SERGEI GLAZYEV

GENOCIDE

RUSSIA AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER

EIR News Service

Genocide

(October 1993–August 1998)

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A Strategy for Economic Growth on the Threshold of the 21st Century

To Dr Mahathir,
the story about IMF
policy in Russia,
with respect to
Malaysian economic
miracle

5.11.98

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

Russia and the New World Order

A Strategy for Economic Growth on the Threshold of the 21st Century

SERGEI GLAZYEV

TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN BY
RACHEL B. DOUGLAS

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Preface

Behind Russia's Catastrophic Liberal 'Reforms': A Fatal Pattern of Policy-Shaping

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

Russia might outlive Thatcherism.

At the time the English edition of Dr. Sergei Glazyev's book goes to the printer, we have reached the point of successive economic collapses of not one, but, now, both of the principal super-power alliances which had dominated the post-Franklin Roosevelt world. At the present moment, there is no scientific way of foretelling on which week the present International Monetary Fund-dominated world financial system will collapse, but it is nonetheless certain, that that system is doomed, and that soon.

For the period immediately ahead, we can be certain of only two facts about the world economy as a whole. First, we may be certain, as many leading bankers and others are certain today, that the present, hopelessly bankrupt IMF system, is at the brink of either one, or a series of precipitous systemic, fatal, chain-reaction implosions. Only the exact date and choice among several probable detonators of that general collapse remain uncertain. Second, we know, that either the present world financial system will be put into bank-

ruptcy-reorganization, that by joint action of some of the world's leading nations, or the system will simply disintegrate of its own accord. In the latter case, the result will be the unleashing of a virtually global, economic chaos. A collapse of the latter sort would plunge most, or all of the world into something echoing Europe's mid-fourteenth-century "New Dark Age," perhaps for decades to come.

In the case of the 1989–1991 disintegration of the Comecon and Soviet Union, it is arguable that many among the contributing causes for that collapse were of a voluntary nature. Which were those mistaken choices of action and inaction, by the Soviet leadership, is still being debated; but, the fact that some grave errors of choice occurred, is not debatable. At bottom, whatever those voluntary errors of leadership were, the essential fact is, that the collapse of the system was ultimately not simply the result of some isolable bad individual decisions; the bad decisions were the outcome of a pervasive systemic flaw within the decision-making characteristics of the system within which particular decisions were made.

The same judgment must be passed on the presently collapsing world financial system: the so-called "IMF system." After all secondary questions are taken into account, the reason the present world financial system is now disintegrating, is simply that any system of the special functional characteristics described by my "Triple Curve," the characteristics of the decision-making of the present IMF system, must cause that system to disintegrate.

Therefore, we must say, that the reasons for the presently ongoing collapse are of a systemic, rather than an accidental nature.

For example, it was President Richard Nixon's follies of August 1971, which launched what has been demonstrated to have been an inherently ruinous "floating-exchange-rate monetary system," the present IMF system. It might seem that any of Nixon's successors among the leaders of the G-7 nations, could have, theoretically, reversed the 1971–72 blunders of Nixon, George Shultz, et al. In fact, they did not do so; instead, the later decisions made, simply made things much worse than Nixon's blunder had done. When one takes into account the powerful interests which usually control the election and downfall of governments, perhaps the bottom line

is, that those officials simply lacked the ability to make anything other than foolish decisions on these matters of long-term trends in monetary, financial and economic policies.

The reasons the Atlantic powers did not reverse the terrible monetary-policy blunders of 1971–1976, lie in the systemic, policy-shaping characteristics of the dominant factions within that social formation fairly identified as the London-led "Atlantic establishment." It was not any one policy which has steered the present IMF system from the folly of August 1971 to the fatal "derivatives bubble" crisis of today. The fault behind the onrushing doom of the world's present financial system, lies not with individual policy-decisions, but in an ultimately fatal pattern of policy-shaping innovations. Typical of what have proven to have been the most crucial among such follies, were those introduced by the trans-Atlantic powers under the influence of the long reign of the Mont Pelerin Society's British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

That point should be repeated. The fault lies not in any particular decision, as such; the fault lies in the social and ideological characteristics of today's "Atlantic establishment," just as the collapse of the Soviet system flowed from the ideological and related characteristics of its establishment. The fault lies in the habituated, ideologically charged pattern of changes of decision, an ordering of changes which shape the "planetary" orbit of the net effects so produced. We say, therefore, that the fatal trajectory of events is, like a planet's orbit, essentially systemic, not the result of several isolable policy-decisions on direction made along the way.

