


Islam in Southeast Asia

Political, Social and
Strategic Challenges for
the 21st Century

EDITED BY
K. S. Nathan
Mohammad Hashim Kamali



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ISEAS Series on Islam

Islam in Southeast Asia

Political, Social and
Strategic Challenges for
the 21st Century

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K. S. Nathan
Mohammad Hashim Kamali



INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
S PUSTAKA PERDANA



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CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	ix
INTRODUCTION: Understanding Political Islam Post-September 11 <i>K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali</i>	xi
PART ONE: ISLAMIC DOCTRINE, HISTORY, GROWTH AND INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA	
1 Islamic Thought: Theory, Concepts, and Doctrines in the Context of Southeast Asian Islam <i>Azyumardi Azra</i>	3
2 The History of Islam in Southeast Asia: Some Questions and Debates <i>Johan H. Meuleman</i>	22
3 The Advent and Growth of Islam in the Philippines <i>Carmen A. Abubakar</i>	45
4 Islamic Economic Institutions in Indonesia: A Religio-Political Perspective <i>Bahtiar Effendy</i>	64
5 The Development and Impact of Islamic Economic Institutions: The Malaysian Experience <i>Mohamed Aslam Haneef</i>	82

PART TWO: POLITICS, GOVERNANCE,
CIVIL SOCIETY AND GENDER ISSUES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISLAM

- | | | |
|----|---|-----|
| 6 | Islam Embedded: 'Moderate' Political Islam and Governance in the Malay World
<i>Shamsul A.B.</i> | 103 |
| 7 | Law-Making in the Name of Islam:
Implications for Democratic Governance
<i>Zainah Anwar</i> | 121 |
| 8 | Is It Always Islam versus Civil Society?
<i>Patricia A. Martinez</i> | 135 |
| 9 | Islamization, Civil Society and Religious Minorities in Malaysia
<i>Peter G. Riddell</i> | 162 |
| 10 | Islam and Gender: Reading Equality and Patriarchy
<i>Lily Zakiyah Munir</i> | 191 |

PART THREE: MODERNIZATION, GLOBALIZATION
AND THE 'ISLAMIC STATE' DEBATE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

- | | | |
|----|---|-----|
| 11 | Islam and Modernization
<i>Syed Farid Alatas</i> | 209 |
| 12 | Modernization and the Process of Globalization:
The Muslim Experience and Responses
<i>Abdul Rashid Moten</i> | 231 |
| 13 | The Malaysian Constitution, the Islamic State,
and <i>Hudud</i> Laws
<i>Shad Saleem Faruqi</i> | 256 |
| 14 | The Islamic State: Origins, Definition, and Salient Attributes
<i>Mohammad Hashim Kamali</i> | 278 |



PART FOUR: IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11 ON ISLAMIC
THOUGHT AND PRACTICE

- 15 September 11 and Islamic Militancy in
Post-New Order Indonesia 301
Noorhaidi Hasan
- 16 The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia 325
Bernard Adeney-Risakotta
- CONCLUSION: Addressing the Challenge of Political Islam
in Southeast Asia 347
K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali
- Note on Contributors* 355
- About the Editors* 362

PREFACE

This book is a revised version of the proceedings of the Conference on "Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social, and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century" held at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore on 2–3 September 2002. To the extent possible, all chapters have been revised and updated to include recent developments that highlight the role, relevance and challenges, as well as the political and strategic dimensions of Islam in contemporary Southeast Asia.

In producing this special volume, we wish to express our deep appreciation and gratitude to several individuals whose support, assistance and co-operation have in no small measure contributed to the materialization of this publication. Firstly, the former ISEAS Director, Professor Chia Siow Yue who played a key role in initiating the idea of this seminar, and Mr. K. Kesavapany, the present Director whose enthusiastic commitment has enabled the final stages of editing and publication to proceed without a hitch. Our thanks are also due to the valiant efforts of three Research Associates whose editorial assistance has been crucial to the completion of this project: Ravi A. Menon, Graham Gerard Ong, and S. Thyaga Rajan. In the final stages, Thyaga worked very diligently with both of us in tying up loose ends and in improving the technical quality of the final drafts.

