


The Politics of Federalism




SYED KECHIK
IN EAST
MALAYSIA

BRUCE ROSS-LARSON



Party Composition of Sabah Governments



Prominent party leaders

USNO: Tun Datu Mustapha, Tan Sri Said Keruak, Harris Salleh, Dzulkifli Abdul Hamid, Ghani Gilong. **UPKO:** Donald Stephens, Peter Mojuntin, Ghani Gilong. **SCA:** Khoo Siak Chiew, Peter Lo. **Berjaya:** Tun Fuad Stephens, Harris Salleh, Peter Mojuntin.

COVER KEY

1	2	3	4
5	6		7
8	9		10
11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18

- 1 Tunku Abdul Rahman
- 2 Tun Abdul Razak
- 3 Tun Datu Musapha
- 4 Tun Mohammed Fuad Stephens
- 5 Datuk Hussein Onn
- 6 Tengku Tan Sri Razaleigh Hamzah
- 7 Datuk Abdul Rahman Yakub
- 8 Ghafar Baba
- 9 Tan Sri Said Keruak
- 10 Tan Sri Temenggong Jugah
- 11 Datuk Ghani Gilong
- 12 Datuk Peter Mojuntin
- 13 Datuk Harris Salleh
- 14 Datuk Abdul Taib Mahmud
- 15 Datuk Dzulkifli Abdul Hamid
- 16 Thomas Kana
- 17 Penghulu Tawi Sli
- 18 Datuk Stephen Kalong Ningkan

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Cover design by Banyan Productions Pte Ltd, Singapore.



THE POLITICS OF FEDERALISM



PERDANA
LEADERSHIP
FOUNDATION
YAYASAN
KEIMPINAN
PERDANA

Bruce Ross-Larson

The Politics of Federalism

SYED KECHIK IN EAST MALAYSIA



PUSTAKA PERDANA



1006169



Singapore
Bruce Ross-Larson
1976



First published December 1976 by
Bruce Ross-Larson
195-b Penang Road, Singapore 9

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Printed in Singapore by Times Printers Sdn. Bhd.



Contents

Preface	page	vii
Map of Southeast Asia		xi
Map of Sabah and Sarawak		xii
Prologue		1
1 Political Storm in Sabah (1965-66)		16
2 Cabinet Coup in Sarawak (1966)		35
3 Sabah's First General Elections (1966-67)		54
4 Formation of the Mustapha Government (1967)		76
5 From Politics to Development (1968-70)		93
6 Continuing Detours in Politics (1969-71)		112
7 Apart from the Inner Circle (1971-75)		131
8 The Birth of Berjaya (1974-75)		145
9 The Coup Forestalled (1975)		163
10 USNO's Fall from Power (1976)		186
Epilogue		213
Abbreviations and Acronyms		221
Sketches of Principal Personalities		223
Index		229





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PERDANA

Preface

Politically biographies typically focus on the public personalities seen as principal actors on the political stage. Often, however, behind-the-scene strategists play an equally important role in determining the course of political events. This was the case in Sabah during the period 1965-76 when Syed Kechik bin Syed Mohamed, a Malay lawyer who previously had been working in government in the Malaysian federal capital of Kuala Lumpur, acted as political adviser to Tun Mustapha and his United Sabah National Organization (USNO). A highly symbiotic relationship developed between these two men, and many political strategies instrumental to Tun Mustapha's rise and reign as Chief Minister of Sabah were the result of this combination. Syed Kechik's influence spread on occasion to Sarawak, where he was also involved in shaping fundamental political circumstances. It seemed reasonable, therefore, to undertake an account of political events in Sabah, and to lesser extent in Sarawak, from the viewpoint of Syed Kechik—a viewpoint distinct from the reportage in the Malaysian press, from the interpretations in other books written on East Malaysian politics, and from that of the public personalities involved.

Pursuing this viewpoint necessarily skews the description of events away from the objectivity of a dispassionate overview. But any analysis of political events, indeed any history, is subjective to the extent that analysts select certain decisions,

actions, and events to highlight and develop their arguments. This has never deterred them from wearing the mantle of objectivity. The approach here adopted also skews the portrayal of many personalities involved, particularly the antagonists, to the pointed and not the fully three-dimensional. As a result, the facets turned for purposes of the narrative are simply that—single facets of multi-faceted personalities—and the reader should appreciate that those cast in a less than favourable light have their intrinsic virtues, just as those portrayed favourably have their intrinsic flaws.

