

STATEMENT BY THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER REGARDING THE FAILURE OF THE SUMMIT TALKS IN TOKYO, IN THE DEWAN RAKYAT ON 6TH JULY, 1964

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I wish to inform this House on what transpired at the meeting in Tokyo and to explain briefly the reason why that meeting ended the way it did. Sir, I left for Tokyo on 12th June, 1964, followed by the Honourable Prime Minister on the 14th amidst an atmosphere of uncertainty, whether Indonesia would abide by the terms of the Agreement to withdraw their troops, regulars and irregulars, from the Malaysian territory, and consequently, whether there was really going to be a Tripartite Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Heads of Government. Now, at that time discussions among the military liaison teams in Bangkok on the mechanics of the withdrawal did not make any headway, with the Indonesia side making the ridiculous request that not only the order for withdrawal of their troops be secretly given but that the checkpoint should be in Pontianak, a hundred miles within Indonesian territory. This appears, Sir, as if the whole exercise was to effect withdrawal from Indonesia and not from Malaysia. The Malaysian side wanted more checkpoints as it was unrealistic in a territory covering over 1,800 miles for withdrawals to be effected through a few checkpoints and the greater the number of checkpoints, the quicker would be the withdrawal. We also requested these checkpoints be located on the border or within Malaysian territory and undertook to give necessary protection and safe conduct for those guerillas who wanted to withdraw. These proposals were rejected by the Indonesians and at that stage, the Malaysian Government was full of doubts as to the sincerity and good intention of the Indonesians to live up to their commitment in the Agreement. However, out of respect for President Macapagal,<sup>1</sup> who has made a great effort to resolve our differences with Indonesia and who had left for Tokyo, we made the journey to Tokyo.

Honourable Members might recall that Tripartite Ministerial Talks had been held before. The first talks in Bangkok in February 1964 were inconclusive primarily because Dr. Subandrio, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, was unwilling to commit Indonesia to an agreement to withdraw their forces, regular or irregular, out of our territory. It has always been our contention that the presence of these troops in our territory

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<sup>1</sup> President of the Republic of Philippines.

is not a gross violation of our sovereignty and integrity, but amounted to demanding upon us to negotiate under duress. Any self-respecting nation would not tolerate such military pressure.

The second Ministerial Talks were also held in Bangkok in March. The Indonesians stood fast to their oft repeated position that the pace of the withdrawal of their forces was contingent upon the progress of the political settlement. When it was clear that this second round of the ministerial talks would equally prove abortive, Ambassador Lopez of the Philippines initiated a three-point formula — first, to provide for the disengagement and the confinement of the activities of the Indonesian and Malaysian forces in their respective territories, secondly, the commencement at the same time of talks with a view to reaching final political settlement; and, thirdly, the commencement of the meeting of Heads of Government as soon as withdrawal was completed. Malaysia accepted this formula with the provision that there should not be any link between the question of withdrawal and the question of the political settlement. This formula, known as the "Lopez" formula was not acceptable to Indonesia.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I intend today to show to this House that despite subsequent efforts both by President Macapagal and Ambassador Lopez, the Indonesian Government had not abandoned their militant attitude to force us to come to a political settlement and to accede to their political ambition which is to "crush Malaysia". It is also my intention to inform Honourable Members that despite this militant objective of the Indonesian Government, Malaysia will continue to seek peaceful means for the solution of the present differences between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Sir, it was in early May this year that we received a message from President Macapagal proposing a two-point formula:

- (i) That the initial withdrawal of the Indonesian troops from Sabah and Sarawak would take place simultaneously with the beginning of the Summit Talks;
- (ii) That Summit Talks commence with a meeting of Foreign Ministers who will accompany their respective Heads of Government.

President Macapagal informed us that this arrangement would be preferable to holding a separate meeting of Foreign Ministers since the presence of Heads of Government in the same place and at the same time would provide opportunities for instant consultations. It was his earnest conviction the Summit Talks would offer the only practical alternative to facilitate a peaceful solution to Indonesia/Malaysia relations.

