

W. R. ROFF
THE ORIGINS
OF MALAY
NATIONALISM
PUSTAKA ILMU



The Origins of Malay Nationalism

by

WILLIAM R. ROFF

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PUSTAKA PERDANA



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*To my mother
and for
the children of Kampong Jawa*

Foreword

For decades, the writing of Southeast Asian history was the almost exclusive preserve of a handful of dedicated men, many of them directly or indirectly attached to colonial administrations. It is only in the past two decades or so that it has become more broadly based and also increasingly international. But it is not quantitative and spatial expansion per se, but rather some qualitative changes, that make the recent—to-date still lamentably limited—flowering interesting and at times even exciting. This is not to argue that the contemporary, usually younger, practitioners are better historians than their immediate predecessors—far from it. Few, indeed, can yet match the painstaking thoroughness and enviable brilliance of the best representatives of the older generation, some of them, happily, still in our midst. But the postwar generation, largely stimulated as it has been by the breathtaking rate of change in most Southeast Asian societies no less than by more modern trends in historiography and also the social sciences, has often come to look at new problems or to ask new questions. Wherever their pioneering zeal has been tempered by the historians' time-honored tenets of careful scrutiny of the available evidence and by the observation of scholarly objectivity, we have good reason to be grateful for their efforts.

Dr. Roff, a Scot by birth, with university training in New Zealand and in Australia, and with ample experience in Malaysia (he is currently teaching there), deserves high praise on all these counts. He has addressed himself to the modern history of Malaya with important new questions in mind, and in seeking answers has neither

neglected to sift a great amount of information—written as well as oral—nor hesitated to call to his aid a variety of methodological approaches. His is, in truth, a pioneering work of the highest significance, but he has presented it without a trace of intellectual arrogance, and, let us be thankful, in prose so clear and graceful that to read his book is both an educative and a pleasurable experience.

A pioneering work in Malay history? Yes, for the simple reason that Roff has in fact written the first history of the *Malays* in modern times, strange as this may sound. There are quite a few good, and even some outstanding, books on "British Malaya" (few if any are missing from the footnotes or bibliography in the present volume), some of them for that matter of very recent vintage. Yet practically without exception they deal either with administrative and constitutional developments or else with facets of modern Malaya's economic growth. But preoccupation with these themes has invariably led most historians of Malaya to focus on the foreigners—British, Indian, and Chinese—relegating the Malays to an inconspicuous background. The foreigners, it is true, were responsible for most of the "input" in the past century, providing the scaffolding of modern administration no less than the sinews and the personnel of the modern economy. They thus fully deserved to be studied with care, a task in any case facilitated by the relative wealth of available documentary materials, especially those relating to administrative matters. Granting all this, however, it must be said that the writing of Malayan history has also continued to be overwhelmingly cast in what has come to be called a "Europocentric" mold, a frame of reference that assigns primacy to what the colonial rulers did rather than to the effects of their actions upon their native "wards" and, at least equally important, to the reactions or responses of the indigenous society to the many-faceted colonial impact.

It is this imbalance that the author has set out to redress, to our benefit. I hasten to add that Roff has not written a "pro-Malay," let alone an "anti-British," anticolonial history of modern Malaya. To write "Asian-centric" history does not, much heated recent debate to the contrary, mean to write "Europocentric" history in reverse: it means, rather, to shift one's observation post from, say, British Residents, Chinese tin miners, and Indian rubber tappers (to indulge in clichés for just once) to Malays. Actually our author has abstained from dwelling on theoretical discussions. Rather than arguing the

advantages of "Asian-centric" history, he has gone and written it—and written it well. No one can any longer pretend that there are not enough sources for this kind of historiography; the amazing thing is that so much (albeit with lacunae) could have gone unused for so long, most notably with regard to vernacular newspapers and periodicals. Not that Roff has, in his turn, ignored the foreigners. Wherever they have affected Malay society—and of course they have done this time and again—they are given their due, but always they are seen (as far as possible) through Malay eyes. In short, the Malays have at long last become the prime *dramatis personae* in a scholarly book devoted to the modern history of their country.

