

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON



THE
CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS



AND THE
REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER



**'ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT BOOKS
TO HAVE EMERGED SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR'**

HENRY KISSINGER



Samuel P. Huntington



The
Clash
of
Civilizations
and the
Remaking
of
World Order



PUSTAKA PERDANA



1013883

290070

First published in Great Britain by Simon & Schuster UK Ltd, 1997
This edition first published by The Free Press, 2002
An imprint of Simon & Schuster UK Ltd
A CBS COMPANY

Copyright © Samuel P. Huntington, 1996

This book is copyright under the Berne Convention
No reproduction without permission
® and © 1997 Simon & Schuster Inc. All rights reserved
The Free Press & Design is a registered trademark of
Simon & Schuster Inc

The right of Samuel P Huntington to be identified as
author of this work has been asserted in accordance
with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act, 1988.

2 4 6 8 10 9 7 5 3 1

Simon & Schuster UK Ltd
1st Floor
222 Gray's Inn Road
London WC1X 8HB

www.simonandschuster.co.uk

Simon & Schuster Australia
Sydney

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from
the British Library

ISBN-13: 978-1-4711-6885-7

Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY



PERDANA
LEADERSHIP
FOUNDATION
YAYASAN
KEPIMPINAN
PERDANA

*To Nancy,
who has endured “the clash” with a smile*





Contents

List of Illustrations: Tables, Figures, Maps	11
Preface	13

I. A World of Civilizations

1. The New Era in World Politics	19
INTRODUCTION: FLAGS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY	19
A MULTIPOLAR, MULTICIVILIZATIONAL WORLD	21
OTHER WORLDS?	29
COMPARING WORLDS: REALISM, PARSIMONY, AND PREDICTIONS	36
2. Civilizations in History and Today	40
THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS	40
RELATIONS AMONG CIVILIZATIONS	48
3. A Universal Civilization? Modernization and Westernization	56
UNIVERSAL CIVILIZATION: MEANINGS	56
UNIVERSAL CIVILIZATION: SOURCES	66
THE WEST AND MODERNIZATION	68
RESPONSES TO THE WEST AND MODERNIZATION	72

II. The Shifting Balance of Civilizations

4. The Fading of the West: Power, Culture, and Indigenization	81
WESTERN POWER: DOMINANCE AND DECLINE	81
INDIGENIZATION: THE RESURGENCE OF NON-WESTERN CULTURES	91
<i>LA REVANCHE DE DIEU</i>	95

5. Economics, Demography, and the Challenger Civilizations	102
THE ASIAN AFFIRMATION	103
THE ISLAMIC RESURGENCE	109
CHANGING CHALLENGES	120

III. The Emerging Order of Civilizations

6. The Cultural Reconfiguration of Global Politics	125
GROPING FOR GROUPINGS: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY	125
CULTURE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION	130
THE STRUCTURE OF CIVILIZATIONS	135
TORN COUNTRIES: THE FAILURE OF CIVILIZATION SHIFTING	139
7. Core States, Concentric Circles, and Civilizational Order	155
CIVILIZATIONS AND ORDER	155
BOUNDING THE WEST	157
RUSSIA AND ITS NEAR ABROAD	163
GREATER CHINA AND ITS CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE	168
ISLAM: CONSCIOUSNESS WITHOUT COHESION	174

IV. Clashes of Civilizations

8. The West and the Rest: Intercivilizational Issues	183
WESTERN UNIVERSALISM	183
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION	186
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY	192
IMMIGRATION	198
9. The Global Politics of Civilizations	207
CORE STATE AND FAULT LINE CONFLICTS	207
ISLAM AND THE WEST	209
ASIA, CHINA, AND AMERICA	218
CIVILIZATIONS AND CORE STATES: EMERGING ALIGNMENTS	238
10. From Transition Wars to Fault Line Wars	246
TRANSITION WARS: AFGHANISTAN AND THE GULF	246
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAULT LINE WARS	252

<i>Contents</i>	9
INCIDENCE: ISLAM'S BLOODY BORDERS	254
CAUSES: HISTORY, DEMOGRAPHY, POLITICS	259
11. The Dynamics of Fault Line Wars	266
IDENTITY: THE RISE OF CIVILIZATION CONSCIOUSNESS	266
CIVILIZATION RALLYING: KIN COUNTRIES AND DIASPORAS	272
HALTING FAULT LINE WARS	291

