JULIAN PAGET

COUNTER-INSURRENCY CAMPAIGNING

With a Foreword by
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Director of Army Training
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Counter-insurgency is a subject of vital interest to the free world, and in particular to Britain, since we have been involved in it continuously since 1945. It is at least as deserving of detailed study as nuclear or conventional warfare.

There have been many personal accounts of counter-insurgency campaigns but no official histories and very few unofficial ones. This book is a detailed study of three major campaigns waged by Britain—Malaya 1948-60, Kenya 1952-6 and Cyprus 1954-8. It is written by a professional soldier who is in a position to analyse them and draw from them conclusions which provide lessons for the future. Counter-Insurgency Campaigning will be of particular value to Servicemen and all those concerned with the conduct of the cold war, but it is by no means a purely military treatise and the clear, brief and readable histories of each emergency will provoke much general interest, both in this country and abroad.

Colonel Paget joined the Coldstream Guards at the beginning of the war and served with the Guards Armoured Division until 1945. From then until 1948 he was Adjutant of a Coldstream Guards Battalion during the British counter-insurgency campaign in Palestine. He is well qualified to write on this subject for since then he has spent two years in Kenya, has visited Cyprus and Greece, and for six months in 1965 was with the Security Secretariat in Aden.

It is becoming increasingly obvious that conventional methods are of little use in the guerrilla wars which are almost the only action seen by the British soldier today, and to all those who are concerned about the future of the Western world, this book is of exceptional importance.
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FOREWORD

by Lieutenant General D. B. Lang, C.B., D.S.O., M.C.

former Director of Military Training

Since the end of the Second World War, we have been training and preparing our fighting forces for a third conflict, possibly even more disastrous than any yet, because it might include nuclear weapons. But at the same time, British and many other troops have been engaged in active operations in many parts of the world. From British Guiana to Vietnam, security forces have been waging a relentless war against insurgent elements; and there seems to be no end in sight. In fact it has been suggested that this is the Third World War, and that this will be the pattern of international conflict for at least a generation to come. Certainly the pattern of events over the last twenty years suggests that we have not seen the end of ‘small wars.’

Algeria, Kenya, Cyprus and Malaya, to mention but a few, have all been the scene of bitter and prolonged insurgency. Much has been written about them, particularly by journalists, who have produced vivid pictures of the scene and the personalities. But very few of these writers have had the professional knowledge to search further below the surface to analyse the mechanics of this modern type of warfare.

It is to this problem that Colonel Julian Paget has turned his attention. As a professional soldier who has been concerned at one level or another in several counter-insurgency campaigns, he has made a study from a military point of view of three of them, Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, and then drawn some valuable conclusions from the analysis which he has made.

Just as our knowledge and experience of conventional war have evolved over the centuries, there is now a parallel fund of
new experience on which to draw for future counter-insurgency campaigning. But most of the authoritative writing on the subject has come from our opponents, such as Mao Tse-tung, General Giap and General Grivas; Colonel Paget helps to fill this deficiency in a very clear, interesting and well-argued book.

Beginning with Malaya and continuing with Kenya and Cyprus, he indicates the military problems facing the civil and military commanders and studies the steps they took to solve them, as well as analysing their methods of command and control. He shows how the triumvirate of ‘civil, military and police’ set to work, and how completely they relied on Intelligence to enable them to operate effectively.

He is rightly insistent on the necessity for the closest coordination and joint action by all the elements involved in any counter-insurgency. For centuries we have experienced a lack of co-operation between soldiers and civilians as well as between the Services themselves, and this was only rectified in the last war. Colonel Paget demonstrates clearly that successful counter-insurgency operations are dependent on a joint effort by all elements involved, working under one overall commander, either military or civil.

This book emphasizes that the end in this type of warfare must always be a political one; it is not for the soldier to decide the future of Ruritania—that is a matter for the statesmen. But the soldier expects to be given, and is entitled to demand, a clear political directive, which must include, and in fact be built around, the object which the civil Government wishes to be attained. The directive will inevitably involve the civil administration and also the police; once the police are called upon to act outside their normal duties, they will require the support of the military. So the triumvirate is formed of the civil administration, police and soldiers, all working together to attain the political aim.