A few comments should be made regarding nomenclature, particularly Malay terms. A *kampung* is a village. A *penghulu* is a village headman, called an *orang tua* in Sabah. These traditional positions have been institutionalized and many *penghulus* and *orang tuas* now receive salaries as appointed government servants and wield their limited powers over domains larger than a single village. The *Istana* is the Head of State's official residence in Sabah, just as the *Astana* is the Governor's official residence in Sarawak. The word, *bumiputra*, can be literally translated as 'son of the soil' and was brought into parlance to distinguish the indigenous peoples from the non-indigenous, ie. the Chinese and Indians who migrated to what presently is Malaysia. The term should not be confused with Bumiputera, the abridged name of Party Bumiputera Sarawak, even though the meaning is the same.

The majority of other Malay terms used are titles. *Tang di-Pertuan Agung* is the title of the Supreme Ruler, or King, of Malaysia; *Tang di-Pertuan Negara* is the title of Sabah's Head of State. *Tunku* and *Tengku* are hereditary titles denoting links with the royal families of the peninsular states. *Datu* is a hereditary title denoting links with the Sulu Sultanate in Sabah and with the Malay aristocracy in Sarawak. *Tun* and *Tan Sri* are conferred titles, accorded with federal awards made by the *Tang di-Pertuan Agung*. *Datuk* is also a conferred title, accorded with awards made by the rulers in each state. Because most of the personalities discussed in this book have received awards conferring the title, *Datuk*, I have chosen to preface their given names with their title only once, subsequently referring to them by their given name. The exception is Datuk Hussein Onn, the present Prime Minister, and it is


hoped that the other *Datuks* do not feel slighted. Titles accompanying federal awards, on the other hand, preface given names with each mention after the time of their conferral. Thus, Datu Mustapha of the prologue is subsequently referred to as Tun Mustapha because of his receiving the award in 1964. Some of the personalities have changed their names during the period covered by the narrative, and the name used corresponds with their name at the appropriate point in time. Thus, Donald Stephens in the earlier chapters is referred to as Tan Sri Mohammed Fuad Stephens after his conversion in 1971 and as Tun Mohammed Fuad Stephens after 1973. Because of the likely difficulties for readers unfamiliar with Malaysian names, a glossary of personages frequently mentioned has been appended for reference.


The term, East Malaysia, also requires clarification. For many years, Sabah and Sarawak were referred to as East Malaysia and the states of the Malay Peninsula as West Malaysia. In 1973, it was decided that this sounded too much like East and West Pakistan, with all the attendant unsavoury connotations, and an official directive was issued to government bodies and the media instructing that the West Malaysian states should subsequently be referred to as Peninsular Malaysia and the East Malaysian states as Sabah and Sarawak. Because many overseas readers may know of Malaysia, but not Sabah or Sarawak, the earlier practice is adhered to in certain contexts for the sake of clarity. It should also be noted that all currency figures are in *ringgit*, the Malaysian currency unit popularly referred to as the Malaysian dollar. In 1976, the Malaysian dollar was roughly equivalent to US \$0.40 and 20 New Pence Sterling.

Research for this book consisted mainly of interviews and the analysis of government documents, personal files, and newspaper reports. Three published works were also useful: Margaret Roff's *The Politics of Belonging: Political Change in Sabah and Sarawak*, published by Oxford University Press in 1974; Michael Leigh's *The Rising Moon: Political Change in Sarawak*, published by Sydney University Press in 1974; and R.S. Milne's and K.J. Ratnam's *Malaysia—New States in a New Nation: Political Development of Sarawak and Sabah in Malaysia*, published by Frank Cass in 1974. These works are

essentially scholarly and cover political events in Sabah or Sarawak only up to the early 1970s, but were valuable for reference and the corroboration of various dates and electoral figures. I am indebted to a large number of people in Kota Kinabalu, Kuching, and Kuala Lumpur who gave their time to discuss with me the political situation in Sabah and Sarawak over the past decade, and particularly to Syed Kechik who graciously submitted to long hours of interviews. Without their cooperation, this book would not have been possible. It is hoped that the product of these variegated discussions is fairly portrayed and that the descriptions and conclusions are regarded by none as misrepresentation or as a breach of their confidence. Naturally, I assume sole responsibility for all the views and statements of fact herein.

