, Beijing adopted a somewhat skeptical attitude. Recently, however, it has been an active and constructive member. China has published a white paper on its defense policy. It has even volunteered to co-chair one of the working groups on confidence-building.

The seven ASEAN members — Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam — hold the common view that the peace of the Asia-Pacific region requires a stable triangular relationship between the United States, Japan and China.

In the first few years of the Clinton administration, U.S.-Japanese relations went through a rocky period caused mainly by frictions in the field of trade and business practices. Recently, however, the relationship appears to have been stabilized as a result of President Bill Clinton's visit to Japan and the adoption of a joint declaration affirming the strength and relevance of their alliance.

The second side of the triangle, the relationship between China and Japan, is reasonably good, despite differences over such issues as Chinese nuclear weapons testing. But this is a relationship burdened by history. The good ties between Beijing and Tokyo today could, under certain circumstances, take a turn for the worse.

The third side, the relationship between China and the United States, is the most unstable. From a geostrategic standpoint, Washington ought to aim to have better relations with Tokyo and Beijing than they have with each other. The United States had such a pivotal position not so many years ago.

Currently, the relationship between the United States and China is one which Southeast Asians would characterize as hot and cold, or sweet and sour. To be sure, neither side is free from blame. However, most Southeast Asians feel that America has not pursued a consistent, coherent and comprehensive policy toward China.

It seems to us in the region as if some elements of the U.S. government wish to pursue a policy of engagement with Beijing while others want to pursue a course of containment. It also seems to us that the U.S. attitude toward China changes from day to day depending on the particular issue and the reactions of the relevant interest groups and the media.

China is not entirely blameless. Beijing could be more cooperative with Washington on a whole spectrum of issues, such as nuclear nonproliferation, the sale of missile technology, the Korean Peninsula and protection of intellectual property rights.

The future of Chinese-American relations can go in either of two opposite directions.

There are some in the United States who see the rise of a more powerful China as being inimical to the U.S. national interest. They fear that sometime in the next century, China will have the capacity to challenge American hegemony. Those who hold this view advocate a policy of containment.

If the United States were to pursue this path, it would put all of its allies and friends in Southeast Asia in a dilemma. None of us would like to be allied with America against China or allied with China against America.

There is a second school of thought in the United States. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is perhaps the most articulate spokesman for this point of view. He has argued that it is in America's national interest to engage, rather than contain, China.

If the United States chooses to follow this path, it should consider taking the following steps.

There should be regular high-level dialogues between Chi-nese and American leaders, conducted on the basis of mutual respect and understanding. The United States should reaffirm its commitment to the three joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act.

The administration should try to negotiate a bipartisan accord with Congress so that America can speak with one voice on China policy and stop using China as a political football in U.S. domestic politics.

Washington should encourage Beijing and Taipei to resume cross-strait talks, allow direct contacts between China and Taiwan, and exchange mutual gestures of goodwill and confidence-building.

Three-quarters of Singapore's population is of Chinese descent, and there are significant numbers of Chinese elsewhere in the region. But Southeast Asia's view of China is not based on common ethnicity.

Mahathir bin Mohamad, the Malaysian prime minister, is on record as saying that Malaysia refuses to see China as a military or political threat, instead preferring to see it as a friend and partner in the pursuit of regional peace and prosperity.

The writer, a former Singapore ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, is director of the Institute of Policy Studies in Singapore. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

Copyright © 2006 The International Herald Tribune