This situation is not a new one. The British Army has been engaged in giving aid to the civil power for centuries, and the lack of publicity that it has received is a measure of its success. What is new is the probability of this situation continuing be-
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Beyond the foreseeable future, and also the glaring publicity under which the Security Forces now have to operate. It is these factors which have given world importance to what, half a century ago, would have received little recognition, and no encouragement outside its local environs.

Today the circumstances are very different. A country which finds the normal diplomatic procedures too ponderous or ineffective can seek to achieve any aggressive aims by instigating insurgency instead of hazarding all on a declaration of war. It will need a considerable issue to provoke a nuclear conflict, but insurgency can always be labelled as a ‘struggle for freedom’, and can be promoted, financed and encouraged with a minimum of risk. Publicity can be used by the sponsors of the revolt to portray the insurgents as patriots and sufferers under the oppression of brutal and powerful ‘imperialists’; and there is no lack of publicity today for such a cause. That is why Colonel Paget insists so rightly on adequate public relations coverage for our own cause in the early stages of any counter-insurgency campaign; it is much easier to create a well-informed public opinion from the start rather than to correct an unfavourable image which has already been projected to the world by the opposition.

When I was Director of Army Training, it was my task to train the Army for the next war; this presupposes that one knows the form which the next war can be expected to take. But unless we are going to start it ourselves, we shall have to conform, at least in the early stages, to the pattern initiated by our opponents, and they have a wide choice ranging from nuclear war down to plain terrorism. Based on the pattern of the last twenty years, it seems highly probable that insurgency in one form or another will play a part in most future campaigns in which the British Army is involved. We must therefore study counter-insurgency as seriously as we have in the past studied nuclear and conventional warfare, for it is a type of warfare which has come to stay.

Colonel Paget’s book is a valuable contribution to current military thought on this important subject, and I commend it
not only to all members of the 'civil, military and police' triumvirate, who may be involved at any time in counter-insurgency, but also to all who are in any way interested in the conduct of the cold war and the keeping of the peace.

*Foreword*
In 1965 I found myself in Aden in a staff appointment directly concerned with the planning of measures, both civil and military, to be taken to defeat the insurgents then operating in those parts. The problems that arose were remarkably diverse and complex, but they were seldom completely new; they had almost all cropped up before in some previous Emergency, such as Palestine, Kenya, Cyprus or Malaya, and it would have been most helpful to be able to study this past experience and learn from it.

An excellent Joint Services pamphlet has now been compiled on counter-insurgency, but it was not available then, and there seemed few sources that could be tapped. So I began to devote my siesta hours to making my own research into past insurgencies, in an endeavour to find an answer to the many unresolved riddles piling up in my In tray. It proved to be such an absorbing subject that my notes eventually grew into this book, which I hope may help others who find themselves involved in counter-insurgency to produce better solutions than I ever managed and with rather less effort.

I would like to express my very sincere thanks to those who have helped me in the writing of my book. Field Marshal Harding and General Sir Gerald Lathbury have both most kindly given me of their personal experience and wisdom; Otto Heilbrunn, a great authority on guerrilla warfare, has also given me valuable comment and advice. I am particularly grateful to Brigadier Pat Hayward for his constant encouragement and for reading proofs and pointing out errors; also to the staff of the Ministry of Defence and Army Library for their assistance over research.

Julian Paget
Chapter 1

COLD WAR CAMPAIGNING

During the last twenty years, the British Army has been nominally at peace, and yet it has been involved in more than thirty operations of war, ranging from limited wars in Korea and Suez to ‘policing’ operations in Hong Kong and Jamaica. At times, there have been three major campaigns in progress at the same moment, and at the time of writing (1966) British forces are deployed in no less than eleven ‘active service’ or potentially operational areas. There has in fact been no time since 1945 when British troops have not been involved in operations somewhere in the world, as can be seen from Appendix A, which shows every campaign involving the British Army between 1945 and 1966.