We wish to thank all the contributors for their fine papers and their full co-operation in responding promptly to requests for chapter revisions. We are also grateful to Mrs. Triena Ong, Head of the Publications Unit in ISEAS for providing valuable suggestions and handling production and marketing of this book, Ms Ch'ng Kim See and staff of the ISEAS Library

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K.S. NATHAN

MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI

Singapore

September 2004

INTRODUCTION

Understanding Political Islam Post-September 11

K.S. Nathan and Mohammad Hashim Kamali

The process of globalization has taken us out of isolation and brought us into a truly new phase of human co-existence which, for the present, is unsettled and dangerous. Globalization initially promised to be a vehicle for promotion of human development and democracy addressing issues like freedom and opportunities for progress. However, it seems to have brought greater concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the industrialized West. September 11 further accentuated the negative dimensions of globalization. The U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq heightened the sense of insecurity over the prospects of world peace and people were alerted to the stark reality of the militarist overtones of globalization. Terrorism is heinous and frightening wherever it occurs and when it extends to suicide bombing and becomes an engaging theme of world civilizations, its negative repercussions are bound to overshadow every other aspect of East-West relations, especially relations between the Muslim world and the United States.

The West's relentless drive to fight terrorism with military means has brought espionage activities and intelligence agencies to a new prominence that is reminiscent of similar tendencies following WWI when fifth columnist activities overshadowed the climate of understanding among countries and nations. Mutual suspicion has become dominant and the world has seen, as per Subroto Roy, "a collapse of the global conversation". The crimes of September 11 were ones of political protest, but they were not something inexplicable or *sui generis*. They symbolized a total breakdown of the centuries-old cosmopolitan conversation with Islam. There exists today a fundamental

disconnect in communication between the United States and Muslims around the world. At its root lies the inescapable truth that each side sees the world through a very different prism. That basic misunderstanding brought into sharp relief by September 11 has widened ever since by an increasingly polarized media on both sides. The unilateralist tendencies in U.S. foreign policy, exhibited not just in its relations with Muslims, but also with its allies in Europe and elsewhere often stand in the way of genuine dialogue. This may not be easy to penetrate in the face of the entrenched American self-image of the supremacy of its values and vision, and the expectation therefore that others must accept them and comply.

A great deal of American values may admittedly be said to be shared by others, including the Muslims. This is shown by the fact, even to this day, that the United States has many friends and allies among Muslims countries, some of which may still entertain a positive image and a historical memory of friendship with the United States. That invaluable sentiment has been shaken and in most cases overshadowed by hostile and polarized media, and of course, the United States' unwavering support for Israeli militarist policies in Palestine.

Efforts are being made in the meantime at international forums and conferences, interfaith dialogues and persons of goodwill to open up avenues of communication and draw attention to the more enduring themes of shared values on both sides. The present volume of essays also aims at widening the horizons of understanding between the West and the world of Islam. Notwithstanding the latent dominance of negative trends in East-West relations and the historical obsession on both sides to focus on the differences between them, often at the expense of the much wider scope of their common values, it remains to be said that Islamic and Western civilizations maintain similar perspectives on basic human values such as the sanctity of life, justice, human dignity and freedom.

If one were to characterize aspects of the two cultures, the Arab culture, one might say Islam generally, accentuates human dignity whereas Western culture tends to emphasize liberty. Bedouin culture in the history of the Arabs had a highly developed methodology and nexus of dignity and honour. These dignitarian concepts penetrated the wider culture of the Arabs and had enormous consequences on the gender question and issues of war and peace. Arab culture in turn had considerable influence on the religion of Islam worldwide. In those cases where Muslims are in rebellion against the *status quo*, a substantial cultural reason for the rebellion is perceived collective indignity. This is true, as Ali Mazrui noted in a 2002

article, of rebellions of Muslims in Chechnya, Palestine, Macedonia, Kashmir, Kosovo and even Nigeria.

