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**INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES, SINGAPORE**

# **The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73**

**Chandran Jeshurun**

**Occasional Paper No. 35  
October 1975**



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The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73  
Some Foreign Press Reactions

by

Chandran Jeshurun

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Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Price: S\$4.00

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Dr. Chandran Jeshurun's "The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73: Some Foreign Press Reactions" is the thirty-fifth publication in the Institute's Occasional Papers series. This series was inaugurated in 1970 and for the most part consists of discussion and other papers presented at the Institute's Occasional and In-House seminars.

Growing out of a larger research project currently in progress, Dr. Chandran's survey of foreign, especially British, press reactions to the growth of Malaysia's armed forces should be of considerable interest to students of Malaysian military affairs. Perhaps even more important, let's hope it will stimulate further work along these lines, and also on such other issues as the role of armed forces in national political, economic, and social development, in Malaysia as well as the other countries of the region. In the meantime, while wishing Dr. Chandran and his study all the best, it is clearly understood that responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in the work that follows rests exclusively with Dr. Chandran and his interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Institute or its supporters.

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## Acknowledgements

The research for this paper was done in London in 1974 while I was Commonwealth Visiting Academic Fellow at the Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London. I should like to express my gratitude to the Association of Commonwealth Universities for the award of the Fellowship. I am grateful for facilities made available at the Press Library, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, and at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. I should also like to acknowledge the comments made on an earlier version of this paper by Dr. Peter Lyon, Senior Lecturer in Commonwealth Studies, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, although I take full responsibility for the contents of this paper.





## The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73: Some Foreign Press Reactions

The role of the armed forces in the political evolution of the emerging nations of Southeast Asia is a subject of growing prominence in the study of the recent history of the region. Few generalizations about that role, however, have been possible due to the different ways in which the military has actually participated in the political processes of particular countries. Nevertheless, it is eminently clear from some of the most able accounts of the rise of the military in Southeast Asia that the personal role of individual leaders was a vital element in the political predominance of the armed forces as a whole.<sup>1</sup> There are, of course, those countries in which the military has remained inconspicuously in the background of political change, however much individual members of the armed forces might have been politicized during the struggle for independence. Of these, the armed forces in Malaysia certainly occupy an unique position in that not even the embryonic elements of the early Malay regiments appear to have played an active role in the pre-Independence nationalist movements. Consequently, it has been very much an axiom of the recent political history of Malaysia that, just as its governmental

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1 For a general introduction to the subject, see J.J. Johnson, ed., *The Role of the Military in Under-developed Countries*, Princeton, 1962; H. Daalder, *The Role of the Military in the Emerging Countries*, 's-Gravenhage, 1969; Jacques van Doorn, ed., *Military Profession and Military Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts*, The Hague, 1969; Lucien W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," *European Journal of Sociology* (Paris), Vol. II, No. 1, 1961, pp. 89-92. Among more detailed case studies, see Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Vol. XXXVI, Winter 1963/64, pp. 349-364; John P. Lovell and C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Military and Political Change in Asia," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XL, Spring-Summer 1967, pp. 113-123; Roger Paget, "The Military in Indonesian Politics: The Burden of Power," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XL, Fall-Winter, 1967/68, pp. 294-314; J. Stephen Hoadley, *The Future of Portuguese Timor: Dilemmas and Opportunities*, Occasional Paper No. 27, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1975.

system drew its inspiration from a Westminster model, so, too, the place of the armed forces within that system was adapted according to British precedents. The factors that have contributed to this singular character of the Malaysian armed forces could very well form the basis of a separate study.

Malaysia is possibly one of the few examples of an independent nation in post-war Southeast Asia which laid a somewhat limited emphasis on national defence planning during its formative years. Apart from the fact that its independence was a relatively recent event (the independent Federation of Malaya came into being in 1957 and Malaysia only in 1963), the country's external defence was assured by the Anglo-Malayan (Malaysian after 1963) Defence Agreement (AMDA).<sup>2</sup> Internally, however, during the early years of its independence, the country continued to face the threat posed by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) although the remnants of the CPM's guerilla forces had been driven out into the relatively inaccessible regions of the Thai-Malaysian border by 1960. This prevailing security situation, therefore, ensured that the strength of the armed forces was maintained, albeit at a more nominal level compared to the peak of the communist insurrection, known as the Emergency (1948-60). The major element of the armed forces, however, continued to be made up of the Army and the para-military units of the Police and neither the Navy nor the Air Force was appreciably developed in the immediate post-Independence period.

The imminent formation of the new Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and the international crisis that it provoked in the form of Indonesia's Confrontation policy inevitably resulted in greater attention being paid to the question of Malaysia's defence needs. Although Confrontation itself was the kind of hypothetical scenario for which the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement had been designed, the vastly extended national boundaries, particularly in the Borneo states, and the increased dangers of internal subversion necessitated an immediate physical expansion of the country's armed forces. The very process of the formation of Malaysia had generated sufficient political differences between the Malayan Government and the new member states that pointed to the

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2 For a comprehensive account of the Anglo-Malayan (Malaysian) Defence Agreement see D. Hawkins, *The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore: From AMDA to ANZUK*, London, 1972.

likelihood of new dangers to the internal security situation. This coupled with the firm intention of the central government to bear the brunt of the country's immediate defence needs independently of the Commonwealth defence umbrella meant that there would have to be adequate forces properly equipped to deal with any emergency. The separation of Singapore from the Federation in 1965 and the end of Confrontation in the following year do not appear to have altered the basic premises on which the Malaysian armed forces were built up in the post-1963 period.

Whereas the concept of maintaining internal security and coping with what was then described by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Tun Abdul Razak, as the "close defence"<sup>3</sup> of the country was a viable one so long as the AMDA deterrent remained, the situation was drastically changed by the British Labour Government's decision in 1968 to withdraw militarily from east of Suez by the mid-1970s with a much firmer date being eventually fixed as 1971.<sup>4</sup> The politics of the actual withdrawal, which had begun in the Borneo states as early as in 1966, together with the ambiguous nature of the alternative defence arrangements that were supposed to replace AMDA,<sup>5</sup> seem to have been largely responsible for the Malaysian Government adopting a more independent approach towards the development of the armed forces. It is, needless to say, impossible to determine precisely how much of the new thinking about the country's defence needs was due to

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3 *Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Ra'ayat*, Vol. V, No. 4, 29 May 1963, cols. 494-495.