More than filling a lacuna, Roff has also written what for want of a better term might be called the first sociological history of modern Malay society. It is not so much social history as an examination of social change in response to a changing environment, the emergence of new social and political elite groups forming the core of his analysis. We are introduced to three such elites, distinguished by social origins and, more importantly, by educational and hence cultural-political orientations. The earliest came from the mostly urban, piously Muslim bourgeoisie in the Straits Settlements. Of Arab or South Indian rather than pure Malay extraction, its members were nonetheless, the founders of modern Malay journalism, using it as the main vehicle for the spread of Islamic Reformism from the end of the nineteenth century on. The second group was the Malay intelligentsia. Reared in vernacular schools, it hailed from peasant rather than urban backgrounds. These young men, too, identified with Islam, but theirs was a "communal" rather than a properly religious identification undergirding an impatient groping for a pan-Malay nationalism with radical, and from the 1930s on increasingly pro-Indonesian, overtones.

For reasons lucidly stated by Dr. Roff, neither of these elites succeeded in gaining an adequate mass following, especially among the bulk of the peninsular Malays who still lived in relative rural seclusion, content with the political and social status quo. Far more promising were the prospects of the third emergent elite, that of the English-schooled scions of the Malay ruling houses. Enjoying the twin advantages of traditional status and charisma and of modern education, this group had several representatives in state administrations but also in the federal Malayan Civil Service toward the end of

the colonial era. On the eve of the Second World War, a Malay nationalism proper, transcending the separate Malay States, had not yet come into being. But the Malay Associations founded by or with the support of the aristocratic elite in the decade preceding the Japanese occupation, though solidly based on and entrenched in the individual states, were to provide both the organizational and ideological framework for the rapid postwar growth of Malay nationalism.

To scholars with a primary interest in the study of modern Indonesian history like myself Dr. Roff presents a compelling and irresistible invitation to compare the development of the two neighboring polities which to all appearances share so much and yet are so different. Indeed, we are often enough in his book reminded of the fact that the political boundaries drawn by Europeans in island Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century did not—and do not—preclude or impede mutual interaction between Malays and Indonesians. Take for instance Islamic Reformism. It received its original impetus from Muslims in the volatile, cosmopolitan setting of Penang and Singapore, yet its proponents failed to win sizable followings in peninsular Malaya, while they succeeded only too well in vitally influencing Islamic life in the adjacent Dutch colony. The contrast is even starker with regard to the feeble beginnings of the radical intelligentsia in Malaya and the turbulent growth, not to speak of the mass support, of its counterpart across the Straits of Malacca. Dr. Roff himself obviously had such a comparison in mind when he wrote that the problem facing the radical Malay intelligentsia in the 1930s was "that of trying to start a fire in damp wood without the benefit either of the match of modern organizational know-how or the burning-glass of charisma."

Two major factors may be singled out to account for these and many other differences. First, the rate of social change was far slower in Malaya than in Indonesia (in Java and parts of Sumatra, at any rate); or rather, where in Indonesia economic modernization directly impinged upon and involved hundreds of thousands of natives, in the Federated States, in particular, Malays were cushioned from its disintegrative effects by the extraordinarily large Indian and Chinese immigrant communities that provided almost the entire industrial and plantation labor force, leaving the indigenous population by and large to such traditional pursuits as rice cultiva-

tion and fishing. This protective social umbrella was, second, reinforced by the colonial power's maintaining and even strengthening of the traditional hierarchical order of things. For sure, in strictly political terms "indirect rule" was here as in so many other colonial domains no more than a polite legal fiction at best thinly disguising the realities of progressive British encroachments on the actual governance of much of "British Malaya." But one only has to think of the almost complete erosion of the Javanese political structure by the Dutch, a process that took some two centuries, to appreciate the significance of the survival of Malaya's monarchical institutions and of her traditional elite after a bare four or five decades of British "protection."

Enough said to show my admiration for this fine book. It augurs well for its author's future and, hopefully, for the growth of Malayan and indeed Southeast Asian historiography.

Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut
January 1967

Harry J. Benda

Preface

The political and economic history of Malaya during its relatively brief period of colonial rule has been given increasing attention by historians during the past two decades. The trading, strategic, and other considerations which led to the establishment of the British on the periphery of the peninsula in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are now well understood, even if the weight to be attached to one or another element in the process is still open to some dispute.¹ The transfer of the Straits Settlements of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca from India Office to Colonial Office control in 1867 and particularly the growth of Singapore in the nineteenth century as the economic focus of two colonial empires have been described in detail in a number of historical monographs.² Particular attention has been devoted in recent years to the motives underlying British intervention in the peninsular states in the 1870s, to the subsequent establishment of the Residential system of administration, and to the extension of

1. Recent studies of this period include Nicholas Tarling, *Piracy and Politics in the Malay World* (Melbourne, 1963) and *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780-1824* (Queensland, 1962); H. J. Marks, "The First Contest for Singapore, 1819-1824," *Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, 28 (The Hague, 1959); K. G. Tregonning, *The British in Malaya—The First Forty Years (1786-1826)* (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1965); and C. D. Cowan, ed., "Early Penang and the Rise of Singapore, 1805-1832," *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (J.M.B.R.A.S.)*, 23, (March 1950), 1-210.