The conflicting ‘peacetime’ commitments of our Army today are clearly demonstrated by the ceremony of Trooping the Colour in London on the occasion of the official Birthday of The Queen. It might be thought that the traditional pageantry of this ceremonial parade was as far removed from active service as it was possible to be. Yet in fact, at least half of the 1,200 men on parade will either be overseas on operational tasks within a year of the parade, or else they will have returned from abroad within the previous twelve months.

In June 1966 for example, one Guards battalion taking part in the parade had returned from Aden the previous October, and another was under orders to move to that theatre the next.
October. Among the troops lining the Mall was the Guards Independent Parachute Company, which had until recently been in Malaysia, carrying out deep penetration patrols along the Indonesian border. Many of the Household Cavalry troopers on parade would, before the end of the year, be changing their chargers for armoured cars in either Germany or Malaysia. Yet another Guards battalion would soon be faced with two tasks in addition to its ceremonial duties; it had to prepare to move in October to Germany, where it would train for both nuclear and large-scale conventional war in a completely new role as an Armoured Personnel Carrier Battalion. At the same time, they would, while still in the United Kingdom, be required at times to be at seven days’ notice or less to move anywhere in the world as part of the national Strategic Reserve.

This triple task—calling as it does for a tunic and bearskin in one locker, combat clothing in another and jungle green in yet a third—illuminates the problem of cold war campaigning as far as Britain is concerned. Although theoretically it is peacetime, we must be prepared for both nuclear and conventional warfare and at the same time be able to carry out limited war campaigns, counter-insurgency and internal security operations worldwide.

It may be helpful at this stage to make some definitions, in order to avoid confusion, since so many different terms have been used to describe the forms of warfare that have occurred during the last twenty years. The various cold war campaigns have been referred to as ‘irregular’, ‘insurgent’, ‘partisan’, ‘guer­rilla’ and ‘unconventional’ warfare; the enemy have been called ‘bandits’, ‘rebels’, ‘dissidents’, ‘guerrillas’, ‘insurgents’ and ‘terrorists’.

In this book, ‘insurgency’ is used to describe a form of armed rebellion against the Government, in which the rebels have the support or acquiescence of a substantial part of the populace; the methods that they adopt to achieve their aim of overthrowing the Government may include guerrilla warfare, but insurgents may equally well resort to civil disobedience, sabotage or terrorist tactics. Operations taken by the Government to defeat such a rebellion are ‘counter-insurgency’ operations; the military and
police forces engaged in such a campaign are termed the ‘Security Forces’.

‘Guerrilla warfare’ is used here in the sense of the special form of warfare, based on mobile tactics by small, lightly armed groups, who aim to harass their opponents rather than to defeat them in open battle. ‘Internal security’ operations, otherwise known as ‘duties in aid of the Civil Power’, are not to be confused with ‘counter-insurgency’; they are aimed at controlling civil disturbances and are based on the principle of the use of minimum force, which does not apply in actions against insurgents.

The opposition throughout this book will be referred to as ‘insurgents’ if they are engaged in insurgency, ‘guerrillas’ if they are fighting a guerrilla war and ‘terrorists’ if they are indulging in terrorism.

An analysis of the time spent by the British Army on various types of operations since 1945 shows that the total period spent on active operations amounts to about forty years, and that of this, only five years or so have been devoted to conventional warfare as against thirty-five years or more which have been spent on counter-insurgency campaigns. These figures do not include the numerous ‘internal security’ operations which have also arisen.¹

Nor is Britain alone in this commitment, for the United States, France and other countries have also been involved in varying degrees in similar counter-insurgency campaigns, as can be seen in Appendix B.