4 See Philip Darby, *British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947-1968*, London, 1973; N. Brown, *British Arms and Strategy, 1970-80*, London, 1969, Chapter 2; L.W. Martin, *British Defence Policy: The Long Recessional*, Adelphi Paper no. 61, London, 1969; Hawkins, *Defence of Malaysia and Singapore*, Chapter III. For a somewhat spirited account of a possible earlier Malaysian reaction to continued military dependence on Britain, see David C. Hawkins, "Britain and Malaysia - Another View: Was the Decision to Withdraw Entirely Voluntary or Was Britain Pushed a Little?" *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), Vol. IX, No. 7, July 1969, pp. 546-562.

5 Chin Kin Wah, *The Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA: Some Observations on the Nature of an Evolving Partnership*, Occasional Paper No. 23, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1974.

purely military influence or the result of a fresh assessment of foreign policy goals and the potentialities of the domestic situation. Suffice to add that there had always been a certain lack of enthusiasm for AMDA among Malayan/Malaysian political circles which was expressed in an extremely truculent form by sections of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) component of the ruling Alliance Party when the British announced their decision to withdraw militarily from the region.

Admittedly, these pressures by themselves are unlikely to have accounted for the continued expansion of the Malaysian armed forces and it is quite conceivable that much more significant was the growing uncertainty in the international relations of the region which was signalled by the Sino-American rapprochement and the gradual disengagement of the United States from the Vietnam War. These trends severely limited the defence and foreign policy options open to small nations in Southeast Asia such as Malaysia.<sup>6</sup> It is also very likely that, just as the Malaysian proposal in 1970 for the neutralization of Southeast Asia was typical of the response to the new situation, the creation of a credible defence force was its irresistible corollary. However, Malaysia's efforts to beef up her armed forces in anticipation of the onerous burden of self-reliance in defence matters has attracted a certain amount of adverse publicity outside the country. A number of domestic issues and changes in multilateral defence arrangements have, to some extent, clouded most interpretations of the growth of the Malaysian armed forces over the ten-year period, 1963-73. Of these, undoubtedly the aftermath of the May 1969 post-election racial disturbances in Kuala Lumpur and various parts of Peninsular Malaysia has tended to colour many opinions as to the desirability for a small country such as Malaysia to concentrate her resources in building up her military strength.<sup>7</sup>

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6 Milton E. Osborne, "Post Vietnam: The End of an Era in Southeast Asia?", *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 45, No. 2, April 1969, pp. 223-233; W.A.C. Adie, "Possibilities for Regional Defence in the Post-Vietnam Era," *Revue du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l'Extrême-Orient* (Brussels), 1970/72, pp. 139-150; Peter Lyon, "Reorientations in Southeast Asia, ANZUK and After," *Round Table* (London), No. 246, April 1972, pp. 231-239.

7 Expenditure on defence and internal security formed 21.8% of the budget in 1973. See Malaysia, *The Expenditure Budget of the Federal Government, 1973*, Kuala Lumpur, 1973, p. vii.

In their most extreme form, these comments have bluntly predicted that the rapid and massive expansion of the Army in particular would lead ultimately to a military and, by implication, Malay political hegemony.<sup>8</sup> Not unexpectedly, too, the Malaysian response to the gradual phasing out of the Commonwealth defence role in Malaysia and Singapore provoked a somewhat questioning reaction from those quarters which had traditionally been accustomed to the view that neither Malaysia nor Singapore would ever be able to maintain their own independent forces. Far from surveying the entire range of opinions expressed about the growth of the Malaysian armed forces, it is the aim of this paper to focus largely on the reaction of the British press in particular and the apparent response of Malaysian official circles as a possible backdrop for the overt steps taken by the Malaysian Government to expand the armed forces.

As this paper is intended to be an examination of the reaction of the British press to the evolution of Malaysian defence policy during the ten-year period 1963-73, it is necessary at the very outset to establish that the strength of the armed forces has, in fact, increased during those years. Hitherto, most references to Malaysia's defence capability have merely alluded to the apparent increase in numbers, particularly of the Army, without specifically indicating the areas in which growth has taken place or attempting to trace the stages of expansion.<sup>9</sup> There is no doubt that in sheer numbers alone the strength of the armed forces has increased enormously from about 22,000 men in 1963 to probably more than 60,000 by 1973.<sup>10</sup>

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8 See especially, Peter Simms, "A Quiet Coup in Kuala Lumpur," *Life Magazine*, Asia Ed. (Tokyo), 21 July 1969; Felix V. Gagliano, *Communal Violence in Malaysia 1969: The Political Aftermath*, Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series no.13, Athens, Ohio, 1971, Reprint, pp. 34-35.

9 Hawkins, *Defence of Malaysia and Singapore*, Chapter IV: Gagliano, *Communal Violence in Malaysia*, pp. 34-35.

10 See Table I. The latter figure, it must be stressed, is widely quoted among non-Malaysian sources though official Malaysian figures fall far short of the alleged 60,000. In April 1971, for example, the Malaysian Chief of the General Staff is reported to have stated that the total strength of the regular forces would be 38,000 when development plans were finally completed. Hawkins, *Defence of Malaysia and Singapore*, p. 61, also cautions against treating any of the estimates as reliable.

While the Army itself accounts for almost four-fifths of this total, the rate of expansion of both the Navy and the Air Force has been even more impressive. The latter Services have evolved dramatically from their original roles as minor support wings in the armed forces into independent and viable units performing certain essential functions within the overall defence strategy. The question has thus been raised as to the strategic rationale behind the growth of the Malaysian armed forces and it is hoped to gain some idea of the motives in defence planning by tracing the various stages of growth.

In order to keep a study such as this in its proper perspective it would be also useful to begin with a brief survey of the background of political and diplomatic change since 1963. Undoubtedly, as has been pointed out, the formation of Malaysia in that year and Indonesia's Confrontation policy were events which necessitated the formulation of a more comprehensive policy towards national security. Although this resulted immediately in much-publicized steps to increase the strength of various elements of the armed forces, fundamental changes were, however, precluded by the fact of continued dependence on British defence assistance. It was not until the British announcement of a military withdrawal from east of Suez in 1968 that more positive steps appear to have been taken by the Malaysian Government to review its own defence policy. There is, however, something of a lacunae in the available information about specific official decisions with regard to the nature of the expansion of the armed forces that was being contemplated between 1968 and the ostensible decline of the concept of five-power Commonwealth defence cooperation by 1970. While this is entirely understandable from the Malaysian Government's security point of view, it is, nevertheless, a pity for one is forced to rely mostly on the data compiled by interested international bodies such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies in analyzing the thinking of Malaysian defence planners, especially in the post-1969 era.