A clash of cultures did occur when President Bush used, when addressing the Taliban, the language of ultimatum and no negotiation over surrendering Osama bin Laden: “Just hand over Osama bin Laden and his thugs. There is nothing to talk about.” He did not give the Taliban any line of dignified retreat. Admittedly the Western culture also puts a high premium on dignity. The United States even stood up for the dignity of the colonized people of the Muslim world and elsewhere. Even as late as in the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy was emphasizing that “Africa was for the African” — and not for the white settlers or minority governments. Yet the Americans arguably saw their anti-colonialism as a defence basically of liberty, whereas for the Muslims the fight against European colonialism was above all a struggle for collective dignity.

Meanwhile a Jewish state had been created in a region which for a thousand years had been overwhelmingly Muslim. What is more, it was created in ways which violated dignity. There was an ethnic cleansing which displaced thousands of Palestinians to make room for Jews. Someone from the Ukraine who claimed to have had a Jewish ancestor two thousand years ago had a greater right under Israel’s Law of Return than a Palestinian who ran away from within the Israeli borders in 1948. In the face of the new waves of Israeli military actions in 2000–01 against street processions of the Palestinian youth, new Jewish settlements and destruction of Palestinian homes, it was baffling to the Muslims, and one would assume to most people, to hear President Bush’s description of Ariel Sharon as “a man of peace”. The Palestinian issue is basically not a religious issue but the consequence of an unjust situation over occupation of territory.

Ever since its inception in 1969 the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which is a representative forum of fifty-seven Muslim and Muslim majority countries, indeed the largest Muslim forum in existence, had consistently exhibited a pro-U.S. posture and generally aligned itself with its policies during the Cold War years. But the OIC grew critical and took an anti-American stance over the Palestinian issue on basically the following four grounds:

1. The U.S. opposition to giving Palestinians their rights;
2. Its continuous military, economic and political support for Israel;
3. Its use of veto power in the UN Security Council on issues pertaining to Jerusalem and Palestine;

4. Its diplomatic and propaganda campaign against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Moreover, the United States moved to deal with OIC countries outside the framework of the OIC. It acted as a catalyst in getting Egypt, an OIC member country, to recognize Israel and sign a treaty with it. The OIC consequently condemned the United States. The signatory of that treaty, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, was soon assassinated.

Terrorism is not condoned by the vast majority of moderate Muslims who subscribe to the belief that Islam abhors terrorism and it can never be justified in its name. Malaysia's Prime Minister, Abdullah Badawi, who is the current OIC Chairman, was only recently quoted in the media to reiterate what he had said on several occasions:

There were those who claimed that terrorist acts perpetrated by some Muslims were representative of Islam, and others who see the religion as intolerant and promoted violence. This is patently untrue as Islam is a religion of peace. It abhors violence and the unnecessary taking of life. (*The Star*, Kuala Lumpur, 6 August 2004).

The perception also holds among Muslim leaders and intellectuals that radical Islamism advocated by violent methods is misrepresentative of Islam itself. In a post September 11 article, Edward Said pointed out that "the carefully planned and horrendous, pathologically motivated suicide attacks and mass slaughter by a small group of deranged militants has been turned into proof of Huntington's thesis" ("The Clash of Ignorance", *The Nation* (USA), 22 October 2002). Suicide bombing has been condemned by numerous Muslim commentators and political leaders across the Muslim world as criminal acts by a small group of hateful individuals. Terrorism violates the fundamental Islamic norm of the sanctity of life. Suicide bombing intentionally violates innocent life and also violates the religion.