Bruce Ross-Larson
October 1976





Prologue

At a press conference in Singapore on May 27, 1961, Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman Al-Haj proposed that the independent Federation of Malaya be incorporated with the British-controlled territories of Singapore, Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah (North Borneo) to create a new nation, Malaysia. Each of the territories had cultural, historical, and administrative ties with Malaya, and in this era of British decolonization, the granting of self-rule to four small states by merging them with an already independent nation would simplify problems of divestiture and salve concerns about their future viability. Most Singapore leaders were receptive to the proposal, having for years advocated a link-up with Malaya. Leaders in the Borneo states, having given little thought to independence, were a bit bewildered. Brunei, particularly, was chary of being incorporated into a larger federal structure and eventually decided to pull out from the negotiations that ensued. Leaders in Sabah and Sarawak were similarly less than enthusiastic, at least at the outset, about the federal prospect. They were outraged that the proposal had been mooted without their having first been consulted, and they were concerned that their states would be colonized by Malaya, which was far more advanced politically, economically, and administratively. Still, they were necessary components of the federal patchwork. If Singapore alone were to merge with Malaya, its predominantly

Chinese population would reduce the majority enjoyed by Malays in Malaya to an uncomfortable minority, and this was unacceptable to Malay leaders. By bringing Sabah and Sarawak in, the Malays and other indigenous groups would constitute a majority.

Ethnically, the Borneo states are far more complex than Malaya and Singapore, where the essential breakdown is Malays, Chinese, and Indians. In Sabah, for example, 38 separate ethnic groups were listed in the 1960 census. For political purposes, however, the populations of Sabah and Sarawak, which respectively totalled about 500,000 and 750,000 in 1960, are considered as comprising non-Muslim indigenous people, Muslim indigenous people, and Chinese. This is not strictly correct, as leaders in Kuala Lumpur were later to discover, but it does provide a general picture. In Sabah, Kadazans (28%) are the largest of the non-Muslim indigenous groups, and the Muruts (4%) are the other non-Muslim indigenous group of note. The Bajaus are the largest Muslim group, followed by the Bruneis, Suluks, and Illanuns, and together these groups constitute more than one-third of the population. The Chinese (24%) and various other ethnic groups make up the balance. In Sarawak, the Ibans (30%) are the largest non-Muslim indigenous group followed by the Land Dayaks (8%). Sarawak Malays and Melanau are both Muslim groups and form nearly one-quarter of the populace. The Sarawak Chinese (30%) and a smattering of smaller groups make up the balance. This ethnic complexity gave rise to less than clear-cut political party alignments, unlike in the Peninsula where, with the exception of opposition parties, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) represented the great majority of Malays, the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) the Chinese, and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) the Indians.

At the time of the Tunku's proposal, Borneo politics were undeveloped. Traditionally, the lands of Sabah and Sarawak had respectively been under the control of the Sultans of Sulu and Brunei. Sabah came under the control of the North Borneo Chartered Company in 1881, when it was made a British protectorate. Sarawak, under the control of the *raj* first established by Sir James Brooke in 1841, also became a

protectorate in 1881. As protectorates, the territories were ruled almost privately—one as a company, the other as a personal domain—until the Japanese Occupation in 1941. Although Malays were drawn into the civil service in Sarawak, and Kadazans into the civil service in Sabah, the notion of the noble savage prevailed as a latter day anachronism, and few efforts were made to involve the people of these territories in their own governance. When the British Military Administration picked up the pieces in 1945, it was clear that the third Rajah Brooke and the penniless Chartered Company were not able to undertake reconstruction. Consequently, the sovereignty of both territories was transferred to the British Crown in 1946. Although it was Britain's intention to prepare Sabah and Sarawak for eventual independence, colonial rule did not differ substantially from private rule, and few constitutional advances were made over the next fifteen years. Legislative and executive councils operated in both colonies, but their memberships were largely appointive. It was only after the proposal for Malaysia was made that political activity got into full swing.

The first political party established in Sabah was the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO). Founded in August 1961 by Donald Stephens, a timber man and newspaper owner, the party attracted the support of Kadazans of the West Coast and Interior Residencies. This was followed in December 1961 by the formation of the United Sabah National Organization (USNO) by Datu Mustapha bin Datu Harun, a traditional Suluk leader who had served as a native chief and, like Stephens, had been a member of the early legislative and executive councils. Although USNO was structured as an all-native party, its membership comprised mostly Bajaus, Suluks, and other coastal Muslim groups, and it was controlled largely by Suluks because of Datu Mustapha's position as President. In January 1962, the United National Pasok Momogun Party (Pasok Momogun) was established by G.S. Sundang, a Murut leader, to provide a multi-racial alternative to UNKO, which seemed to be controlled by Kadazans without regard for other Dusuns. Immediately thereafter, two Chinese parties were registered. The United Party, based in Sandakan, was founded by

Khoo Siak Chiew, and the Democratic Party, based in Jesselton, by Peter Chin. These merged a few months later as the Borneo Utara National Party (BUNAP). In general, the Christians supported UNKO; the Muslims, USNO; the Chinese, BUNAP; and the Muruts and animist Kadazans, Pasok Momogun.