In discussing the evolution of Malaysian defence planning it needs to be stressed that throughout the period from 1963 until late 1969 the dominating influence in external questions, which only too often involved defence, was that of the then Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Although Tun Razak, his deputy, held the defence portfolio since 1957 it would seem on the basis of the official record itself that his power was more nominal than

real and that the major decisions about defence emanated as much from the Prime Minister's Department as from the Ministry of Defence. To some extent this was due to the fact that Razak's position was, for most of the period, an invidious one in that, not only was defence regarded as an adjunct to external relations (or vice versa), a ministry which was also under the Prime Minister, but he was also burdened with other politically difficult responsibilities such as rural development. At the level of the Civil Service hierarchy, too, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence does not appear to have enjoyed the seniority and influence of his colleague in External Affairs, for example, who was often directly in touch with the Prime Minister on matters affecting defence policy.

It is not entirely clear what role, if any, the high command of the armed forces itself played in the various phases of defence planning from 1963 to 1973. Confrontation undoubtedly provided an unique opportunity for a certain amount of direct military influence on defence planning but most probably it was the British military withdrawal which opened up the higher echelons of the command structure to younger members of the senior personnel. For obvious reasons, however, it is impossible to characterize the precise nature of the role of this new blood in the plans that were drawn up for the expansion of the armed forces after 1968.

### The Malaysian Phase

As has been explained earlier, the imminent formation of the new Federation of Malaysia persuaded even the most pacific minds in Government of the need to consider some increase in the strength of the armed forces. As Razak stated in Parliament on 29 May 1963: "... we have now, as a result of Malaysia, a much bigger area to cover and a much longer coastline to protect; and we have, therefore, to expand our defence forces to look after this area .... Whatever policy we adopt externally, we must still have enough defence forces, firstly, to maintain law and order in our country, and secondly, to look after the close defence of our country."<sup>11</sup> Much earlier in the year, Razak

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<sup>11</sup> *Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Ra'ayat*, Vol. 1, No. 4, 29 May 1963, cols. 507-508.

had already spoken publicly of the "substantial expansion"<sup>12</sup> of the armed forces which was formally confirmed on 23 May in the Royal Address to a joint session of Parliament.<sup>13</sup> In asking for a Supplementary Vote of M\$75 million, Razak outlined some of the details of the proposed expansion. It was intended to immediately set up the 4th Infantry Brigade Headquarters for the Singapore area for which an additional battalion of the Royal Malay Regiment, the 8th, would be formed and there would also be a new Reconnaissance Squadron as well as facilities for increased output of officers and men from the existing training establishments. The Navy's strength was to be doubled with the acquisition of its first frigate, a coastal minesweeper and 4 fast patrol craft while the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) was to be shortly supplied with 4 Handley Page *Dart Herald* medium-range transports and 8 Sud-Aviation *Alouette III* helicopters plus a number of other trainer aircraft. The main emphasis of the 1963 plans was on the setting up of the 4th Infantry Brigade for the Singapore area, which was begun with the withdrawal of the Malaysian contingent from the U.N. Special Force in the Congo, and the provision for tactical troop movements to any part of Malaysia in case of emergency.

The Army in 1963 comprised 7 infantry battalions known as the Royal Malay Regiment, 1 regiment each of Reconnaissance and Artillery, and a number of support elements none of which came up to battalion strength. The mid-1963 proposals envisaged the immediate raising of a 4th Infantry Brigade in the Singapore area by bringing together the contingent sent to the Congo, 2 battalions of the Singapore Infantry Regiment and the 8th Battalion of the Royal Malay Regiment. By the end of the year, however, plans were set in motion for the establishment of 2 new Malaysian Ranger battalions with British military assistance and it was expected that the number of brigade formations would be increased to 5 by 1966.<sup>14</sup> Plans for the RMAF primarily involved the need to maintain direct supply and transport communications with the Borneo states and the first of the HP *Dart Herald* transport planes arrived in

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12 *The Times* (London), 14 February 1963.

13 *Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Ra'ayat*, Vol. V, No. 1, 23 May 1963, cols. 22, 202.

14 *The Times*, 30 December 1963; *Daily Telegraph* (London), 12 February 1964.

November 1963. In August 1963 the RMAF took possession of its 12 Sud-Aviation *Alouette III* helicopters thus giving itself greater air mobility. In July 1964 an order was placed with Vosper Thornycroft for 6 more high-speed patrol boats<sup>15</sup> and the Navy's first frigate was commissioned on 2 October at Plymouth.<sup>16</sup> This was the *KD Hang Tuah* (KD stands for "Kapal Diraja" or "His Majesty's Ship") which had seen service in the Second World War as the *HMS Loch Insh* but had undergone an extensive refit.

In short, the Razak proposals of 1963-64 did not envisage a particularly large increase in the size of the Malaysian armed forces although they did suggest that the government was aware of the urgency of developing selected areas where they were notably weak, especially in the vastly different security context of the new federation. However, in seeking the approval of Parliament for increased defence expenditure in December 1964, Razak did explain that the government's policy was only to have sufficient armed forces, fully trained, equipped and mobile.<sup>17</sup> On the basis of actual plans in the pipeline at that time, it would seem that his comments were intended largely to assuage the apprehensions of party supporters in the face of several landings by Indonesian infiltrators. Indeed, his statement in Parliament can be read to mean that no spectacular change in defence policy was anticipated although there was much talk of conscription of between 12,000 and 15,000 men between the ages of 21 and 29<sup>18</sup> and of setting up an ammunitions factory in the country. Apparently, the government had every confidence in meeting an Indonesian military threat with the armed might of AMDA, the more so as Britain's huge task force began to assemble in the Malaysian region.<sup>19</sup>

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15 *The Times*, 3 July 1964.

16 *Ministry of Defence (Royal Navy) News Release*, No. 146/64, London, 25 September 1964; see also *Flight International* (London), 15 October 1964.