V. The Future of Civilizations

12. The West, Civilizations, and Civilization	301
THE RENEWAL OF THE WEST?	301
THE WEST IN THE WORLD	308
CIVILIZATIONAL WAR AND ORDER	312
THE COMMONALITIES OF CIVILIZATION	318
Notes	323
Index	353





List of Illustrations



Tables

- 2.1. Use of Terms: “Free World” and “the West,” p. 55
- 3.1. Speakers of Major Languages, p. 60
- 3.2. Speakers of Principal Chinese and Western Languages, p. 61
- 3.3. Proportion of World Population Adhering to Major Religious Traditions, p. 65
- 4.1. Territory Under the Political Control of Civilizations, 1900–1993, p. 84
- 4.2. Populations of Countries Belonging to the World’s Major Civilizations, 1993, p. 85
- 4.3. Shares of World Population Under the Political Control of Civilizations, 1900–2025, p. 85
- 4.4. Shares of World Manufacturing Output by Civilization or Country, 1750–1980, p. 86
- 4.5. Civilization Shares of World Gross Economic Product, 1950–1992, p. 87
- 4.6. Civilization Shares of Total World Military Manpower, p. 88
- 5.1. Youth Bulge in Muslim Countries, p. 119
- 8.1. Selected Chinese Arms Transfers, 1980–1991, p. 189
- 8.2. U.S. Population by Race and Ethnicity, p. 205
- 10.1. Ethnopolitical Conflicts, 1993–1994, p. 258
- 10.2. Ethnic Conflicts, 1993, p. 258
- 10.3. Militarism of Muslim and Christian Countries, p. 258
- 10.4. Possible Causes of Muslim Conflict Propensity, p. 263

Figures

- 2.1. Eastern Hemisphere Civilizations, p. 49
- 3.1. Alternative Responses to the Impact of the West, p. 75



- 3.2. Modernization and Cultural Resurgence, p. 76
- 5.1. The Economic Challenge: Asia and the West, p. 104
- 5.2. The Demographic Challenge: Islam, Russia, and the West, p. 118
- 5.3. Muslim Youth Bulge by Region, p. 120
- 9.1. The Global Politics of Civilizations: Emerging Alignments, p. 245
- 10.1. Sri Lanka: Sinhalese and Tamil Youth Bulges, p. 260
- 11.1. The Structure of a Complex Fault Line War, p. 274

Maps

- 1.1. The West and the Rest: 1920, pp. 22–23
- 1.2. The Cold War World: 1960s, pp. 24–25
- 1.3. The World of Civilizations: Post-1990, pp. 26–27
- 7.1. The Eastern Boundary of Western Civilization, p. 159
- 7.2. Ukraine: A Cleft Country, p. 166
- 8.1. The United States in 2020: A Cleft Country? p. 205



Preface



In the summer of 1993 the journal *Foreign Affairs* published an article of mine titled "The Clash of Civilizations?". That article, according to the *Foreign Affairs* editors, stirred up more discussion in three years than any other article they had published since the 1940s. It certainly stirred up more debate in three years than anything else I have written. The responses and comments on it have come from every continent and scores of countries. People were variously impressed, intrigued, outraged, frightened, and perplexed by my argument that the central and most dangerous dimension of the emerging global politics would be conflict between groups from differing civilizations. Whatever else it did, the article struck a nerve in people of every civilization.

Given the interest in, misrepresentation of, and controversy over the article, it seemed desirable for me to explore further the issues it raised. One constructive way of posing a question is to state an hypothesis. The article, which had a generally ignored question mark in its title, was an effort to do that. This book is intended to provide a fuller, deeper, and more thoroughly documented answer to the article's question. I here attempt to elaborate, refine, supplement, and, on occasion, qualify the themes set forth in the article and to develop many ideas and cover many topics not dealt with or touched on only in passing in the article. These include: the concept of civilizations; the question of a universal civilization; the relation between power and culture; the shifting balance of power among civilizations; cultural indigenization in non-Western societies; the political structure of civilizations; conflicts generated by Western universalism, Muslim militancy, and Chinese assertion; balancing and bandwagoning responses to the rise of Chinese power; the causes and dynamics of fault line wars; and the futures of the West and of a world of civilizations. One major theme absent from the article concerns the crucial impact of population growth on instability and the balance of power. A second important theme absent from the article is summarized in the book's title and final sentence: "clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war."