Political Islam in the sense of radical Islamism was in a state of decline in the 1990s in the belief that it failed to offer a viable alternative for a system of government within the Muslim lands and failed also to facilitate resolution of disputed issues. Just as moderate Islam was beginning to emerge at the centre stage, September 11 and its aftermath was a shot in the arm for radical Islamism, and gave a new lease of life to Muslim extremism. It is now obvious that Muslims themselves are the principal victims of terrorism and the world is witness to a vicious circle where extremism on the part of a few is given the unwarranted respectability of dictating the course of the U.S. presidential

election, of world affairs generally, and of robbing the moderate thinkers of their initiative.

In Southeast Asia as elsewhere, since September 11, the concept and phenomenon of “political Islam” has somehow impacted upon our imagination even more than in the pre-9/11 era, as we attempt to come to grips with the political and strategic dimensions of a religious ideology that has global political, social, cultural and security implications. Given Southeast Asia’s generally open societies and economies, the region’s survival, progress and prosperity in the twenty-first century is a matter of concern to all — policymakers, scholars, diplomats, businessmen, media professionals, military strategists, students and researchers of political economy — and even the ordinary man in the street. In the wake of Islamic globalization since the Khomeini Revolution in Iran in the late seventies, the spread of contemporary Islamic influence in Southeast Asia is marked both by a process of active cultural expansion, as well as a reactive process to modernization and secular globalization originating from the West, especially since the end of the Cold War.

For Muslims, Islam apparently furnishes a complete if not comprehensive system in which politics, economy, religion and society are all interwoven into a complex whole. Non-Muslims, however, who have become accustomed to secular political, economic and social processes since independence in the 1940s and 1950s in Southeast Asia, do not quite understand the rationale or significance of this fusion of religion and politics in Islam. It also needs to be mentioned that Muslims equally fail to appreciate the concerns of Non-Muslims when attempts are made by certain sections of Muslims in the current nation-state system in Southeast Asia, to vigorously pursue the path of Islamization without due regard to the political, social, economic, and strategic consequences of such an approach in culturally diverse and pluralistic societies such as ours.

The events following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States attest to the fact that perceptions of Islam and rising Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia require a much deeper analysis of the origins and growth of this religion, its socio-political and ideological character, organizational impulse, and cultural impact on government and society in the region. More importantly, further intellectual inquiry and debate on the strategic impact of global Islam have become more relevant in the light of September 11, as all state actors — big, medium and small — begin to grapple with the pressing need to maintain domestic order and regional stability — and to contain all forms of terror, whether religiously motivated or not — that threaten to

undermine the very fabric of social order and prosperity the region has thus far achieved.

The chapters that follow reflect a sound knowledge and expertise on the part of scholars and activists in the field of doctrinal and political Islam — and its strategic implications for Southeast Asia. Part I outlines Islamic doctrine and traces the history and growth of Islam in Southeast Asia as well as the role and development of Islamic economic institutions in the region. In Part II, politics, governance, civil society and gender issues are examined in the context of Southeast Asian Islam. Part III devotes itself to the impact of modernization and globalization on Muslim society and the ongoing debate about the merits, problems and challenges of establishing an “Islamic State” in the context of the modern international system based on the nation-state structure. Part IV examines and evaluates the impact of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the icons of the American superpower, and attempts to explore the significance of this event and impact if any on Islamic thought and practice. The Conclusion attempts to offer some perspectives on the challenges and prospects for Islamic doctrine and practice in the context of Southeast Asia.

In Chapter 1, Azyumardi Azra expounds on the complexity of Islamic thought in the philosophical, dogmatic, theoretical, and conceptual aspects especially in the context of recent international developments such as the September 11 tragedy. He adds that the complexity is also great in the discussion of Southeast Asian Islam which, in addition to having a lot of affinities with Middle Eastern Islam, possesses a number of distinctive characteristics. He concludes that despite little traces of Shi’ism and the attempts to spread Shi’ism after the Iranian revolution in the 1980s, Southeast Asian Islam remains Sunni. But, again, within the Sunni themselves, there exist groups that have differing if not conflicting religious, intellectual, and political tendencies. This creates not only disunity among Sunni Muslims, but also social and political struggles that characterize the dynamics of the Muslim world, including Southeast Asia.