17 *The Times*, 14 December 1964.

18 *The Times*, 5 June, 3 July 1964.

19 *The Times*, 12 August 1964; *Sunday Times* (London), 13 September 1964.

The central government was not to be disappointed in the publicity value of its unusual activity over armed forces expansion in 1963 and 1964 for Lee Kuan Yew, the Singapore Prime Minister, was quick to warn of the dangers of having a large standing army and the possibility of a military takeover.<sup>20</sup> In marked contrast to the qualms of people like Lee Kuan Yew, however, was the perspicacious comment of *The Guardian* that the Malaysian Government's attitude was "all sound and few deeds." It complained that even the modest budget for 1964 had been met with a howl of indignation from business quarters who seemed to care little about the nation's defence as demonstrated by the poor response to the National Defence Fund. Doubts were also raised as to the government's own seriousness on the grounds that the much-publicized recruiting campaign after the proclamation of conscription had been allegedly a dismal failure. *The Guardian* correspondent's sharp word of advice was that there should be more sense of purpose in the government's defence plans which could begin by not observing fasting in the armed forces during the Muslim month of Ramadhan.<sup>21</sup> The Tunku attempted to answer some of this criticism by announcing that training centres would be set up immediately in every state as a follow-up of conscription. But the persistent attacks in the British press caused Razak to declare that Malaysia could not afford to have a large standing army which was why the government intended to develop the Territorial Army as a reserve of fighting men.<sup>22</sup>

It became clear as the Razak plan of 1964 was implemented that the main emphasis of the proposed expansion was on building up the Air Force and Navy. In July 1965, for example, Razak admitted that negotiations were in progress for the purchase of a jet strike aircraft with a view of establishing 1 or 2 squadrons at the earliest possible date. He also stated that the current strength of 5 squadrons was to be expanded by 2 squadrons of De Havilland Canada *Caribou* STOL transport planes and *Alouette III*.

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20 *The Times*, 14 December 1964.

21 *The Guardian* (London), 7 January 1965.

22 *The Times*, 18 January 1965; *Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), 17 January 1965. Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent citations refer to the Malaysian edition of the *Straits Times*.

helicopters respectively.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile, the Navy's increased patrolling duties were acknowledged by a further order, in addition to the 10 that had already been acquired, for 14 fast patrol boats from Vosper.<sup>24</sup> There was nothing in these proposed measures that could be possibly construed as being at variance with the position that Razak had taken in stating Malaysia's defence plans. They were certainly consonant with Malaysia's continuing reliance on AMDA, and, as such, were unaffected by the novel situation that was created by the separation of Singapore later in 1965. It was mainly this event and its inevitable repercussions on AMDA that were to lead to the next phase in the growth of the Malaysian armed forces.

### The Uncertain Phase

As stated earlier, the emphasis in armed forces expansion since 1963 had been mainly in improving the transport and support operations of the Air Force and in assuming increased naval patrolling duties. However, it can be argued that the new squadron of jet strike aircraft that had been envisaged early in 1965 was probably intended to be the nucleus of an eventual fighter squadron as it was essential to have sufficient experience with a trainer jet before proceeding to the more sophisticated supersonic fighters. The project was, no doubt, conceived in earnest for in March 1966 it was announced that an order had been placed for the Canadair CL-41S, an armed version of the *Tutor* standard primary jet trainer.<sup>25</sup> The new squadron would be based at what was described as a "strike base" in Kuantan on the east coast of the peninsula.<sup>26</sup> In these circumstances, the decision,<sup>27</sup> in February 1966, to acquire

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23 *The Times*, 23 July 1965; *Straits Times*, 5 June 1965; *Flight International*, 29 July 1965. STOL stands for "Short Take-Off and Landing."

24 *Financial Times* (London), 1 July 1965.

25 *Straits Times*, 26 February 1966; *Flight International*, 17 March 1966.

26 *Straits Times*, 22, 23 December 1965.

27 *Financial Times*, 14 February 1966; *Straits Times*, 15 February 1966. This was the somewhat unfortunate *KD Hang Jebat* which was launched in December 1967 but was only delivered in September 1972 after

the latest Yarrow-design frigate equipped for anti-submarine warfare and armed with surface-to-air *Seacat* missiles at a cost of M\$30 million would seem to have been indicative of a more ambitious long-term defence strategy. It is no doubt possible that the evaluation of the vessel had already begun long before the separation of Singapore for Razak had, after all, spoken as early as in 1964 of the eventual acquisition of "frigates" for the Navy. Nevertheless, the choice of this particular vessel for a small navy with highly specialized tasks has not ceased to baffle many unless it is to be regarded as part and parcel of an overall external defence strategy designed to reduce the heavy dependence on AMDA.

Singapore's separation, it seemed, only served to strengthen the conviction of both governments, Malaysian and Singaporean, to affirm repeatedly in public pronouncements their unshakable faith in the so-called concept of the "indivisible defence" of both countries. It seems only too obvious now, in retrospect, that it was, in fact, no more than a ploy to draw the other Commonwealth partners into a new defence arrangement. Its object was virtually lost with the collapse of the Joint Defence Council and the Combined Operations Committee that had been hastily set up after separation, not to speak of continuing strains in Malaysia-Singapore relations as the end of Confrontation approached.<sup>28</sup> The whole question of the British disengagement and its aftermath in Southeast Asia is too complicated to be dealt with in any depth here but it can hardly be exaggerated that, apart from the quest for a new policy that it brought about in Malaysia, it was to leave a deep impression on the Malaysian commanders who took over to the extent that they were often more critical of the British than even the politicians in Kuala Lumpur.

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a delay of almost three years due to innumerable problems including labour strikes at the shipyard and a mysterious fire during construction. It is said, not altogether in jest, among RMN circles that it was renamed the *KD Rahmat* (meaning "divine blessing") largely because of the Tunku's superstitious belief that Hang Jebat, who was a rebel in Malay mythology, was an ill-judged choice of name! See Hawkins, *Defence of Malaysia and Singapore*, p. 61, for one explanation of the unusual delay in the completion of the frigate.

28 *The Times*, 22 February 1966; *The Guardian*, 31 March 1966. See also Chin Kin Wah, *Five Power Defence Arrangements and AMDA*.