Thus, in both doomed cases, the fallen Soviet system, and the presently doomed IMF system, the ultimately inevitable doom of the system lies in what may be viewed as the characteristic behavior of the species—the characteristics of that species of system.

The rabbit who is killed by the automobile, had the physical ability to avoid that risk; it was the characteristic of the rabbit's nature, to choose the new decision which then doomed it to serve the pleasure of the waiting crows. The skilled hunter relies upon his or her knowledge of the inhering follies of the intended prey's inhering behavioral traits, just as the skilled military tactician regularly outflanks his unwitting intended prey. Animal species can learn, but they can not improve upon the axiomatic assumptions

which govern their behavioral propensities. The doom of any lower species is, therefore, systemic, rather than the accidental result of the animal's isolated decisions.

The doom of social and political systems, lies not in any one or several among the decisions leading into that doom. Human beings, and therefore societies, have the ability to change the characteristics of a society's mass behavior. The cause of the collapse of a society, is, rather, those flawed, axiomatic habits of decision-making which the system itself stubbornly refused to change. So it was with the Soviet system; so it has been with the 1971–1999 pattern of decision-making by the IMF's establishmemt.

Therefore, in examining the self-inflicted doom of once-powerful political systems, we must focus on both the similarities and qualitative differences between the lower animal species and human beings. The difference lies in the rational options always implicitly available to human beings. Therefore, the crucial issue is, the potential of societies, using reason, to survive, by recognizing and correcting the follies of their own seemingly built-in, axiomatic assumptions.

The analogy for such fatally flawed decision-making by the two presently doomed systems, is the problem posed by the way in which the mathematician's adoption of any specific set of definitions, axioms, and postulates, dooms that mathematician to adopt only those theorems (e.g., policy-decisions of practice) which are consistent with his (often unwitting) axiomatic assumptions. If his opinions are shaped, like theorems, by the wrong set of definitions, axioms, and postulates, every crucial theorem he develops will be wrong. Such errors are systemic, and neither accidental, nor transitory in nature.

If that kind of policy-shaping error is adopted by a society, that society is ultimately doomed by its stubborn acceptance of its own "generally accepted ideas." This defines what we must regard as the true cause of a systemic collapse, as distinct from a temporary collapse which might be caused by a series of accidental mistakes in choice of policy. That is the difference between a systemic economic crisis, such as the present world crisis, and a mere temporary, cyclical crisis in an otherwise successfully ongoing economic system.

So, Dr. Sergei Glazyev and I, as others, have been impelled to

study the systemic, rather than merely accidental reasons for the apparently imminent doom of both the Soviet system and its neo-liberalism-dominated Russian successor. For me, that is the most important implication of his book. On the problems and options presented to Russia's economy today, he is an exceptionally qualified insider. Such Russian specialists must sort out what was valid in the former Soviet system, and distinguish that from the causes of the systemic collapse of both that system and the doomed liberal experiment which followed.

Similarly, I, like any serious patriot of the present-day economies of the USA or western continental Europe, must define both the virtues and follies of post-Franklin Roosevelt U.S. economic systems.

We have come to the point, that the present IMF system is hopelessly doomed to an early end. Either we change the system fundamentally, or we must expect a plunge deep into a prolonged period of vast devastation. That catastrophe few nations, if any, were likely to survive. To prevent that, we must act, very soon, to change the system systemically. We must sweep aside, and replace, many of what have become, over the interval 1971–1999, the most passionately adored among the post-1971 changes in the present world financial, monetary, and economic system.

To save civilization, we must act immediately, to change the present world system in a most sudden and radical way. Otherwise, all of us are berthed on a sinking world-economic Titanic, with no lifeboats available.

To make such radical and sudden changes, two preconditions must be satisfied. First, the USA must find a powerful array of accomplices among nations of the world. These nations, acting in concert, must make those sudden and sweeping changes, which eliminate immediately the present IMF system, and introduce its healthy replacement. Second, we could not bring such agreement about in a timely fashion, unless the authority of successful precedents from the pre-1971 period could be invoked as proof of what might work to replace the presently doomed, post-1971 evolution of the IMF system.

The nations which must be brought together to make such a quick decision, must be a group of sovereign nation-states representing a majority of the world's population. This includes, together

with the President of the USA, the sovereign governments of Dr. Glazyev's Russia, China, India, at least some nation from western continental Europe, plus other states of Eurasia, Africa, and the Americas likely to rally to the same effort.