The history of Islam in Southeast Asia is traced by Johan H. Mueleman in Chapter 2. He argues that any approach that fails to consider a diversity of factors and a variety of successive stages in its history will also misunderstand contemporary Southeast Asian Islam. Mueleman examines the position of the Southeast Asian Muslim community in past and present globalization, Islamic “counter-globalization” and localization processes, and offers an explanation for some contemporary dissimilarities of the situation and characteristics of Islam in the various countries of the region by referring to differing styles of colonization and decolonization.

In Chapter 3, Carmen A. Abu Bakar discusses the spread and growth of Islam in the Philippines. She suggests that trade has been a crucial factor in the advent of Islam to the Philippines, adding that the role of the Sufi movement in consolidating the Muslims into organized communities that served as the bulwark against the onslaught of colonialism in the sixteenth century was equally important. More recently, in the post-9/11 era, she argues that the the Philippine Government's high profile in the anti-terrorist campaign has caused Muslims to suffer, thereby prompting a growing number of people to revert to Islam — a phenomenon known as "*balik Islam*" which is invariably linked to the worldwide Islamic resurgence.

The evolution of Islamic economic institutions in Indonesia is the subject of discussion by Bahtiar Effendy in Chapter 4, while Mohamed Aslam Haneef focuses on similar developments in Malaysia in Chapter 5. Effendy considers the founding of an Islamic bank (Bank Mualamat Indonesia) in 1991 as a historical landmark in the creation of Islamic financial institutions in the country, as the existence of this institution enables Muslims to perform their religious obligation in the field of economy. However, he notes that what constitutes *riba* (usury) is still a debatable subject with no finality or consensus emerging from the *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) scholars themselves — and there is no prospect of such a consensus emerging in the near future. Haneef in his expose categorically argues that the need for development programmes after political independence, and the perceived failures of both the capitalist and socialist models, provided a fresh opportunity for Muslims to seek "indigenous solutions" to their socio-economic problems. Taking a broader view of the region, he maintains that the "Islamization" of modern economics has been the basis of the efforts in Southeast Asia rather than any attempt to impose traditional models and views that may not necessarily be contextually relevant.

Chapters 6–10 engage the reader in several issues of major significance to the practice of contemporary Islam in the context of modernization and globalization. In Chapter 6, Shamsul A.B. suggests that globalization has contributed to "political Islam" being highly profiled internationally leading to the suggestion by Samuel Huntington that it is one of the Eastern civilizations that would challenge Western civilization. In his essay, Shamsul discusses the kind of political Islam that has become embedded in a highly pluralistic Southeast Asian environment, and how it has affected directly and indirectly state formation and governance in the region. However, Zainah Anwar in Chapter 7 prefers to focus specifically on the efforts and attempts of Islamist party, PAS, to impose the *hudud* law in the Malaysian states of Terengganu and Kelantan. Through this case study, she draws out issues and

raises questions on the relationship between religion and politics, and the fundamental challenges posed to democratic governance when Islam is used as a political ideology to mobilize support for political power. She concludes by examining the implications of the politicization of Islam for women's rights, human rights and fundamental liberties when religion is used as a source of laws and public policies.

The course of events in Malaysia tends to confirm the scenario painted by Zainah. In 1993 the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS) introduced the *Shari'a* Criminal Enactment, known as the *Hudud* Bill, following their victory in the 1990 elections. The bill was passed by the State Legislature of Kelantan and even signed by the Sultan, but it remains in abeyance ever since due to its disapproval by the federal government. This is because the bill proposes a range of severe penalties for offences which fall outside the jurisdictional limitations of the *shari'a* courts as stipulated in the Federal Constitution. The *Hudud* Bill has been politicized so much so as to engage the state government of Kelantan and the federal government of Malaysia in a decade-long political controversy. The *hudud* became a topical issue for the media and the years of publicity on it left the juridical aspects of that issue altogether in the background.