In Sarawak, party formation began with the establishment of the Sarawak United People's Party (SUPP) in June 1959 in anticipation of the Kuching municipal elections scheduled later that year. From the outset, its most influential leaders were Stephen Yong and Ong Kee Hui, both prominent businessmen, but its multi-racial, socialist platform opened it to infiltration by leftists and communists. In April 1960, Party Negara Sarawak (PANAS) was formed by Abang Haji Mustapha, a First Division Malay leader, as an essentially Malay, although avowedly multi-racial, party to oppose the political influence of the Chinese in SUPP. The Sarawak National Party (SNAP) was formed in March 1961 and supported by Second Division Ibans and Fifth Division Chinese. Stephen Kalong Ningkan, a Second Division Iban who had worked as a hospital assistant with the Shell Company in Brunei, was the party's first Secretary-General and became its most influential spokesman. The Barisan Rakyat Jati Sarawak (Barjasa) was formed as a Muslim alternative to PANAS in December 1961 and drew most of its support from Second and Third Division Malays and Melanaus. Two legally-trained civil servants instrumental in Barjasa's early growth, although not at first in the membership because they held government posts, were Abdul Rahman Yakub and his nephew, Abdul Taib Mahmud. With the growing prospect of Malaysia, the Sarawak Chinese Association (SCA) was established in July 1962 by businessmen Ling Beng Siew and William Tan as a conservative alternative for Foochows and Teochews to the vehemently anti-federal SUPP, which was predominantly Hakka and Hokkien. The Party Pesaka Anak Sarawak (Pesaka) was also established in July 1962 as an Iban party that drew its support from Third Division Ibans to counter the Second Division Iban thrust of SNAP. Temeng-gong Jugah, the traditional leader of Third Division Ibans, left PANAS to join with four Third Division penghulus in

forming the party, and he became its first President. Given the avowed multi-racialness of most of Sarawak's political parties, the relationship between ethnic group and party affiliation was more blurred than in Sabah.

Just as public opinion in Sabah and Sarawak over the Malaysia question was divided into pro-Malaysia, anti-Malaysia, and anti-independence camps, so also were the leanings of political parties. The opening platforms of most parties in the two territories were against Malaysia, but gradually the sentiments shifted in favour of the federal concept, with varying degrees of concern for the rights to be retained by the states. The most resolute anti-Malaysia party, SUPP, maintained its stance for many years. Chinese parties initially opposed the Malaysia concept because of their concerns about what federation might mean for their business interests. Non-Muslim native parties, seeing opportunities for economic advancement vis-a-vis the Chinese, favoured Malaysia, but with the proviso that state's rights be jealously guarded. Muslim native parties were the most vocal in their support of the Malaysia concept and the least concerned about safeguards, seeing the possibilities of their being politically linked with the powerful UMNO in the Peninsula.

Several official bodies were formed to resolve these differences of opinion and assess whether the people of the Borneo states in fact wanted to join Malaysia. The Malaysian Solidarity Consultative Committee (MSCC) was formed in 1961 to consider the full implications of federation for the would-be partners. The Cobbold Commission, named for its chairman, Lord Cobbold, assessed the leanings of people in Sabah and Sarawak towards the federal conglomerate. After two months' surveying in all reaches of the two states, the commission released findings that roughly one-third of the people favoured early federation with Malaysia and were not overly concerned about the conditions associated with their entry; a second third favoured early federation, but with reservations about the conditions of entry; the last third either wanted full independence before considering a link-up with Malaya or a continuation of British rule. The report of the commission was submitted in July 1962 and recommended that Sabah and Sarawak enter the proposed federation with

rigid protection of their rights. It was subsequently announced on August 1, 1962 that the decision had been made in principle to form Malaysia by August 31, 1963. An Inter-Governmental Committee was created to draw up necessary legislation — the Malaysia Agreement and the Malaysia Act—and incorporate the requirements of the member states.