2. See, e.g., Nicholas Tarling, "British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago, 1824-71," *J.M.B.R.A.S.*, 30, 3 (1958), 1-228; L. A. Mills, "British Malaya, 1824-67," *ibid.*, 3 (November 1925), 1-293, edited for reprinting by C. M. Turnbull, *ibid.*, 33, 3 (1960), 1-424; and Wong Lin Ken, "The Trade of Singapore, 1819-69," *ibid.*, 33 (December 1960), 1-315.

British political control to the remaining Malay states after 1900.³ For the present century up to the Second World War, there are a number of studies of British policy and administration in Malaya and of the development of the export economy; though first published several years ago, these studies still speak with authority.⁴ In the field of economics proper, there have been historical studies of the development of the rubber and tin industries and of the activities of Western capital enterprise in Malaya.⁵ Social history, particularly in relation to the separate ethnic groups which comprise Malaya's plural society, has been less well served, but there are historical accounts of both the Chinese and the Indian communities or of certain aspects of their lives.⁶

In all this activity, there has been a marked neglect, with some few exceptions,⁷ of the original possessors of the peninsular states, of the people about whose ears the elaborate superstructure of modern Malaya was built and who in present-day Malaya still hold the reins of political power. No attempt has so far been made to study the effects of British colonial protectorate control and of consequent social, political, and economic change in the peninsula upon the indigenous inhabitants, the Malays. This book has been written in the hope of doing something to remedy this lack, particularly for the central years

3. The principal studies are those of C. N. Parkinson, *British Intervention in Malaya, 1867-77* (Singapore, 1960); C. D. Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya: The Origins of British Political Control* (London, 1961); E. Sadka, "The Residential System in the Protected Malay States, 1874-1895" (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University, 1960, University of Malaya Press, forthcoming); and E. Thio, "British Policy in the Malay Peninsula, 1880-1909" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1956, to be published).

4. See especially R. Emerson, *Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York, 1937; reprinted Kuala Lumpur, 1965); L. A. Mills, *British Rule in Eastern Asia* (London, 1942); and Virginia Thompson, *Postmortem on Malaya* (New York, 1943).

5. See, e.g., P. T. Bauer, *The Rubber Industry* (London, 1948); J. Norman Parmer, *Colonial Labor Policy and Administration: A History of Labor in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya, c. 1910-1941* (New York, 1960); Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914* (Tucson, University of Arizona Press, 1965); G. C. Allen and Audrey G. Donnithorne, *Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya* (London, 1957); and Kathleen M. Stahl, *The Metropolitan Organisation of British Colonial Trade* (London, 1951).

6. V. Purcell, *The Chinese in Malaya* (London, 1941) and *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London, 1951); L. F. Comber, *Chinese Secret Societies in Malaya* (New York, 1959); Usha Mahajani, *The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaya* (Bombay, 1960); and Parmer, *Colonial Labor Policy and Administration*.

7. Notably, J. M. Gullick's excellent study in historical sociology, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya* (London, 1958); Sadka ("The Residential System") gives a detailed analysis of the Malay-British relationship during the early years of the Residential system.

of British rule from 1900 to 1941. Though it has in fact been necessary to go back beyond the earlier of these dates, they were chosen initially as marking a period from the first intrusion of indigenous modernizing forces upon the Malay scene, in the persons of the religious reformists, until the collapse of British rule in the face of the Japanese invasion, beginning for the Malays a time of very rapid and confused change which requires much more detailed study than has been possible here.

No attempt has been made to present a detailed or connected account of British policy and administration in Malaya except where these related to the Malays or to specifically Malay interests, but the contextual background has been filled in when this seemed necessary or desirable. So far as possible, the study has been conceived as an examination of continuities and changes, or incipient changes, within Malay society itself. Many of these changes took place or became evident in response to factors extraneous or marginal to the incidents of British rule. Attention is focused mainly upon the emergence of three new elite groups in Malay society and upon the relationship of these groups with traditional Malay leadership.