President Macapagal's message was followed by a visit by Ambassador Lopez who arrived in Kuala Lumpur from Jakarta on 15th May. He informed the Honourable Prime Minister that President Soekarno was prepared to make a token withdrawal of his troops simultaneously with the start of the meeting of Foreign Ministers. As Honourable Members are aware, this was the beginning of Ambassador Lopez's efforts, shuttling between Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta for about two weeks, putting forward before us, first, Indonesian agreement to a token withdrawal, then agreement to the principle of withdrawal with the verification of the initial withdrawal, and later the verification of only the beginning of the withdrawal. All these, Sir, were merely a play of words without, in the least, affecting the position of Indonesia to use military pressure to achieve a political objective.

The Honourable the Prime Minister explained to Ambassador Lopez that what was important was that Indonesia should make genuine efforts to withdraw her troops from Malaysian territory to show her sincerity and good faith to end aggression and live in peace. There must be acceptance by Indonesia of the prerequisite to any meeting between the parties concerned that there should be the withdrawal of her troops — both regular and irregular — from Sabah and Sarawak and that there should be no further intrusions into these territories. A token or initial withdrawal or the verification of only the beginning of the withdrawal would be insufficient. However, towards the later stage of Ambassador Lopez's efforts, Malaysia was prepared, for the sake of peace, to agree to the venue, date, and even the idea of the Heads of Government being present in Tokyo at the same time when the Foreign Ministers would be meeting. Malaysia was also prepared not to insist on complete withdrawal before the Summit Meeting so long as the Indonesians had shown sincere intentions to withdraw their forces from our territory and had made genuine efforts to do so.

This was conveyed to President Soekarno by Ambassador Lopez and after a series of comings and goings, it was finally agreed as made public on the 30th May — and I quote:

"That there shall be a meeting in Tokyo between President Soekarno President Macapagal and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and these three Heads of Government shall be accompanied by their respective Foreign Ministers;

that there shall be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers before the meeting of the Heads of Government;

that Indonesia accepts the principle of the withdrawal of her forces from Sabah and Sarawak;

that the beginning of the withdrawal shall commence with the meeting of the Foreign Ministers;

that Thailand be asked to undertake the verification of the withdrawal; and

that as soon as the verification has been communicated by the Thai Foreign Minister and the agenda agreed upon, the meeting of the Heads of State will commence".

Now, Sir, this agreement would provide the necessary procedure for all concerned to work for a satisfactory solution if there were goodwill and good intention among the parties concerned. This, however, did not seem to be the Indonesian motive for the announcement that was made in Jakarta contained an additional paragraph which stressed, and I quote:

"President Soekarno had repeatedly emphasised to Ambassador Lopez to convey to Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman that further withdrawal will take place in conformity with the progress of the political talks. Ambassador Lopez confirmed to have conveyed this statement of President Soekarno to Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman".

Sir, this was an excellent example of Indonesian duplicity, which took even Ambassador Lopez by surprise. This additional paragraph brought us back to where we started. The prospect of the proposed summit was again in jeopardy. However, after an exchange of letters between the Permanent Secretary of External Affairs and Ambassador Lopez, it was later clarified to us there was only one official version as issued in Kuala Lumpur and Manila, and this understanding was subsequently confirmed by President Soekarno to President Macapagal. But the question, Mr. Speaker, Sir, whether Indonesia was sincere in carrying out the withdrawal still lingered in our minds.

Honourable Members will remember that the Honourable Prime Minister stated after the announcement of this Agreement that he would be prepared to go to Tokyo only after the question of the mechanics of the withdrawal had been completed. As far as we are concerned the speed and efficiency of the verification of the withdrawal were dependent upon early agreement on this question. The matter had already been discussed with the Thai Foreign Minister at Cameron Highlands and the proposal had been conveyed to President Soekarno by Ambassador Lopez. However, it was obvious during the discussion

by the military liaison officers in Bangkok that there was a wide divergence between the Malaysian and the Indonesian views. While Malaysia requested as many check-points as possible to be located within the Malaysian territory, or on the border, and that the order for the withdrawal of the guerillas be made public, Indonesia insisted only on one check-point in Pontianak, one hundred miles away from the border. The order for withdrawal had also to be secret. To us the question of check-points was one of purely practical consideration, since the greater the number of check-points the quicker would be the withdrawal. To them it was a question of a device to cloak a hidden objective, and the objective was clear. There would be no withdrawal. There would be further acts of aggression and incursions, sabotage, arson and murder. Indeed the two incidents on the 13th June in Second Division of Sarawak were an act of bad faith on the part of Indonesia despite its acceptance of the principle of withdrawal, and an affront to the efforts being made towards holding a Summit Meeting. We were, nevertheless in Tokyo. We were there, Sir, because we remained firm in our commitment in the agreement, despite evidence of bad intention and insincerity on the part of Indonesia.