On this account, the lessons of the successful experiences of those nations' past must be taken into account. Dr. Glazyev's role, his background as a professional economist, and his several important roles as a leading youthful, upcoming figure of a Russia whose participation is essential to the USA and other prospective partners, make his knowledge and opinions of special included importance to all those, in every nation, who must be assembled to establish the urgently needed new world monetary system.

On both sides of the former divide, I, for example, for the USA, and Dr. Glazyev, for example, for Russia, these are the types of issues which serious policy-shapers must consider, in searching for happy ways out of the presently threatened common doom of both former strategic systems. The English-speaking reader, including, one would hope, President William Jefferson Clinton, should view Dr. Glazyev's book with that thought in view.

—September 17, 1999

Author's Foreword To the Second Russian Edition

The present work is in three parts, the first of which analyzes the results of six years of "the great turmoil." The second examines the tendencies for formation of a New World Order, and Russia's place in it. These two sections deal with the present condition of Russia and the directions of its social and economic evolution. The third part is devoted to prospects for the development of the country and characterizes the basic lines of an economic growth policy, oriented toward activation of the competitive advantages of the Russian economy, its internal reserves and potentialities, and its optimal integration into world economic relations. It surveys the still existing possibilities to restore Russia's might and prosperity, against the backdrop of the gloomy tendencies of recent years.

The groundwork for an economic growth policy, developed here, shows that there are alternate scenarios of economic and overall social development, and supports the argument that the catastrophic results of the past six years were contingent in nature, following from the conscious policy of the oligarchy that ruled the country. Its exploitation of power for purposes of personal enrichment effectively led to genocide against the Russian people.

The bankruptcy of that policy of destruction of the country's productive forces, which transpired on August 17, 1998, opened up possibilities for a change in economic policy, in the direction of an upswing of production and prosperity for the people, and the creation of conditions for economic growth and an increase in the competitiveness of the Russian economy. The leading organizers of the genocide have been removed from power. The influence of the parasitical oligarchy of financial speculators has been reduced, as a result of the destruction of its established practice of appropriat-

ing the country's national wealth, which vanished together with the collapse of the system of state finances. Thus, an opportunity has been created for the rebirth of Russian statehood and a transition from a policy of destruction and genocide, to a constructive policy in the national interest.

Each part of this work stands on its own. The purpose of combining them in a single monograph is to point up the choice facing the country today: Either we passively submit to a suicidal policy of self-destruction and the colonization of Russia, which has been imposed from the outside by deception and graft, or we concentrate the political will of society's healthy forces on the goal of breaking the tendencies that have been so catastrophic for the country and the Russian people, and move to a scientifically grounded strategy for economic growth, improvement of the people's welfare, and restoration of the spiritual-intellectual strength and the scientific and technical potential of the Russian State.

—November 1998

Genocide

(October 1993–August 1998)

The August 17, 1998 collapse of the radical reform policy, conducted since 1992, provides the occasion to assess the results of the new Russian revolution. After the destruction of the country's productive forces, and its economic and financial system, we face a historic choice once again. This time, it may be final. With the change of government in September 1998 and the weakening of the positions of those, whose policy it was to turn Russia into a colony, there is a possibility to make that choice from the standpoint of our national interests. It is important for the relevant decisions to be taken in full consciousness, which means that the period of revolutionary transformations (which we date from the moment of the breakup of the USSR in 1991, to the financial collapse of August 17, 1998) must be subjected to an objective evaluation.

The policy of self-destruction of the economic system of the State, which was carried out in Russia after 1992 in the guise of liberal economic reforms, cast off the shackles of legality and became economic genocide against broad layers of the population, as a result of the coup d'etat of September–October 1993. After the shelling of the Russian Parliament at the beginning of October 1993, the victorious revolutionaries felt that they could commit any acts whatsoever, with impunity, whereupon they turned the reforms in the direction of their own personal enrichment: The privatization of state property, as well as financial and budget policy, became synonymous with lawlessness and corruption. From a political and juridical standpoint, therefore, the policy of genocide should be

reckoned from October 1993, when the revolutionaries usurped power and assumed full responsibility for the formulation and conduct of social and economic policy. Having gotten free rein for the implementation of their intentions, they carried out, under cover of market reforms, a consistent policy of appropriating the national wealth and colonizing the country for the benefit of international capital, the consequences of which have been catastrophic for the Russian people.