Acknowledgments

Writing a book is a bit like what Malays call "*gotong royong*"—cooperative endeavor. The work for this one was done initially with the assistance of a research scholarship from the Australian National University, Canberra, for which I am very grateful. The individuals to whom I am indebted are numerous and cannot all be named. Dr. Emily Sadka introduced me to the study of Malaya and together with Professor J. W. Davidson bore the brunt of my early trials and tribulations. Colleagues and fellow research students in Canberra—especially Professor A. H. Johns, Mr. E. K. Fisk, Dr. John Purcal, and Dr. J. P. S. Uberoi—helped me in a great variety of ways, personal and professional. For helpful criticism and comment on various stages of the draft, I particularly wish to thank Dr. Herbert Feith of the Department of Politics, Monash University; Dr. M. G. Swift of the Department of Anthropology, University of Sydney; Professor J. D. Legge of the Department of History, Monash University; and Professor C. S. Skinner of the Department of Indonesian and Malay Languages, Monash University. I did not always take their good advice. A lasting debt is owed to my wife who, as Miss Margaret Clark of the Department of Indonesian Studies, University of Melbourne, gave me much needed encouragement to persist as well as the benefit of her clear, critical mind.

The libraries of the Australian National University, the Universities of Malaya and Singapore, and Monash University, and the Australian National Library and the National Library of Singapore gave me facilities and assistance which contributed largely to the accomplishment of the research. My thanks are also due to the staffs of the

National Archives, Kuala Lumpur, and of the Museums Department, Federation of Malaya, for their interest and help.

Most importantly—and it is difficult to know how best to express this—I am deeply grateful to countless Malays from all walks of life throughout Malaya and Singapore. Their patient teaching, conversation and hospitality, and unfailing courtesy made possible this study of themselves and their lives. Acknowledgment is made to many individually in the course of the book but I should like to give special thanks to my chief mentor and frequent host, Tuan Haji Abdul Karim b. H. M. Noor, of Kampong Jawa, Klang, whose name may stand, perhaps, for all the others.

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University of Malaya
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William R. Roff

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1

The Malays and the British: Initial Impact

Malay Society in the Mid-Nineteenth Century

The Malays were characteristically a river people occupying the valleys of the waterways, which drain the central ranges on both sides of the peninsula. For the most part they lived in scattered villages along the banks of the main rivers, which were their principal means of communication and the natural focus of political control. The few larger centers of population, notably the Malacca area and the Klang estuary on the west coast and the port town of Kuala Trengganu and the rice plain of the Kelantan delta on the east, did little to detract from the impression of a forest-clad land sparsely and intermittently occupied. The majority of the settled population were peasant farmers engaged in a largely subsistence agricultural economy based on rice—wet rice cultivated in irrigated or flooded fields and, to a much lesser extent, dry rice grown in shifting patches on cleared hill slopes. They fished the rivers, kept some domestic livestock such as buffalo and goats, and supplemented their diet with coconut, tapioca, fruit, and some vegetables grown on house land. On both sides of the peninsula, but especially on the east coast, many made a living from fishing in the sea or estuaries.

Although the Malay economy was basically a subsistence one for the villager, with only a small local exchange of goods and produce, there was always an appreciable amount of petty trade up the lower reaches of the rivers, in the hands of the local nobility, or often "foreign

Malays¹ or Arabs, and later Chinese. Under a system of tribute to their local chief, villagers collected forest produce such as rattan, bamboo, gutta-percha, and resin which were traded for imported textiles, Javanese tobacco, salt, and iron tools. In addition, there was a valuable export trade in tin from several of the states and a much smaller one in gold, the two products for which Malaya was widely known beyond her shores.² With the influx of Chinese miners and entrepreneurs in the middle years of the century, tin acquired an enhanced importance. This led to the introduction of radical elements of imbalance in Malay political life as factional struggles took place between and within the communities for the possession and control of tin-bearing areas.³