The day after I arrived in Tokyo and after having the morning discussion with Ambassador Lopez, I personally directed our officials in Bangkok to reduce the number of check-points from thirty-one to five. I regard this as the bare minimum, from practical consideration alone, and if the check-points are too far apart a guerilla who wishes to withdraw may take months to walk to the check-point whereas the border could be only a few miles from his position.

In the meantime, the Thai Government proposed a compromise formula of two pairs of check-points, one in Sarawak and another one in Indonesia, and another in Sabah and the other one on the Indonesian side of the border in Sabah. The Malaysian delegation, again for similar consideration, thought this proposal impracticable.

However, the Prime Minister, earnest in trying to find a solution and also desirous of having the Summit as soon as possible, over-ruled this objection and agreed, after discussion with President Macapagal, to put forward a suggestion to Indonesia.. I quote this agreement we had in Tokyo:

"On the understanding that the Foreign Ministers Meeting will start simultaneously with the beginning of the withdrawal, Indonesia is prepared to begin the withdrawal from an area in Sarawak through one check-point on the Malaysian side, across the border to another check-point on the Indonesian side of the border. Indonesia and Malaysia have

agreed to designate and prepare another check-point for withdrawal from Sabah. Withdrawal generally will require additional check-points which will be a matter for discussion by the Foreign Ministers. Both sides agree that guerillas activities as well as counter operations against these activities will cease along the route related to the check-points where withdrawal takes place".

Sir, we waited for the report of the beginning of the withdrawal from the Thais in order to start the Foreign Ministers meeting. However, due to the time factor and knowing that the Thai observers were already in the field, we further agreed to hold the meeting even before the actual withdrawals had started. We felt that a difference of a few hours from the time of the actual verification of the beginning of the withdrawal did not warrant further delay of the Foreign Ministers Meeting.

The Foreign Ministers met in two sessions on 18th and 19th June. Although Indonesia finally agreed to more check-points, we began to sense their real intention. Dr. Subandrio began to recount his old arguments, which have often heard in Bangkok, that Indonesia was not opposed to Malaysia but was opposed to the formation of Malaysia. He asserted that Indonesia did not violate the sovereignty of Malaysia because Indonesia did not recognize Malaysia. He insisted on the return to the Manila Accord and on treating the question as a whole. The question of withdrawal and the presence of Indonesian forces were not military but political issues. The political issues must be settled first.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I must say the statement by Dr. Subandrio did not come as a surprise to us because we have heard it before. We, nevertheless made our position doubly clear that Malaysia could not negotiate at the point of a gun. Although Malaysia would not insist on a complete withdrawal ascertainment by the Michelmores Mission was not in accordance with the terms of the Manila Agreement. He described Malaysia as a British creation and asserted that Malaysia must be opposed by Indonesia as a consequence. Indonesia, he added, was not interfering in the internal affairs of Malaysia. There was only a conflict between the two countries.

President Soekarno said that he would accept the Afro-Asian Commission, but that in the meantime "confrontation" would continue. Withdrawal of Indonesian guerillas, he said, would be in conformity with the progress of the political settlement.

Our Prime Minister explained at the Meetings that he could not understand the objection of President Soekarno to the formation of Malaysia on the grounds that it was created by the British. He further

explained to the Meetings that Malaysia came into being in the same way as other countries in the Commonwealth through negotiations with the metropolitan power, that is the British Government. The same process had taken place when Malaya became independent in August, 1957. Indonesia did not object to Malaya nor did she object to the presence of the British in North Borneo and Sarawak before the 16th September, 1963. The formation of Malaysia received further authentication of the desire of the peoples concerned from the Secretary-General of the United Nations. President Soekarno failed to adduce evidence that the Secretary-General had not fully implemented the Manila Accord.