An indication of the government's awareness of the new problems that would be caused by the withdrawal of the British military presence was the announcement by the Tunku as early as in July 1966, that the Army was to be increased to 20 infantry battalions while there was to be further development of the Navy and the Air Force.<sup>29</sup> There appears to have been an earnest review of Malaysia's defence needs in 1966 for Razak revealed in Parliament on 3 February 1967 that the government had decided on big increases in the armed forces. Although the details of the proposed expansion were not divulged at the time, it was significant that Razak made special mention of the fact that the British and Australian Commanders of the Air Force and Navy, respectively, were to be replaced by Malaysians by the end of the year.<sup>30</sup> The available data show that the Army, in 1966, already had 12 infantry battalions comprising 8 battalions of the Royal Malay Regiment, 2 Malaysian Ranger battalions, and 2 mobilized Territorial Army battalions.<sup>31</sup> They were to be apparently augmented by another 4 infantry battalions including a commando unit but, other than these, there was no further information as to the proposed increases in the armed forces.<sup>32</sup>

Despite the fact that the unspecified nature of the Malaysian defence plans was strongly reminiscent of the Razak proposals of 1963-64, they appear to have sufficiently impressed *The Times* to merit a rather scathing leader on 4 February 1967 against what was described as Malaysia's "unnecessarily ambitious programme." It chided the Malaysian defence planners for not appreciating that "they cannot afford, and do not need, to replace the departing British presence man for man, weapon for weapon." *The Times* did not attempt to disguise its lack of confidence in the ability of the Malaysian armed forces to continue the British "hearts and minds" campaign in East Malaysia. The Malaysian

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29 *The Times*, 1 August 1966; *Sunday Times* (Singapore), 31 July 1966.

30 *The Times*, 4 February 1967; *Straits Times*, 4 February 1967.

31 *The Military Balance* (London), 1965/66, p. 36. I have attempted to give the breakdown of the infantry regiments on the basis of unofficial information.

32 *Straits Times*, 19 February 1967. Report of a speech by the Chief of the General Staff at the passing-out parade of the 4th Battalion, Malaysian Rangers.

Government's efforts to attain some form of air power also came in for severe criticism: "Jet fighters, though attractive as a status symbol, hardly meet the requirements of the country." Arguing that Malaysia was too small to be able to defend itself alone against external aggression, *The Times* suggested that the Navy, for example, should be developed "to deter piracy in local waters rather than plan on the assumption that its foremost task will be to confront an enemy navy at sea."<sup>33</sup>

The entire editorial in *The Times* had, in fact, been taken almost word for word from a lengthy article in *The Times Supplement* on Malaysia of 31 August 1966 by its Defence Correspondent.<sup>34</sup> The blaze of publicity given to the Malaysian attempts to achieve a more independent defence role in 1966 was no doubt responsible for the Defence Correspondent's undue anxiety, but the editorial was certainly intended to be more than merely patronizing. In his reply to these criticisms on 24 February 1967, Razak insisted that the plans that he had outlined in Parliament were the "absolute minimum to preserve stability and a good climate for development." In any case, he declared, *The Times* was in no position to know what the actual defence plan was and pointed out that it had been largely based on a study of Malaysia's defence needs by a British team in 1962. Razak also repeated that it was not the government's policy "to have a large defence force, but one sufficient to defend our borders and our shores and to look after our internal security."<sup>35</sup> In view of the still unsettled state of affairs consequent upon the British withdrawal, Razak prudently did not dwell on his statement in 1966 that Malaysia's aim was to be able to defend herself without outside assistance.

The evidence is strongly suggestive that in 1966 and 1967, at least, Malaysia was wavering uneasily not only in her future defence plans but even more in her foreign policy.<sup>36</sup> It was a time when the revival of the Association

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33 "Malaysia Defends Itself," *The Times*, 4 February 1967.

34 "Civic Demands on the Armed Forces," *The Times Supplement*, 31 August 1966.

35 *The Times*, 25 February 1967.

36 In July 1967 Razak revealed that the original plan after Singapore's separation to raise another 10 battalions had been scrapped and the aim was to limit the expansion of the infantry to 20 battalions. *Straits Times*, 8 July 1967.

of Southeast Asia (ASA) in an expanded form with Indonesian participation was being actively pursued leading to the successful establishment of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in 1967. On the other hand, the great gathering of anti-communist countries at Seoul in South Korea, early in 1966, and the formation of the Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC), in which Malaysia became a member, pointed to another possible direction for the future.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the continuing pressure in Britain for a firm policy of military withdrawal from east of Suez coupled with constant talk of a possible British base being set up in Australia were subjects which no doubt caused much concern among Malaysian defence authorities. A more immediate concern than these alarming prospects for the future was the interminable sources of friction with the Singapore Government, many of which vitally affected Malaysian defence interests.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, *The Times'* attack in 1967, seen in the context of poor relations with Singapore, was even more intolerable to the Malaysians because of the nagging suspicion that the British press, for one, tended to side with the latter.<sup>39</sup> Thus, as Malaysia approached the prospect of the Five Power Commonwealth defence talks, scheduled to be held in 1968, it was inevitable that some viable alternatives for her own defence should have been considered.

### The Planned Phase

It might well be said of Malaysia's response to the changes in regional security and international relations in Southeast Asia in 1968 that her policy seemed to veer between vague hopes of a temporary breathing spell through some arrangement among the five Commonwealth powers, on the one hand, and her desire for a regional balance of power as implied in the proposal for the neutralization of

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37 Peter Lyon, "Strategy and South Asia: Twenty-Five Years on," *International Journal* (Toronto), Vol. XXVII, 1971-72, pp. 333-336.

38 See for example, *The Observer*, 12 March 1967; and Hawkins, *Defence of Malaysia and Singapore*, Chapter IV.

39 See particularly Peter Boyce, *Malaysia and Singapore in International Diplomacy: Documents and Commentaries*, Sydney, 1968, pp. 131-134, Documents 9 and 12.

Southeast Asia.<sup>40</sup> It was by then eminently clear to her defence planners that more energetic steps were necessary to prepare for the 1970s but, outside Malaysia, her growing defence bill was beginning to cause some concern as to the motives of the government.<sup>41</sup> There seems little doubt, however, that defence planning began to be more closely based than before on foreign policy considerations and there were also signs that the consequent overall expansion and development of the armed forces became a more coordinated and coherent effort. It also appears that important changes in the command structure and in the highest ranks of the armed forces, particularly in the Army, were made at about this time.