The *Hudud* Bill remained a hot issue also in the 1999 elections which in which PAS won further ground and acquired control of a second state, namely Terengganu. The *Hudud* Bill debate acquired fresh prominence as a result and it was no surprise that Terengganu followed the same route as that of Kelantan over this issue. In the March 2004 elections the PAS governments in the two states declared that if they won the elections they would proceed to implement the *hudud* penalties. On this occasion, however, PAS lost ground and lost not only Terengganu but barely managed to retain Kelantan with a narrow majority. This phenomenal election defeat overwhelmed and disillusioned the PAS leaders far beyond expectations. One wonders once again whether it was due to the politicization of *shari'a*. Why should an essentially juridical issue be so politicized as to be included in party election manifestos? Is it possible at all to recall any other criminal legislation, or any proposed enactment for that matter, that has topped the party political agenda the way the *Hudud* Bill did?

One clear message of the 2004 elections in Malaysia is that the vast majority of Muslims in that country do not support radical Islamism, nor even politicization of Islamic issues, the way PAS was able to do during the 1990s. Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi won a landslide electoral mandate due mainly to his moderate approaches to issues of concern to religion and

ethnic relations. Badawi's administration has committed itself to the politics of accommodation and compromise in relations among the religious and ethnic groups of Malaysia. Badawi has advocated not only greater tolerance but adjustment and integration of ethnic and religious groups. He has also spoken of Islam *Hadhari*, or action-oriented progressive Islam that maintains a perspective over the civilizational dimensions of interfaith relations, and the desire to accentuate aspects of Islam that strike common ground with the best values of other civilizations.

Civil society issues in Islam are the subject matter of discussion by both Patricia A. Martinez (Chapter 8) and Peter G. Riddell (Chapter 9). Martinez begins her discussion by raising a very fundamental question: Is it civil society versus Islam, in Malaysia? She notes that many writers have excluded Islamists from definitions of civil society largely on the grounds that Islam and Islamism are part of traditional and primordial formations, and partly on the perceived incompatibility of a religious-based society, sought by Islamism, with pluralist democracy. This latter idea is reinforced by the totalitarian and authoritarian manifestations of many Islamic movements, especially in the Middle East. In the context of contemporary Islam in Malaysia, she attempts to describe the various actors and layers of complexity that are fluid and eemerging quickly in the evolution of Islam, the "Islamic state" claimed by the ruling polity and its political opposition, and the Islamization agendas of both the ruling party and the Islamist opposition. She concludes by exploring whether the conundrum in Malaysia is the Islamists versus civil society dilemma, or whether there are other possibilities and problems that define their engagement. In furtherance of this debate, Peter Riddell outlines in Chapter 9 key elements in the Islamization process in recent years in Malaysia at the state and non-state levels. However, the major focus of his presentation is on the impact of Islamization on religious minorities in Malaysia, especially the Christian community — their perspectives, concerns and responses in the midst of a struggle taking place among Malaysian Muslims to define the future direction of the nation.

The last essay in this section takes an analytical view of gender issues in Islam. In Chapter 10, Lily Zakiyah Munir seeks to understand the age-old debates over the subject of Islam and gender with particular focus on the issues in Islamic family law most affecting women: marriage, sexuality, polygamy, divorce, and inheritance. Her central argument is that the arduous and relentless struggle for the realization of Islam as a women-liberating religion has been exacerbated by the entrenched patriarchy pervasive among most Muslim societies. She elaborates that despite explicit provisions in the

Qur'an that do not prohibit women's rights to participate in politics, business and employment, these issues remain controversial in most Muslim societies. Women's veiling, regardless of its theological debate, has apparently become a social pressure for women in Southeast Asia for the last two decades in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. Shaped by gender-biased socio-cultural backgrounds, Lily Munir concludes that most Muslim societies appear to have fallen into the patriarchal reading and interpretations of religious scriptures thus subduing Islam's basic mission of justice, equality and freedom for all, both men and women. There is no mandate in the Qur'an on the practice of veiling or of any particular dress form. The text instead speaks of the virtue of modesty in the encounter among members of the opposite sex. Radical Islamists have on the other hand chosen to read the relatively open terms of the Qur'anic text in favour of their much stricter puritanical positions.