The largest territorial unit of political importance in peninsular Malaya was the independent state, in each case ruled over by an hereditary monarch described by the Malay title *yang di-pertuan* (he who is made lord) or by the Hindu generic term for ruler, *raja*.⁴ The personal honorific of *sultan*, known in the Malay states since the coming of Islam, was not widely used in the nineteenth century though it achieved general currency thereafter. The ruler was supported by a number of territorial chiefs, holding areas of the state in which, for the most part, they lived; they in turn had minor chiefs and village headmen at their command for purposes of administration, revenue collection, and raising manpower for war or joint labor projects. The role of *yang di-pertuan* was first and foremost to express the symbolic unity of the State and to protect its order and integrity. Embodying in his person both *daulat*, the mystical reinforcement of personality conferred by kingship, and *kuasa*, supreme temporal authority, he was invested with an aura of sanctity and the supernatural that found outward form in an elaborate apparatus of ceremonial practice and

1. In the west coast states, these were mainly Buginese and certain Sumatrans. The term might be used of anyone from another state, but more commonly of ethnic Malays from outside the peninsula.

2. For an account of these products in Malaya prior to the nineteenth century, see Paul Wheatley's historical geography of the peninsula, *The Golden Kbersonese* (London, 1962), pp. xxi-xxiv and passim.

3. See, e.g., E. Sadka, "The Residential System in the Protected Malay States" (Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University, 1960, University of Malaya Press, forthcoming), pp. 30-58.

4. In the discussion of Malay political organization that follows, I am much indebted to J. M. Gullick's pioneering study in the historical sociology of Malaya, *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya* (London, 1958).

belief, nonetheless important even if it frequently represented no corresponding concentration of administrative strength or real power.

Accounts of the installation of rulers⁵ make clear the sacred and magical importance of the office. Succession was confined to male members of a single royal line, with final selection and confirmation by the chiefs from among the available candidates. A ruler's ascent to the throne was marked first by ritual lustration, signifying exaltation from the ranks of his kinsmen and the creation of a new and larger personality. The secret formula of state, "*surat chiri*," was communicated to him privily, and he was equipped with the insignia of office, the royal regalia, ranging from symbolic weapons, drums, and special dress to the state seal and ritual ornaments, all held to share in the supernatural qualities of kingship. A senior official of the court mosque uttered the Kuranic text, "Lo, We have set thee as a Viceroy upon the Earth,"⁸ to mark the ruler's function as defender and arbiter of the Islamic faith. And finally, the assembled chiefs performed before him a symbolic act of homage, repeated at intervals throughout his reign at gatherings specially convened for this purpose.⁷ The accepted norm of conduct toward the ruler was characterized by careful respect for the proper forms of address and approach and by strict formal obedience to his commands (*titah*). Outside his ritual and symbolic roles, his most important functions for the state as a whole were those concerning external relations and defense. In these matters it was the raja or sultan who represented his people, although even here decisions in important affairs required the presence of and a consensus of agreement from the senior chiefs.

The exercise of authority by the ruler beyond his own royal district was limited by the extent to which he could in fact control and command his territorial chiefs. This situation was much exacerbated in the western states in the mid-century as varying incomes from the richer tin-bearing areas gave some chiefs a disproportionate source of economic power.

Malay society was divided into two main social groups, a ruling

5. See, e.g., R. O. Winstedt, "Kingship and Enthronement in Malaya," *J.M.B.R.A.S.*, 20 (June 1947), 129-39; and R. J. Wilkinson, "Some Malay Studies," *ibid.*, 10 (January 1932), 788o.

6. Wilkinson, "Some Malay Studies," p. 79. This passage occurs in *Surah* 38, Verse 7, of the Kuran.

7. The ambivalent nature of these gatherings is discussed in Gullick, *Indigenous Political Systems*, p. 66.

class and a subject class. The distinction between them was based on birth and clearly demarcated by custom and belief. In addition to those of royal descent, both the *waris negeri* (state heirs) and the remaining members of the line too remote to aspire to the throne, the Malay aristocracy consisted of a large number of those whose claim to privilege lay in belonging to families which had a customary right to various chiefly offices. These offices, appointment to which was authorized or validated by the ruler, were ranked in complex orders of seniority, based on a system held to have been in use at the time of the Malacca sultanate in the fifteenth century but now serving primarily as a means of defining and determining relative position and influence within the traditional elite. As with the office of ruler itself, chiefly titles had their own appurtenances and symbols of rank, respected and jealously guarded as an expression of the virtue inherent in the office and shared by the holder and his kin.⁸ The concept of differential status and concern for its expression were of abiding interest to the traditional elite, with a correspondingly exclusive attitude toward those not privileged to belong to it. It was rare for a man to cross the barrier from the subject class, particularly in his own state where his origins and background were known. Marriage outside one's class was also exceptional, though marrying children into advantageously positioned families was a well-established means within the ruling class itself of indulging a constant preoccupation with rank and influence.