Now, Sir, our Malaysian Prime Minister agreed in principle to the Commission as proposed by President Macapagal, because we are prepared to go to any length in search for peace, with the proviso that aggressive acts must first cease before the establishment of this Commission.

It should be noted that there was agreement among the three Heads of Government on only one aspect of the proposed Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission, namely, that there should be a body of persons, who would constitute this Commission. There was no discussion and, therefore, no agreement on either the composition, or the terms of reference of the Commission.

It should be also noted that the Commission, as proposed by President Macapagal, is not a Truce Commission like the one for Kashmir. Malaysia's provisional acceptance of the proposed Commission only presupposes that the body will not be a Truce Commission. The Afro-Asian Commission has been proposed to find ways and means of enabling Indonesia to be reconciled with Malaysia.

Malaysia has no quarrel with Indonesia and by right need no subject herself to this Commission. However, in the interests of peace, we are prepared to agree to this proposal, provided it is clear that Indonesia has a genuine desire and intention to adopt a peaceful policy towards Malaysia.

The imposition of Indonesia's will on Malaysia by means of force and the threat of force cannot be justified under any circumstances and condemnable by the Charter of the United Nations and by the Bandung Declaration of which Indonesia claims to be the champion. The Honourable Prime Minister in his reply to President Soekarno said Malaysia though small would not succumb to any form of military pressure. He was elected by his people for the enorous duty to protect and defend his country. In solemn terms he told President Soekarno that we would

rather be crushed and perish in defence of our rights and our way of life than succumb to any form of military pressure.

We agreed to the proposal of the Conciliation Commission, but since the Commission is a Conciliation Commission with the task of normalising relations between Indonesia and Malaysia, we proposed that all forms of confrontation and aggression should cease before consideration could be given to the appointment of this Commission. The withdrawal of the Indonesian forces, regulars and irregulars, from Malaysia which began with the commencement of the Foreign Ministers meeting and carried out in earnest and with genuine efforts should continue and be concluded within a few weeks. At the conclusion of the withdrawal, the Foreign Ministers should meet to consider the terms of reference, the composition, the operative dates and procedural matters for the Commission. We also proposed that a favourable climate be created to enable the Commission to carry out their task smoothly and effectively by agreeing to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other's country, to uphold the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, to refrain from hostile acts against each other and to take every possible measure to avoid making acrimonious attacks and disparaging references to each other.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, the Summit Conference on which so much hope had been attached by millions of people finally broke down without any agreement. We on our side had done all we could to come to terms with Indonesia and we gave in several times, so that the Prime Minister could come face to face with Soekarno, to try to understand the reasons behind Soekarno's objection to Malaysia.

Throughout the meetings we could not discern the slightest inclination on the part of President Soekarno towards a just and peaceful settlement of Indonesia's differences with Malaysia. On the contrary, President Soekarno clearly displayed his implacable hostility towards the very existence of Malaysia.

As a result of the Tokyo Meeting, we now know, and the world now knows, that despite his protestations that "all human beings have a right to live in peace and happiness", Soekarno's real ambition is to dominate this whole region. As soon as the Indonesians went back to Jakarta from Tokyo, Subandrio came out with a most cynical statement declaring that Indonesia is now no longer bound to its previous commitments and now free to intensify its "crush Malaysia" campaign. So, it is "Crush Malaysia" again! By no stretch of imagination could one believe that those words came from a man who really desires peace.

Sir, we are now back where we were. We have demonstrated in no

uncertain terms our overriding desire for peace with Indonesia consistent with our independence and sovereignty. However, our peace efforts had been spurned by Soekarno and we could not continue giving in to the Indonesians without compromising our own independence and sovereignty. It was obvious that Soekarno would only accept a solution that would end in the dismemberment of Malaysia. Nothing would be dearer to his heart than to see Sabah and Sarawak under his rule. It is, therefore, clear that there will be no end to this exasperating state of affairs, unless there is a change of heart in the Jakarta regime.

The situation in Sabah and Sarawak today may become more serious in view of the massive Indonesian build-up along the border and Indonesia's declarations to intensify their "confrontation". I call upon all Malaysians to give their utmost support to the Government in our efforts to defend this country and would choose this as the best of times to show their loyalty to this country.