Chapters 11–14 in Part Three enter into some theoretical discussion and debate on the meaning, context and significance of modernization and globalization for discourses on the need and relevance/irrelevance of establishing an "Islamic state" to best serve the spiritual and material needs of Muslims today. According to Syed Farid Alatas (Chapter 11), modernity refers to the end result of the process of modernization. The traits of modernization include the rationalization of economic and political life, rapid urbanization, industrialization, differentiation in the social structure, greater popular involvement in public affairs, and globalization. Using this broad context, Alatas observes that in Islamic economics, there is still no empirical work on existing economic systems, and the nature, function and effects of interest in these systems in a manner that could be regarded in theoretical and methodological terms as specifically Islamic. On democracy and civil society or *masyarakat madani*, he concludes that thus far, calls for a *masyarakat madani* have been made without a deeper understanding by Muslim scholars of the contextual realities of modern political economy so that there appears to be a disjuncture between proponents of democracy on the one hand and those seeking an Islamic order on the other.

In Chapter 12, Abdul Rashid Moten provides a critical perspective of Muslim experiences and responses to modernization and the process of globalization. He maintains that contrary to widespread belief, most of the principles (such as toleration, plurality, justice, unity) espoused by Islam are in harmony with those inherent in modernization and the processes of globalization. As a general rule civilizations should unite under common values, belief systems and histories. They did not. While America and Europe are obsessed with globalization, Muslims are apprehensive about Francis

Fukuyama's annihilation of history and the triumphalism about the hegemony of Western values, ideas and civilization. From a Muslim point of view, the conduct of foreign relations and the imposition of the so-called "modernization and globalization" agenda by the West have been both Machiavellian and coercive. There exists, throughout the Muslim world, a great sense of grievance and resentment toward the West. Moten then goes on to identify the three Muslim responses: first, the mass response, which is frequently expressed in the form of spontaneous and, at times, violent acts of protest against all forms of radical Westernization and colonial invasion. Second, the theoretical and intellectual response, which recognizes and emphasizes the inextricable ties between Western modernity and Western imperialism. The third response comes from the governing elites in the Muslim world who believe that globalization is inevitable and that there is no conflict between Islam and the values upheld by modernization and globalization, but demand an opportunity to reinterpret and modify the rules of the game "to prevent discrimination and favouritism", and to ensure an equitable distribution of the benefits of globalization. Moten concludes rather emphatically that the three Muslim responses are in essence a rejection of the disruptive nature of Western dominance and the suppression of their own (Muslim) politics and cultures, not actually against modernization and globalization.

In Chapters 13 and 14, Shad Saleem Faruqi and Mohammad Hashim Kamali discuss the problems of conceptualization, definition and interpretation of what constitutes an "Islamic state" in the context of contemporary politics and international relations. Faruqi suggests in Chapter 13 that to a large extent the debate whether Malaysia is an Islamic or secular state is attributable to semantics. The problem is compounded by the fact that there is no ideal or prototype secular or Islamic state that one could hold up as a shining model of one or the other. In the midst of this debate a number of deeply divisive and sensitive issues are coming to the foreground — the right of the state to punish "deviationists"; the branding by some Muslims of other Muslims as *kafirs* (infidels); the constitutional claim of some Muslims to convert to other faiths versus the right of the Islamic state to punish apostates; and the conflict between *shari'a* and civil courts. In this emerging context Faruqi asks: Will the Islamic tide sweep away the existing "mixed" Constitution and replace Malaysia's cherished multi-cultural mosaic with something more "ideal" and "pure" is a question on many lips? He argues that it is unlikely that Islam will have a "walkover" in Malaysia and sweep away everything in its path. Malaysia will remain a plural society. Islam in Malaysia will continue to co-exist with modernity, with Malay