The main advantage of the rank of chief, apart from the values inherent in the prestige it bestowed, lay in the right it gave the holder and his kin to a share in the economic resources of the state in the form of taxation and toll, monopolies and concessions, produce, and labor or followers. Although the actual workings of the Malay political system varied somewhat in detail from state to state, and within states from time to time, it was seldom characterized by any form of centralized authority in the middle of the nineteenth century. The district chief was the key to political organization, holding under *tauliah* (commission) from the sultan an area of the state, usually based on a stretch of river, in which he exercised direct personal con-

8. "All rank and dignity is thought to be served by unseen forces that punish insults to lawful authority": Wilkinson, "Some Malay Studies," p. 80. In the same writer's *Malay-English Dictionary* (2d ed. Mytilene, 1932), the listing "*daulat*" gives descriptive names for these forces and their possessors as follows: *daulat*, ruler; *andeka*, major chief; *tuab*, village headman; *berkat*, saint; and others. Though this list is literary rather than historical, it makes the essential point.

trol. Because the non-subsistence sector of the economy was based on river-borne trade, a chief usually found it advantageous to live in the principal village of his district at a strategic point on the river, a situation that enabled him to exact toll on the traffic and to defend his district.

The basis and emblem of authority was manpower, so that much depended on the ability of a chief to gather and retain a following both from among his own kinsmen and from the peasants. A typical chief's household consisted of dependent kin performing the necessary tasks of administering his lands and acting as secretaries or accountants and tax gatherers; of mercenaries and free volunteers who provided a permanent, if often idle, armed force; and of debt-bondsmen and slaves who filled a great variety of service roles from those of household domestics and concubines for the chief and his followers to boatmen and gardeners. Though the district chief's household was not in absolute terms particularly large,⁹ it was sizable in relation to most Malay agricultural communities. Being almost entirely nonproductive, it relied heavily on the peasantry for its maintenance. To supplement the agricultural labor supplied by the chief's and his kinsmen's debt-bondsmen, use was made of the institution of *kerah* or corvee under which the inhabitants of all the villages in the district were obliged to contribute labor for working the fields, for collecting forest products, and for other public or private work from clearing paths to erecting buildings.

In the absence of adequate communications or of any form of centralized administration, only a sultan possessing personal authority beyond the ordinary could expect to be, in effect, more than *primus inter pares*, a district chief among district chiefs. It is true that the usual situation of the royal capital at the mouth of the state's principal river, and therefore at the most advantageous of all taxation points, gave him some economic advantage,¹⁰ as did to some extent the system of tribute from district chiefs in return for their benefices. But, proportionate to their power, chiefs commonly retained a great deal

9. Sadka, "The Residential System," p. 20, gives a figure of about fifty followers for a normal size household.

10. An interesting example of a ruler moving court and capital to take advantage of a shift in trade is provided by Sultan Ahmad of Kedah who in 1804 left the old capital of Alor Star for a new site at the mouth of the Muda River in South Kedah in response to the rapid increase of the Kroh tin trade after the opening of Penang. See Mohd. Radzi b. Puteh, "Kota Kuala Muda," *Malayan Historical Journal*, 3 (July 1956), 30.

The slow growth of communal, ethnic, and national feeling among the peninsular Malays during the first four decades of this century, and the expression of this feeling in voluntary associations of a potentially nationalist nature are the subjects of Dr. Roff's study. The author points to three new Malay elite groups as offering an implicit challenge to the traditional *raja* elite in the interests of a distinctly Malay nationalism. Within the context of the continuing presence of British political rule and the resulting rapid economic and social development of the peninsular states outside the Malay peasant sector, the author focuses on the three new leadership groups, describing and analyzing their relationship with the traditional elite and with the general peasant population. Research into a variety of Malay-language publications, long periods of residence by the author in Malay households, and interviews with people who participated in the events described form the basis for Dr. Roff's study.

A major contribution to the historiography of modern Malaya.
—John Bacon, University of London, Yale Southeast Asia Studies, 2

Dr. Roff is lecturer at the University of Malaya.

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