There is not yet a coherent opinion among the public, about the results and the effectiveness of the revolutionary transformations that took place. The partisans of the policy that was pursued give high marks to certain outward effects: the absence of queues, the saturation of demand, and the freedom of each person to do as he pleases. Its opponents refer to the monstrous economic depression, the social catastrophe that has gripped the majority of the population, the growth of crime, and the de facto loss of national independence. The former define these deprivations as a "transformation recession," attributing them to some objective causes, while the latter call it a "systemic crisis," which stemmed primarily from the type of economic reorganization policy that was carried out.

It is important to give a precise definition of the content of the policy that was implemented, from the moment of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the beginning of radical reforms in 1992, through to August 17, 1998, not only for the sake of comprehending what happened, but also in order properly to plan for the future. This definition ought to reflect an interpretation of the implemented policy that subsumes the objective, factual domain and the value and idea content, as well as an evaluation from the standpoint of law. It should be given in precise juridical terms, defining the responsibility of the ruling authorities before society, in order that each citizen may have a clear idea of what is happening in the country. Such an adequate evaluation of the changes that have occurred and the present situation is also necessary for the development of a constructive action program, aimed at the elimination of threats to the national security, and at overcoming the crisis.

The precise definition, as will be shown below, is the concept of "genocide," used in international law.

1 Definitions

Let us recall that in 1954 our country adhered to the United Nations International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. According to this Convention, genocide is defined as a crime, committed "with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." The Convention emphasizes that genocide by no means has to entail the use of physical violence or the conduct of war. Among the instruments of the crime, the Convention identifies, in particular, "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part," and "measures intended to prevent births within the group." [1]*

Although the definition of genocide includes the element of *intent*, i.e., deliberate commission of the crime against large groups of the population, in practice the policy of genocide is not always fully conscious on the part of those who perpetrate it—far less, is it openly proclaimed. It may be cloaked with quite respectable slogans about reforms for the good of society, to attain freedom and social justice. Many de facto parties to the crimes may "not notice" the real consequences of their actions, genuinely believing that they are heroes and benefactors of mankind.

It is no accident that the most monstrous acts of genocide in world history were carried out in the name of very noble and attractive goals for society. The French Revolution's genocide against influential layers of society, and the Napoleonic Wars that ensued, were waged in the name of the ideals of "freedom, equality, brotherhood." Genocide was carried out against the native population of North America in the name of progress. Genocide against the

*Numbers in brackets refer to the Bibliography, p. 285.

clergy, nobility, merchants and peasants in 1917–1937 was organized in Russia in the name of universal justice and happiness. Even the ethnic genocide, committed by Hitler's followers against all the peoples of Europe, was justified with utopian ideas about the formation of a breed of "superman."

In the latest wave of genocide against the population of Russia, during 1992–1998, a paradoxical ideological "cover" was provided by the doctrine of "universal human values," in which a central concept is the priority of human rights within the state system and in policy. Those who carried it out were not troubled over the means by which this doctrine was implemented—consistent violation of the rights of the overwhelming majority of the citizens of Russia to labor, education, welfare, and life itself. Instead of universal human values such as goodness, peace, and justice, the policy actually implemented in Russia resulted in the propagation of misanthropic values like enmity, money-grubbing, depravity, violence, evil, and arbitrary injustice.

In this sense, the intellectual and, in some part, genetic forebears of the organizers of the contemporary Russian revolution—the leaders of the two Revolutions of 1917 and the Civil War—have found "worthy" successors. Eight decades ago, genocide against the population of Russia, which ultimately cost 100 million persons either killed or not born, just as F.M. Dostoevsky had warned in his novel *The Possessed*, was unleashed under the ideological cover of "overcoming the age-old backwardness of Russia," building a "civilized," and subsequently "the most advanced" society, universal brotherhood, equality, and happiness. Genocide against the population of Russia in 1992–1998 has been perpetrated under cover of the ideas and semblance of democracy, utilizing the very same slogans about freedom, equality, and moving closer to "civilized" countries.

The distorted implementation of proclaimed positive values, which is frequently diametrically opposite in content to what is proclaimed, ought not to discredit the real essence of those values. Beyond any doubt, the plotters who overthrew the Tsar, the leaders of the "Red Terror," and their modern successors, who donned the toga of democrats and liberals, did not act according to the values they proclaimed, but rather against them. The idea that actually drove them was hatred toward Russia and Russian culture, and a desire to crush our civilization, turning Russians, in the expression

attributed to Trotsky-Bronstein, into "white slaves."[1] Today's heirs of that organizer of the Civil War in Russia differ from him only in the form of the values they proclaim. The sense of the revolution remains the same—the destruction of Russia. Privatization, their chosen method for effecting revolutionary change, has been no less effective than the nationalization and requisition of property during War Communism, in its destructive impact on the country's productive forces. Likewise, the mass privatization of state property by the present-day revolutionaries is just as remote, with respect to the real content of production relations, from the institution of private property under actual market relations, as the network of forced labor detention camps, developed by their spiritual-intellectual predecessors, was remote from the principles of socialist competition among labor collectives.