We must now be prepared for a protracted war of nerves and we must strengthen ourselves in the belief that democracy, justice, and our way of life, will in the end triumph. That is why Government is taking measures to strengthen our Defence Forces and to increase our vigilance against the enemy's activities. We know there are enemy activities. We know there are enemy agents in our midst carrying out sabotage work and disturbing the peace and harmony of our people. We know also that the enemies are recruiting young people from our country and training them with the intention not only of carrying out subversive activities but also armed struggle against our Government and our people. The Government with the agreement of the various State Governments has decided to establish Vigilance Corps or Pasukan Kawalan throughout the country, so that the ordinary people will have an opportunity to play their full part in guarding their houses and their villages.

The Government also proposes to commence training of persons registered under the "call-up" from 1st August both for military and civil defence. As measures to increase our Defence Forces means increase in defence expenditure, our Prime Minister, who is now on his way to London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, proposes to ask United Kingdom and our friends in the Commonwealth for financial assistance for our defence. The Prime Minister will also be visiting Paris, Ottawa and Washington, and he will have an opportunity of explaining to the leaders of these countries Indonesia's aggression of all countries who desire peace and international understanding, have the responsibility of assisting in deterring Indonesian aggression because, if the present trouble escalates into a major conflict not only Indonesia

and Malaysia and countries in this region will be involved but also many other countries of the world will be involved.

While we have to increase our defence expenditure, we have also to continue with our development programmes, particularly in Sabah and Sarawak. We have to show to the people of these two new territories that Malaysia does not only mean confrontation but better and higher standard of living for them and better amenities of life. It is only by doing this, can we keep our people together and prevent them from being attracted to Indonesia or Communist propaganda.

Sir, before I conclude I would like to take this opportunity in expressing our very deep appreciation and gratitude to the Government of Thailand, in particular to those personnel in the Thai Armed Forces, who were involved in the verification exercises. In the course of the discussions in Bangkok, we found the Thai Government extremely sympathetic and understanding, and it was this attitude of mind that made it possible for the verification of the beginning of the withdrawal, and which in turn made it possible for the Foreign Ministers to start meeting. Their contribution towards peace in this region and their demonstration of friendship towards us will always be remembered.

It is also proper for me to express our grateful thanks to the Japanese Government, who were our hosts when we were in Tokyo and who did very much to provide the proper atmosphere, which was conducive to the possibility of the meeting being held at all. Again, I must mention here that we found that the Japanese Government were full of understanding of the problems which beset us, and it is with a sense of deep appreciation that I would say here that the Japanese Government have found it possible to be hosts to our King and Queen during the Royal Tour of that beautiful land and at the same time to divert a great deal of their attention and resources to the Tripartite Summit Meeting. I think only the Japanese ingenuity could succeed in such a tricky exercise in diplomacy.

Lastly, I would like to express our thanks to President Macapagal for his efforts to bring an end to the present situation, and to restore peace in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Speaker, Sir, after what happened in Tokyo, as I said, we are now back where we were at the beginning of the confrontation. Indonesia now stated that she would intensify her confrontation against us. Therefore, the situation in Sabah and Sarawak and in Malaysia as well as Singapore, may become more serious. We on our part have done everything possible to bring about peace with Indonesia. Indeed, as the House and, I think, the country will agree, we have gone out of our way to

look for peace, but the meetings in Tokyo had proved beyond any doubt that Soekarno does not want peace. Soekarno wants to crush Malaysia. Therefore, Sir, it is the duty of us all to rally round the Government to defend ourselves. The Government has taken all possible measures and will continue to take whatever measures necessary to defend our independence and our integrity that any nation has the right to exist and that no other nation can violate its independence and its integrity. The Indonesian action is a clear downright act of aggression, and I have no doubt that our friends in the free world, and all countries in Asia and Africa, would realize that if this aggression is not stopped, then no small country can feel safe and that the whole principle of the United Nations Charter is violated and the peace not only of this region but of the whole world will be in jeopardy.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, Sir, in this hour of national crisis, on behalf of the Prime Minister and the Government, I ask all of you to stand solidly behind the Government in defence of our independence, our integrity and our honour. Let us show to the enemies that we are determined to resist their acts of hostilities, in whatever form they may appear, to the bitter end. We are now a free and independent nation, and we cannot call ourselves worthy of our country unless we are prepared to defend that freedom and that independence with our lives.