Indonesia Can Choose Compromise 
International Herald Tribune
May 21, 1999
Philip Bowring

The 30th anniversary of the riots which rocked Malaysia on May 13, 1969, came as Indonesia was set to begin the official campaign for its June 7 elections. It was a reminder of the dangers of communal politics, and of the remedies that can be applied to communal grievances. It was also a reminder of how 1969 events propelled the political career of Mahathir bin Mohamad to the premiership in 1981.

Those riots were the outcome of elections in a race-based party system which saw the ruling coalition lose seats to Chinese on the left and Muslims on the right. The Malay majority felt that its hold on political power was weakening and its leaders not doing enough to advance Malay economic interests.

Many in Indonesia today fear that dissatisfaction with the outcome of the voting could lead to similar riots, particularly if Suharto era forces do well enough to frustrate the reforms that society at large seems to believe are needed.

But comparisons should not be taken too far. Whatever the dangers of postelection riots here, they do not have the communal element of May 1969 in Kuala Lumpur, if only because the Chinese are not numerous enough to be a political force.

Communal politics in Indonesia is largely confined to peripheral localities. In most of the country, the election is a fierce but noncommunal battle between indigenous, national political parties. This is about Islam, secularism, nationalism, the army, wealth distribution and regionalism. Religion and wealth issues touch on ethnicity, but ethnic issues are not at the center of Indonesian politics.

That is not necessarily the impression one gets from reading much foreign media coverage, which has tended to focus on the problems of Timor, Aceh and Ambon rather than on the election itself. Some newspapers in the region, which at home are required to play down domestic and communal issues, are being accused by Indonesians of exaggerating turmoil here, and in particular the danger to Chinese. Westernembassies have not helped by implying that foreigners, too, could be in danger.

Fifty thousand Indonesian Chinese are said to be sitting out the elections in the comfort of Singapore, Hong Kong or California. Playing it safe may seem wise to some, but it is doubtful if it does much for the communal well-being of the 99 percent of Indonesia's 5 million Chinese who cannot afford to leave. Indeed, failure of Chinese to take an active (but noncommunal) part in the political process now that the opportunity exists could set back the integration process.

May 13 is also a reminder that riots, which left more than 200 dead, led to affirmative action to promote the economic and social position of the Malay majority. After 30 years the policy may have outlived its usefulness, inducing, like most long-run welfare schemes, Malay dependency. It has also contributed to cronyism via the links between affirmative action, political patronage and government decision-making. However, Malaysia's economic progress since 1969 owes much to the social stability it engendered.

Indonesia cannot and should not follow the Malaysian example. Its society is more diverse, its Malay/Chinese divide much less stark, its government machinery insufficiently competent. It lacks the sudden oil wealth that financed much of Malaysia's wealth equalization program. Indonesia anyway has even bigger issues, including regionalism and religious tensions, to worry about.

Nonetheless the Indonesian election is a reminder that the future government must at once meet popular aspirations for a wider sharing of wealth, and keep the confidence of Indonesian Chinese capital.

The political process can help or hinder. In Malaysia it is not forgotten how close to the abyss the nation went in 1969. Since then the promise of stability, at the cost of some liberties, has been a successful electoral formula for the ruling party.

So far the omens are promising that Indonesians remember both their 1965 massacres and their May 1998 disturbances, and will use the election to forge compromises. In turn that would help reduce resentment of Chinese commercial dominance.

But either way, unlike Malaysia in 1969, ethnic politics is not the main problem.

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