nationalism, with Malay *adat* (custom) and with the dominant American and European culture that shapes the world view and the thinking processes of most Malaysians including Malaysian Muslims.

Mohammad Hashim Kamali sets out in Chapter 14 some of the uncertainties concerning the concept and definition of an Islamic state, a brief history of developments, and a literature review. He then discusses the salient attributes of an Islamic state: whether the Islamic state proposes a limited as opposed to a totalitarian government, whether it can be characterized a civilian state as opposed to theocracy, and whether it would be justified to characterize the Islamic state as a qualified democracy. Finally, Kamali briefly addresses the Islamist demand for the establishment of an Islamic state, and provides some comments on recent developments in Malaysia, including his observation that the Islamic state is more an idea and concept than an institutional form. He concludes objectively that any state that is committed to the principles of equality, justice, basic rights and liberties of the people including religious freedom for non-Muslims to practice their own faith free of interference, supports a civilian, constitutional and representative system that upholds people's welfare and the morality and dogma of Islam — can be regarded as an Islamic state. The disjuncture that Farid Alatas has noted concerning Islamic economics also obtains, according to Kamali, in the existing literature on Islamic state and government. A certain gap thus remains in the writings of Muslim jurists on constitutional law between the theoretical orientations of an Islamic polity and the more developed aspects of the modern nation state.

The impact of September 11 on Islamic thought and practice constitutes the substance of the discussion in the final part, Part IV. Noorhaidi Hasan examines in Chapter 15 the rise of Islamic militancy in Indonesia in the post-9/11 context. He argues that in the aftermath of September 11, the radical Islamist discourse has become increasingly dominant in the public sphere of Indonesia and interlocked with the radical Islamist discourse all over the world — in which Osama bin Laden has become the key point of reference. He concludes that instead of reducing the space for Islamic militancy which has engulfed Indonesia since the collapse of the New Order regime, the September 11 incident and its aftermath has empowered various radical Islamist groups to be more vocal and effective in producing their discourse. In the final chapter (Chapter 16), Bernard Adeney-Risakotta argues that whereas it is always dangerous to generalize about Islam anywhere, let alone in a region as large and diverse as Southeast Asia, it is useful to reflect on commonalities in Muslim responses to September 11, before going on to observe the differences. While Islam is not a monolith, it is striking that

almost all Muslim leaders in Southeast Asia condemned the attack on September 11, including those from Islamic groups considered “radical” and those considered “moderate”. Even more striking is the fact that almost all Muslims, from all parties, also condemned the attack on Afghanistan. Indeed, Muslim responses to September 11 cannot be considered in isolation from the broader contexts of Afghanistan and the Middle East. Thus, he maintains, Muslim definitions of terrorism and differing perceptions about who are the terrorists cannot be ignored. He suggests that the modern nation-state is losing credibility in the eyes of many Muslims, as the sole legitimate wielder of force. September 11 strengthened solidarity among Muslims and weakened nationalism in Southeast Asia. Muslim resistance to Western capitalistic hegemony is not primarily waged on the basis of local, particularistic values, but rather is based on a competing universal ideology. The tragedy of September 11 brought forth conflicting and ambivalent emotions among Southeast Asian Muslims. In fact, Risakotta notes that many viewed Osama Bin Laden as simultaneously a scapegoat, sacrificial victim and heroic martyr. The political impact of September 11 is quite distinct from, although connected to, the emotional response of Muslims. He concludes with some reflections on the political impact of September 11 in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore.