In the first half of 1968 prior to the Five Power Commonwealth defence talks which were held in Kuala Lumpur in June, the Malaysian Government's initial response to the revised British decision to accelerate their military withdrawal appeared to take the form of a newly-found enthusiasm for some sort of non-aggression and neutrality pacts with neighbouring countries.<sup>42</sup> Malaysia's disenchantment with her traditional alliance partners and the prospect of continuing tension with the Philippines over Sabah pointed unmistakably to the need to adopt a more independent and self-reliant defence policy and various utterances by her leaders at the end of the year clearly testified to this realization.<sup>43</sup> As *Le Monde* commented much earlier in

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40 See, for example, *Financial Times*, 10 August 1967; Justus M. van der Kroef, "Malaysia-Singapore: Neutrality or Regional Defence," *World Review* (Brisbane), Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1969, pp. 3-15; P. Darby, "Stability Mechanisms in Southeast Asia," *International Affairs* (London), Vol. 49, Nos. 1 and 2, January and April 1973, pp. 23-24 and 204-218; T.B. Millar, "The Five-Power Defence Agreement and Southeast Asian Security," *Pacific Community* (Tokyo), Vol. 3, No. 2, January 1972, pp. 341-351.

41 *Financial Times*, 15 January 1968.

42 *Parliamentary Debates, Dewan Ra'ayat*, Vol. IV, No. 26, 27 January 1967, Cols. 4332-4336; Interview between the Tunku and Mr. Max Suich, 29 January 1968, *Foreign Affairs Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur), Vol. 1, Nos. 7 and 8, March 1968, pp. 53-54.

43 Address by the Tunku to the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents' Club, 5 March 1968, *Foreign Affairs Malaysia*, Vol. 1, Nos. 7 and 8, pp. 76-82; "Southeast Asia in the Seventies," text of a speech by

the year, both the search for a regional security pact and the desire to be non-aligned in her external relations were to some extent a reflection of the attitudes of "the 'young Turks' in the Malaysian majority party."<sup>44</sup> The strategic build-up of the armed forces was thus becoming irresistible by the end of 1968 and was to provoke much recrimination against the Malaysian Government's growing intransigence in the matter among foreign press commentators.

In January 1968, for example, the Air Force began taking delivery of its new Sikorsky S-61A-4 troop transport helicopters from the United States which had, in fact, been ordered before the defence review was necessitated. The additional squadron of Caribou transport planes was also set up in 1968. The more significant changes in the armed forces organization were the rapid promotions of senior officers during the year. Until 1968 there had been only 1 full General, Tunku Osman bin Tunku Mohd. Jewa, but by June of that year the Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Abdul Hamid Bidin, was made a full General in preparation for assuming the post of Chief of the Armed Forces Staff in 1969 when Gen. Tunku Osman was due to retire. Earlier on, Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Ismail, who had been entrusted with the heavy responsibility of taking over from the British in East Malaysia as Director of Operations, had been promoted to Maj. Gen. and there was a further upgrading of ranks and posts in the Defence Ministry involving a number of the younger Colonels.<sup>45</sup>

The Five Power defence talks in Kuala Lumpur in June 1968 erased whatever lingering hopes there remained in the minds of both the Malaysian and Singapore Governments as to the British military withdrawal being appreciably slowed down.<sup>46</sup>

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Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie, Permanent Secretary for Foreign Affairs, at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, 16 December 1968, *Foreign Affairs Malaysia*, Vol. 1, Nos. 9 and 10, 1968, pp. 1-10; *Straits Times*, 5 December 1968.

44 *Le Monde* (Paris), 31 January 1968.

45 See *Straits Times*, 10 and 29 January 1968; *Sunday Times* (Kuala Lumpur), 30 June 1968; *Straits Times*, 12 October and 26 November 1968.

46 *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), 27 June 1968.

As her initiative on neutrality pacts and regional security arrangements had, so far, produced little material success,<sup>47</sup> Malaysia was faced squarely with the task of bolstering up particular aspects of her armed forces. Similarly, Singapore lost no time in quickly implementing her revised defence plan which was indicated by the decision to acquire a naval force of fast patrol boats as well as the orders that were placed in June-July 1968 for refurbished Hawker *Hunter* jet fighters and BAC 167 *Jet Provost* trainer/light strike aircraft.<sup>48</sup> Much of the emphasis in the expansion of the Singapore armed forces appears to have been on air defence and one of the early items of weaponry acquired was a section of *Bloodhound* surface-to-air missiles from Britain.

In monetary terms, the new emphasis on defence expansion in Malaysia can be gauged by the provision of M\$382 million for defence expenditure in the 1969 budget.<sup>49</sup> By January 1969 there was official talk in Malaysia of acquiring a squadron of supersonic fighter aircraft which, according to the *Financial Times* had "raised some eyebrows." It was insinuated in the British press that Malaysia's interest in supersonic jets was an irrational reaction to the recent Anglo-Singaporean *Hunter* deal and Britain's earlier opposition to the sale of *Hunters* to Malaysia on the grounds that it would have sparked off "a senseless arms race between Malaysia and Singapore." While the questionable tactical advantage of such aircraft as the French Dassault *Mirage* or the English Electric *Lightning*, in both of which the Malaysians had expressed interest, appeared to be the main grounds for the criticism of the *Financial Times*, it was obvious that London had been keenly disappointed at the dismal failure of the concept of Malaysia-Singapore's "indivisible defence."<sup>50</sup>

The renewed spate of Anglo-Malaysian bickering that the supersonic jet fighter issue engendered in January 1969 took place against a background of what the *Financial Times* described as "the Tunku's comings and goings between

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47 *Japan Times* (Tokyo), 13 May 1968; 17 June 1968.

48 *Baltimore Sun*, 23 January 1968; *The Times*, 27 March 1968; *Daily Telegraph*, 4 July 1968; *The Guardian*, 6 July 1968.

49 Malaysia, *Expenditure Budget of the Federal Government, 1970*, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, pp. ix-x.

50 *Financial Times*, 23 January 1969.