As we can see, the ideological cover for the revolutionary destruction of a country is chosen for the given situation. A social utopia is designed for the public mood, depending on the state of public consciousness. Then, in the name of establishing that utopia, society is split into warring groups, blinded by principled antagonism, which destroy each other and the country in their exhausting combat, clearing out space for those who commissioned the revolutionary process.[2] It is, therefore, a most important task for every honest researcher and writer to distinguish the essence of acts of genocide from their ideological cover, while exposing the mendacity of the top leaders, executors, and apologists for the genocide policy, who have organized the division of society and civil war to the point of self-annihilation. For genocide is a crime committed against great masses of people by a whole army of executors. It is only possible to organize these executors, if there is an appropriate ideology to anesthetize the human conscience, which will justify the crimes they commit in the name of "noble" goals and depict the victims of the genocide as non-people or, at the very least, inferior. In order to carry out genocide, the army of executors must assimilate ideas, which permit and even compel them to commit mass crimes, and in light of which the ideologists of the genocide are seen by the executors as prophets. The executors themselves feel like missionaries for the great idea of transforming society, and they cease to see their victims as people like themselves.

The content of these ideas may vary, but their general characteristic is the division of people into two categories—the chosen mis-

sionaries and others, the latter being subject to "reeducation," annihilation, or enslavement. Thus, many religious wars in the past were justified by the concept of "the chosen quality" of the bearers of the relevant creed, the ideologues of which portrayed themselves as prophets, while the adherents of traditional views were seen as inferior people. The Civil War in Russia was justified by the concept of "class enemies" being "cannibals" and "bloodsuckers," worthy only to be eliminated, while society as a whole required total reeducation. Fascist ideologues justified the Second World War by their racial superiority and the inferiority of other peoples, whose members did not fit their notion of the "new" man.

Today's revolutionaries, the radical reformers in Russia and in most of the other republics of the destroyed Soviet Union, justify the crimes against the population and coups d'etat, committed in the course of reform, by citing the inferiority of the former socialist society and most of the people who comprised it. The latter are sacrificed for the sake of an increase in economic effectiveness and prosperity, which is allegedly expected some time in the future. The social obligations of the State and social protections are abolished, in the name of phantoms like macroeconomic stabilization and the creation of apparent conditions for economic prosperity in the future. In reality, as will be shown here, in the minds of the directors of the new Russian revolution, the policy conducted from 1992 to 1998 meant Russia's annihilation, while for the majority of those who carried it out, it came down to banal self-enrichment, the formation of a privileged veneer of "New Russians," most of whom are not ethnically Russian, who feel that they are a new ruling class.

The subjective disposition of the ideologues of the contemporary revolution in Russia strongly recalls, in the hatred and contempt for the people of their own country, Hitler's propaganda or Trotskyite agitation. Suffice it to recall the commentaries from many of them during the shelling of the Russian Parliament or the forcible dispersion of protest demonstrations. Violence on the part of the authorities was justified by representing its victims as inferior, aggressive "less-than-humans," who were hostile to everything progressive. Certain "figures from the world of culture" and journalists, who supported the shelling of the Supreme Soviet, have sullied their reputations forever.

Specialists have compared the political rhetoric of the leading

mass media in Russia with Goebbels' propaganda. The ideologists of the ruling oligarchy exhibit the same sort of zoological dislike for people who uphold the national interests of Russia and demand that the Government honor social guarantees, as Hitler's Nazis had for those of other racial stock. They treat the people as a whole as "lowlife," who can be deceived and robbed blind, towards whom "all is permitted." Accordingly, acts of violence against political opponents of the regime are portrayed as heroic deeds, the appropriation of state property by the ruling oligarchy as progressive reform, and the impoverishment of the population as a result of the implemented macroeconomic policy is explained as due to the population's inferiority, its inability to adapt to the "progressive reform" in a timely fashion.

Certain advice, given to the Russian leaders by their "liberal- and democratic-thinking" consultants, is noteworthy in this connection. One well-known Polish liberal economist recommended that the radical reforms be accompanied by the airing of pornographic films on television and the sale of cheap alcoholic beverages on the street, in order to soften up the youth and distract their attention, as well as to demoralize the population and mitigate the mood of social protest against the policy of "shock therapy." One of his Russian colleagues tried to convince a presidential candidate from the democratic opposition, that people older than 40 were by definition incapable of "correctly" understanding the reform, and thus were objectively inferior, condemned to a pitiful existence and undeserving of any sympathy.