In these negotiations, the Twenty Points emerged as the conditions for Sabah's entry, echoing the sentiments of leaders in Sarawak. These points dealt largely with constitutional safeguards to protect their positions in the federation regarding such matters as religion, language, education, immigration, representation in the federal government, and control of the civil service. The intent of the safeguards was to give state leaders the illusion of having greater control than they in fact possessed, but illusions which they were to take very seriously. It was also agreed that the federal government, during the first five years of Malaysia, would allocate \$300 million in federal funds to Sarawak and \$200 million to Sabah. In essence, the various official bodies were a whitewash that enabled proceeding with what had been agreed between leaders in the various territories, and it is probable that few people in either of these states really comprehended what Malaysia was all about.

To get the process of constitutional development rolling in Sabah and Sarawak and better prepare their leaders for participation in the federation, elections were held in Sabah in December 1962 and May-June 1963 and in Sarawak in April-June 1963. The electoral pattern in both states was three-tiered: representatives were popularly elected to district and local councils, electors were chosen from among these representatives, and members of the legislative assemblies in both states (called the Council Negeri in Sarawak) were selected by the electors. Cabinets were formed by parties forming the majority in coalition, and after Malaysia was formed, the assemblies selected representatives to the federal parliament. The results of these council elections are important to an understanding of what later would unfold.

In the Sabah elections to 137 district and local council seats, USNO won 53, UNKO 39, the SCA 27, Pasok Momogun 12, and independents six. Four electoral colleges, one for

each of the four residencies, were formed from among these councillors to select the members of the Legislative Assembly, where seats were allocated as follows: USNO eight, UNKO four, SCA four, and Pasok Momogun one. Before the elections, USNO, UNKO, the SCA, and Pasok Momogun united to form the Sabah Alliance Party, along the lines of the national Alliance Party of UMNO, MCA, and MIC in the Peninsula, but nevertheless contested against each other in constituencies where predominance was not clear-cut. Of the 429 councillors elected to the 24 district councils in Sarawak, SUPP won 115 seats, independents 117, PANAS 59, SNAP 48, Barjasa 44, Pesaka 43, and the SCA three. From among themselves, the councillors selected representatives to five divisional councils, one for each of the five divisions, and these representatives selected the 36 members of the Council Negeri, who subsequently were augmented by three nominated members appointed by the cabinet and three *ex officio* members. Before the elections, Barjasa, SNAP, Pesaka, and the SCA united to form the Sarawak Alliance Party. PANAS had originally joined, but pulled out just before polling began to enter into partnership with SUPP. The improved bargaining which accrued to the Sarawak Alliance was reflected in the distribution of seats in the Council Negeri. Of the 36 selected seats, Pesaka was given 11, SNAP six, Barjasa five, and the SCA one; PANAS and SUPP, as non-Alliance parties, were given five seats each. Three independents were also selected, one of whom, James Wong, joined up with SNAP as a result of his being appointed Deputy Chief Minister. Of the three appointed seats, two went to the SCA and one to Barjasa.

The ambivalence in Sabah and Sarawak about the proposed federation was removed by a series of external events. In June 1962, the Philippines restated their long-standing claim to Sabah, questioning the legitimacy of the original transfer from the Sultan of Sulu to express their discontent over the Malaysia concept. Indonesia was also unhappy with the proposed amalgamation of a string of neighbouring states which, unified, might later represent a threat. Their diplomatic discontent developed into the policy of armed confrontation that persisted until 1966. And in December 1962, the Azahari rebellion in Brunei and

northern Sarawak, which sought to unite the people of all Borneo against colonial oppression, evoked instead a greater understanding of the threat of communism to small, independent states. All three actions, intended to discourage the formation of Malaysia, strengthened the resolve of member states to proceed as quickly as possible. These conflicts did nevertheless make it necessary to bring in an international body, the United Nations Malaysia Mission (UNMM), and assess once again the desire of the people of Sabah and Sarawak to join the federation. This had the effect of deferring for a short while the time-table for merger. Although Malaysia was originally to have been formed on August 31, 1963, the UNMM did not release their endorsement rejoicing the objections of Indonesia and the Philippines until September 13. Sabah and Sarawak, after being granted independence from Britain on August 31, merged with Singapore and Malaya to create the new nation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963. In Sabah, Donald Stephens was appointed Chief Minister, and Datu Mustapha, the Head of State; in Sarawak, Stephen Kalong Ningkan was appointed Chief Minister, and Datu Abang Openg, the Governor.