London and Paris."<sup>51</sup> While the Prime Minister was actively engaged in what were believed to be serious negotiations for either the *Mirage* or the *Lightning*,<sup>52</sup> government back-benchers in Kuala Lumpur launched a virulent attack against Britain, not only for showing undue favour to Singapore, but also for having tried to allegedly fob-off outmoded *Hunters* to Malaysia.<sup>53</sup> It was no doubt galling for the Malaysians to learn at the height of the controversy that the Americans had been apparently responsible for asking Britain not to sell advanced supersonic aircraft to Malaysia.<sup>54</sup>

There is some uncertainty as to the real causes of the acrimonious debate over the acquisition of supersonic jet fighters for the RMAF in January-February 1969. Initially, it appeared that the anger in Kuala Lumpur, especially among the more vocal members of UMNO, was due to the Anglo-American attempt to prevent Malaysia from strengthening her air defences while Singapore was able to proceed with her own plans unhampered. Later, the Tunku seemed to have capitalized on the issue by asking Britain to provide continued air support with 2 squadrons of RAF *Lightnings* at Labuan.<sup>55</sup> Finally, the British responded by offering through the High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur the sale of 6 *Hunters* for the time being with a promise of a squadron of VTOL *Harrier* jets by 1971.<sup>56</sup> The Malaysians, however, did not take up these eleventh-hour British proposals and contented themselves for the moment by accepting the Australian gift of 10 F-86F *Sabre* jets in April.<sup>57</sup> As late as June 1971, the Malaysian Government was still insisting that it did not have any

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51 *Ibid.*

52 *Le Monde*, 19-20 January 1969.

53 *Straits Times*, 24 January 1969; *The Guardian*, 24 January 1969; *The Times*, 25 January 1969.

54 *The Times*, 27 January 1969; *Straits Times*, 26-27 January 1969; *New York Times*, 25 January 1969.

55 *The Times*, 28 January 1969; *Daily Telegraph*, 30 January 1969; *Financial Times*, 13 February 1969.

56 *The Times*, 14 February 1969. VTOL - Vertical Take-Off and Landing.

57 *Straits Times*, 16 April 1969.

plans to buy supersonic jet fighters of the *Mirage* type<sup>58</sup> and it was only in mid-1972 that a final decision was made to order 16 of the Northrop F-5E *Tiger II* fighters from the United States.<sup>59</sup>

In the wake of the internal political upheaval caused by the May 13 disturbances in 1969 it would be entirely reasonable to find the government more than unduly concerned about the state of the armed forces. In fact, however, there is little evidence to suggest that the new threats to internal security had accelerated the pace of expansion in the armed forces which had been going on since 1963. Admittedly, the emphasis on air defence which had been highlighted by the controversy in January-February 1969 gave way to more urgent measures of which the immediate raising of new infantry battalions received somewhat undue publicity. From about mid-1969 there appears to have been much less information about the armed forces that was divulged to the public and it is only possible, consequently, to have a rough idea of the actual plans that were implemented. It is, nevertheless, clear that the immediate building-up of the strength of the Army, in order to cope with large-scale internal disorder as well as to conduct counter-insurgency operations against the communist guerillas in Sarawak and on the Thai-Malaysian border, was not the only aspect of armed forces expansion that received official attention.

Between 1970 and 1973, intermittent reports, some officially confirmed and others based only on information from potential sources of supply, have tended to indicate that one of the major areas of concentration in the development and growth of the Malaysian armed forces is the updating of equipment that was becoming fast out-of-date as well as the acquisition of technically more sophisticated weaponry. The British withdrawal and the virtual failure of a workable Five Power Defence arrangement have also contributed to an enormous increase in the range of duties that have had to be undertaken by the armed forces and it would appear that a number of special units have been formed for this purpose. Lastly, much of the training needs to meet the new tasks have had to be met within the country and the

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58 Letter to the Editor from the Malaysian Information Attaché in London, *The Guardian*, 14 June 1971.

59 *Straits Times*, 6 January 1973.

establishment of the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College in 1972 was one more proof of this fact.

It was revealed in 1973 that the armed forces were already using new infantry small arms in what was apparently a full-scale conversion from the old Belgian SLRs (Self-Loading Rifles) of 7.62mm calibre to the American 5.56mm M16 automatic rifles as well as the HK33 German rifles, the latter being locally assembled.<sup>60</sup> It was also known that since 1971 Malaysia had been buying Panhard M3/VTT APCs (Armoured Personnel Carriers)<sup>61</sup> and the latest American V100 and V150 *Commando* APCs. There had, in addition, been numerous changes in the combat kit of the infantry soldier and research is reported to be in progress on dehydrated rations for extended operations in the jungle.<sup>62</sup> Similarly, the Air Force and air defence requirements, in general, have been steadily met with the setting up of Malaysia's own helicopter flying training school in 1975<sup>63</sup> and the deployment of Low Level Air Defence camps in strategic parts of the country.<sup>64</sup> It is the Navy, however, that appears to have received a spectacular boost to its strength through the acquisition of the powerful French-built missile boats of the "*La Combattante II*" class<sup>65</sup> armed with *Exocet* surface-to-surface missiles since 1972 and plans are already being put into operation for a permanent naval base at Lumut on the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia.<sup>66</sup> It is no wonder, then, that the allocation for the Ministry of Defence in 1973 totalled M\$681 million of which M\$101.3 was for development expenditure. Together with the allocation for internal security, the expenditure on defence and security formed 21.8% of the total budget for 1973 which

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60 *Sunday Times* (Kuala Lumpur), 24 June 1973; *Straits Times*, 8 September 1973.

61 *Le Monde*, 22 September 1971.

62 *Sunday Times* (Kuala Lumpur), 24 June 1973.

63 *Straits Times*, 5 September 1973.

64 *Straits Times*, 15 August 1971; 11 March 1971.

65 *The Guardian*, 25 August 1970; *Le Monde*, 25 August 1970; *Straits Times*, 14 August 1970.