In light of our spiritual character, based on Russia's humanistic culture, the misanthropic motivation of the ideologues and organizers of the radical shattering of Russian society seems incredible. They are accused of incompetence, lack of talent, and corruption, as if our woes were due to the personal shortcomings of individual members of the ruling oligarchy. This is only partly true, and it is not the most important element. The commission of mass crimes is always accompanied by a flowering of all the human vices, which break out under conditions of social chaos. But they are not what directs the historical process.

The time has come for us to understand that it is not a matter of accidental manifestations of human foulness in the upper echelons of the ruling oligarchy. For the second time in this century,

we have clashed with the enemies of Russian culture and civilization, who treat us, at best, the way a bad hunter treats a herd of animals. For the ideologists of the present-day Russian revolution, as for their spiritual predecessors, who unleashed the Revolution, the World War, and the Civil War during the second decade of this century, our people and our country are no more than an object of material gain, whose planned enslavement requires the annihilation of the Russian cultural genotype.

Therefore, "all is permitted" with respect to us. Therefore, actions that civil society defines as criminal, are hailed in the case of Russia as great achievements by the reformers. Therefore, we have gotten the rule of the criminal instead of a competitive market environment, an oligarchy with its subservient corrupt bureaucracy instead of a law-based State, total disinformation instead of freedom of speech, demoralization of the population instead of a flowering of creativity, and colonization instead of economic growth.

It should be noted that ideologies, establishing fundamental differences among the rights (actual rights, not juridical ones) of various groups of people, are widespread in not only historical, but also modern social systems. The revival of the institution of slavery in Chechnya, the American financial oligarchy's ambitions for world rule, discrimination against the Arab population in Israel or Russians in Estonia and Latvia, and the colonization of Russia by comprador clans with an ideology of dividing society into full-fledged and second-class people (according to which "all is permitted" the former with respect to the latter), are akin to the practice of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination in centuries past. In many ideological systems, the division of society into "the chosen" and "all the others," whereby the former appropriate all the rights of the latter, is an incontestable norm. There is a broad spectrum of such systems—from the prison camp's division of society into "bosses" and "zeroes," to the pseudoscientific school of class struggle in "scientific communism," and the age-old, much-travelled talmudic ideology of "the chosen people."

Ideological systems that justify the division of society into two parts, privileged (full-fledged) and those without rights (inferior, abnormal), granting the former the moral right to conduct any form of exploitation and violence against the latter, have played a great role in the actual practice of social relations, and continue to do so.

These ideological systems may be promulgated either overtly (as usually occurs during periods of war, which require the mass mobilization of people for the organized killing of the citizens of hostile states and, consequently, some arguments in favor of the inferiority of the latter) or covertly (among groups of those who consider themselves chosen, and live by a "double" moral standard). In the second instance, behind the smokescreen of an official ideology of equality for the broad masses of people, the ruling groups, or those who would claim a privileged position, preach their own special ideology of being "chosen," which erases moral restrictions and permits crimes against the rest of society.

The mobilizing significance of the contraposition "we–they" for any social group is well known in social psychology. It is the basis for the formation and self-preservation of each nation, each clan, each group warring for power. Of course, this contraposition by no means has to assume an antagonistic character, and still less frequently does it go so far as to become a war of mutual annihilation. At the same time, the contraposition of a ruling elite to the rest of society is of fundamental importance for structuring social relations and maintaining the mechanism of a privileged minority's rule over the unorganized majority, in most known social systems. Throughout almost the entire history of mankind, this was the norm, which served as the basis for slaveholding, serfdom, and overt social inequality. It is no rarity to this day, being encountered in diverse social systems, from totalitarian to democratic. Socialist society's oft-denounced practice of a division into a privileged nomenklatura and all the rest of the population, is similar, in this regard, to actual practice in the countries of so-called advanced democracy, where there is a clan-like ruling elite, structured through family ties, prestigious clubs, Masonic lodges, and religious and ethnic communities.