In the years preceding independence, political leaders in Sabah and Sarawak focussed almost exclusively on the issue of statehood. In Malaysia, they had suddenly to turn their attentions to governing the states in the federal context. This necessarily resulted in the emergence of inter-party tensions which required fundamental readjustments in political alignments and methods.

The first realignment in the Sabah Alliance took place before the June 1964 elections, in which the district and local council electors again selected the members of the Legislative Assembly because of the increase in the number of seats from 18 to 32. Immediately before the electors met, UNKO and Pasok Momogun merged to form the United Pasok-momogun Kadazan Organization (UPKO). (The Sabah National Party, formerly Borneo Utara National Party, subsequently merged with the Sabah Chinese Association (SCA), a community organization, and adopted their name.) The inter-party negotiations for seats were conducted within the Sabah Alliance framework, which by this time included

the Sabah Indian Congress (SIC), and the allocations were amicably agreed upon. USNO was given 14 of the elected seats, UPKO 11, the SCA seven; each of the four parties was given one of the four nominated seats, and the Speaker's post, the thirty-seventh seat, was held by a retired civil servant with no active party affiliation. Although USNO enjoyed numerical superiority in the Assembly, UPKO wielded greater power in the cabinet because of Stephens' holding the Chief Minister's post. Tun Mustapha had expected that, as Head of State, he would retain many functions previously in the purview of the all-powerful Governor. As it became increasingly apparent that most of these powers resided with the Chief Minister, Tun Mustapha's frustration increased. In December 1964, he refused to ratify the approval of Donald Stephens' recommendation for State Secretary. Although the issue was minor, it nevertheless was indicative of underlying tensions. To resolve the impasse, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman was called upon as mediator. The solution was for Stephens to resign as Chief Minister on December 31 and take up the post of federal Minister for Sabah Affairs. Replacing him as Chief Minister was Peter Lo, previously federal Minister without Portfolio, who was to act as a caretaker until general elections resolved the question of which party and person would hold the Chief Ministership. Tun Mustapha stayed on as Head of State, but the Sabah Alliance was decidedly more fragile than ever before.

In Sarawak, too, there were tussles between the Muslim native and non-Muslim native parties. One issue was legislation proposed to revise the zoning system for land. Previously, all natives had been issued a plot of land which could not be sold. This made it difficult for the Chinese to acquire land, and the new legislation was designed to make this easier. Before the bill was to be tabled in May 1965, a native alliance was formed, comprising Pesaka, Barjasa, and PANAS, but excluding SNAP and the SCA. Chief Minister Ningkan immediately expelled Barjasa from the Sarawak Alliance and sought to retain the support of Pesaka. The result was the formation of a new Sarawak Alliance of SNAP, Pesaka, and the SCA that excluded the Muslim parties, Barjasa and PANAS. After pressures from Kuala

When Malaysia was formed in 1963 to amalgamate the independent Federation of Malaya with the British colonies of Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah, there was more optimism about joint prospects than understanding of the problems involved in forging a new state and nation. The first years were fraught with difficulties, both political and constitutional, that resulted in the separation of Singapore in 1965 and in threats of secession in Sarawak and Sabah. Although these threats were greatest in the months immediately following the Singapore separation, secessionist sentiment in the East Malaysian states persisted well into the 1970s.

In late 1965, a Malay lawyer by the name of Syed Kechik was instructed by Kuala Lumpur's top leadership to go to Sabah to do what he could for the cause of federalism. He thought he would be away from the federal capital for a few months at most, but ended up staying there permanently. Initially, he acted as an arm of federal persuasion. Subsequently, he was instrumental to the rise and reign of Tun Mustapha as Chief Minister of Sabah. His influence spread on occasion to Sarawak, where he was also involved in shaping fundamental political circumstances. This book is the account of Syed Kechik's influence on the course of politics in Sabah and Sarawak, and of the influence of those politics on his life.

The author graduated from Yale in 1966 and joined the Peace Corps for two years' service in Kenya. He returned to the United States to work in banking and institutional investment, and in 1970 and 1971 undertook the writing and photography for a series of eight books published by the U.S.-based Creative Educational Society. Ross-Larson arrived in Malaysia in 1972 and became a lecturer at the Mara Institute of Technology's School of Mass Communications. He edited *Sabah and the Sabah Foundation*, published in 1974, and together with three Malaysians authored *Contemporary Issues in Malaysia*, to be published in 1977 by Heinemann Educational Books. He currently is writing *Malaysia: 2001*, also to be published in 1977.

S/M \$7.50 (US\$4.00 postpaid)