This book is not intended to be a work of social science. It is instead meant to be an interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the Cold War. It aspires to present a framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to scholars and useful to policymakers. The test of its

meaningfulness and usefulness is not whether it accounts for everything that is happening in global politics. Obviously it does not. The test is whether it provides a more meaningful and useful lens through which to view international developments than any alternative paradigm. In addition, no paradigm is eternally valid. While a civilizational approach may be helpful to understanding global politics in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, this does not mean that it would have been equally helpful in the mid-twentieth century or that it will be helpful in the mid-twenty-first century.

The ideas that eventually became the article and this book were first publicly expressed in a Bradley Lecture at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington in October 1992 and then set forth in an Occasional Paper prepared for the Olin Institute's project on "The Changing Security Environment and American National Interests," made possible by the Smith Richardson Foundation. Following publication of the article, I became involved in innumerable seminars and meetings focused on "the clash" with academic, government, business, and other groups across the United States. In addition, I was fortunate to be able to participate in discussions of the article and its thesis in many other countries, including Argentina, Belgium, China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Korea, Japan, Luxembourg, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan. These discussions exposed me to all the major civilizations except Hinduism, and I benefitted immensely from the insights and perspectives of the participants in these discussions. In 1994 and 1995 I taught a seminar at Harvard on the nature of the post-Cold War world, and the always vigorous and at times quite critical comments of the seminar students were an additional stimulus. My work on this book also benefitted greatly from the collegial and supportive environment of Harvard's John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and Center for International Affairs.

The manuscript was read in its entirety by Michael C. Desch, Robert O. Keohane, Fareed Zakaria, and R. Scott Zimmerman, and their comments led to significant improvements in both its substance and organization. Throughout the writing of this book, Scott Zimmerman also provided indispensable research assistance; without his energetic, expert, and devoted help, this book would never have been completed when it was. Our undergraduate assistants, Peter Jun and Christiana Briggs, also pitched in constructively. Grace de Magistris typed early portions of the manuscript, and Carol Edwards with great commitment and superb efficiency redid the manuscript so many times that she must know large portions of it almost by heart. Denise Shannon and Lynn Cox at Georges Borchardt and Robert Asahina, Robert Bender, and Johanna Li at Simon & Schuster have cheerfully and professionally guided the manuscript through the publication process. I am immensely grateful to all these individuals for their help in bringing this book into being. They have made it much better than it would have been otherwise, and the remaining deficiencies are my responsibility.

My work on this book was made possible by the financial support of the John M. Olin Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation. Without their assistance, completion of the book would have been delayed for years, and I greatly appreciate their generous backing of this effort. While other foundations have increasingly focused on domestic issues, Olin and Smith Richardson deserve accolades for maintaining their interest in and support for work on war, peace, and national and international security.

S . P . H .





PERDANA
LEADERSHIP
FOUNDATION
YAYASAN
KEPIMPINAN
PERDAMA

I
•
A
World
of
Civilizations





PERDANA
LEADERSHIP
FOUNDATION
YAYASAN
KEPIMPINAN
PERDAMA

Chapter 1

The New Era in World Politics

INTRODUCTION: FLAGS AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

On January 3, 1992 a meeting of Russian and American scholars took place in the auditorium of a government building in Moscow. Two weeks earlier the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and the Russian Federation had become an independent country. As a result, the statue of Lenin which previously graced the stage of the auditorium had disappeared and instead the flag of the Russian Federation was now displayed on the front wall. The only problem, one American observed, was that the flag had been hung upside down. After this was pointed out to the Russian hosts, they quickly and quietly corrected the error during the first intermission.

The years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in peoples' identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines. Upside-down flags were a sign of the transition, but more and more the flags are flying high and true, and Russians and other peoples are mobilizing and marching behind these and other symbols of their new cultural identities.

On April 18, 1994 two thousand people rallied in Sarajevo waving the flags of Saudi Arabia and Turkey. By flying those banners, instead of U.N., NATO, or American flags, these Sarajevans identified themselves with their fellow Muslims and told the world who were their real and not-so-real friends.