In our history, the organization of society in practice was characterized at various times by very cruel forms of opposition between a ruling elite and the popular masses, although that ran counter to the popular religious philosophy of *sobornost.** During periods of social revolution, however, the ideology that served as the basis

**Sobornost* in Russian denotes collectivity, community, solidarity. Its root, meaning "to gather," is shared by the word for cathedral—*sobor.* —*Translator's note.*

for the privileged position of the renovated ruling elite would be russophobic and anti-popular in nature. So it was, for example, in the epoch of Peter I, and then in the period when the Autocracy was overthrown, followed by the Civil War. In the period of collectivization and the GULAG, through to the USSR's victory in the Great Patriotic War, russophobia was an element of great importance in the self-definition of the ruling elite. An analogous situation may be observed in the contemporary structural formation of the new ruling class, which arose on the soil of the dissolved Soviet empire.

An anti-popular self-definition by a ruling elite, in the sense of counterposing itself to the majority of the population and, on that basis, justifying its moral (and, sometimes, juridical) right to rule and its privileges, is more the norm in world history, than an exception. Initially, claims of the right to rule were usually based on ethnic grounds. (In particular, that is how the Roman, Mogul, and Inca Empires were made, in which power was consolidated in the hands of a privileged ethnic minority.) Later, during formation of great empires that needed a broad social base in order to maintain the power of the elite, the religious principle came to dominate, which greatly mitigated social conflicts (the Byzantine, Arab, Holy Roman, and Russian Empires). The modern period has revealed an even greater diversity of ideological grounds for the mechanisms of reproducing ruling elites, both within countries and on the international level. The formation and maintenance of a dual ideology of social organization has become the rule: one ideology for the broad masses (universal equality, freedom, and justice), and another for the elite groups (defining the basis for the elite's right to rule, its privileges, and why, for its members, "all is permitted"). Members of the elite may preach different ideologies, depending on their position in the machinery of power—from people's representatives (in the organs of state power), to ethnic associations of people from the same area and family clans (with their covert form of self-organization and their own system of moral norms), to, finally, Masonic lodges and sects (with a secret form of self-organization, special obligations to fellow members, and a standard that "all is permitted" with respect to the uninitiated).

Unfortunately, we have a short historical memory and an extremely weak understanding of the real mechanisms of power in modern democratic societies. Due to Russian culture's ideals of

social justice, humanism, truth, and goodness, the real picture of how society is ruled remains hidden from public awareness, which easily succumbs to myths and is shaped by modern techniques of mass propaganda and inculcation.

The ideology of fascism does not lodge well in the head of the Russian, who thrice saved Europe and the world from enslavement and destruction—by the Mongol Horde, by Napoleon's Army, and by Hitler's forces. But an anti-Russian ideology of precisely that sort is characteristic of the revolutionary reformers, who seized and held power in 1992–1998. Unnatural as it is for our world view, it must be recognized that the theoreticians and practitioners of such an ideology, who have appropriated our national wealth and befouled our country, do not view us as full-fledged human beings and, in accord with their convictions, believe that they have the right to do as they will with the population of Russia—from the appropriation of public property, to the organization of civil wars and coups, moral corruption of children, and demoralization of society.

Until we learn that lesson, we are doomed to degeneration, and the country to colonization. We have to know whom we are dealing with, and act accordingly. If our fathers and grandfathers had tried to placate Hitler's or Napoleon's aggressors with bread and salt, coaxing them not to plunder our towns and villages, we would likely be unable even to speak our native language today. We, however, for almost seven straight years of destructive revolution were co-responsible, by our passivity and submissiveness, for a policy of genocide against our own people.

Let us, however, leave the study of the subjective motives of the ideologists and purveyors of the genocide policy implemented in Russia to specialists in the area of philosophy and animal psychology [2], and turn to an examination of its factual content. The policy carried out by the fascists is more important than the speeches of their fuehrers, for understanding the essence of fascism. The main element of the above-cited definition of genocide is its objective side, which reflects the qualitative characteristics of the social and economic policy carried out in Russia. The present work is not intended to substantiate accusations against the individuals, who planned and conducted the genocide policy. That is the business of jurists. Our task is to give an objective characterization of the policy implemented in Russia. It is obvious that in order to stop the

course of any disease, the most important thing to do is to identify and remove the causes of the illness, rather than to catch and punish an individual carrier of the infection.

Another important task of this study is to develop the basis for proposals on how to shift to a constructive economic policy for overcoming the crisis tendencies and reviving the nation, a policy oriented toward the people's welfare and the successful economic, scientific and technological development of the country. The basic elements of such a policy are characterized in the concluding section of the book. At the same time, it is only possible to remove the causes of the crisis in Russian society, based on an understanding of the objective nature and the mechanisms of the policy that has been carried out to date, and its long-term effects. Therefore, the book begins with analysis and generalization of facts and exposure of the lines of cause and effect, which have determined the tendencies of Russia's social and economic evolution.

