Is the Bigger ASEAN Better?
International Herald Tribune
June 2, 1997
Philip Bowring 

It is a done deal. There will be 10 members of the Association of South East Asian Nations, including newcomers Burma, Cambodia and Laos, to celebrate the organization's 30th birthday in July. Whether a bigger ASEAN is a better one has yet to been seen.

Is this like letting the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians into the European Union? Or is it like letting Albania, Romania and Bulgaria into European monetary union?

The demands of geography have now been satisfied. ASEAN is complete.

Plausible reasons for delay, such as government confusion in Cambodia, did exist that would not have placed the blame where it surely belonged — on the ruling junta in Rangoon.

But in the end it was felt that delay would waste an opportunity to exploit the symbolism of the anniversary and would imply humiliation of the leaders who had insisted most publicly that expansion would go ahead, President Suharto of Indonesia and Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia.

Three countries and 60 million more people could add proportionately to the group's international clout. And the additions mean a better balance between mainland and island Southeast Asia. Without Burma, which in size and history is the equal of Thailand and Vietnam, ASEAN would look lopsided. Admission of Cambodia and Laos enhances their role as buffer states in the competition between Thais and Vietnamese.

There is hope that ASEAN identity will reduce a junta-run Burma's dependence on China. Rangoon owes many favors to Beijing for military and diplomatic support.

Mainland Chinese business has established a leading role in Burmese trade. Together with the interests of ethnic Chinese from elsewhere, these groups, allied to the junta, are even more dominant in Burmese commerce than were their counterparts, Indian and Chinese, in the immediate postcolonial era before their expulsion by Ne Win.

The military junta will now feel the southerly pull of ASEAN gravity. Enhanced opportunities for market-oriented development will, it is assumed, spur economic reform within Burma.

However, there is plentyof potential downside for ASEAN. The group's international standing has owed at least as much to economic success and the prestige of durable leaders such as Suharto as to its strength as an institution. The current leaderships in Burma and Cambodia will have a negative impact on international per-ceptions, even among those with no interest in democratic procedures.

The clubby atmosphere in ASEAN has been bruised by arguments over Burma. It was always going to be hard to sustain clubbiness as ASEAN expanded, but the Burma issue could leave a lingering sour taste. For the first time, enlargement of ASEAN has become a contentious issue within the region.

Entry of three impoverished states will also complicate — possibly fatally undermine — ASEAN's ambitious free trade agenda.

Finally, and perhaps most important, enlargement will dilute ASEAN's ability to have much influence on the region's most difficult international issue, China's claims over the South China Sea.

Most recently, ASEAN has shown minimal solidarity with Vietnam and the Philippines in the face of Chinese provocation.

Earlier this year, China sent a drill ship to waters within Vietnam's Exclusive Economic Zone and on its continental shelf, and last month it was promoting its claim to the Scarborough shoal, which lies close to the Philippines coast. ASEAN leaders have found it easier to fire rhetorical salvos against Western interference than to risk offending China with strong statements.

As none of the three new members has any direct interest in the South China Sea, the likelihood of a united stand against China on an issue which affects five out of the seven current members is further reduced.

In short, inclusion of all 10 states is a formidable achievement for ASEAN, but it makes the pursuit of a coherent agenda that much harder.

Copyright © 2006 The International Herald Tribune