Insurgency has emerged as a science in its own right since the end of World War Two; it took the form during that conflict of guerrilla warfare and extensive sabotage by national partisans and Resistance Movements, but their activities tended always to be subservient to the main conventional warfare campaign. Since 1945, however, it has developed as a popular new technique for the attainment of political aims by subversive means in these days of so-called peace. It has been used by the Communists as a weapon in the cold war, and also by the leaders of

¹ See Appendix A.
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numerous rebel movements as a means of achieving their aims, be they political, nationalist, racial or subversive. It has usually included both guerrilla warfare and terrorism among its methods and has, in almost every case, been directed at the overthrow, for one reason or another, of the authorized Government.

Insurgents cannot be fought successfully by conventional warfare methods, as the French discovered in their campaign in Indo-China 1946-54, and as the Americans are slowly learning again, over ten years later. As in all forms of warfare, the correct strategy and tactics can only be developed through a thorough knowledge and understanding of the enemy, his strengths and weaknesses, his psychology and his methods. This applies in particular to guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare, and the subject must be given the recognition which it deserves.

The continuing insurgent campaigns being waged against the Western Powers are a threat in themselves, but it is important to realize that they are a further threat in that they form part of the cold war. Post-war insurgencies have arisen from a variety of motives and in a variety of countries; but in many cases, they have been exploited to some extent by the Communist leaders to further their own aims. There is no evidence that the two Communist Powers have abandoned their long-term aims of achieving Communist domination of as much of the world as possible, and there is every indication that Communist China, at least, is becoming increasingly ambitious and aggressive.

Insurgent uprisings since 1945 have not necessarily been Communist inspired or controlled; the Emergencies in Palestine, Kenya and Cyprus all arose from other causes, as did those in Algeria, the Yemen and Aden. Some have been actively organized by Moscow or Peking however, with a view to overthrowing the existing Government and replacing it by a Communist regime, and these include China itself, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos and Malaya.

Campaigns to defeat insurgencies require a considerable effort by the Government and the Armed Forces if they are to be successful; the campaign is usually lengthy and costly, particularly where guerrilla warfare develops, since it is a charac-
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teristic of this type of warfare that a handful of skilled guerrillas can tie down a totally disproportionate number of Security Forces for a long time.

Counter-insurgency campaigns are costly in money as well as in man-power, for not only are the actual operations a financial burden, (the French calculated that the Algerian War cost them £1 million a day), but the cost in terms of lost production and damage to economic interests can also be considerable. For example, in the Kenya Emergency the country’s agriculture suffered and in Malaya there was damage to the rubber plantations and tin mines.

There is no easy or quick answer as to how to defeat insurgents, but much can be learned from a study of the many campaigns that have occurred in the past; they provide useful experience and lessons, which can be applied to the present and the future. We must not only profit from our own past knowledge, but we must try to anticipate possible future foes and their methods.

The Communists believe firmly in revolution as a means of overthrowing the existing systems, and their leaders have stated openly that they support revolutionary movements wherever they occur—unless, of course, they happen to be against themselves as in Hungary! They may give only moral support and training to the insurgents, they may supply arms and equipment, or they may resort to direct intervention, whichever seems appropriate. The 'uncommitted nations' of the world, and in particular, the emergent or newly independent ex-colonial territories are a primary target for Communist take-over bids, since they provide ideal conditions for anti-Western propaganda and are as yet inexperienced in countering the guiles of Communism.

This constant effort by the Communists to spread their creed by all means short of general war is referred to by the Free World as the 'cold war'; the Communists call it 'peaceful co-existence’. It is a conflict fought in the political, economic and ideological spheres as well as by military means, and these aspects of the struggle must be understood by any counter-insurgency forces, since they have a bearing on the military
campaigns. We are concerned here primarily with the military problems, and will consider the other aspects only in so far as they affect the military issues.

The Communists in both Russia and China have made a detailed study of guerrilla warfare and as a result have developed a strategy for military campaigns in the cold war, based on three principles: the threat of military force, warfare by proxy and guerrilla warfare.