66 *Sunday Times* (Kuala Lumpur), 2 December 1973.

was exceeded only by the sums allocated for social services.<sup>67</sup>

More than the mere physical expansion that has been going on in the armed forces since 1963, however, it is undoubtedly true that the increased responsibilities following the British withdrawal coupled with the peculiar problem of nation-building after 1969 have resulted in an overall rise of military concerns in national affairs. In the field of external affairs, too, security questions have dominated the various initiatives that Malaysia has taken and it would be strange if the need was not felt for expert military opinion. Fortunately, despite the short time in which the armed forces have had to play this expanded role, there does not seem to have been any acute problem either over shortage of qualified officers or in managing such a large organization.<sup>68</sup>

Although an attempt has been made in this paper to bring some degree of coherence to the gradual evolution of Malaysian defence policy between 1963 and 1973 by examining the process of physical expansion of the forces in the light of the reactions that it caused among foreign observers, it would be unrealistic to assume that a true picture of the actual situation can thereby be formed. Even the details of the strength of each branch of the three services as given in Table 1 are, at most, an approximation based on a number of sources which do not, themselves, agree on every item of logistics and manpower.<sup>69</sup> This is, of course, not unexpected as few governments on the whole make available complete and precise information on the strength and quality of their armed forces for reasons that are quite obvious.

Similarly, it has been found particularly difficult to collate the statistics of financial expenditure on the armed forces over the ten-year period as there is undoubtedly much confusion between figures for annually recurrent operating

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67 Malaysia, *Expenditure Budget of the Federal Government, 1973*, Kuala Lumpur, 1973, p. vii.

68 Without more thorough study it would be impossible to reach such a conclusion as the *New York Times* did that "the rapid expansion of the Malaysian army has diluted its quality." *New York Times*, 18 July 1971.

69 *Military Balance, 1963-* ; SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments, 1968/69*, Stockholm, 1970.

expenditure and those for purely development costs. In order to illustrate the lack of accuracy in the figures that are sometimes quoted, it might be pointed out, for example, that the official Expenditure Budget for 1970 contained defence allocations of M\$380.3 million for ordinary expenditure and M\$155 million for development costs.<sup>70</sup> The *Military Balance*, published annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, gives a figure of M\$803 million as the total defence budget for 1970 but the difference of M\$267 million between this sum and the official figure was, in fact, the allocation for the Ministry of Home Affairs and Royal Malaysia Police.<sup>71</sup> Similarly, for 1973 another source quotes a figure of M\$860.1 million as the defence allocation but the total defence budget for that year only amounted to M\$681 million.<sup>72</sup> Thus, it must be clear that too much reliance cannot be placed on some of the popularly quoted figures on Malaysian defence spending and the problem is further compounded by the fact that estimated expenditure was quite often revised during the course of the financial year. Needless to say, precise information is vital in evaluating the expansion of the armed forces and without a clear idea of the different forms of defence expenditure it is virtually impossible to work out the financial costs of the growth that took place between 1963 and 1973.

An attempt has been made in this short paper to demonstrate that much of the storm that was raised in the international, especially British, journalistic circles over the allegedly unnecessary expansion of the Malaysian armed forces was itself something of an over-reaction. It has been suggested that each major decision involving the expansion of the armed forces should be measured as far as possible against the changing attitudes and responses of the Malaysian Government to a variety of domestic and international issues during the period 1963-73. The press criticism of Malaysia's defence plans initially was

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70 Malaysia, *Expenditure Budget of the Federal Government, 1970*, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, p. vii.

71 *Military Balance, 1970/71*, p. 66.

72 *Asia Research Bulletin* (Singapore), Vol. 2, No. 8, January 1973, p. 1494c; cf. Malaysia, *Expenditure Budget of the Federal Government, 1973*, Kuala Lumpur, 1973, p. vii.

directed against what was considered to be a certain lack of purpose in the way the government was going about the serious business of meeting the Indonesian threat in 1963. It is easily understandable that such feelings were entertained in Britain where it was no doubt felt that Malaysia was shrewdly taking refuge against Indonesia's Confrontation under the AMDA defence umbrella. It has been shown, however, that in Kuala Lumpur the immediate consideration was to expand the fundamental role of the armed forces to cover the larger area of Malaysia in accordance with the concept of internal security and close defence. On the other hand, the worsening relations between the Federal Government and Singapore which eventually led to separation in 1965 was another scenario in which the growth of the Malaysian armed forces was greatly misunderstood.<sup>73</sup> But there was not, in fact, any significant change in the direction of the country's defence policy both prior to and after separation which justified the journalists' alarm. Finally, the continuing growth of the armed forces in the late sixties and early seventies was in no sense fundamentally affected by the internal disturbances of May 1969, as has been sometimes insinuated, and was much more of a response to impending changes to the international order of the region. Thus, public outcry against any increase in defence spending by newly-independent nations, particularly in the context of the rise of military governments, can often be as misinformed or myopic as the governments that indulge in such policies themselves.

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73 See, for example, "Sunshine or Storm Clouds?," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 7 January 1965.

Table 1: Expansion of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73\*

	1963	1973
I. Total armed forces	c. 22,000	56,000 <sup>1</sup>
II. Army: Total strength	19,000	46,500 <sup>2</sup>
Brigade groups	3	9
Infantry battalions	7	30
Commando battalions	-	2
Reconnaissance regiments	2	3
Artillery regiments	2	3
Signals regiments	-	3
III. Navy: Total strength	2,000	4,800 <sup>3</sup>
Frigates	-	2
Coastal minesweepers	3	6
Fast missile strike craft	-	8
Patrol craft (less than 100 tons)	10	24
IV. Air Force: Total strength	1,000	4,700
Supersonic fighters		
(Northrop F-5E <i>Tiger II</i> )	-	16 (1975)
Subsonic fighters (F-86F <i>Sabre</i> )	-	18
COIN light strike aircraft		
(CL-41S <i>Tebuan</i> )	-	20
Twin and single <i>Pioneer</i> short-range transport planes	14	-
HP <i>Dart Herald</i> 401 medium-range transport planes	-	10
DHC-4A <i>Caribou</i> transport planes	-	12
Sikorsky S-61A helicopters	-	16
Sud-Aviation <i>Alouette III</i> helicopters	-	25
Short <i>Bulldog</i> 102 trainer aircraft	-	16

\* This is by no means an authoritative count particularly as regards the manpower strength. It has been largely adopted from the *Military Balance* and newspaper and journalistic sources.

1 The total number of bodies in the Military, Logistics and Training Services is 82,214. See Malaysia, *Expenditure Budget of the Federal Government, 1974*, Kuala Lumpur, 1973.

2 This figure naturally includes the other supporting services which are not listed specifically below.

3 The *KD Hang Tuah* is now a training ship.