On October 16, 1994 in Los Angeles 70,000 people marched beneath "a sea of Mexican flags" protesting Proposition 187, a referendum measure which would deny many state benefits to illegal immigrants and their children. Why are they "walking down the street with a Mexican flag and demanding that this

country give them a free education?" observers asked. "They should be waving the American flag." Two weeks later more protestors did march down the street carrying an American flag—upside down. These flag displays ensured victory for Proposition 187, which was approved by 59 percent of California voters.

In the post-Cold War world flags count and so do other symbols of cultural identity, including crosses, crescents, and even head coverings, because culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people. People are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies.

One grim *Weltanschauung* for this new era was well expressed by the Venetian nationalist demagogue in Michael Dibdin's novel, *Dead Lagoon*: "There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. These are the old truths we are painfully rediscovering after a century and more of sentimental cant. Those who deny them deny their family, their heritage, their culture, their birthright, their very selves! They will not lightly be forgiven." The unfortunate truth in these old truths cannot be ignored by statesmen and scholars. For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the world's major civilizations.

The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world. The five parts of this book elaborate corollaries to this main proposition.

Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multicivilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.

Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.

Part III: A civilization-based world order is emerging: societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around the lead or core states of their civilization.

Part IV: The West's universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate "kin-country rallying," the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.

Part V: The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not

universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from non-Western societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilizational character of global politics.

A MULTIPOLAR, MULTICIVILIZATIONAL WORLD

In the post-Cold War world, for the first time in history, global politics has become multipolar *and* multicivilizational. During most of human existence, contacts between civilizations were intermittent or nonexistent. Then, with the beginning of the modern era, about A.D. 1500, global politics assumed two dimensions. For over four hundred years, the nation states of the West—Britain, France, Spain, Austria, Prussia, Germany, the United States, and others—constituted a multipolar international system within Western civilization and interacted, competed, and fought wars with each other. At the same time, Western nations also expanded, conquered, colonized, or decisively influenced every other civilization (Map 1.1). During the Cold War global politics became bipolar and the world was divided into three parts. A group of mostly wealthy and democratic societies, led by the United States, was engaged in a pervasive ideological, political, economic, and, at times, military competition with a group of somewhat poorer communist societies associated with and led by the Soviet Union. Much of this conflict occurred in the Third World outside these two camps, composed of countries which often were poor, lacked political stability, were recently independent, and claimed to be nonaligned (Map 1.2).

In the late 1980s the communist world collapsed, and the Cold War international system became history. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural. Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we? And they are answering that question in the traditional way human beings have answered it, by reference to the things that mean most to them. People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations. People use politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.

Nation states remain the principal actors in world affairs. Their behavior is shaped as in the past by the pursuit of power and wealth, but it is also shaped by cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences. The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocs of the Cold War but rather the world's seven or eight major civilizations (Map 1.3). Non-Western societies, particularly in East Asia, are developing their economic wealth and creating the basis for enhanced military power and political influence. As their power and self-confidence increase, non-Western societies increasingly assert their

In 1993 the esteemed journal *Foreign Affairs* published an article entitled 'The Clash of Civilizations?' by Harvard professor Samuel P. Huntington. According to the journal's editors it went on to generate more discussion than anything they had published since the Second World War.

In the article, Huntington posed the question whether conflicts between civilizations would dominate the future of world politics. In this book, he gives the answer, showing not only how clashes between civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace but also how an international order based on civilizations is the best safeguard against war. Since September 11, his thesis has seemed even more prescient and acute. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* is now recognized as a classic study of international relations in an increasingly uncertain world.



'This is one of those rare books ... which will shape times as well as reflect them'

TIMOTHY MO

'The book is dazzling in its scope and grasp of the intricacies of contemporary global politics'

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA

'An intellectual tour de force: bold, imaginative, and provocative. A seminal work that will revolutionize our understanding of international affairs'


ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Cover illustration by
Slatter-Anderson

The Free Press
CURRENT
AFFAIRS/POLITICS
£9.99

www.simonandschuster.co.uk

ISBN 978-1-4711-6885-7



9 781471 168857