The Soviet Army is nearly two million strong, but it has never been in action since 1945, except to suppress internal revolts behind the Iron Curtain. Its very existence is used however by its masters as a threat to the West and as such, it is sufficient to tie down considerable Allied forces, particularly in Europe.

The Chinese Communist Army has been more aggressively employed and has fought in Korea, Tibet and India. Here again, even when it is not directly involved, the constant threat of its overt or covert intervention in the cold war in South East Asia is a significant factor. It encourages insurgents to fight on when they might otherwise consider accepting defeat, and it imposes caution on the West, both militarily and politically.

Most of the Communist cold war campaigning has been carried out by proxy; they have stirred up trouble and incited revolt wherever possible, the Communist Armies remaining as a threat in the background. Local insurgents have been used by the Communists to fight their battles for them, and only if they are not available at the right moment are the local Communist Parties thrown into the battle, as in Greece and Malaya.

Insurgency clearly has many advantages for this warfare by proxy. Firstly, the campaign can be fought as an ‘undeclared war’, with no overt commitment for the Communist Powers. Secondly, it enables them to carry the cold war militarily far beyond their own frontiers, simply by supporting other insurgent movements with arms and equipment and even on occasions, with ‘volunteers’. Thirdly, it enables them to make the most effective use of their own supporters in any country in which they want to stir up trouble. Above all, insurgency is the most economical technique for their cold war campaigning. It is tradi-
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tionally the method of the few fighting the many, and it costs the counter-insurgents far more in terms of money, manpower and effort than it does their enemies.

It is not difficult to see why the Communists seem to prefer cold war methods for the moment to a ‘hot war’; while this is so, it must mean that the Free World, and Britain in particular, will continue to be faced by counter-insurgency campaigns, such as have formed most of our post-war operations. It is a basic rule that one should try to ‘know your enemy’, and the next chapter tries therefore to analyse the methods of insurgents and their organization.
Some Faber Books of Military Interest

by Jules Roy

THE BATTLE OF DIENBIENPHU  Translated by Robert Baldick

'This is a most important book not simply because it is well written (and well translated), not because of its sober analytical account. It is important first because it provides an outstanding textbook on guerrilla tactics and strategy. . . . No student of strategic studies can afford to ignore this book. . . . In the second place this book has immediate relevance to the present situation in South-East Asia.' Brian Chapman in The Guardian 42s net

by Richard Miers

SHOOT TO KILL

'The Malayan emergency has now been described from many angles; Brig. Miers . . . deals with it from the regular soldier's point of view. . . . His account of the hunting of a series of particularly brutal terrorists makes lively reading, and the pursuit of the last of them, Ming Lee, ends in high comedy.' The Daily Telegraph 21s net

by Edgar O'Ballance

MALAYA: THE COMMUNIST INSURGENT WAR 1948-1960

Major O'Ballance here provides a lucid and authoritative account of the successful though protracted campaign of the successive British and Malayan governments against the Communist rebels in the jungles and remote villages of the peninsula. 30s net

THE INDO-CHINA WAR 1945-1954 A Study in Guerrilla Warfare

'Major O'Ballance follows up his well-informed history of the Red Army of China with an equally calm and valuable study of the complex practice of guerrilla and “positional” warfare in Indo-China.' Birmingham Post 35s net

THE RED ARMY OF CHINA

'This handy and readable book describes the origin and history of the Chinese Red Army against the background of ageless China and the impact upon it of the Communist Party . . . this book is useful, compact and unique in its treatment of a little-known subject. Major O’B'allance is at his best when describing the Chinese background which he clearly knows well, and he has performed a valuable service in putting the Chinese fighting forces in perspective for the general reader.' Survival—Institute of Strategic Studies 30s net

THE GREEK CIVIL WAR 1944-1949

'Major O’Ballance's book makes fascinating reading both as regards the Greek Civil War itself and for the light it throws on Communist-directed insurgency in its wider context.' C. F. Melville in the Birmingham Post 36s net