2 Facts

As a result of the social and economic policy carried out from the end of 1991 until August 1998, conditions have been created, which seriously hinder the normal reproduction of the social communities, comprising the great majority of the population of Russia. Statistical data about demographics and the standard of living provide vivid evidence of this.

Since 1992, Russia has experienced a steady tendency of **depopulation**, characterized by a 1.5–1.7-times excess of deaths over births **(Fig. 1).** The birthrate in Russia at the present time is one of the lowest in Europe, and is almost two times below the level necessary for the simple numerical replacement of generations of parents by their children (approximately 123 births per 100 women on average). The mortality situation remains highly inauspicious, with the highest rates in Europe [3].

An overwhelming majority of the jurisdictions of the Russian Federation are losing population. The highest rate of natural population decrease is observed in Central Russia [3]. The total excess of the number of deaths over the number of births in the 1992–1997 period is estimated at 3,890,000 persons [4]. At the same time, Russia's overall demographic losses for those years, as a consequence of the deterioration of the social and economic situation and the destruction of a normal cultural and daily life environment, are estimated at 8 million people, of which approximately 3 million died prematurely and 5 million were not born, due to the sharp decline of childbearing. The rate of annual population loss during the mid-1990s was more than double the rate of loss during the period of Stalinist repression and mass famine in the first half of the 1930s. [5].

According to demographic forecasts, "the population of Russia

FIGURE 1
Overall birth and death rates
(number of people born and deceased per 1,000 population) [3]



will decline by another 8.6 million people, or 6%, during 1998–2015. The rate of decline will be virtually constant for the entire forecast period—an average 0.3% per annum. Numerical reduction of the population will be observed in 68 of the constituent territories of the Russian Federation and in five autonomous areas. Due to negative natural growth and out-migration, the expected population decline in the Taimyr, Chukotka, and Nenets Autonomous Districts ranges from 40% to 34% in the forecast period. In Murmansk, Amur, and Tambov Provinces, it will decline quite significantly, by 15–18%." [3, p. 4]

A long-term forecast of the tendencies of degeneration that have gripped Russia indicates a "half-life" for the nation (i.e., the period within which there occurs a reduction of the country's population by a factor of two) of 60–80 years [5]. Russia now has an extremely constricted population reproduction profile, whereby each generation of newborns is quantitatively smaller than its parents' generation and does not compensate for the population lost. This type of population reproduction pattern is now characteristic of Russia alone, and is quite persistent. In 1996 the net population reproduction rate had fallen to the level of 0.603, which has catastrophic

FIGURE 2
Russian population: average life expectancy at birth
(number of years) [49, 76]



demographic consequences, while for the urban population it was even lower—0.544 [75]. Such a low level of reproduction is unprecedented, and has not been observed before now, neither in our country, nor in others, even during wartime.

The depopulation and degeneration of the nation are especially clearly manifest in the reduction of life expectancy, which fell below 58 years for men and 70.5 years for women during the first years of radical reform **(Fig. 2).** In several regions of the country, the situation is even worse. In some republics and provinces in the Ural, West Siberian, and East Siberian regions, life expectancy today is 49–57 for men, 62–71 for women, and 55–64 for the population as a whole. Russia lags 13–15 years behind economically developed countries in life expectancy, and is at the level of Mongolia, Morocco, and Guatemala [3,77].

It is important to give some qualitative characterization of the process of Russia's degeneration, in order to analyze it. Around one-third of the people who die are of working age. Alongside the reduction of the birthrate, we have an increase in the number of

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION

Article I. The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.

Article II. In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: a) Killing members of the group; b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. . . .

Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, Dec. 9, 1948

SERGEI GLAZYEV ON RUSSIA IN THE 1990s

"The rate of annual population loss has been more than double the rate of loss during the period of Stalinist repression and mass famine in the first half of the 1930s. . . . There has been nothing like this in the thousand-year history of Russia."

Minister of Foreign Economic Relations in Boris Yeltsin's first cabinet, the only member of the Russian government to resign in protest of the abolition of the Parliament and the Constitution in 1993, Doctor of Economics Sergei Glazyev looks at post-Soviet policy in Russia from a unique vantage-point. He is confident that Russia can recover, but only if the "reform" policies of the 1990s are rejected as the instrument of national catastrophe that they have been. Glazyev's book is must reading for an understanding of what went wrong, and what was wrong from the outset, after the Soviet Union broke up.

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